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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28 June 1995, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the appellants’ writ petition “in terms of the minutes of order” tendered by counsel for both sides. The appellants later contended that the first clause of those minutes incorrectly stated that certain cited judgments governed their case. They therefore filed a review petition. The High Court dismissed the review on the ground that the original dismissal was a consent order and was thus not open to review. The appellants sought special leave to appeal; notice was served on the respondents, who did not appear before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition “in terms of the minutes of order” constituted a consent order, thereby rendering a review petition non-maintainable.
  2. Consequently, whether the High Court erred in rejecting the appellants’ review petition as not maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The statement in the first clause of the minutes—asserting that two prior judgments governed the matter—was incorrect because those judgments were inapplicable to their case.
  • Given that the original order was not genuinely by consent, a review petition was maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had misconstrued the nature of the 28 June 1995 order:

  • When counsel put in writing that certain judgments “covered the matter,” the court could have simply recorded this orally; the written “minutes of order” were provided as a courtesy to the court.
  • Signatures of counsel on such minutes serve only for identification and do not convert the resulting judicial order into a consent decree.
  • An “order in terms of minutes” is coercive (in invitum) and therefore subject to appeal or review.
  • Only when an order explicitly states it is made “by consent” or “in terms of consent terms” does it become a true consent order that is immune from review.
  • Because the High Court treated the dismissal as a consent order when it was not, its refusal to entertain the review petition was legally unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s order dismissing the review petition is set aside, and the review petition is restored for fresh consideration on the merits. The condonation of delay in filing the review petition remains unaffected, and there is no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies that an order passed “in terms of minutes” is not a consent order unless it explicitly states it is “by consent.” Such orders remain open to appeal and review, thereby safeguarding litigants from being wrongly foreclosed from further remedies.

    Speed Ways Picture Pvt. Ltd. And Another v. Union Of India And Another

    Order

    1. Special leave granted.

    2. On 28-6-1995 a Division Bench of the High Court at Bombay passed an order dismissing the appellants' writ petition in terms of the “minutes of order” tendered by counsel for the parties. It is the appellants' case that the statement made in the first clause of the “minutes of order” was not correct in that the judgments mentioned therein were inapplicable to the facts of their case. Accordingly, the appellants filed a review petition. Upon the review petition the order under challenge was passed.

    3. The order under challenge states that the order dated 28-6-1995 “was passed on the basis of the consent of the parties, which was recorded in the minutes of the order duly signed by the senior counsel for the parties”. The review petition was, therefore, not maintainable.

    4. The notice on the SLP stated that the matter might be disposed of at the SLP stage itself. The notice has been served, but the respondents have not put in an appearance.

    5. The basis upon which the review petition was decided is, in our view, not correct. Counsel for the appellants and the respondents put it in writing that a judgment of this Court and a Full Bench judgment of the High Court covered the matter. The writ petition in that High Court could, therefore, not succeed. This could have been orally stated and recorded by the Court. As a courtesy to the Court, the practice of long standing is to put statements such as these in writing in the form of “minutes of order” which are tendered and on the basis of which the Court passes the order: “Order in terms of minutes”. The signatures of counsel upon “minutes of order” are intended for identification so as to make the order binding upon the parties' counsel represented. An order in terms of minutes is an order in invitum, not a consent order. It is appealable and may be reviewed.

    6. It would be a different matter if the order of the court was passed on “Consent Terms”, i.e, on a statement above the signatures of counsel which expressly stated it was “by consent”. The order of the court in such event would read: “Order in terms of consent terms”.

    7. The order under challenge, made on the basis that the order dated 28-6-1995 dismissing the writ petition was a consent order must, therefore, be set aside and the review petition remanded to the High Court to be considered afresh on merits. We express no view whatsoever on the merits of the review petition.

    8. The appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside and the review petition is restored to the file of the High Court to be heard afresh on merits. It is made clear that the condonation of delay in filing the review petition is not affected by this order.

    9. No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Speed Ways Picture Pvt. Ltd. And Another v. Union Of India And Another
    (Oct 23, 1996)