Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.W.P No. 388 of 2003

Judges

S.S Nijjar
Surya Kant, JJ.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Surya Kant, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (Er. T.R. Bansal), a diploma holder who joined the Punjab State Electricity Board (the Board) as a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 19.5.1962 and was promoted over the years to Assistant Executive Engineer (AEE) w.e.f. 20.1.1988, challenged the Board's decision to fix his pay on 1.1.1996 at a lower amount than that fixed for certain juniors. In the seniority list dated 30.6.1988 the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 124 while two juniors (Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg) were at Serial Nos. 129 and 132 respectively.

The Board revised pay scales effective 1.1.1996. The petitioner's pay was fixed at Rs. 12,900 whereas the pay of the two juniors was fixed at Rs. 15,350 (the petitioner sought re-fixation in the pay scale of Rs. 15,500 - 21,000). The petitioner made representations which led to a writ petition (C.W.P No. 8255 of 2000) that resulted in an order dated 6.7.2000 directing the Secretary/competent authority to decide the pending representation. Pursuant to that direction the Board passed the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) rejecting the petitioner's representation. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition seeking certiorari to quash the 13.9.2000 order and a direction to re-fix his pay from 1.1.1996 at par with his juniors.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the order dated 13.9.2000 rejecting the petitioner's representation for correct fixation of pay (effective 1.1.1996) can be quashed by writ of certiorari.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to re-fixation of his pay with effect from 1.1.1996 at par with the identified juniors (and consequent arrears).
Whether the source of recruitment (promotion versus direct recruitment) can by itself constitute a valid ground for differential pay fixation (i.e., as a permissible classification under Article 16/Article 14).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner sought issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the Board's order dated 13.9.2000 rejecting his representation for correct pay fixation from 1.1.1996.
He sought direction to the Board to re-fix his pay from 1.1.1996 in the pay scale Rs. 15,500 - 21,000 (the scale in which the pay of his juniors had been fixed) and consequential arrears.
The petitioner relied on the fact that his juniors had their pay fixed at a higher revised amount despite being junior in the seniority list dated 30.6.1988, and that he had earlier obtained a direction from this Court (order dated 6.7.2000) to have his representation decided.

Board's Arguments (Respondent)

The Board's written statement asserted that the petitioner was promoted to Assistant Engineer (AE) from the post of Sub-Divisional Officer, whereas Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg had applied for AE posts under direct recruitment, were selected, and were given fresh appointment letters as AE/Trainee on 21.8.1978. The petitioner was promoted to AE by office order dated 4.9.1979 and later regularised retrospectively w.e.f. 3.8.1977.
The Board stated that the opportunity for direct recruitment was open to all employees including the petitioner but he did not avail of it.
The Board pointed out differing pre-revised pay scales prior to 1.1.1996: the petitioner was in pre-revised scale Rs. 2000-4250 (initial start Rs. 2400) and juniors were in pre-revised scale Rs. 4500-6300 (both receiving Rs. 4750 at that time). The Board contended the petitioner's pay was rightly fixed at Rs. 12,900 on 1.1.1996 (revised conversion scale Rs. 7500-13700, initial Rs. 7700), whereas juniors' pay was rightly fixed at Rs. 15,350 (conversion scale Rs. 15,350-21,600).
The Board also relied on its internal instructions/guidelines regarding clearing pay anomalies and asserted that the petitioner's case was not covered under the relevant clauses of the instructions dated 1.6.1994 and that the anomaly was incurable under existing instructions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
K. Naryanan v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44 (AIR 1994 SC 55)	State may classify employees reasonably on the basis of qualifications or other relevant distinctions; classification is permissible under Article 16 where it is reasonable and related to objective.	The Court cited this case to acknowledge that reasonable classification (e.g., based on higher/lower qualifications) is permissible and does not automatically violate Article 16.
P. Murugesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1993) 2 SCC 340	Supports the principle that reasonable classification is permissible; referenced with K. Naryanan on classification issues.	Used with K. Naryanan to frame the proposition that classification by the State is allowed where reasonable nexus exists between classification and objective.
Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S.B. Kohli, (1973) 3 SCC 592 (AIR 1973 SC 811)	Interference by courts is required where differences between groups are insufficient to justify preferential treatment (no reasonable nexus).	The Court relied on this line of authority to state that differential treatment must have a sufficient basis; otherwise judicial interference is warranted.
D.D. Joshi v. Union of India, (1983) 2 SCC 235 (AIR 1983 SC 420)	Similar to Kohli: supports the proposition that classification must have reasonable nexus; otherwise discrimination invites interference.	Cited to reinforce the principle that differences in recruitment or status must meaningfully relate to the objective to justify preferential treatment.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 (AIR 1991 SC 101)	Article 16 is a species of Article 14; requirements of non-arbitrariness and fairness are essential components of Article 16.	The Court invoked this authority to emphasize that Article 16 requires non-arbitrariness and fairness, reinforcing that mere classification is not carte blanche for unequal treatment.
Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Rajinder Singh Patpatia, 2002 (1) RSJ 32 (Division Bench of this Court)	Source of recruitment (promotee vs. direct recruit) cannot by itself be the sole basis for denying benefits; benefit of circular should apply to all similarly situated officers where applicable.	The Court relied on and followed this Division Bench decision to hold that the source of recruitment alone is not a valid ground to deny the petitioner parity in pay; this authority was cited as directly on point.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the impugned order dated 13.9.2000 and the Board's written statement and found the Board's reasoning inconsistent and inadequate. The Board had attempted to justify the lower fixation of the petitioner's pay by reference to the "source of recruitment" — the petitioner being a promotee whereas the juniors were direct recruits — and by asserting that the petitioner's case was "not covered" under the Board's instructions for removal of pay anomalies. However, the Board candidly admitted that the petitioner's case did not fall within clauses (a) to (g) of its instructions dated 1.6.1994.

The Court distilled the applicable constitutional principles: (a) Article 16 permits reasonable classification (e.g., on qualifications, nature of duties, length of service) as recognized in K. Naryanan and P. Murugesan; (b) interference is required where there is no reasonable nexus between classification and the objective (Union of India v. Kohli; D.D. Joshi); and (c) Article 16 incorporates the fairness/non-arbitrariness requirement of Article 14 (DTC v. Mazdoor Congress).

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted that the Board did not contend that the juniors were granted higher pay because of higher qualifications, different duties, or longer service. Instead the Board relied solely on the mode of entry into the feeder cadre (promotion v. direct recruitment). The Court treated the source-of-recruitment justification as insufficient, particularly in light of the Division Bench decision in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Rajinder Singh Patpatia, which had held that source of recruitment alone cannot be the basis to deny benefits and that beneficent provisions meant to break stagnation must be applied to all similarly placed employees.

Given that the Board itself admitted the petitioner's case was not covered by its anomaly-removal instructions, yet sought to deny parity on the ground of recruitment source, the Court concluded that such differential treatment lacked the required reasonable nexus and fairness under Articles 14/16. The Court therefore found the Board's order unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) is quashed.

Directives and Immediate Consequences:

The Board is directed to re-fix the pay of the petitioner in the revised pay scale with effect from 1.1.1996 at par with his juniors identified in the record.
The Board is further directed to grant the consequential arrears to the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the Court's order.
If the Board fails to comply within the stipulated two-month period, the petitioner shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 7% per annum on such arrears.
No order as to costs was made by the Court.

Broader implications: The Court applied established principles concerning permissible classification under Article 16 and the necessity of a reasonable nexus when differential treatment is claimed. The opinion relied on an earlier Division Bench decision (Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Rajinder Singh Patpatia) to hold that source of recruitment alone does not justify denying benefits. The opinion does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case; its direct effect is the quashing of the specific administrative order and the restoration of pay parity and arrears to the petitioner as directed above.

Show full summary ...

T.R Bansal v. Punjab State Electricity Board .

Surya Kant, J.:— The petitioner, who was working as an Assistant Executive Engineer in the Punjab State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’) and has since retired, has approached this Court for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) whereby his representation for correct fixation of his pay with effect from 1.1.1996 has been rejected. He also seeks a direction to the Board to re-fix his pay with effect from 1.1.1996 in the pay scale of Rs. 15,500 - 21,000, namely the pay scale in which the pay of his juniors had been fixed.

2. The petitioner, a diploma holder, joined the Board as a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 19.5.1962 and was thereafter promoted firstly as Sub-Divisional Officer/Assistant Engineer (Civil) and then as Assistant Executive Engineer on 20.1.1988 In the seniority list of Assistant Engineers (Civil), as it stood on 30.6.1988 (Annexure P-1), the petitioner is placed at Serial No. 124 whereas Sarvshri Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg are placed at Serial Nos. 129 and 132 respectively. The Board revised the pay scales of its employees with effect from 1.1.1996, while the pay of the petitioner was fixed at Rs. 12,900/-, that of his juniors was fixed at Rs. 15,350. The petitioner represented before the authorities to remove this anomaly but having found no response, approached this Court in C.W.P No. 8255 of 2000 which was disposed of vide an order dated 6.7.2000 with a direction to the Secretary of the Board and/or the competent authority to take a decision upon pending representation made by the petitioner. Pursuant to these directions, the Board passed the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) and rejected the claim of the petitioner which has further led him to approach this Court again.

3. Notice of motion was issued and in response thereto written statement has been filed on behalf of the Board. We have heard Shri Rakesh Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the prayer made in this writ petition and Shri Kapil Kakkar, learned counsel for the Board and have also perused the record.

4. On a perusal of the impugned order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6), we find that the Board has come up with a strange reasoning that though there exists an anomaly in the fixation of pay of the petitioner in the revised pay scale granted with effect from 1.1.1996, however, the same is incurable under the existing instructions issued by it. It will be beneficial to extract the relevant part of the aforementioned order which reads as follows:—

“Whereas the PSEB has laid down guidelines for clearing of pay anomaly cases in old scales (pre-revised scales). The guidelines have been calculated vide Secy./PSEB Finance Section memo No. 116493/117293 dated 1.6.94 The abstract of instructions as under

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx

(d) xxx xxx xxx

(e) xxx xxx xxx

(f) xxx xxx xxx

(g) xxx xxx xxx

Whereas the case of Ex. T.R Bansal, AEE/Retired is not covered under the above instructions since Sh. Kirpal Singh Mangat/AEE and Sh. Raj Kumar Garg/AEE (now Senior Executive Engineers) while working as JE/Civil applied for the post of AE under direct recruitment category and were selected for the post of AE and on their election they were offered the post of AE/Trainee (Civil) vide Secretary/Board memo No. 101626.EBP-2701 dated 21.8.78 and memo No. 101641.EX/EBP-2706 dated 21.8.78 respectively, whereas Er. T.R Bansal was promoted from the post of JE/Civil to AE vide office Order No. 81.BE dated 4.9.1979 and subsequently he was allowed promotion to AE/Civil retrospectively w.e.f 3.8.77 vide Secretary, PSEB Office Order No. 132.BEG dated 4.2.82

Whereas the Board has not yet finalized and issued any instructions' for removing pay anomaly case ir the revised pay scale effective from 1.1.1996

Whereas taking into consideration of all aspect of the case, the competent authority has observed that the pay anomaly case Er. T.R Bansal AEE/Retired with Er. Kirpal Singh Mangat/AEE and Er. Raj Kumar Garg/AEE (now Executive Engineers) is not covered under the instructions issued by the Board and hence rejected.”

(emphasis ours)

5. It can, thus, be seen that while attempting to justify the pay fixation which has caused payment of lesser emoluments to the petitioner as compared to his juniors, shelter has been taken behind their source of recruitment, namely, that in the feeder cadre the petitioner was appointed by way of promotion whereas his juniors were appointed by direct recruitment. In the next breath, however, it is candidly admitted that the pay anomaly case of the petitioner is not covered under clauses (a) to (g) of the instructions dated 1.6.1994 issued on the subject of removal of pay anomalies.

6. Coming to the pleadings, we further find that the stand taken by the Board to deny the fixation of pay to the petitioner as on 1.1.1996 at par with his juniors, is to the following effect

“13(i) That in reply to sub-para (i) of the writ petition it is submitted that the petitioner was promoted as AE from the post of S.O whereas Engineer Kirpal Singh Mangat and Engineer Raj Kumar Garg both AEE (Now Senior Executive Engineers) while working as S.O Civil applied for the post of A.E Civil under Direct Recruitment and were selected for the post of A.E Civil and given fresh appointment letters. The opportunity to apply for Direct Recruitment for the post of Asstt. Engineer was given to all the entitled employees including Engineer T.R Bansal. The Board advertised the post of A.E Civil to be filled through direct recruitment in which the existing Board employees were also made eligible and were given opportunity to apply but the same was not availed by the petitioner. Further, Er. T.R Bansal was getting pay of Rs. 4750/- in the pre-revised scale of Rs. 2000-4250 with initial start of Rs. 2400/- prior to 1.1.1996 whereas Er. Kirpal Singh Mangat and Er. Raj Kumar Garg who were junior to him also getting pay Rs. 4750/- prior to 1.1.1996 in the pre-revised scale of Rs. 4500/6300. The pay scale of Er. T.R Bansal was lesser than that of his juniors S/Sh. Raj Kumar Garg and Kirpal Singh Mangat. The pay of petitioner was rightly fixed at Rs. 12,900/- on 1.1.1996 in revised conversion scale of Rs. 7500/13700 with initial start of Rs. 7700/-. Whereas the pay of his junior was fixed at Rs. 15,350/- at minimum of the revised conversion scale of Rs. 15350/21600.”

7. True it is that Article 16 does not debar a reasonable classification of the employees provided that such classification is made with reference to the objective to be achieved. Similarly, the State is not precluded from classifying the services into cadres or grades on the basis of higher and lower qualifications, as held by the Apex Court in (i) K. Naryanan v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44 : AIR 1994 SC 55 : [1993 (5) SLR 290 (SC)]; and (ii) P. Murugesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1993) 2 SCC 340 : [1993 (1) SLR 830 (SC)]. However, interference by the Court is inevitable when the differences between the two groups of recruits are not sufficient to give preferential treatment to one against the other, namely, where there is no reasonable nexus between the differences and/or the recruitment, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments including (i) Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S.B Kohli, (1973) 3 SCC 592 : AIR 1973 SC 811; (ii) D.D Joshi v. Union of India, (1983) 2 SCC 235 : AIR 1983 SC 420 : [1983 (1) SLR 552 (SC)]. Still further, since Article 16 is a species of Article 14, the requirement of non-arbitrariness and fairness is also an essential component of Article 16. (Ref. Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : AIR 1991 SC 101) : [1990 (5) SLR 311 (SC)].

8. However, differential treatment based upon academic qualifications, nature of duties, and/or length of service for the purpose of granting higher pay scales etc. are well known instances of reasonable, fair and just classifications.

9. Applying these principles to the facts and circumstances of the case in had, it is, clearly spelt out from the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) as well as from the written statement that it is not the case of the Board that juniors to the petitioner have been granted higher pay scale and/or some additional increments either on account of their higher academic qualifications or for some special nature of duties. Rather, the fixation of pay of the petitioner at a stage which is lower than that of his juniors is sought to be justified merely on the mode of their entering into the feeder cadre, namely, the petitioner coming as a promotee whereas his juniors as direct recruits.

10. Can the source of recruitment by itself be a valid ground for classification for the purpose of grant of higher scale of pay, was considered and negatived by a Division Bench of this Court (to which one of us S.S Nijjar, J is a Member) in the case of Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Rajinder Singh Patpatia, 2002 (1) RSJ 32 after holding as follows:—

“A perusal of the above regulation shows that Regulation 10.2 deals with Circle Head Draftsman and Chief Head Draftsman. It requires only possession of diploma. Hence, it does not require the qualification of degree or A.M.I.E as contended by Shri D.S Nehra. The circular letter dated 25.4.1990 (supra) is not confined only to the category of those who have been given promotion under Regulation 10.4 Therefore, the basic argument of Shri D.S Nehra that degree/A.M.I.E qualification is required for the purpose of earning the scale of Rs. 4500-6300 after completion of 16 years of service is not supported by the reading of Regulation which deals with Circle Head Draftsman as the case of the petitioner. Moreover, by deeming fiction all promotees having been treated as direct recruits and there is no requirement for them to possess degree/A.M.I.E qualifications. Any other construction of the circular would render Clause 2 of the circular referred to in the preceding para as otiose and illusory. We are of the considered view that the benefit of higher scale of pay cannot be confined by the B.B.M.B to those engineers who have come from P.S.E.B only. The benefits are meant for all the engineers working in the B.B.M.B who are covered by circular letter dated 24.5.1990 (supra) whether they have come from P.S.E.B or from any other organisation. The B.B.M.B has adopted the circular dated 24.5.1990 for its application to the engineers working with them. The petitioner was promoted as A.D.E/S.D.O on 25.4.1971 and was regularised as such w.e.f 1.5.1979 He completed 16 years of service in the year 1987 much before the date of his superannuation i.e 30.11.1990 Another reason for taking the view that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of circular dated 24.5.1990 is that these are beneficient provisions made for the breaking of stagnation to bring efficiency in the working of the officers. The petitioner has since retired on 30.11.1990, no prejudice is likely to be caused to any employee in the service.”

(emphasis applied)

11. For the reasons afore-mentioned, we allow this writ petition, quash the order dated 13.9.2000 (Annexure P-6) and direct the Board to re-fix the pay of the petitioner in the revised pay scale with effect from 1.1.1996 at par with his juniors and to grant him the consequential arrear within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order failing which the petitioner shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 7% per annum upon such arrears. No order as to costs.

12. Petition allowed.

T.R Bansal v. Punjab State Electricity Board .

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Surya Kant, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Board's Arguments (Respondent)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

T.R Bansal v. Punjab State Electricity Board .

Comments