Dua, J.:— This case on the merits is covered by a decision of this Court in Lachhman Singh v. District Judge, Hoshiarpur, Civil Writ No. 1178 of 1958, in which Gosain, J. held that Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 is inapplicable where a claim has been wholly or partly satisfied because such a claim does not fall within the definition of ‘verified claim’ as given in the above Act. In an earlier case decided by the same learned Judge (Civil Writ No. 702 of 1957) he had held to the same effect when dealing with a case relating to Agricultural land and his judgment in that case was later confirmed by a Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 227 of 1958, decided by Bhandari, C.J and Falshaw, J. on 23rd September, 1959.
2. Rai Bahadur Har Parshad has, however contended that this point was not raised by the petitioner before the learned District Judge, who decided the reference under section 9 of the above Act on 3rd of October, 1958. It is vehemently contended that the decision of the learned single Judge in Civil Writ No. 702 of 1957 was given on 7th May, 1958, and it was incumbent on the petitioner to raise this point before the learned District Judge, who disposed of the reference in October, 1958.
3. It is further contended that the decision of Gosain, J. merely declared what the law was and it did not create new law, with the result that the existence of that decision would have no material bearing on the obligation of the petitioner to raise the question of law that Section 9 of the above Act did not cover the case of a claim satisfied in whole or in part. My attention has been drawn to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Patiala . 1959 61 P.L.R 597, where it was laid down inter alia, that—
“The failure to raise objection to defect or lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal before it, is always a material and relevant factor and must be taken into account and it makes no difference whether such a defect is patent or latent.”
4. According to this decision such a conduct would ordinarily preclude the petitioner from claiming the writ unless a cogent explanation is furnished by stating the necessary facts upon affidavit, which would satisfy the Court that the failure to raise the objection relating to jurisdiction was not deliberate or that the petitioner had no knowledge of facts on which the objection could be based. Reference was also made to O.A.O.K Latchmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras . A.I.R 1927 Mad. 130., where it was laid down that—
“Where the applicant armed with a point either of law or of fact which would oust the jurisdiction of the lower Court has elected to argue a case on its merits before that Court, he must be taken to have submitted himself to a jurisdiction which he cannot be allowed afterwards to seek to repudiate by applying for a certiorari.”
5. In this decision, it may be noticed that Courts-Trotter, C.J who prepared the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench, made the following observations:—
“In such a matter we act not under statute but under the inherent powers which devolve upon us from the old Supreme Court of Madras. We the refore, stand with regard to prerogative writs in the same position as the Court of King's Bench in England and, in our opinion, we ought to follow the rules laid down by that Court in the decided English cases as to the scope and limitations of its jurisdiction.”
6. Whether these observations would hold good when this Court is acting under a provision of the Constitution for granting requisite relief to suitors against orders of the Tribunals which are clearly without jurisdiction is a question which may call for determination in a fit and proper case. I do not feel called upon to decide this question in the case in hand and I express no considered opinion on this somewhat difficult question. The point that Courts in this country have to deal with conditions materially different from those with which English Courts have to deal has also considerable bearing in determining as to how far we should adopt the precedents of English Courts in discharging our duties under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, as just stated, it is not necessary for me to pursue this matter any further. Suffice it to say that the power of this Court to entertain a new point, which goes to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal whose order is impugned, is well established and has not been doubted in any authoritative decision. Even the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jagatjit Cotton Mills Ltd., merely lays down that failure to raise objections to defect or lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is a relevant consideration to be borne in mind while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not think the petitioner can, on account of his failure to raise the objection before the learned District Judge, be considered to have been guilty of such conduct as would disentitle him to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It cannot be said that the petitioner sat on the fence and took his chance before the District Judge by deliberately and consciously refraining from raising the objection relating to his jurisdiction. It may incidentally be stated that the learned District Judge also did not care to satisfy himself if he had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the reference made to him. After all, he was not completely absolved from the responsibility of considering whether or not he was possessed of the necessary power to pass the order he actually did. I am thus clearly of the view that it would not promote the ends of justice if relief is refused to the petitioner and the order of the learned District Judge which is indisputably without jurisdiction and therefore, a nullity, is allowed to stand. In this connection, it is relevant to bear in mind that consent can never give a Tribunal jurisdiction if a condition, which goes to its root, has patently and manifestly not been performed or fulfilled. No appearance or consent can ever give a jurisdiction to a Tribunal or a Court of limited jurisdiction, which it does not otherwise possess. It is also fairly well settled that if an order is made without jurisdiction, it is never too late, in the absence of some supervening consideration, to give effect to the plea that it is a nullity. I have, therefore, no hesitation in allowing the writ petition, which I hereby do, and quash the orders of the learned District Judge, dated the 3rd October, 1958, deciding the reference under Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
7. For the reasons given above, allowing this writ petition I quash the impugned order, of the learned District Judge. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of these proceedings.
8. Petition allowed.