Westropp, C.J:— On the 10th of September, 1856, Chintaman (alias Chinto) Mayalay, a Konkani Brahmin, advanced in years, and then without male issue, executed in favour of Morbhat Ramkrishnabhat Upadya (a Brahmin of the same caste) a document, which, after describing itself as a bakshishpatra, and after stating its date and the names of the donor and donee and the name of the village of the former, proceeded thus: “Deed of gift is given in writing as follows: I have become old and have no male issue. You are a Brahmin and a fit object of charity (satpatra), and you are my protector. Up to this day you and you ancestors protected me. As I have no male issue, I have given to you, as gift and as charity (dharmast), my property at the kasba aforesaid, together with my moveable property. The particulars thereof are as follows: My own thikan (garden or field,) situate at, &c., there is my house standing thereon—a cowshed adjacent—warkas and grass land. The garden and house, &c., &c., I have given to you as gift this day of my own accord, and I have made the same over to you. You shall pay the Government assessment and village expenses, and you and your grandsons should enjoy the same property, generation after generation, and live in peace there. As long as I live I will take the profits and you should maintain me as if I were one of the members of your family. The property I have mentioned above I have given to you of my own accord, and I have made the same over to you. I have no ownership whatever therein; the ownership belongs to you from this day. This day I owe no money, &c., to anybody. Whatever property there may be after my death, other than that described above, is all given to you. No person has any claim thereto; the entire ownership belongs to you. I have given in writing this deed in sound mind and of my own accord.” This document was in the handwriting of Balaji Hari Sathye, a Brahman of the same caste as the donor and donee. It was duly signed by the donor, and attested by several witnesses. On the 4th October, 1856, it was registered. Possession was given to the donee Morbhat. He for some time managed the property, and paid the Government assessment of the garden, and held receipts for the same. About fifteen months after the execution of the bakshishpatra, Chintaman, the donor, appears to have repented his act, and he, on the 6th January, 1858, addressed a yadi or letter to the Assistant Magistrate, purporting to revoke the bakshishpatra of the 10th September, 1856, and he was, by the Assistant Magistrate, restored to possession. Morbhat brought a civil suit (No. 446 of 1859) in the Munsif's Court to recover the property. Upon the 6th of June, 1859, and before any decree was made in that suit, Chintaman adopted Lakshman (the plaintiff in the present suit) then a child in this eighth year. Lakshman was not made a party to Morbhat's suit. The Munsif made his decree on the 2nd of April, 1860, in the suit (446) of Morbhat v. Chintaman in favour of Morbhat, and found that Chintaman executed the bakshishpatra when in his full senses and that possession had been given by him to Morbhat under that document. The Munsif directed the property to be restored to the possession of Morbhat to ber held in accordance with the bakshishpatra, and ordered Chintaman to pay the coats of the suit. Chintaman appealed against that decree, but subsequently, on the 12th July, 1860, withdrew his appeal, admitted the execution of the bakshishpatra, and stated that he was willing to give over the thikan, and the rest of the property, to Morbhat in accordance with the terms of the Munsif's decree. This was done. The natural father of Lakshman then, upon an alleged mortgage to himself by Chintaman, and on the ground that Morbhat had fraudulently obtained a decree against Chintaman in his own favour, instituted a suit against Morbhat, but was defeated by him in the Munsif's Court, the Assistant Judge's Court, and the High Court successively.
Lakshman, within three years after attaining his majority, instituted the present suit, on the 16th March, 1874, to recover, from Rambhat, the grandson of Morbhat (who is dead), a moiety of the property, on the ground that Chintaman could not, as against his adoptive son Lakshman, alienate more than one-half of the property. The Subordinate Judge and the Assistant Judge have respectively decreed in favour of Lakshman.
The main question is whether the bakshishpatra was by Chintaman, at the time he executed it, intended to operate as a deed or merely as a will? The preliminary question, however, arises whether Lakshman, not being, a party to Morbhat's suit, No. 446 of 1859, is bound by the decree therein made against Chintaman and by Chintaman's withdrawal from his appeal in that suit.
The date, on which the plaint in that suit was presented, is not in evidence in this suit. Assuming, however, most favourably to the defendant Rambhat, that the filing of that plaint was (as is probable) anterior to the adoption of Lakshman, we are of opinion that, inasmuch as Lakshman was certainly adopted before the hearing and decree in that suit, and might have been made a party to it, but was not, the proceedings therein do not bind him, and that, accordingly, he is at liberty to re-open the question whether the bakshishpatra was intended by Chintaman, when executing it to operate as a deed or as a will. We cannot regard the adoption pendente lite as a in the same predicament as an alienation pendente lite(1). If a legitimate son had been born to Chintaman daring the suit, such son, to be bound by a pending suit affecting his father's ancestral property, must be made a party, and we think that a son adopted during the suit would have been in the same position. The one at his birth and the other at his adoption would take a vested interest in his father's ancestral property according to the Hindu law in this Presidency(2). Wo do not think that the circumstance, that Chintaman may have adopted Lakshman for the purpose of endeavouring to defeat the bakshishpatra, alters the case. Whatever evil motive may have influenced Chintaman, he was doing that which, as a sonless Hindu, he had a right to do, and he was not under any obligation to Morbhat not to adopt; and even if he had so contracted with Morbhat, we doubt that such a contract could affect the validity of the adoption, although the right of Morbhat to retain the property, under the bakshishpatra, if it be a deed and not a will, may not be disturbed. Lakshman, an infant in his eighth year, was an innocent party, and the ceremony of giving and taking being duly performed by persons with full authority, he cannot be relegated to the family of his natural father. Taking this view of the adoption, we permitted Lakshman's pleader to argue that the bakshishpatra must be regarded as a will, and not as a deed. If that proposition could have been maintained, we may observe that Lakshman should have sued for the whole and not for a moiety only of the property, inasmuch as Chintaman, being a member of an undivided family at the time of his death, could not have devised away any part of the property from his co-parcener, i.e his adopted son, according to the Hindu law of this Presidency(3).
The question remains to be solved—Was the bakshishpatra intended by Chintaman, when executing it, to be a conveyance by way of deed or to be only a will to operate from the time of his death? In favour its being intended to be only a will, is the circumstance that Morbhat could not beneficially enjoy any portion of income of the property until after the death of Chintaman. The true construction of the document evidently is that Morbhat was to pay the Government assessment and village expenses out of the income, and to make over to Chintaman or to apply, in his maintenance and for his benefit, the residue of the income. On the other hand, the name of the document, given in itself, “bakshishpatra”, indicates a deed and not a will. This per se is not much. If the conduct of Chintaman or the provisions of the document showed that his intentions were purely testamentary, the name of the document would not be important. But Chintaman not only caused it to be registered within a month after its execution, but actually gave over the management and possession of the property to Morbhat, who could not, indeed, pay the Government assessment and village expenses, or maintain Chintaman out of the income of the property, as the ‘document required him to do, unless Morbhat received that income for the purpose. Finding that the document contemplated the management of the property by Morbhat, and that Chintaman, being then old, should be relieved of that trouble, and that possession of the property itself was fully given to Morbhat, we think that the Munsif was right, when, in his decree of 1860, he held the bakshishpatra to be a conveyance and not a will.
Therefore, we must hold that it vested the property in Morbhat on the 10th September, 1856, subject to a trust as regarded the income, left after payment of the Government assessment and village expenses, in favour of Chintaman so long as he lived. It did not contain any power of revocation, and Chintaman's attempted revocation in 1858 was futile in law. Chintaman having in 1856, nearly three years before the plaintiff's adoption, conveyed all of his estate in the property to Morbhat except a life interest, had not, at the time of the adoption, any estate of inheritance in the property, a share of which could vest in Lakshman at the time of his adoption. A conveyance by a Hindu, without male issue at its date, will bind his subsequently born or adopted male issue. Such issue at their birth take a vested interest in such property only as is that of their father at that time. Here Chintaman had parted with his inheritance before the adoption, which in the case of an adopted son occupies the same position as birth with a natural born son. If the bakshishpatra had been executed after the adoption or birth of a son to Chintaman, it could not prevail to any extent against such a son, inasmuch as an alienation by a member of an undivided family without valuable consideration does not, in this Presidency, any more than a will, bind, even to the extent of such member's own share, his co-parceners. They, in such cases, take the whole property by survivorship. But here the adoption came after the alienation.
We must reverse the decrees of the Courts below, and make a decree for the appellant, the defendant. The parties respectively must bear their own costs of the suit and of both appeals.
Decrees reversed.