HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Challenge in the present writ petition is to the notifications dated 12.11.1992 and 21.07.1993 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) respectively, declaring to acquire land measuring 1512.07 acres situated in village Sohana, Tehsil Kharar, District Rup Nagar.

The petitioner, a Society of 508 members, as per the averments made in the writ petition, purchased 14.90 acres of land vide 06 separate sale deeds dated 28.07.1992, 18.08.1992, 07.10.1992, 01.12.1992, 15.01.1993 & 24.02.1993 in village Sohana. The petitioner has been incorporated with the object to acquire land for construction of houses or housing colonies for its members. The petitioner has purchased the aforesaid land for setting up a residential colony, which was to have all modern facilities like open roads, open spaces, schools, community centre, dispensary, water works, parks etc. The petitioner filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act on 11.12.1992 to seek exemption of the land in question from acquisition. The objection was that the State Government is celebrating the Cooperative Year and giving incentive to the Cooperative Societies for the construction of residential houses to the members of the society and that such assurances were given by the Cooperative Minister, therefore, because of these assurances, the petitioner has decided to purchase land in question in the year 1992 before the notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued. The petitioner submitted another representation on 05.02.1993 for exemption of the land from acquisition. But as per the petitioner without giving due opportunity of hearing, the notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 21.07.1993

The petitioner relies upon the statement made by the then State Cooperative Minister, Punjab published in the daily newspaper “The Indian Express” on 27.06.1992 that Punjab Government would soon bring comprehensive amendments in the Punjab Cooperative Act in accordance with Manohar Singh Gill Committee report to minimize official interference in cooperative institutions on the Gujarat pattern. It was also announced that the Government would also amend the Act suitably so that no Government agency could acquire the land of the Cooperative Housing Societies in the State and the Government would provide land for residential purposes to the Societies on the pattern of Delhi.

It is asserted by the petitioner that keeping in view the assurances given by the then State Cooperative Minister, Punjab, the petitioner submitted a representation on 24.12.1992 for release of the land in question to the State Cooperative Minister, who recommended for release of land. The petitioner also submitted a representation for release of land to the then Chief Minister, Punjab, who also ordered examination of the request of the petitioner. But it is pointed out that on 09.10.1993, a publication was issued to the effect that the rates has been fixed at Rs. 40 lacs per acre for allotment of land under Group Housing Scheme to the Cooperative House Building Societies. Thus, it is contended that once the State Government has decided to allot plot to the Group Housing Societies, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to release of the land in furtherance of the objectives sought to be achieved by the State Government. It is also pleaded that the petitioner is ready to comply with the conditions for obtaining license under Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975.

In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, it was inter alia asserted that the Award under Section 11 of the Act was announced on 22.02.1995, the date on which the writ petition was filed. The amount of compensation for the land acquired has been paid to the claimants or deposited in the Treasury and that development work for setting up of a residential urban estate has already been commenced. It is also pleaded that under Section 3 of the Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975, it is mandatory to obtain a license in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act for converting any land into a colony whether residential/commercial or industrial and that the petitioner has not even applied for setting up of a residential colony under the aforesaid Act. The land in question also falls within the ambit of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952. As such, construction over the area governed by the aforesaid Act cannot be carried out without prior permission of the State Government, which has not been even sought for. It is also pleaded that the petitioner were called for hearing on 05.02.1993 and 11.02.1993 and after hearing the objectors present and considering the objections filed, a report was submitted and on the basis of such report notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 21.07.1993

It is also pointed out that Cooperative Housing Societies will be permitted to construct multi-storeyed flats under the Group Housing Scheme in Sector 69 of the Urban Estate and that no Cooperative Society has been permitted to set up a residential colony by carving out plots within the Urban Estate for which the land in question has been acquired. The Cooperative Sector has been invited to construct the multi-storeyed flats under the Group Housing Scheme in Sectors 68, 69 & 70, but the petitioner has not applied under the said Scheme.

Before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that (i) the respondents have dealt with the petitioner in wholly arbitrary and discriminatory manner, as the land of another Society by the name of Punjab Judges & Officers Rural Housing Building Cooperative Society (for short the ‘Judges Society’) has been released from acquisition; and (ii) the respondents are bound by the representations made that the Cooperative Societies will be permitted to raise Group Housing Societies to provide affordable housing to the members of the Society, who are not from the priviged part of the the Society. Therefore, the action of the respondents in continuing with the acquisition proceedings is unsustainable.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The petitioner seeks parity keeping in view the release of land to the Judges Society. The photocopies of the record of respondent No. 2 has been produced by learned counsel for the petitioner. The Vice Chairman in its note dated 21.06.2005 recorded that the said Society is essentially a class in itself, consisting of serving or retired judicial officers and that number of self-styled promoters are trying to set up Cooperative Societies and in case the petitioner is allowed exemption, it will open up the floodgates for such dubious promoters. Still further, another note shows that the petitioner has 197 members and barring aside few, all the members are Government employees whereas 16 members are either widows or house wives and the remaining are Government employees. Another note dated 19.05.2006 shows that the petitioner has sought reference under Section 18 of the Act and the compensation was enhanced by the learned District Judge vide judgment dated 09.10.2002 and total enhanced compensation i.e Rs. 1,98,25,605/- was deposited on 03.09.2004 It has been further found that in respect of Judges Society, the land was acquired in the year 2000 and no compensation was paid.

We do not find any merit in the argument that the petitioner has been dealt with in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner vis-a-vis Judges Society. The petitioner has purchased part of the land vide three separate sale deeds even after the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Even the earlier purchases are within three months from the date of acquisition. It is also well-known that before publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act, there is generally surveys carried out and the information regarding intending acquisition is known. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. State of Haryana (SLP (Civil) No. 33172 of 2011 decided on 12.12.2011) came heavily against the purchasers challenging acquisition. It observed as under:

“We have considered the arguments/submissions of the learned counsel, but have not felt impressed. In our view, the High Court did not commit any error by non-suiting the petitioner on the ground that being a purchaser of the acquired land, it did not have the locus to prosecute the challenge thrown by its vendor M/s Ashoka Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. to the acquisition of land. The proposition that the purchaser Civil Writ Petition No. 798 of 2012 of the acquired land does not have the right to question the acqusition proceedings is well-settled. Reference in this connection can usefully be made to the judgments in U.P Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties(1996) 3 SCC 124, Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India(1996) 10 SCC 721, Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana(1996) 11 SCC 698 and Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi(2008) 9 SCC 177. As a matter of fact, by purchasing the acquired land, the petitioner had purchased litigation with the hope that it will be able to manipulate the State apparatus and secure release of the acquired land. Such a litigant is not entitled to relief either under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution.”

In view of the above, the petitioner who is a purchaser of the part of the land after the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not entitled to claim any benefit on the basis of purchase.

Still further, the petitioner has availed the remedy of reference under Section 18 of the Act. The amount of compensation has been enhanced and deposited in the Court. The present petition was filed on the date of award itself and that there is an order of status quo. Therefore, on the one hand, the respondents have been made to shell out money for acquisition of land, but on the other hand, the respondents have been deprived to use the same to advance the purpose of acquisition.

Still further, there is a discrepancy in the number of members of the petitioner. As per the averments made in the writ petition, there are 508 members, whereas the record of the State Government shows 197 members only. Therefore, it appears that what the State Government was represented differently than the averments made before this Court.

The discrimination can be between two similarly situated societies. The only similarity between the Judges Society as well as the petitioner's society is that both are the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1890. The acquisition of the land of the petitioner is in the year 1992-93 whereas, the land for the judges society was subject matter of acquisition in the year 2000. The petitioner has sought reference and the amount of compensation has been enhanced, whereas no compensation was paid to the Judges Society. Thus, we find that the plea of discrimination is without any basis. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited v. State of U.P(1990) 1 SCC 583 and Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority(2010) 7 SCC 129, to contend that the land of the petitioner is to be excluded from acquisition and that the action of the respondents is discriminatory. The said judgments do not advance the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners. In Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited case (supra), the land of the Cooperative Societies was excluded from the acquisition for the reason that the Societies have taken effective steps before notification for the acquisition. In the present case, the petitioner has purchased part of the land even after publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act and no step whatsoever has been taken by the petitioner for setting up of a residential colony as per the then existing statute. In Bondu Ramaswamy's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed need to revisit the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It examined another question, whether the deletion of land from the proposed acquisition, while proceeding with the acquisition of similar contiguous lands of the appellants amounted to hostile discrimination. The court concluded that a land-owner is not suggested to seek deletion of his land merely on the ground that land of some others have been deleted. He should made out a justifiable clause for deleting his land from acquisition. The Court observed as under:

“130. But in an unauthorised or illegal development, the roads are narrow and minimal, virtually no open spaces for parks and playgrounds, and no area earmarked for civic amenities. There will be no proper water supply or drainage, and there will be a mixed use of the area for residential, commercial and industrial purposes converting the entire area into a polluting concrete jungle. The entries and exists from the layouts will be bottlenecks leading to traffic jams. Once such illegal colonies come up with poor infrastructure and amenities, it will not be possible to either rectify and correct the mistakes in planning nor provide any amenities even in future. Residents of such unauthorised layouts are forever condemned to a life or misery and discomfort. It is to avoid such haphazard, unhealthy development activities by greedy illegal colonisers and ignorant landowners, the State Legislatures provided for city improvement trusts and Development Authorities so that they could develop well planned citizen - friendly layouts with all amenities and facilities.

131. In this background large tracts of lands running into hundreds of acres are acquired to have integrated layouts. Only when a layout is formed on a large scale, adequate provision can be made for good-size parks, playgrounds, and community/civic amenities. For example, if a layout is made in 1000 acres of land, the developer can provide a good-sized park of twenty acres and one or two small parks of 2 to 5 acres, have playgrounds of 5 to 10 acres. Instead of such an integrated large layout, if 200 small individual layouts are made in areas ranging from 2 to 10 acres, there will obviously be no provision for a park or a playground nor any space for civic amenities. Further, small private colonies/layouts will not have well aligned uniform roads and accesses. While it is true that municipal and town planning authorities can by strict monitoring and licensing procedures arrest haphazard development, it is seldom done. That is why formation of small layouts by developers is discouraged and Development Authorities take up large-scale developments.

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143. We are conscious of the fact that when a person subjected to blatant discrimination, approaches a court seeking equal treatment, he expects relief similar to what others have been granted. All that he is interested is getting relief for himself, as others. He is not interested in getting the relief illegally granted to others, quashed. Nor is he interested in knowing whether others were granted relief legally or about the distinction between positive equality and negative equality. In fact, he will be reluctant to approach courts for quashing the relief granted to others on the ground that it is illegal, as he does not want to incur the wrath of those, who have benefited from the wrong action. As a result, in most cases those who benefit by the illegal grants/actions by authorities, get away with the benefit, while others who are not fortunate to have “connections” or “money power” suffer. But these are not the grounds for courts to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality.

144. The fact that Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders if the acquisition process is sued by officers of the Authority with ulterior or mala fide motives. ….”

Therefore, we find that there is no merit in the argument that the petitioner has been dealt with in discriminatory manner.

In respect of second argument that there was a promise extended by the State Cooperative Minister to grant benefit to the Group Housing Societies, therefore, the State is bound by the promise made. The relevant extract from the newspaper report reads as under:

“No further said that the Government would also amend the Act suitable so that not government agency could acquire the land of cooperative housing societies of the State and the Government could provide land for residential purposes to the societies on the pattern of Delhi. He said that cooperative consumer stores would be opened in all districts of the State.”

The said statement cannot be treated as a promise made on the basis of which, the petitioner can seek exemption the land from acquisition for setting up of a residential colony. The statement is that the statute will be amended that no government agency could acquire the land of cooperative housing societies. Admittedly, no amendment in the Act has been carried out. In the absence of any amendment in the statute, no plea of promissory estoppel can be raised as the petitioner has not acted as per the such statement.

In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.