AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 50 of the Nazul Rules
  • Rule 50-A
  • Rule 51
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009
  • Right to Education Act
  • Rules 50, 50-A and 51 of the Nazul Manual
  • Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
  • Rule 52
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • the 2009 Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 50 of the Nazul Rules
  • Rule 50-A
  • Rule 51
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009
  • Right to Education Act
  • Rules 50, 50-A and 51 of the Nazul Manual
  • Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973
  • Rule 52
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • the 2009 Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1958 the Nazul Officer leased Plot No. 92-A, Mahanagar, Lucknow to Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee for 30 years with renewal options and, in 1961, granted a seven-year garden lease over the adjoining Plot No. 92-A/C. The garden lease expired on 31-7-1968 but Banerjee did not surrender possession.

Pursuant to Government policies (G.O. 23-5-1992, 2-12-1992 and 3-10-1994) the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) converted surplus nazul land into freehold and, after cancelling an initial tender, invited fresh bids on 20-12-1994 for eight plots including Plot 92-A/C. City Montessori School (CMS) bid successfully for four plots, deposited 25 % (₹ 7,40,700) but failed to pay the balance despite demand notices, leading LDA to cancel the bids on 14-6-1995.

Through gubernatorial intervention, the State Government on 12-1-1996 directed LDA to hand over possession of the plots to CMS and to accept the remaining 75 % in ten six-monthly instalments. An agreement and possession certificate of the same date recorded these terms, but CMS never paid any instalment over the next 13 years.

In 2009 CMS filed Writ Petition No. 8514 (M/B) of 2009 seeking a mandamus to LDA to accept full sale consideration and to quash proceedings conferring freehold rights on Banerjee’s successors (the present appellants). Meanwhile, the appellants obtained an order (4-5-2009) in Writ Petition No. 4085 (M/B) of 2009 directing the Nazul Officer to decide their application for conversion of Plot 92-A/C into freehold; on 3-8-2009 the Officer converted 4433 sq ft for ₹ 1,95,939.

The High Court (impugned judgment) rejected CMS’s claim to enforce the 1996 agreement but, invoking the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, directed that possession be restored to CMS and a sale deed executed at current market price, while quashing the Nazul Officer’s conversion order in favour of the appellants. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 10180–10181 of 2011.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after refusing to enforce the 12-1-1996 agreement, the High Court could nevertheless grant substantive relief to CMS by relying on the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
  2. Whether the High Court rightly quashed the action of LDA and the Nazul Officer taken pursuant to the order dated 4-5-2009 (W.P. No. 4085 of 2009) converting part of Plot 92-A/C into freehold for the appellants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The High Court’s direction granting CMS possession was unsustainable because CMS had not sought such relief and its bid had been validly cancelled.
  • The State Government’s letter of 12-1-1996 and the ensuing agreement were nullities; paying 25 % of bid money could not revive an agreement 15 years later.
  • CMS’s writ petition was grossly delayed and should have been dismissed on that ground alone.

Respondent 1 (CMS) Arguments

  • The 12-1-1996 agreement, read with Rules 50, 50-A and 51 of the Nazul Manual, was binding; refusal by LDA to accept instalments breached that agreement.
  • Default occurred only because LDA never provided an instalment schedule or interest figure despite repeated requests.
  • As a charitable educational institution, CMS should not be compelled to pay current market price; enforcement of the original terms was equitable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining (2008) 10 SCC 115 Stale or time-barred claims cannot be revived by mere directions to “consider”. Relied on by High Court (and noted by Supreme Court) to hold that appellants’ claim to freehold conversion after decades was stale.
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P. (2011) 5 SCC 29 Public property must be disposed of through transparent methods such as public auction to safeguard public interest. Supreme Court directed LDA to auction the plot in accordance with principles stated in paras 65–66 of this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Enforceability of the 1996 agreement: The Court affirmed the High Court’s view that the Governor’s order and ensuing agreement were issued in violation of procedural norms; the agreement explicitly provided that non-payment of instalments rendered it void. CMS admittedly paid nothing after 1996; hence no enforceable right survived.

2. Invocation of the 2009 Act: The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act contains no provision for allotment or sale of land to schools. The High Court, therefore, erred in relying on it to grant CMS relief, especially after holding CMS a “ranked defaulter”.

3. Appellants’ claim to freehold: Banerjee’s garden lease expired in 1968 and he remained an unauthorised occupant thereafter. Consequently, his successors (the appellants) had no legitimate claim. Their writ petition (No. 4085 of 2009) was branded an abuse of process; the Nazul Officer’s conversion of 4433 sq ft for a nominal amount was arbitrary and rightly quashed.

4. Public interest and Article 14: Once the 1996 agreement stood terminated, LDA was obliged to dispose of the plot through a process consistent with equality, namely public auction, rather than favouring either litigant.

5. Costs for frivolous litigation: Both CMS and the appellants prolonged litigation for years, consuming judicial time. The Court imposed exemplary costs of ₹ 10 lakhs on each.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Civil Appeal No. 10181 of 2011 (by appellants) is partly allowed; the High Court’s direction to hand over Plot 92-A/C to CMS on payment of current market price is set aside. The High Court’s quashing of the Nazul Officer’s freehold conversion in favour of the appellants is upheld. Civil Appeal No. 10180 of 2011 (by CMS) is dismissed. Both CMS and the appellants are saddled with costs of ₹ 10 lakhs each, payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within two months.

Implications: CMS and the appellants must vacate and hand over Plot 92-A/C to LDA within 15 days; LDA shall auction the plot in accordance with principles of transparent public disposal (per Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress). Either party may bid in that auction. The appellants may withdraw the amount earlier deposited toward freehold conversion. No new legal precedent was created; the decision reinforces existing principles of public land disposal, rejection of stale claims, and discouragement of litigative abuse.

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    Khela Banerjee And Another v. City Montessori School And Others

    G.S Singhvi, J.— The main question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether, having rejected its prayer for issue of a mandamus to the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) to accept the total amount of sale consideration with regard to Plot No. 92-A/C (Khasra No. 754), Mahanagar, Lucknow, the High Court could have relied upon the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short “the 2009 Act”) and granted relief to City Montessori School (Respondent 1 in Civil Appeal No. 10181 of 2011 and the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 10180 of 2011) in substantially similar terms. An ancillary question which needs determination is whether the High Court had rightly quashed the action taken by LDA and the Nazul Officer, Lucknow in compliance with the order dated 4-5-2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009.

    2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as the appellants and Respondent 1.

    Background facts and details of the cases filed by the parties

    3. The Nazul Officer leased out Plot No. 92-A, Mahanagar, Faizabad Road, Lucknow to Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee (hereinafter described as “Shri Banerjee”) in 1958 for a period of 30 years with a right to seek two renewals of 30 years each. The terms of the lease were incorporated in the registered deed executed on 14-2-1959. After about 3 years, the Nazul Officer granted lease of the adjoining plot bearing No. 92-A/C to Shri Banerjee for a period of 7 years commencing from 1-8-1961 for garden purposes. The registered lease deed dated 29-1-1964 executed between the Governor of Uttar Pradesh through the Nazul Officer and Shri Banerjee contained a stipulation that at the end of 7 years' period, the lessee shall hand over possession of the plot to the Government. However, Shri Banerjee did not surrender the plot on or after 31-7-1968 and continued to occupy the same till January 1996.

    4. In 1992, the Government of Uttar Pradesh took a policy decision for conversion of leasehold nazul lands into freehold and disposal thereof. This policy was circulated vide G.O dated 23-5-1992 and was subsequently modified vide G.O dated 2-12-1992 and G.O dated 3-10-1994, Para 4 whereof postulated conversion of open nazul land declared surplus under the Ceiling Act and horticulture/agriculture lease land into freehold and disposal thereof by auction or by inviting tenders. In furtherance of the policy contained in G.O dated 3-10-1994, LDA issued tender notice dated 24-11-1994 and invited bids for disposal of plots (open nazul land which had been converted into freehold). However, before the bids received pursuant to the notice dated 24-11-1994 could be accepted, the State Government changed the nature of some of the plots from residential to commercial. Therefore, LDA cancelled tender notice dated 24-11-1994 and invited fresh bids for eight plots including Plot No. 92-A/C.

    5. Shri Banerjee, who was illegally occupying Plot No. 92-A/C filed Suit No. 285 of 1994 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow with the prayer that G.Os dated 2-12-1992 and 3-10-1994 may be quashed and LDA be restrained from dispossessing him pursuant to tender notice dated 24-11-1994.

    6. Respondent 1 filed Writ Petition No. 11 of 1995 for quashing the tender notice dated 20-12-1994 on the ground that the same was contrary to the Zonal Development Plan prepared under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and prayed that a mandamus be issued to the official respondents to accept the tenders submitted pursuant to the notice dated 24-11-1994 and complete the formalities for the execution of the sale deed. Respondent 1 also applied for stay but could not convince the High Court to entertain its prayer.

    7. Faced with the possibility of losing an opportunity to get the plots in respect of which tenders were invited vide notice dated 20-12-1994, Respondent 1 submitted bids for four plots including Plot No. 92-A/C. The competent authority accepted the bids of Respondent 1. The latter deposited 25% of the bid money i.e Rs 7,40,700 but did not pay the balance amount within the stipulated period despite notices dated 21-2-1995 and 8-3-1995 issued by LDA. Instead, Shri Jagdish Gandhi, Manager of Respondent 1 made a representation for early delivery of possession of the plots and grant of permission to pay ¾th of the price in six-monthly instalments in accordance with G.O dated 3-10-1994. LDA did not accept the request of Shri Jagdish Gandhi by observing that the facility of paying the price of plots in six-monthly instalments is not available in the cases involving disposal of open nazul land and garden leases. Shri Jagdish Gandhi then approached the Principal Secretary to the Governor and succeeded in persuading him to send a letter dated 3-4-1995 to the State Government to instruct the officers of LDA to hand over possession of the plots and accept the balance amount in easy instalments. The State Government forwarded that letter to LDA, which declined to accept the request made by Shri Jagdish Gandhi on the ground that the advertisement did not contain any such stipulation. Simultaneously, a decision was taken to cancel the bids and this was conveyed to Respondent 1 vide letter dated 14-6-1995.

    8. Respondent 1 did not challenge cancellation of the bids because its Manager was sure that he will be able to pull strings in the power corridors and get the desired relief. This is evinced from the fact that the representation made by him was accepted by none else than the Governor of the State, who passed the Order dated 17-12-1995 and directed that possession of the plots be handed over to the management of Respondent 1 and the balance amount be accepted in ten six-monthly instalments with interest which may be fixed keeping in view the rates charged for the schemes framed by the Development Authority.

    9. In furtherance of the direction given by the Governor, the State Government sent a Letter dated 12-1-1996 to the Vice-Chairman of LDA, which reads as under:

    “No. 48/9-Aa-4-96-39N/91
    From:
    Shri Rakesh Kumar Goyal,
    Joint Secretary,
    Government of Uttar Pradesh
    To,
    The Vice-Chairman,
    Lucknow Development Authority,
    Lucknow
    Government Section 4Lucknow dated 12-1-1996
    Subject: Regarding handing over possession of nazul land comprised in Khasra Nos. 91-A/B(754), 92-A/C(754), 10-A(758), 90-A/A(754) allotted to City Montessori School, Lucknow through tender.
    Sir,
    Please refer to your Letter No. 425.NS dated 9-1-1996 on the above subject.
    In this regard I have been directed to state to you that all the above four plots of land which have been approved in favour of Manager, Shri Jagdish Gandhi, City Montessori School and which was cancelled vide Government Order dated 14-6-1995, after careful consideration in the matter the Government has decided that with reference to all the above four plots of land if Shri Jagdish Gandhi has deposited 25% amount and if there is no stay order against him, its possession be handed over to Shri Jagdish Gandhi and balance 75% amount be realised in future 10 six-monthly instalments and interest payable thereon shall be informed subsequently.
    sd/-
    (Rakesh Kumar Goel)
    Joint Secretary”

    10. On the same day, an agreement was executed between the Vice-Chairman of LDA acting on behalf of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and Respondent 1 through its Manager, Shri Jagdish Gandhi. The relevant portions of the agreement (as contained in the paper book of Civil Appeal No. 10180 of 2011) are reproduced below:

    “Deed of Agreement
    This deed of agreement is executed between the Vice-Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority, on behalf of H.E the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the vendor’), meaning thereby its representatives, assigns and legal representatives (the first party)
    and
    City Montessori School, Station Road, Lucknow through its Manager, Shri Jagdish Gandhi, aged about 60 years, son of late Shri Phoolchand Agrawal, resident of 12, Station Road (hereinafter referred to as ‘the purchaser’), meaning thereby the purchaser, its heirs, legal heirs and assigns (the second party).
    Whereas as per the directions contained in Government Order No. 48/9-Aa-4-96-39N/91, dated 12-1-1996, issued with regard to management and disposal of nazul land, a nazul land Khasra No. 92-A/C(754), area 7305 sq ft situated at Mahanagar, Faizabad Road, Lucknow was disposed of for commercial purpose by way of freehold tender/auction. In response to the above auction, by this Office Letter No. 71 N.S, dated 20-5-1996 an amount of Rs 22,21,300.00 was required to be deposited. You deposited Rs 7,40,000.00 by bank drafts in the Nazul Fund, details of which are given below. Challan No. BDN-8070443 dated 7-1-1995—Rs 25,000.00, BDN-8070445 dated 7-1-1995—Rs 2,71,200.00, BDN-8069790 dated 13-12-1995—Rs 1,80,000.00, BDN-136509 dated 2-2-1995—Rs 2,64,500.00—total Rs 7,40,700.00, which means that 25% of the total auction amount has been deposited. The second party sought permission to deposit rest 75% amount in instalments, which the Government has granted by Government Order No. 48/9-Aa-4-96-39N/91 dated 12-1-1996 to deposit 75% amount in further ten half-yearly instalments from the date of delivery of possession. Information of rate of interest on the above 75% amount will be conveyed to the second party after receiving instructions from the Government in this regard.
    Thus, the agreement between the aforesaid two parties will be as under:
    1. Whereas the second party has paid 25% of the total tender/auction amount according to the demand letter and remaining 75% amount will be deposited together with the interest, as fixed by the Government, by the second party in 10 half-yearly instalments without any default from the date of execution of the agreement;
    2. Whereas the payment of the instalments as indicated above will be paid by the second party compulsorily by the prescribed time-limit, failing which or in case of failure to deposit two consecutive instalments, this deed of agreement will become void and the first party shall be free to exercise its discretionary power to forfeit ¼th of the total deposit and refund the remaining amount and the first party, if desired so, shall be free to enter the land in question and shall have right to sell it in favour of any third party;
    3. Whereas 25% of the total tender amount has been paid by the second party and for rest of the 75% amount an agreement has been reached at between the parties. Possession of the land in question is being delivered by way of the instant agreement. Therefore, according to the prevailing Greater Scheme (Mahayojana) of 2001, if the second party produces building map, it will be considered for approval, holding thereby that the possession of the land is with the second party, that the nazul land in question or building constructed on it can be transferred only when the entire tender/auction amount and the total expenditure payable by that time are cleared to the first party. Sale deed in respect of the nazul land will be executed on the stamp paper by paying required stamp fees. Stamp fee and other expenses will be borne by the second party;
    4. Whereas the second party shall deposit the remaining aforementioned tender amount in 10 half-yearly instalments under relevant accounts titled ‘0075 legal general services, 105 sale of land and property, 03 lump sum amount on converting nazul land into freehold property’ by the prescribed date by treasury challan/bank draft in the main branch of State Bank at Lucknow;
    5.-7.***
    Witness:
    1.
    2.
    V.K Gupta
    Special Nazul Officer/Joint Secretary
    LDA, Lucknow”
    (emphasis supplied)

    11. Simultaneously, certificate dated 12-1-1996 was issued by LDA showing delivery of possession of Plot No. 92-A/C to Shri Jagdish Gandhi. The same reads as under:

    “Office of the Lucknow Development Authority
    (Nazul Department), Lucknow
    Possession Certificate
    Possession of nazul land Khasra No. 92-A/C(754), area 7305 sq ft, situated at Mahanagar, Faizabad Road, Lucknow is handed over to Shri Jagdish Gandhi, Manager, City Montessori School, Lucknow today 12-1-1996.
    Boundary of the abovementioned land is as under:

    East Road Mount Carmel School West Land of City Montessori School North Shri M.M Banerjee's house South Faizabad Road Signature of the person to whom possession is delivered Signature of the person who delivered the possession (Jagdish Gandhi) (P.K Mishra) Amin, LDA”

    12. Although the management of Respondent 1 knew that the balance price is required to be paid in ten six-monthly instalments, it deliberately omitted to do so and performed the ritual of sending one letter every year to the functionaries of LDA on the issues of demarcation of land and fixation of instalments to show that the balance amount could not be paid due to LDA's failure to indicate the amount required to be deposited along with interest.

    13. After 13 years of the execution of agreement and taking possession of the plot, Respondent 1 filed Writ Petition No. 8514 of 2009 with the following substantive prayers:

    “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to accept forthwith the total amount of sale consideration with regard to Plot No. 92-A/C(754) along with interest whatsoever may be fixed either by this Court or by the respondents;
    (ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the entire proceedings of conferring freehold rights on Respondents 4 and 5 on the said Plot No. 92-A/C(754), Mahanagar, Lucknow which has already been purchased by the petitioner in auction as held on 9-1-2005 and the agreement dated 12-1-1996 been executed by Respondent 3 in favour of the petitioner and possession has also been delivered vide possession certificate dated 12-1-1996 after summoning the record of the proceedings from the office of Opposite Parties 2 and 3”.

    14. In the meanwhile, Shri Banerjee filed Writ Petition No. 446 of 1996 and prayed that the State Government, LDA and the Nazul Officer may be restrained from taking any action in violation of the lease deed dated 14-2-1959 or give the strip of garden lease to any other person without taking proceedings in accordance with law or convert the same for any other purpose. The same was disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 30-8-2005 with an observation that if any action is taken by Respondents 3 and 4 in violation of the terms of lease then the writ petitioner shall be free to approach an appropriate forum.

    15. During the pendency of Writ Petition No. 446 of 1996, the State Government issued another Order dated 17-2-1996 for conversion of nazul land from leasehold to freehold and made the same applicable to the cases in which the lease had already expired but the lessee was continuing in possession. The primary object of this order was to legitimise the continued illegal occupation of land by the erstwhile lessees.

    16. With a view to take advantage of the policy contained in the order dated 17-2-1996, Shri Banerjee submitted application dated 23-3-1996 to the Vice-Chairman, LDA for conversion of Plot No. 92-A, Faizabad Road, Mahanagar into freehold. He submitted another application dated 29-3-1996 to the Special Nazul Officer, LDA with similar prayer by stating that the plot had been allotted to him for the purpose of gardening. Along with the first application, Shri Banerjee annexed a photostat copy of the lease deed dated 29-1-1964, which related to Plot No. 92-A/C. The application made by Shri Banerjee was not entertained by LDA on the ground that after the expiry of lease period, the plot was auctioned and the bid given by Respondent 1 had been accepted.

    17. When the management of Respondent 1 started construction of boundary wall on Plot No. 92-A/C, Shri Banerjee raised objection by claiming that he was in lawful possession of the plot. Thereupon, Respondent 1 filed Suit No. 58 of 1996 for permanent injunction. The trial court prima facie felt convinced that Respondent 1 was having possession of the plot and passed injunction order dated 22-2-1996, which was confirmed on 13-5-2002.

    18. Shri Banerjee died on 10-5-1996. After about two years, the appellants submitted application dated 17-3-2008 for mutation of their names in respect of Plot No. 92-A. They claimed that by virtue of will dated 14-7-2005 executed by the deceased, they had become owners of the plot. After some time, they filed Writ Petition No. 5049 of 2008 with the grievance that the application made by them was not being decided by the competent authority and prayed for issue of direction to LDA to sanction mutation in their favour. The Division Bench of the High Court passed an interim order dated 6-6-2008 and directed the Nazul Officer, Lucknow to consider and decide the application made by the appellants. Thereafter, LDA passed order dated 25-3-2009 and sanctioned conversion of Plot No. 92-A from leasehold to freehold. Thereafter, the appellants deposited Rs 4,97,692 as conversion charges.

    19. During the pendency of Writ Petition No. 5049 of 2008, Appellant 2, Chandak Banerjee filed Suit No. 538 of 2008 for a declaration that auction held pursuant to the advertisement dated 20-12-1994 was illegal and inoperative. He also prayed that the respondents be restrained from interfering with his possession over Plot No. 92-A/C.

    20. The appellants also filed Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009 for issue of a mandamus to LDA to convert leasehold rights into freehold in respect of Plot No. 92-A/C. The same was disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 4-5-2009, which reads as under:

    “Heard Shri Pratish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for Opposite Party 1 and Shri D.K Upadhyay, learned counsel for Opposite Parties 2 and 3.
    The petitioner has alleged that a lease of appurtenant land bearing Plot No. 92-A/C measuring 6 biswas 5 biswansis 13 kachwansis (7188 sq ft) situated at Mahanagar was granted in favour of Shri M.M Banerji by the Nazul Officer, Lucknow for gardening purpose for a period of seven years.
    The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Shri M.M Banerji, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners in pursuance of the Government Order dated 17-2-1996 had applied for freehold rights of the property after depositing the requisite amount but till date no decision has been taken by the Nazul Officer, Lucknow with respect to the freehold rights to the petitioner who are successors of late Shri M.M Banerji, who was the original leaseholder.
    In view of the aforesaid facts, we dispose of the writ petition with a direction to Opposite Party 2 to take a final decision with respect to the freehold rights of Nazul Plot No. 92-A/C, situated at Mahanagar, Lucknow within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced.”

    21. In compliance with the direction given by the High Court, the Nazul Officer passed the order dated 3-8-2009 and converted 4433 sq ft of land out of the total area of 7188 sq ft of Plot No. 92-A/C into freehold. The remaining area was retained for widening the road. On next day, the appellants deposited conversion charges amounting to Rs 1,95,939.

    22. In the writ petitions filed by them, the appellants did not implead Respondent 1 as a party, but the latter impleaded them as Respondents 4 and 5 in Writ Petition No. 8514(M/B) of 2009. Respondent 1 also gave details of the cases filed by the parties and annexed copies of the orders passed by the civil courts and the High Court. The appellants contested Writ Petition No. 8514 of 2009 and pleaded that the State Government did not have the power to ordain delivery of possession of the plot to Respondent 1 because the bid given by it had been cancelled by LDA on account of non-payment of the balance price. They also pleaded that the agreement dated 12-1-1996 was a nullity and was not binding on them.

    23. After noting the factual matrix of the case, the Division Bench of the High Court considered the question whether Respondent 1 could seek a mandamus for enforcement of the agreement dated 12-1-1996 and answered the same in negative by making the following observations WP No. 8514 of 2009:

    “Though we accept and hold in terms of the legal submissions, as above, urged by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, yet looking to the factual background of this case, we are of the considered view that the impugned agreement entered into between the petitioner and the official respondents on 12-1-1996 would not be enforceable in law after the lapse of a period of 13 years only on the strength of depositing an amount of Rs 7,40,700, said to be the one-fourth of the total consideration amount. It appears that the petitioner engaged itself only in correspondence with the official respondents and in litigation, instead of paying the rest of the principal amount, leaving aside the interest amount, which could have been determined later by the authority concerned. Even no efforts were made to seek direction from the courts to accept the deposit of principal amount before the filing of this writ petition. It also appears that the initial agreement was cancelled on 14-6-1995 for default in depositing the rest, say, ¾th of the consideration amount which had been demanded vide the letters dated 21-2-1995 and 8-3-1995. However, taking a considerate view, on a written request made by the petitioner school, the payment schedule was rearranged vide the agreement dated 12-1-1996 but again no amount was deposited towards the payment of any of the instalments. Thus, the petitioner school was not ready and willing to perform its obligation under the agreement and in law.”

    24. The Division Bench then adverted to the appellants' plea that the direction in Writ Petition No. 4085 (M/B) of 2009 cannot be nullified by entertaining a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and held that they are not entitled to get the plot in dispute by paying the paltry amount of Rs 1,95,939. This is evinced from the following extracts of the impugned order WP No. 8514 of 2009:

    “Here, in the instant case, the garden lease in respect of the property in question was granted for a brief period of 7 years in favour of Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee, the predecessor-in-interest of private Respondents 4 and 5, which expired in 1968. As per the condition of garden lease agreement, the plot in question was to stand surrendered to the State after the expiry of lease deed. Moreover, after the garden lease period was over, no effort was made by Shri Moni Banerjee for a renewal and perhaps, it was also not renewable under the terms of the lease deed. Thereafter, the land was converted into a commercial property, and it was advertised for auction-sale wherein the tender of the petitioner school being the highest bidder was accepted and a lease agreement was executed between the petitioner and the official respondents. Simultaneously, the possession of the property was also delivered to the petitioner school.
    It is also noticeable that Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee did not participate in the auction-sale despite having knowledge about the status of the property through the advertisement. It is only when the petitioner school wanted to construct a boundary wall that Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee put a resistance and went in litigation but in none of the litigations any title in respect of the property was settled in favour of Shri Banerjee or his successors-in-interest. Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee had no sanction of any lease agreement or government order to continue with possession of the property and as noticed above, even some attempts were also made by the official respondents to take back the possession of property from Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee and his successors. Thus, the official respondents had a clear intention that the impugned property was in illegal possession of Shri Moni Mohan Banerjee.
    Moreover, with the efflux of time between 1968 and 1996 when the Government Notification dated 17-2-1996 was issued to provide for conversion of leasehold right into freehold right, in respect of nazul lands in occupation of people, the nature of land had been changed to commercial property and it was put to auction. Thus, the claim of private respondents had become stale which could not have been revived by a direction of this Court to consider or take a final decision on the application of Respondents 4 and 5 in view of the ratio of judgment in C. Jacob case (2008) 10 SCC 115 and the property could not have been settled for a paltry amount of Rs 1,95,939 whereas the same property was sold in auction for an amount of over Rs 29 lakhs in favour of the petitioner way back in 1995, and presently, its market price is over Rs 2 crore. The direction to consider the claim of Respondents 4 and 5 was passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 (MB) of 2009 vide the order dated 4-5-2009, which on reproduction reads as under:
    It is a settled principle of law that if an authority is directed to consider the case, it should consider judiciously on merit and in accordance with law and not arbitrarily causing a huge loss to public exchequer under the umbrella of a court's order directing to consider or take final decision on the case. Thus, the order of official Respondents 2 and 3, Lucknow Development Authority and Nazul Officer, as also the demand notice and subsequent proceedings regarding grant of freehold right in favour of private Respondents 4 and 5 deserve to be and is hereby quashed.”

    25. Notwithstanding its finding that a mandamus cannot be issued for enforcing the agreement dated 12-1-1996, the High Court virtually allowed the writ petition of Respondent 1 by relying upon the 2009 Act and directed the official respondents to hand over possession of Plot No. 92-A/C to the said respondent and execute the sale deed on payment of market price at the current rate. The reasons recorded by the High Court for granting relief to Respondent 1 are as under:

    “Needless to say that this Court is not only the court of law but also a court of equity and, therefore, its decision must subserve the cause of justice and in an appropriate case it may grant such relief to which the writ petitioner would be entitled to in law as well in equity. Equity is not anti-law but a moral dimension of law. Rather it is a grace and conscience of living law, and thus, a court's discretion is to be exercised with circumspection within the precincts of justice, equity and good conscience while keeping in view the given facts and circumstances of the case.
    Thus, taking into consideration the facts that Parliament has passed the Right to Education Act, that the petitioner deposited 25% (Rs 7,40,700) of the consideration amount way back in 1995, and that he is ready to pay the present market price of the plot whereas no such offer has come from private Respondents 4 and 5 during the course of hearing, we think it expedient in the interest of justice to direct the settlement of property in question in favour of the petitioner school upon making payment of cost price at the current market rate prevailing in the locality.
    In the premises set out hereinabove, we partly allow the writ petition with a direction to official respondents to hand over the possession of the plot in question and execute the sale deed after completing necessary procedural formalities on payment of market price at current rate prevailing in the locality where the plot is situated within a period of two months from the date of receiving a copy of this order. In case the petitioner fails to pay the market price at current rate to be determined by the authority concerned, the official respondents would be at liberty to invite fresh tender for the auction of the same at a price not less than the prevailing market price so that the public exchequer is not made to suffer in any manner and the property is able to fetch the maximum price.”

    26. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the direction given by the High Court is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside because in the writ petition filed by it, Respondent 1 had not claimed relief. He further argued that the Letter dated 12-1-1996 sent by the State Government to the Vice-Chairman, LDA with a direction to hand over possession of four plots to Shri Jagdish Gandhi and to accept the balance price in ten six-monthly instalments with interest as also the agreement executed between the State Government and Respondent 1 were a nullity and the mere fact that Respondent 1 had paid 25% of the bid amount could not be made basis for indirect revival of the agreement after a gap of almost 15 years. Another argument of the learned counsel is that the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 was highly belated and the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the same.

    27. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 1 argued that the agreement dated 12-1-1996 was binding on the parties and the High Court committed serious error by declining to issue a mandamus for its enforcement only on the ground that Respondent 1 had not paid the balance price. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon Rules 50, 50-A and 51 of the Nazul Manual and the provisions of the 2009 Act and argued that having accepted the bid of Respondent 1, LDA and its functionaries could not refuse to act in accordance with the agreement. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the instalments of price could not be paid by Respondent 1 because despite repeated representations, LDA neither gave the schedule of instalments nor indicated the rate of interest. The learned Senior Counsel laid considerable emphasis on the fact that Respondent 1 is a charitable institution and argued that even though it may have committed default in payment of the balance price, the High Court was not justified in directing payment of current market price as a condition for transfer of the plot in question.

    28. Before dealing with the respective arguments, we consider it necessary to mention that even though the prayer made in Writ Petition No. 11 of 1995 gives an impression that Respondent 1 was claiming relief in respect of plots for which tender notice was issued on 24-11-1994, the contents of Paras 15 to 34 thereof clearly show that Respondent 1 was really claiming Plot No. 92-A, Faizabad Road, Mahanagar, Lucknow of which lease was granted to Smt Rajrani Srivastava sometime in 1958. We may also mention that the will executed by Shri Banerjee in favour of the appellants was only in respect of Plot No. 92-A.

    29. The first question which merits consideration is whether the conclusion recorded by the High Court on the issue of enforceability of the agreement dated 12-1-1996 is correct and Respondent 1's prayer for issue of a direction to LDA to accept the balance price was rightly rejected. It is an admitted position that in response to tender notice dated 20-12-1994, Respondent 1 gave bids for four plots including Plot No. 92-A/C and paid 25% of the price offered by it but did not pay the balance amount necessitating cancellation of the bid, about which intimation was given vide letter dated 14-6-1995. Respondent 1 did not challenge the cancellation of bids by availing appropriate legal remedy but its Manager succeeded in convincing the Governor of the State to pass an unusual order for handing over possession of the plots and acceptance of the balance amount in six-monthly instalments. The reasons which prompted the Governor to act in violation of the Rules of Business and ordain restoration of the plots in favour of Respondent 1 albeit without setting aside the decision of LDA to cancel the bids are not borne out from the records produced before this Court. Therefore, we hold that the order passed by the Governor and the consequential actions taken by the State Government and LDA including the execution of agreement dated 12-1-1996 did not create an enforceable right in favour of Respondent 1 and the High Court rightly declined to issue a mandamus to LDA to accept the offer made on its behalf for payment of the balance price.

    30. It is significant to note that the agreement dated 12-1-1996 contained an unequivocal stipulation that if Respondent 1 fails to pay the instalments of balance price within the prescribed time-limit then the agreement would become void and LDA will be free to sell the plot to any other person. Admittedly, Respondent 1 did not pay the instalments of balance price. Therefore, the agreement stood automatically terminated and LDA became entitled to dispose of the plot by adopting an appropriate mechanism consistent with the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is rather intriguing as to why the functionaries of LDA remained silent for more than 13 years and did not repossess the plot in question. This was perhaps due to the pressure brought by the Manager of Respondent 1 from different quarters, administrative as well as political.

    31. The next question which requires consideration is whether the High Court could invoke the provisions of the 2009 Act and direct LDA to hand over possession of Plot No. 92-A/C to Respondent 1 and execute the sale deed on payment of market price at the current rate. In the writ petition filed on behalf of Respondent 1 it was not claimed that in view of the provisions contained in the 2009 Act, LDA is bound to allot Plot No. 92-A/C or allow Respondent 1 to retain the plot for which its bid had been accepted by the competent authority. Therefore, neither the appellants nor the official respondents had the opportunity to controvert such claim and show that the provisions of the 2009 Act do not provide for allotment/sale of land to the educational institutions. The High Court has made a passing reference to the 2009 Act and granted relief to Respondent 1 only on the ground that it had already deposited 25% of the bid amount way back in 1995 and Respondents 4 and 5 had not made an offer to take the plot by paying the current market price.

    32. We have carefully gone through the provisions of the 2009 Act and find that they do not even remotely deal with the issue of allotment of land to the educational institutions. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in ordering transfer of the plot to Respondent 1 and that too by ignoring its own finding that the said respondent was a ranked defaulter and the writ petition was filed after a time gap of 13 years without any tangible explanation.

    33. The Nazul Rules on which reliance has been placed by Shri Shanti Bhushan do not have any bearing on the issues raised in these appeals. Rule 50 of the Nazul Rules lays down that in all cases, whether of sale or of new leases or of renewal of leases which have expired without option of renewal which involves a concession in favour of the vendee or the lessee e.g in which it is proposed to fix the sale price or the rent at a rate lower than the prevailing market rate or at which it is proposed to sell or lease the land without holding a public auction or inviting public tenders, prior approval of the State Government shall be obtained before sanction, even though such cases, owing to the value of the land being within the limits laid down in the Rules, could otherwise be sanctioned without reference to the State Government.

    34. Rule 50-A deals with lease of small stretches for gardening purposes and lays down that such lease shall be for a short period not exceeding seven years and shall be subject to the conditions enumerated in that Rule. Rule 51 deals with grant of lease or sale of nazul land at concessional rates for charitable purposes like, hospitals, educational institutions and orphanages. It further lays down that the concession shall not exceed half the annual rental in the case of lease or half of the total market value in the case of sale. Two provisos to this Rule specify the limits of concession. Rule 52 contains a non obstante clause and empowers the State Government to sanction a lease or sale of nazul land for the particular purpose and at the particular rate keeping in view the special circumstances of the case.

    35. These Rules do not, in any manner, support the cause of Respondent 1 because it failed to pay the price of land in terms of the bid given pursuant to tender notice dated 20-12-1994 or even in terms of agreement dated 12-1-1996 and tried to concoct evidence to show that LDA was the defaulter.

    36. The issue which remains to be considered is whether the appellants are entitled to Plot No. 92-A/C and the High Court committed an error by quashing the action taken by LDA and the Nazul Officer in furtherance of the order dated 4-5-2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009.

    37. It is not in dispute that the term of the garden lease had ended on 31-7-1968 and the same was not extended by the competent authority. Therefore, in view of the stipulations contained in the lease deed dated 29-1-1964, he was bound to hand over the plot to the Government. However, Shri Banerjee continued to unauthorisedly occupy the plot till its disposal by LDA in 1994 by inviting bids. Although, Respondent 1 also failed to abide by the terms of the agreement dated 12-1-1996, Shri Banerjee was not entitled to take benefit of the order dated 17-2-1996 and seek conversion of leasehold rights into freehold because LDA had already accepted the bid given by Respondent 1 and delivered possession of the plot to Shri Jagdish Gandhi.

    38. The appellants who claim to be beneficiaries of the will executed by Shri Banerjee cannot claim a better right. Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009 filed by them was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court, which disposed of the writ petition vide order dated 4-5-2009 did not even bother to call upon the respondents to admit or controvert the averments contained in the writ petition filed by the appellants and directed the Nazul Officer to decide their representation for grant of freehold rights in respect of Plot No. 92-A/C. The error committed by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition of the appellants was compounded by the Nazul Officer who ordered conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights in respect of 4433 sq ft and gave an opportunity to the appellants to grab a valuable piece of land by depositing a paltry amount of Rs 1,95,939 as against the market price of Rs 2 crores. It is a different thing that the appellants did not succeed in their design and the High Court quashed the action taken by the Nazul Officer for conversion of the plot.

    39. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 10181 of 2011 is partly allowed and the direction given by the High Court for handing over possession of Plot No. 92-A/C to Respondent 1 on payment of the current market price is set aside. However, the decision of the High Court to quash the action taken by LDA and the Nazul Officer in furtherance of the order dated 4-5-2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009 is upheld. Civil Appeal No. 10180 of 2011 is dismissed. For filing frivolous and unwarranted litigation, which has consumed substantial time of various courts including this Court, the appellants and Respondent 1 are saddled with costs of Rs 10 lakhs each. They are directed to deposit the amount of costs with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of two months from today.

    40. Respondent 1 is directed to hand over possession of Plot No. 92-A/C to the Vice-Chairman, LDA within a period of 15 days. If the appellants have managed to take possession of the plot then they shall surrender the plot to the Vice-Chairman, LDA within 15 days. Thereafter, LDA shall dispose of the plot by public auction keeping in view the propositions laid down by this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P (2011) 5 SCC 29 (paras 65 and 66). It is needless to say that Respondent 1 shall be free to participate in the auction which may be conducted by LDA in compliance with this order. The appellants shall be free to withdraw the amount deposited for conversion of Plot No. 92-A/C.

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