Mehar Singh, C.J:— This is a tenant's revision application from the order, dated February 28, 1966, of the appellate authority, affirming the order, dated November 29, 1965, of the Rent Controller, directing ejectment of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent.
2. There is no dispute that there are arrears of rent, and the explanation rendered by the tenant, that he did not pay the rent because the landlord had entered into an agreement with him to sell the property and pursuant to that agreement had received a certain amount from him, has not been found by the authority below to have any bearing on the question of payment of arrears of rent. The plea taken by the tenant in defence was that the landlord, Mahant Avtar Singh, had not signed either the application for ejectment or the power given to the counsel that was attached with that application. The Rent Controller, on the evidence, came to the conclusion that both the ejectment application and the power given to the counsel were signed by the land lord. In an appeal by the tenant the appellate authority had before him other admitted signatures of the landlord on documents on the file of the appellate authority.
3. It appears that the appellate authority was probably not satisfied, on comparison of the signatures of the landlord on the other documents with his alleged signatures on the ejectment application and the power given to the counsel, that on the latter documents the signatures were in fact his. The arguments in the case were heard by the appellate authority on December 24, 1965. Subsequently, on January 6, 1966, an application was moved by the landlord for permission to sign both the ejectment application and the power given to the counsel. Objections were invited to that application, but any objections on the side of the tenant were overruled and the landlord was permitted to sign the application on payment of Rs. 100/- as costs. On February 4, 1966, the landlord appeared, paid the costs to the counsel of the tenant and signed the ejectment application and also the verification on it and the power given to the counsel. The appellate authority was of the opinion that those signatures must date back to the date of the filling of the application, having retrospective effect, and the objection that there was no competent application before the Rent Controller filed by the landlord was no longer of material consequence. So the appellate authority proceeded to affirm the order of the Rent Controller and to dismiss the appeal of the tenant.
4. In this revision application by the tenant there is only one argument on his behalf for consideration, that is, whether the approach of the appellate authority that when the ejectment application was signed by the landlord for the first time on February 4, 1966, the removal of the defect dated back from the original date of the application is or is not correct. In the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949), it is section 16 which deals with the powers of an appellate authority or Rent Controller regard to summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as being the same as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, but there is no provision which deals with a matter like this. In Mathra Das v. Om Parkash . 1957 59 P.L.R 45. Bhandari, C.J, held, that in the absence of a restraining provision, a Rent Controller or a District Judge acting under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act is at liberty to follow any procedure that he may choose to evolve for himself so long as the said procedure is orderly and consistent with the rules of natural justice and so long as it does not contravene the positive provisions of the law. The learned Chief Justice pointed out that the elementary and fundamental principles of a judicial enquiry should be observed but the more technical forms discarded. It is true that, if my impression is correct under the Code of Civil Procedure if there is a defect in verification of pleadings that can be cured subsequently, and when allowed to be cured it will not affect the question of the date of the filing of the pleadings, but I do not understand that if pleadings are not signed by any party, subsequent signatures on the pleadings can date back from an earlier date on which the unsigned pleadings were filed. So that this is an approach by the appellate authority which is not consistent with the known notions of prevailing procedure in matters of civil dispute?. If the defect was confined only to verification on the ejectment application, there was something to be said for the approach of the appellate authority, but here is a case in which what the tenant has throughout pressed is that the ejectment application itself was never signed by the landlord, nor was the power given or purported to have been given by him to his counsel signed by him. If that is a fact, then there never was any ejectment application before the Rent Controller untill the landlord signed such an application before the appellate authority on February 4, 1966.
5. The Rent Controller found it as a fact that the original ejectment application was in fact signed by the landlord and the power given to the counsel was also signed by him. The appellate authority has given no finding on this aspect of the matter. It has proceeded on this, that the signatures appended by the landlord to the ejectment application and the power given to the counsel on February 4, 1966, date back and are effective from the date of the filing of ejectment application on November 27, 1964. This, as I have said, is not a correct approach. The matter cannot be disposed of here, for now the appellate authority must decide whether the conclusion of the Rent Controller that the ejectment application and the power given to the counsel were signed by the landlord is or is not correct. If the decision of the Rent Controller is affirmed on this matter, then the disposal of the appeal of the tenant before the appellate authority is a simple matter, but if, on the contrary, the appellate authority's conclusion is that the original ejectment application and the power given to the counsel were never signed by the landlord until February 4, 1966, then there was no application for ejectment by the landlord till February 4, 1966. If that be so, then other questions arise and one of the important questions from the point of view of the tenant is his right to have recourse to the proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 13 of East Punjab Act 3 of 1949.
6. In the circumstances the order of the appellate authority is set aside and the case is remitted to it for disposal of the appeal after decision of the question whether the original ejectment application and the power given to the counsel with it were or were not signed by the landlord. There is no order in regard to costs in this revision application.
7. Case remanded.