Melvill, J.:— The instrument on which this suit was brought, is of the nature of a letter of attorney, whereby the plaintiff and his descendants were constituted the hereditary agents of the defendant for the management of his share in an inam village.
As the present dispute has arisen between the original parties to the instrument, it is unnecessary for us to consider what would be the effect of such an appointment after the death of either party. As between the parties, the appointment was valid and binding, whether or not any valuable consideration passed; for the mere acceptance of the office by the plaintiff was a sufficient consideration for the appointment.
The parties seem to be agreed that the authority has been revoked. This is not indeed so stated in the plaint, but it is alleged in the defendant's written statement, and is admitted in the plaintiff's examination. The parties appear to differ as to the date of the revocation. Their statements are not very clear and precise, but the plaintiff apparently alleges that the revocation took place after he had been performing the duties of the office for six months, while the defendant declares that he revoked the authority before the plaintiff entered on the duties of the office, and that, consequently, the plaintiff never performed any service at all.
We do not understand that the plaintiff disputes the defendant's power to revoke the authority; nor, if he did so, could his contention be maintained. The instrument itself contains a provision that the defendant shall continue to pay the plaintiff's salary, even if he gets the work done by any other person; and this implies that the defendant has a right, conditional on the payment of a penalty, to employ another agent. And, independently of the terms of the instrument, the defendant would have a right, under the general provisions of the law (Indian Contract Act, IX of 1872, sec. 203,) to revoke the authority given to the plaintiff, whether or not the agency had been created for a valuable consideration. The mere arrangement that the plaintiff's salary should be paid out of the rents, cannot be regarded as giving to the plaintiff an interest in the property which formed the subject-matter of the agency; and the Legislature has not adopted to its full extent the dictum of Lord Eldon in Bromley v. Holland(1) that where a power of attorney was granted upon a valuable consideration the Court (of Chancery) would not permit it to be revoked.
The remedy for the improper revocation of an agency lies, under ordinary circumstances, in an action for damages for breach of contract. By section 205 of the Contract Act, the principal is bound to make compensation to the agent, whenever there is an express or implied contract that the agency shall be continued for any period of time. This would probably always be the case when a valuable consideration had been given by the agent. An action for damages might probably have been maintained in the present case, whether a valuable consideration was given by the plaintiff or not. In such an action the plaintiff would have been bound to claim a lump sum as compensation, and it would not be competent to him to break up his damages into annual instalments, and to bring periodical actions for their recovery. As, however, the present action does not purport to be one for damages on account of the revocation of the agency, it is not necessary for us further to consider this question.
We must deal with this claim as it is put forward by the plaintiff himself in his plaint, and in his answers on examination. In his plaint he claims his salary for two years on account of service rendered. In his examination, however, he states that he worked for six months only, and that then the defendant refused to allow him to perform any more service. He is undoubtedly entitled to recover his salary as for work and services done for the period during which such services were rendered, but on his own showing such period did not exceed six months. Whether it amounted to six months, is a matter which will have to be considered; but, at any rate, for at least eighteen months out of the two years to which the claim relates, the plaintiff must show some other foundation for his claim than that of work and services rendered.
As it is not contended, and could not be contended, that the agency still subsists, and as the suit is not for damages, but for specific performance of the terms of the contract which relate to the payment of the plaintiff's remuneration, the only foundation for the plaintiff's claim for payment after his services ceased must be the clause of the agreement to which reference has already been made, and which is as follows: “If I get my work done by others, I will, without making any reduction in your pay, permanently continue to give you, generation after generation, the sum of money now fixed in writing from out of the whole amount of my share.” This is the clause on which the Courts below have proceeded in awarding the full amount claimed, without thinking it necessary to inquire whether the plaintiff had rendered service or not. But it cannot be doubted that such an agreement to pay a perpetual annuity, whether any service were rendered by the annuitant or not, would be nudum pactum, unless there were a valuable consideration for the promise. The plaintiff himself seems to have felt this, for he alleges in his plaint that he paid Rs. 500 to the defendant in consideration of the execution of the exhibit No. 20. This allegation has not been inquired into by either of the Courts below; but we find it impossible to determine the rights of the parties unless the truth of the allegation be ascertained.
If the allegation were established, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover his remuneration, whether he performed service or not; and it would not then be necessary to determine the length of time for which service was rendered. But if he fails to prove the payment of the Rs. 500, it will then have to be ascertained whether the plaintiff worked for the defendant for six months, as he alleges, or for any shorter period, or not at all. The evidence offered by the defendant to prove that the plaintiff performed no service at all, was refused by the Courts below; but, in the eventuality which we have supposed, it will become necessary to take it.
We must, therefore, require the District Court, after taking, or causing to be taken, the evidence produced by the parties, to find on the following issue:—
Has the plaintiff proved that he paid Its. 500 to the defendant in consideration of the execution by the defendant of the instrument (exhibit No. 20)?
If the above issue be found in the negative, but not otherwise, the District Court should find, after taking, or causing to be taken, the evidence on the point which was rejected, on the following issue:—
For what period did the plaintiff actually perform work and services as the defendant's agent under the exhibit No. 20?
It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to say that the District Judge should require very strong and convincing evidence of the payment of the Rs. 500 as consideration for the creation of the agency. The exhibit No. 20 contains no indication of the payment of any consideration; and as the instrument has been drawn up with rather more than ordinary care and formality, it is certainly remarkable that no mention should have been made of such an important circumstance, and that there should be no provision for the repayment of the sum advanced in the event of the agency being revoked.