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Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.D. Koshal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Before the reorganisation of Punjab under the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, a Panchayat Samiti existed for Majri Block (in Tehsil Kharar), constituted under the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961 ("the Samitis Act"). Two petitioners were elected members of that Samiti in 1955 under the statutory provision cited in the opinion.

After the 1966 Act, the Majri Block included areas falling into the newly created Union Territory of Chandigarh (notably the village Maloa), making the Samiti an inter-State corporation. By G.S.R. 1785 dated 20 November 1967, the Central Government amended the schedule to the Inter-State Corporations Act, 1957 ("the Corporations Act") to include the Samitis Act. Acting under section 4 of the Corporations Act, the Central Government promulgated an Order (Punjab Zila Parishads, Panchayat Samitis and Gram Sabhas (Re-constitution and Re-organisation) Order, 1969) which dissolved all Panchayat Samitis functioning as inter-State corporations with effect from 1 September 1969.

On 16 December 1969 the Punjab Government (under clause 4 of the Order) reconstituted the Majri Panchayat Samiti by nominating 25 members; only 11 of these had been members before dissolution and the two petitioners were not among them. The petitioners challenged the dissolution and reconstitution by filing this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. At hearing, three grounds were advanced on behalf of the petitioners (summarised below).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Government's Order (under the Corporations Act) dissolving and reconstituting inter‑State Panchayat Samitis was ultra vires because Section 2 of the Corporations Act, as originally enacted, limited "Inter‑State Corporation" to bodies functioning on 1 November 1956 (when the States Re-organisation Act came into force), and so could not apply to bodies becoming inter‑State corporations later.
  2. Whether the dissolution and reconstitution of the Majri Panchayat Samiti were mala fide — undertaken for political reasons and favouring a particular group — such that the action should be set aside.
  3. Whether the reconstitution violated Article 14 of the Constitution by being discriminatory in comparison with the procedure adopted for Kharar Panchayat Samiti (i.e., whether the State government applied inconsistent criteria and thereby discriminated against members associated with a rival group).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • First ground: The petitioners contended that Section 2 of the Corporations Act, as originally enacted, defined "Inter-State Corporation" by reference to section 109 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, and thereby limited the Act's reach to corporations functioning on 1 November 1956. The Order (dissolving and reconstituting Samitis) therefore exceeded the Corporations Act's scope and was ultra vires.
  • Second ground: Petitioners alleged mala fide conduct by the State Government in reconstituting the Majri Panchayat Samiti — that nominations were politically motivated to favour supporters of a particular MLA (Shri Surjit Singh) over supporters of a rival MLA (Shri Raja Singh).
  • Third ground: Petitioners argued that the reconstitution infringed Article 14 because the State applied a different criterion in Majri than it did in Kharar (where only the member from the area falling in Chandigarh was excluded). In Majri, petitioners claimed that instead of merely excluding the Maloa member, the State brought in fourteen new members favourable to another political group, thereby discriminating against former members.
  • During argument, Mr. Bindra (for the petitioners) conceded that Section 2 of the Corporations Act had been amended but sought to construe that amendment narrowly as applicable only to the Bombay Reorganisation Act; he also ultimately abandoned the mala fides ground at the hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, 1955 2 S.C.R 925 Observation that a discretionary power vested in government is not necessarily discriminatory and that abuse of power should not be lightly assumed where discretion rests with the government. The Court relied on this observation to support the presumption that the State Government would properly exercise clause 4 powers under the Order and therefore to reject an assumption of mala fides in the exercise of nomination powers.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538 The opinion of Matajog Dobey (quoted above) was quoted with approval in this case (i.e., endorsement of the caution against assuming abuse of discretionary power vested in high executive authorities). The Court noted the approval in Ram Krishna Dalmia to reinforce the presumption against easy assumptions of abuse of power where high authorities exercise discretion.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, 1957 S.C.R 233 Bhagwati, J.'s statement that discretionary power vested in top-ranking authorities is not necessarily discriminatory and that abuse of power cannot be easily assumed; presumption that public officials will discharge duties honestly and according to law. The Court cited this passage to bolster the presumption that the State Government would discharge nomination powers honestly and to reject the petitioners' mala fides allegation (which was in any event abandoned).
Ch. Bishan Dass v. The Governor of the Punjab, I.L.R. 1969 2 Pb. & Har. 413 Authority upholding the constitutionality of a statutory provision (sub‑section (3‑A) of section 26 of the Punjab Co‑operative Societies Act, 1961) that allowed a high state official (the Registrar) to nominate members in certain circumstances; the court refused to treat the power as constitutionally invalid merely because no guiding principles were specified for nominations. The Court found the power conferred on the State Government by clause 4 of the Order analogous to the power upheld in Ch. Bishan Dass. It used that analogy to conclude that the State Government need not follow a particular formula in nominations and that the absence of specified criteria does not invalidate the exercise of the power.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each of the petitioners' grounds in sequence.

  1. First ground (scope of "Inter‑State Corporation" and vires of the Order):
    • The court observed that Section 2 of the Corporations Act had been amended by section 75 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act (1960) so that the definition of "Inter‑State Corporation" expressly included bodies functioning by virtue of "section 109 of the States Re‑organisation Act, 1956 or of any other enactment relating to reorganisation of States."
    • Given the explicit language of that amendment ("any other enactment"), the court rejected the petitioners' contention that the amendment should be read narrowly as referring only to the Bombay Act. The court held that if the legislature had intended a narrow reading it would have used different language (e.g., naming the Bombay Act specifically), and therefore the first ground failed.
  2. Second ground (alleged mala fides / political motivation):
    • At the hearing, counsel for the petitioners (Mr. Bindra) abandoned the mala fides allegation when it was pointed out that he had not identified the names of members said to belong to the rival group. The court therefore held that no case of mala fides had been established and the Government's action could not be struck down on that basis.
    • The court reinforced this conclusion by reference to established authorities warning against readily assuming abuse of discretionary powers vested in high executive authorities.
  3. Third ground (Article 14 / alleged discrimination):
    • The court examined the Order, reproducing the relevant text of clause 3 (which dissolves existing Panchayats and provides for constitution of new bodies by specified authorities) and clause 4 (which authorises the authority that constitutes a body to appoint administrators or nominate persons to exercise functions until elections are held).
    • The court noted that the State Government was the authority empowered under the First Schedule to constitute the Majri Panchayat Samiti and therefore the same authority was competent to exercise powers under clause 4.
    • Relying on the presumption that a State Government (as the highest executive body in the State) will properly exercise its discretion, and on the cited precedents (which caution against assuming abuse of discretionary power where vested in high authorities), the court held that the State Government had unfettered discretion to select nominees under clause 4. No person had a right to be nominated; suitability was for the Government alone to decide, and nothing in clause 4 required the Government to consider claims of ex‑members.
    • The court drew an explicit analogy to Ch. Bishan Dass (which upheld an analogous power of nomination vested in the Registrar in the cooperative society context) and accepted that the absence of prescribed criteria did not render the power invalid or require the Government to follow one particular mode in all cases. Consequently, the court rejected the Article 14 challenge based on alleged discrimination compared to the Kharar Samiti reconstitution.

Having rejected all three grounds (the second having been abandoned), the court concluded that the petition must fail.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

The court dismissed the petition and made no orders as to costs. The direct consequence is that the dissolution of the Majri Panchayat Samiti (by the Central Government Order) and its reconstitution (by the State Government under clause 4 of that Order) stand. The court explicitly found:

  • That the Corporations Act, as amended by section 75 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, validly extended the Act's scope to bodies made inter‑State corporations by any enactment relating to reorganisation of States; therefore the Order was not ultra vires on that ground.
  • That no mala fide conduct was established (the mala fides allegation was abandoned at hearing).
  • That the State Government's discretion to nominate temporary members under clause 4 was lawful and analogous to powers upheld in prior cases; no right to nomination or requirement to follow identical criteria in all reconstitutions was recognized, so no Article 14 violation was made out in the circumstances alleged.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any novel legal principle; it applies existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts and results in dismissal of the petition without creating a new precedent beyond the application of the cited principles.

    Karam Singh And Another v. Union Of India And Others

    A.D Koshal, J.:— This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has arisen in the following circumstances. Before the reorganisation of the State of Punjab by the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 1966 Act), there existed in Tehsil Kharar a Panchayat Samiti for a Block known as the Majri Block. That Samiti had been constituted under the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Samitis Act and the twi petitioners, along with 22 others, were members thereof, having been so elected in the year 1955 from amongst the Panches and Sarpanches concerned under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Samitis Act. Majri Block then consisted of 83 Gram Sabha areas including village Maloa which after the passing of the 1966 Act fell within the Union Territory of Chandigarh, so that the Samiti, a corporate body, became an inter-State corporation.

    2. By virtue of notification No. G.S.R 1785, dated the 20th of November, 1967, the Central Government amended the schedule appended to the inter-State Corporations Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Act) so that the Samitis Act was included therein as item No. 7. Purporting to act in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Corporations Act, the Central Government promulgated the Punjab Zila Parishads, Panchayat Samitis and Gram Sabhas (Re-constitution and Re-organisation) Under 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the order) by clause 3 of which all Panchnyat Samitis (including that for Majri Block) which were heretofore functioning as inter-State corporations were dissolved with effect from the 1st of September, 1969, the date on which the Order came into force. About 3 ½ months later, i.e on the 16th of December, 1969, the Punjab Government, acting in exercise of the powers conferred on it by clause 4 of the Order, re-constituted the Majri Panchayat Samiti nominating to it 25 members, only 11 of whom (not including the two petitioners) were members of the Samiti before its dissolution on the 1st of September, 1969. The dissolution and reconstitution of the Samiti were challenged in the petition on various grounds, only the following three of which have been put forward on behalf of the petitioners at the hearing before me:

    (1) Action under the Corporations Act can be taken not with regard to all inter-State corporations but only such of them as fall within the ambit of the definition of the term “Inter-State Corporation” given in Section 2 of the Corporations Act which, as originally enacted, ran thus:

    “In this Act, ‘Inter-State Corporation’ means any body corporate constituted under any of the Acts specified in the schedule and functioning in two or more States by virtue of section 109 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956.”

    3. The definition is limited to inter-State corporations which were functioning on the 1st of November, 1956, when the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, came into force and not to any corporate bodies which came into existence later. The Order, therefore, is ultra vires of the Corporations Act.

    (2) Shri Parkash Singh Badal, who was at the relevant time functioning as the Development and Panchayats Minister in Punjab, is a brother-in-law of Shri Surjit Singh, an M.L.A belonging to the Akali Party, who patronised one group of members of the Majri Panchayat Samiti while a rival group is led by Shri Raja Singh, M.L.A The eleven members of the dissolved Samiti who were nominated to the re-constituted Samiti are supporters of Shri Surjit Singh above mentioned. A majority of the members belonging to the group of Shri Raja Singh were not nominated to the reconstituted Samiti and instead fourteen new members, all belonging to the group of Shri Surjit Singh above mentioned, were brought on the reconstituted Samiti. The dissolution and reconstitution of the Samiti were brought about mala fide and for political considerations in order to help Shri Snrjit Singn, Akali M.L.A

    (3) The reconstitution of the Majri Panchayat Samiti is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it was brought about in an arbitrary manner wholly different from that adopted in the case of Kharar Panchayat Samiti. In regard to the latter all that was done was that the member elected from the area which fell within the Union Territory of Chandigarh as a result of the 1966 Act was excluded from the reconstituted Samiti which was comprised of all the other members of the dissolved Samiti. The same criterion should have been followed in the case of Majri Panchayat Samiti by excluding the member elected from Maloa village and reconstituting the Samiti with the other twenty-three members. The action taken by the State Government in reconstituting the Majri Panchayat Samiti is discriminatory.

    4. There is no substance in the first ground. Section 2 of the Corporations Act was amended by section 75 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act) passed by Parliament in 1960, to read as under:—

    “In this Act, ‘Inter-State Corporation’ means any body corporate constituted under any of the Acts specified in the schedule and functioning in two or more States by virtue of section 109 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 or of any other enactment relating to reorganisation of States.”

    5. Mr. Bindra, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, concedes that Section 2 of the Corporations Act was so amended but contends that the amendment must be given a limited meaning so as to have reference only to the Bombay Act and not to any other enactment. The argument is clearly untenable in view of the unambiguous language used by the legislature in section 75 of the Bombay Act. If it was intended to enlarge the scope of Section 2 of the Corporations Act merely so as to make it embrace the Bombay Act, the words “any other enactment” would certainly not have been used and on the other band, the language employed would have been “or of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960”. In this view of the matter the first ground need not be scrutinized any further and is repelled.

    6. The second ground was given up at the hearing by Mr. Bindra when it was pointed out to him that he had not so much as mentioned the names of members who, according to the petitioner, belonged to the Raja Singh group. It is, therefore, held, that the action of the Government impugned in the petition is not liable to be struck down by reason of its having been taken mala fide.

    7. The third ground is also without merit. The relevant protion of clause 3 of the Order which provides for dissolution of the existing Samitis and constitution of new ones may be reproduced here:—

    “3. As from the appointed day,—(1) the existing Panchayats shall stand dissolved and all members thereof (including, in the case of a Gram Sabha, the Chairman of the Gram Sabha and Sarpanches and Panches of the Gram Panchayat of the Gram Sabha) shall vacate office;

    (2) the authorities specified in column (4) of the First Schedule shall constitute for the areas specified in column (2) thereof, a new Zila Parished, Panchayat Samiti or Gram Sabha, as the case may be, by the name specified in column (3) of the said Schedule;

    Provided that where the same name has been specified in column (3) of the First Schedule against different areas specified in column (2) thereof, all such areas shall be-constituted into a single Zila Parished, Panchayat Samiti or Gram Sabha, as the case may be;

    8. Clause 4 of the Order makes provision for temporary administration of the new Panchayat Samitis until members are elected thereto. It runs thus:

    “Until members are elected to a Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti or the Gram Panchayat of a Gram Sabha constituted under clause (2) of paragraph 3 of this Order and the first meeting of that body is held, the authority which constitutes that body shall appoint an adminissrator or administrators or nominate any person or persons considered suitable in this behalf, to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samiti or Gram Panchayat as the case may be.”

    9. Now the authority specified in column 4 of the First Schedule appended to the Order as being competent to constitute the Majri Panchayat Samiti is the State Government. It is therefore, that Government which is also competent to take action under clause 4. Now it goes without saying that the State Government is the highest executive body in the State and there is every reason for this Court to presume that it would properly exercise the power conferred on it by clause 4. In this connection reference may be made with advantage to the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari . 1955 2 S.C.R 925., which were quoted with approval in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R Tendolkar* . A.I.R 1958 S.C 538..

    “It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official.”

    10. Again in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India . 1957 S.C.R 233., the same view was reiterated thus by Bhagwati, J.:

    “It may also be remembered that this power is vested not in minor officials but in top-ranking authorities like the Commissioner of income-tax and the Central Board of Revenue who act on the information supplied to them by the Income-tax officers concerned. This power is discretionary and not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in such high officials. There is moreover a presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the rules of law.”

    11. I may repeat here that in the present case the allegation of mala fides on the part of the State Government in the matter of nominating members to the Majri Panchayat Samiti has already been given up so that no ulterior motive is attributable to that Government in connection therewith. As it is the State Government has unfettered discretion in the matter of selecting persons whom it would nominate to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Panchayat Samitis concerned. No person in view of the language of clause 4 can claim as a matter of right to be so nominated. The question of suitability of the persons to be nominated is to be decided solely by the Government and there is no limitation on its power of nomination such as may require it to consider the claims of any ex-members, so that no question of discrimination arises merely by reason of the fact that in the case of Kharar Panchayat Samiti all the parsons nominated under clause 4 were members of the dissolved Samiti. In the view I have just above expressed I am fortified by the opinion of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mehar Singh, C.J and Tuli, J. in Ch. Bishan Dass v. The Governor of the Punjab . I.L.R 1969 2 Pb. & Har. 413.. In that case sub-section (3-A) of section 26 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, which runs thus—

    “3-A. Where for any reason the number of members of the Committee of a Co-operative Society falls short of the quorum prescribed in the bye-laws of the Society for a meeting of the Committee, then notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Registrar may nominate such number of Members of the Committee not exceeding the total number of vacancies, as he may deem fit. A member so nominated shall cease to hold office when the vacancy, against which he is nominated, is filled by election or a period of one year has expired from the date of his nomination which ever event occurs earlier.”

    12. Was challenged on the ground, among others, that it gave the Registrar unrestricted power to nominate any persons as members of a Committee Relying on the above-quoted observations of Bhagwati, J., the challenge was repelled by Tuli, J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, in the following words.:

    “The second challenge to the validity of the Ordinance is that sub-section (3-A) newly enacted gives powers to the Registrar to nominate any persons, whether shareholder or not and he can nominate any number of persons and for the exercise of this power, no guiding principles have been laid down. In my view, there is no force in this contention. The Registrar is a very high officer of the State Government and the power has been left with him to be exercised only in such cases in which the number of continuing members of the committee of management is below the quorum prescribed in the bye-laws and it is necessary to fill up the vacancies of members of the managing Committees or the Boards of Directors to provide interim management till the vacancies are filled in by election. In all the three cases the Registrar has nominated such persons who are either the share-holders of the Society or the share-holders of the co-operative societies which are shareholders of the Society. He has, however, the power to nominate any person, whether a share-holder or not, whom he considers fit to perform the duties of a member of the managing committee or the Board of Directors. The vesting of this power in the Registrar does not make the newly-enacted sub-section constitutionally invalid.”

    13. The power given to the State Government in the present case is similar to that conferred on the Registrar in the case just above cited and it cannot be said that the State Government must exercise that power in a particular way or that it must follow certain criteria in the matter of nominations to all Panchayat Samitis.

    14. For the reasons stated, the petition fails and is dismissed, but with no orders as to costs.

    15. Petition dismissed.

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    Karam Singh And Another v. Union Of India And Others
    (Jan 29, 1971)