1. Rectification application filed by the petitioner under section 21-A of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal solely on the ground that subsequent judgment of the constitutional courts after the decision of the Tribunal was not a mistake apparent from the record requiring passing of a fresh order. The Tribunal was persuaded to take such a view on the basis of the judgments in [1984] 56 STC 82 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Meenambal and Co.) and [1987] 67 STC 148 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Everest Trading Co.).
2. The petitioner herein had relied upon the judgments reported in [1976] 38 STC 593 (SC) [Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (Coal Sales) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh], [1991] 83 STC 26 (P&H) (Jainson Hosiery Industries v. Assessing Authority) and [1992] 84 STC 177 (P&H) [Jain Motor Company (Pb.) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab] for the purposes of rectification of the earlier order of the Tribunal passed on December 20, 1992.
3. The Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. P.K Syed Akbar Sahib [1988] 70 STC 191 : [1988] 173 ITR 1 had dealt with the points raised before us and held that review could be entertained on the basis of a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court. In that case, the High Court declined to review its earlier judgment on the basis of subsequent judgment to the contrary. The facts of the case were that the High Court had earlier ordered refund of licence fee collected under the relevant Act. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the vires of the Act challenged before the High Court and the State on the basis of the Supreme Court judgment filed a petition before the High Court seeking review of its earlier judgment ordering refund. Upon dismissal of the review petition by the High Court, the Supreme Court held:
“……………The High Court has taken the view that the review was not competent. Having considered the judgment rendered by the High Court, we are of the view that in the background of the aforesaid facts, the High Court was not justified in refusing to entertain the review petition on super-technical considerations which were ill-founded. The High Court was in error in taking the view that the review petition was not maintainable notwithstanding the fact that the validity of the Act had been subsequently upheld by the court whereas the judgment sought to be reviewed was based on the premise that the Validation Act was ultra vires In our considered opinion the High Court should have entertained the application for review……………”
4. To the same effect is another judgment of the apex Court in Vijaya Wines v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 42 STC 329 (sic).
5. A Division Bench of this Court in C.W.P No. 6751 of 1993 decided on February 16, 1995* Hero Cycles Limited v. State of Punjab held:
“………we are of the opinion that the Tribunal should have taken note of the abovesaid judgment while deciding the application for rectification of the mistake. As the Supreme Court has already held that its subsequent judgment, if not taken note of, would be deemed to be a mistake apparent from the record, the Tribunal had no option but to pass orders afresh, by taking into account the latest law settled by the Supreme Court.”
6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents have not been in a position to show us any other judgment to the contrary. Otherwise also the view taken by the Tribunal appears to be unreasonable besides being against the public policy. No person can be deprived of his right merely on the ground of technicalities. As the judgment of the Supreme Court is a law settled for the country, no citizen could be deprived of its benefits. The judgment impugned in the writ petition is, therefore, held to be against the provisions of law and is liable to be set aside.
7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed by setting aside the order impugned and remanding the case back to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal with a direction to pass afresh appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of law and the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon by the petitioner. Appropriate orders shall be passed after notice to the parties.
8. Writ petition allowed.