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Summary of Opinion — Gurdev Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Many years earlier vacant land in Johanna town, district Ludhiana, was let by its owner Shrimati Ajmer Kaur to Shri Surinder Nath (predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1–5) for purposes of their business. The tenant, with the landlord's permission, erected structures and installed machinery on the leased land. The last rent-note (Exhibit A.1) executed on 30th November 1949 allowed the tenant to put up further structures "at his own cost and risk" and provided that on expiry of the 15-year term the landlady would be entitled to vacant possession of the rented land only and not the structures; it also required the tenant to fill pits and level the land on handing back possession.

Before the 15-year term expired, Shrimati Mohinder Kaur and Shrimati Davinder Kaur (successors-in-interest of Ajmer Kaur) applied on 10th September 1962 for eviction under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging arrears of rent and wrongful subletting. Arrears were paid at the first hearing (so that ground fell away), and the Rent Controller tried the matter on the subletting allegation, found subletting established and ordered eviction. On appeal the Appellate Authority (Ludhiana) reversed the Rent Controller and dismissed the eviction application on the ground that, because the tenant had put up structures on originally vacant land, the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction to order eviction from such altered premises. The landladies sought revision in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to order eviction of a tenant from vacant land that was originally let out as such but on which the tenant, with the landlord's permission, subsequently put up structures in connection with his business.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Landladies') Arguments — Mr. Bhagirath Das (counsel)

  • The Appellate Authority's view is untenable and contrary to the rule laid down by this Court in various cases.
  • The liability of a tenant to eviction must be determined by the nature of the property at the time it was let out; subsequent erection of structures or installation of machinery by the tenant does not defeat the landlord's right to obtain eviction.
  • A tenant's alterations to make the premises more useful for the business for which the land was let cannot prevent the landlord from seeking eviction on grounds available under the Act.

Respondents' Arguments — Mr. Raj Kumar / Mr. Raj Kumar Aggarwal (counsel)

  • Because the tenant constructed buildings and installed machinery, the nature of the premises was altered and therefore the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to order eviction (the respondents were not tenants of the buildings standing thereon).
  • Relied upon earlier Single Bench decisions (referenced by the Appellate Authority) to support the contention that an eviction order could not be made in respect of premises that were not the tenanted property.
  • Also contended that no order could be made requiring the tenant to remove the structures or machinery; the Court noted this contention but did not decide the point because it would benefit the tenant and removal was left as a permissive right for the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Chinnakannu Pillai v. Ammalu Ammal — A.I.R. 1952 Tr. C. (as cited) Held that an order by the Rent Controller directing the landlord to pay compensation for structures set up by the tenant was without jurisdiction (as stated in the opinion). The Court distinguished this case on the ground that in the present case there was no question of compensation; the Court noted that the power to order eviction does not include power to order payment of compensation before landlord takes over property.
Pyara Singh v. Mahant Gurmukh Dass — (reported) 1964 66 P.L.R. 193 (as cited) Observations that the Rent Controller is circumscribed by statutory jurisdiction and could pass an eviction order only in regard to premises actually let to the tenant; should not order eviction from property not let out to the tenant. The Court recorded that Dua, J. expressly left the question of effect of tenant setting up structures to the Rent Controller and did not decide it; the present Court held those observations did not support respondents' contention or the Appellate Authority's view.
Partap Singh v. Santokh Singh — Single Bench decision (7 April 1961) Recognised competence of the Rent Controller to order eviction from land notwithstanding that the tenant had put up structures after the lease; held that putting up structures for use in trade/business does not convert rented land into a "building" for definition purposes if it was not let as a building. The Court relied on and followed the reasoning in this case as representing the correct legal position, noting facts closely similar to the present case and adopting the view that the premises remained rented land.
Ram Parshad v. Municipal Committee, Ladwa — C.R. No. ??? of 1961 (3 Nov 1961) Held that where vacant land let to a tenant was subsequently used by the tenant to put up structures and the tenant sublet the premises, the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to order eviction notwithstanding such structures. The Court relied on this decision as supporting the proposition that subletting established liability to eviction even though structures had been put up by the tenant.
Lachhman Dass v. Kesri — Civil Revision No. 476 of 1959 The opinion notes the decision but does not explicate its rule in the provided text; it was mentioned as having been noticed and distinguished. The judgment of Ram Parshad (and the present Court) distinguished these earlier decisions; the Court did not adopt the view relied upon by the Appellate Authority.
Raja Ram v. Mukund Singh — Civil Revision No. 475 of 1960 The opinion notes the decision but does not set out the principle in the provided text; it was mentioned as having been noticed and distinguished. The Court noted these decisions were distinguished in the Ram Parshad decision which supported the proposition that subletting renders tenant liable for eviction despite structures put up on rented land.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the critical legal question as whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to order eviction of a tenant from vacant land originally let as such but on which the tenant, with the landlord's permission, had erected structures and installed machinery.

The Court examined the lease/rent-note (Exhibit A.1/A.2) and emphasized that the character and nature of the premises must be ascertained primarily from the lease instrument at the time of the inception of the tenancy. The rent-note explicitly permitted the tenant to erect structures "at his own cost and risk" and provided that the landlord would be entitled to vacant possession of the land (and not the structures) on expiry of the 15-year term; the tenant was obliged to level the land and fill any pits on handing back possession. These contract terms, the Court held, indicate the parties' intention that the premises as let were vacant site/land and were to be returned in that state.

On jurisdiction, the Court observed that if the case falls under any clause of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to deal with an application for eviction. The Appellate Authority's conclusion that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction because the premises had ceased to be vacant land after erection of structures was examined and rejected.

The Court considered the precedents relied upon by the Appellate Authority (including P. Chinnakannu Pillai and Pyara Singh). It found those decisions distinguishable on their facts: in P. Chinnakannu Pillai the issue involved an order directing payment of compensation (which the High Court held was without jurisdiction), a circumstance not present in the instant case; in Pyara Singh Dua, J. had not decided the legal effect of a tenant setting up structures but had remitted the question to the Rent Controller.

The Court relied on two Single Bench decisions (Partap Singh v. Santokh Singh and Ram Parshad v. Municipal Committee, Ladwa) which recognised the competence of the Rent Controller to order eviction from rented land even after structures had been put up by the tenant during the term. The Court adopted the reasoning in those cases: if land was let for business or trade, some structures may be necessary for that purpose; such subsequent structures do not convert the premises into a "building" within the statutory definition so as to deprive the landlord of his right to seek eviction on statutory grounds (e.g., subletting).

Applying these principles to the present facts — where the parties agreed the premises were originally vacant land let for business purposes, the tenant had permission to erect structures at his cost, and the rent-note fixed the tenant's obligation to restore the land on expiry — the Court concluded that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction and that the established subletting ground made the respondents liable for eviction.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is accepted. The Court held that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to order eviction from the rented land despite the fact that the tenant had put up structures on the land with the landlord's permission, and that, since subletting was proved, the respondents incurred liability for eviction.

Direct effects and remedial orders:

  • The petitioners' revision is allowed and the Appellate Authority's order is set aside.
  • The respondents are directed to hand over possession of the premises to the petitioners within three months; costs were awarded to the petitioners.
  • The respondents were given the liberty to remove the structures and machinery installed by them within the three-month period if they wished to do so; if they decline that option, it does not affect the petitioners' right to possession.

Implications for precedent: The opinion relied upon and followed earlier Single Bench decisions of this Court (cited in the analysis) that recognise the Rent Controller's competence to order eviction from land originally let as vacant land even if structures are put up by the tenant subsequently. The opinion did not purport to create a novel rule beyond the authorities it applied; its direct consequence is the eviction of the respondents on the proved ground of subletting and the directions summarized above.

Additional Notes

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.

    Jatinder Singh And Others, v. Jatinder Singh And Others,

    Gurdev Singh, J.:— The decision of this petition for revision of the order of the Appellate Authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, dated 21st December, 1964, turns upon the determination of the legal question, namely, “Whether the Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to order eviction of the tenant from a vacant land which was originally let out as such, but on which the tenant with the permission of the landlords had put up structure in connection with his business?”

    2. It is common case of the parties that many years back vacant land situate in Johanna town, district Ludhiana, was let out by its owner Shrimati Ajmer Kaur to Shri Surinder Nath, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents 1 to 5, for purposes of their business. In due course, the tenants set up certain structures and installed machinery on the leased land and the landlady continued to renew the lease in his favour. The last rent-note, Exhibit A.1, was executed by him on 30th November, 1949 it provided inter alia that the tenant, if he so desired, could set up further structures on the vacant land leased out to him, but that would be at his own cost and risk, and on the expiry of 15 years, the term fixed under the lease, the landlady would be entitled to obtain vacant possession of the rented land only and not the structures. This rent-note further provided:—

    “It the tenant dug any pits in the land he would have to fill up the same while handing over possession on the expiry of the lease, and would give up the possession of the leased premises after levelling the land.”

    3. Before the period of 15 years fixed under the lease deed could expire, Shrimati Mohinder Kaur and Shrimati Davinder Kaur, successors in-interest of the landlady Shrimati Ajmer Kaur, applied for the eviction of the tenant on 10th September, 1962, under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act on the grounds that the rent of the premises had fallen in arrears and that the tenant had sublet the premises or portiens thereof to various persons. The arrears of rent having been paid by the first hearing of the case in accordance with the proviso to sub-section (1)(a) of section 13 of the Act, that ground of eviction ceased to be available to the landladies. The trial of the application proceeded only on the plea that the tenant had incurred liability for eviction having sublet the premises without the consent of the land-ladies. The Rent Controller found that the subletting had been established. Accordingly he ordered the eviction of the tenant. Against that order an appeal was taken to the Appellate Authority, Ludhiana. Shri M.L Puri, who dealt with the same, reversed the decision of the Rent Controller and dismissed the landladies' application far eviction.

    4. The learned appellate Authority accepted the finding of the Rent Controller that the premises had been sublet by the tenant without the consent of the landladies. He, however, took the view that since what was originally let out was vacant land and the buildings or structures thereon were constructed by the tenant himself, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass any order for the tenant's eviction from such premises which had ceased to be vacant land it was originally let out. In this connection, he has sought to derive support from the Single Bench decision in P. Chinnakannu Pillai v. Ammalu Ammal Gomathi Ammal . A.I.R 1952 Tr. C. 125. and the judgment of this Court by Dua, J. (as he then was) reported as Pyara Singh v. Mahant Gurmukh Dass . 1964 66 P.L.R 193.. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Authority the landladies have come up in revision to this Court.

    5. Mr. Bhagirath Das, learned counsel for the petitioners, has Vehemently argued that the view taken by the learned Appellate Authority is entirely untenable and contrary to the rule laid down by this Court in various cases. He contends that the question of liability of a tenant for eviction from the premises, such as a vacant land, has to be Settled by taking into account the nature of the property at the time it was let out, and if subsequently the tenant builds upon the land for his own convenience or installs machinery therein in connection with his business that is of no consequence so far as the right of the landlord to obtain eviction is concerned, and that right cannot be defeated by the tenant's conduct in effecting alterations in the premises to put it to the best use in connection with the business for which he had obtained the lease. This argument, in my opinion, is unexceptionable, and after the counsel for both the parties, I am satisfied that the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained.

    6. As has been observed earlier, and this fact is not disputed before the, what was let out to the respondents' predecessor in interest “Shri Surinder Nath was vacant land for the purpose of his business and in order to enable him to carry on that business, the landlady had agreed to permit him to set up certain structures and install machinery. Surinder Nath availed of this concession and set up certain structures. In the year 1949, when he executed the fresh rent note, Exhibit A.2, he again obtained the right to put up further structures, but at the same time specifically agreed to band over the possession of the rented land on the expiry of the period of 15 years. The structure was permitted to be put up by him at us own cost, and it his further agreed between the parties that while handing back the possession the tenant was to level the ground and fill up pits etc. if there were any. This indicates beyond any manner of doubt that the intention of the parties was that though during the period of tenancy the tenant could make use of the premises in any manner that he considered best in his interests and for that purpose he could put up certain structures, the nature of the Premises at the time of the inception of the tenancy was Vacant site, and it was in that state that its possession had to be delivered back to the landlady on the expiry of the lease.

    7. On these premises, it will be evident that the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to deal with an application for eviction of the tenant if the case fell under any of the clauses of section 13 of the Act.

    8. The argument that has been raised on behalf of the respondents is that since by construction of buildings and installations of machinery over the rented land the nature of the premises had altered, the Rent Controller had no Jurisdiction to order the eviction, as the respondents were not tenants in the buildings standing thereon and the Vacant land as such was no longer there the possession of which could be handed over to the landladies. In support of this argument, reliance is placed upon the single Bench decisions to which reference has already been made and upon which the judgment of the Appellate Authority proceeds. Both these decisions are, however, distinguishable on facts. In A.I.R 1952 Tr. C. 251 (supra), the Rent Controller had ordered the landlord to pay compensation for the structures set up by the tenant. The High Court held that order was without jurisdiction. In the case before as there is no question of any compensation, and it can well be appreciated that the power to order eviction does not include the authority to order payment of compensation before the landlord takes over the property. In A.I.R 1964 P.L.R 1933 (supra), Dua, J. did not express any opinion on the effect of the tenant setting up a structure on the rented land. On the other hand, his Lordship expressly left this matter to be decided by the Rent Controller, and for that purposes remanded the case. The observations in that judgment, upon which Mr. Raj Kumar, appearing for the respondents, places reliance, are these:—

    “In my opinion, the Rent Controller whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by the statute as a special tribunal was enjoined by law to keep himself within the bounds of his jurisdiction. As is obvious, the tenant was a tenant only in regard to the vacant site and the Rent Controller could only pass an eviction order in regard to that site. The fact that the tenant had not specifically raised the plea would not clothe the Rent Controller with jurisdiction to pass any order of eviction in regard to the property which is not let out by the landlord to the tenant, whether actually or constructively. In my opinion, it was the duty and function of the Rent Controller to advert to this fact and not to pass an order of eviction from the building, as if it was automatic, merely on the failure of the tenant to pay or tender the arrears of rent on the first hearing of the application. The learned appellate authority also seems to me to have fallen into the same error, namely, that an order of eviction from the structure which is not the tenanted premises must automatically be passed on failure on the part of the tenant to pay or tender the arrears on the first hearing.”

    9. These observations, in my opinion, do not support the contention raised on behalf of the respondents or the view taken by the learned Appellate Authority.

    10. On the contrary, there are two other Single Bench decisions of this Court, in which the competence of the Rent Controller to order eviction from the land, notwithstanding the setting up of the structures alter the lease in his favour, has been recognised. In Partap Singh v. Santokh Singh decided on 7th April, 1961, Grover, J. while dealing with a similar question, held that notwithstanding the fact that a structure had been put up on the rented land by the tenant, the Rent Controller could order eviction if the ground of eviction was made out under the Act. The facts of that case are closely similar to those of the case in hand. In that case, the Rent Controller had taken the view that though originally what was let out to the tenants was land, yet since they were allowed to set up machinery electric motors and also some structures, the premises fell within the category of non residential building from which ejectment could not be ordered alter the amendment of the Act. The Appellate Authority agreed with that view, but Grover, J. overruled it with these observations:—

    “It is common ground that originally when the land in dispute was let out, it consisted of a vacant piece but that certain structures were subsequently put up on it for the purposes of running a sawmills. It had thus been rented for business, and merely because some structures had been put on it, it is not possible to see how it ceased to be a rented land. Whenever any land is let out for the purposes of being used principally for business or trade, some sort of structures are bound to be made in order to carry on that business or trade. “Building” is defined by sub-clause (a) of section 2 to mean ‘any building or part of a building let for any purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not……’ It is no body's case that the premises when they were originally let out fell within the definition of the word ‘building’. In order to become a building within the meaning of the definition, it must be let out as such. In other words, there must be a building standing on some land which should be let out by the landlord to the tenant. I have not been persuaded either on the language of the statute or on the basis of any principle or authority that if some structures are put up on land which is rented for the purposes of trade or business in order to carry out that trade or business by the tenants, then the premises would cease to be rented land and would become building within the mean of the definition given in section 2.”

    11. If I may say so with respect, this represents the correct legal position.

    12. Later, in Ram Parshad v. Municipal Committee, Ladwa . C.R No. ??? of 1961. decided on 3rd November, 1961) Dulat, J., while dealing with the case of subletting by a tenant to whom vacant land had been let out but upon which some structure had been put up subsequent to the commencement of the lease by the landlord, held that if the premises were sublet the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to order eviction notwithstanding the fact that the structure had to be put up upon the rented land by the tenant during the term of his lease. The relevant observations made by his Lordship are found in the following passage of that judgment:—

    “Mr. Aggarwal first contends that the property let in this case cannot be properly described as rented land because according to him the purpose for which the land was let to the lessees was not any business or trade but merely the building of one or two shops on it, the implication of the argument being that it is not necessary or even permissible to look beyond the immediate object, namely, the construction of shops. I do not see how it is possible to view the facts in that artificial manner. The recitals in the lease deed and other admitted facts leave no doubt that the only purpose for hiring the land in question was to build shops for purposes of the ordinary business and trade of the lessees. Rented land is defined in the Rent Restriction Act as land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade and there is little doubt that in this case the main purpose was business and trade; and of course the land was let separately from any building.”

    13. After noticing the decisions of this Court in Civil Revision No. 476 of 1959 (Lachhman Dass v. Kesri . C.R No. 476 of 1909.) and Civil Revision No. 475 of 1960 (Raja Ram v. Mukund Singh . C.R No. 475 of 1960.), and distinguishing the same, his Lordship held that a tenant who had sublet the premises after putting up structures on the rented land was liable to eviction.

    14. It is thus obvious that so far as the authority of this Court goes, the view taken is against that which has appealed to the learned Appellate Authority. Even on the bare reading of the various provisions of the Act, I find there is nothing to sustain the decision of the Appellate Authority. To ascertain the nature of the premises and the purpose for which it was let one has primarily to look to the lease deed or the rent note itself. If subsequently there is any alteration made in the premises by the tenant or it is used for a purpose different from the one for which it had been let out, that would not deprive the landlord of this right to seek eviction. This is obvious from the very provisions of section 13 as conversion of user itself is made a ground for ejectment. In the instant case, there is no dispute that what was originally let out to the respondents was vacant land without any building, and though the tenants were given the right to set up structures suitable for his convenience and to instal machinery in connection with their trade and business, on the expiry of the lease deed, they were bound to restore the property to the landlady in its original condition. It is true that so far as the buildings standing on this land are concerned the tenant has the right of ownership and the petitioners have no claim over the same. It is also correct that so far as those buildings are concerned, the respondents are not the tenants of the petitioners, but that does not mean that the petitioners have lost the right to recover possession simply because they had permitted the tenant to set up structures and instal machinery which was necessary for carrying on the business for which the premises were let out.

    15. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the subletting having been proved, the respondents had incurred liability for eviction and cannot remain in possession as tenants. The petition is, accordingly, accepted with costs. The respondents are, however, allowed three months' time to hand over the possession of the premises to the petitioners.

    16. It may be mentioned that Mr. Raj Kumar Aggarwal has contended in the course of arguments that no order calling upon the tenant to remove the structures or the machinery installed thereon can be passed by the Rent Controlled or the Appellate Authority. It is needless to go into this matter as such an order would enure for the benefit of the tenant and if the tenant does not wish to avail of that concession, he is at liberty to ignore that part of the order. I would thus make it clear that if the respondents wish to remove the structures and the machinery installed by them on the rented land, they will be at liberty to do so and should remove the same within the period of three months allowed to them by this order, but if they do not wish to avail of this concession it would not affect the right of the petitioners to take possession of the premises.

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    Jatinder Singh And Others, v. Jatinder Singh And Others,
    (Nov 8, 1967)