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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The present opinion concerns two petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (OMP Nos. 1656/2014 and 1657/2014) challenging arbitral awards dated 7th August 2013. These awards were passed by Sh. Nitin Chadha, Advocate, in claims by M/s Religare Finvest Ltd. (RFL) against Ashish Gupta, Suresh Kumar Gupta, Sneh Gupta, and Ruchi Gupta (the "Guptas"). The awards directed recovery of monetary sums from the Guptas along with interest and costs and provided that the sale proceeds of mortgaged property, specifically house No. 76, Harsh Vihar, Pitam Pura, Delhi, would be applied towards satisfaction of the awarded amounts.

The petitioner, who is not a party to the arbitration agreement or proceedings and against whom no arbitral award was made, purchased the said property after the awards. The petitioner began construction on the property but was served a police notice to stop construction following a court order attaching the property in execution proceedings related to the arbitral awards. The petitioner contends that the property was mortgaged by the Guptas to RFL but also had been sold previously to other parties, and asserts that the documents relied upon by RFL are forged. The petitioner challenges the portion of the arbitral awards permitting recovery from the sale proceeds of the property and seeks relief under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a non-party to arbitration proceedings can maintain a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge an arbitral award.
  2. Whether the petitioner’s remedy against attachment and sale of the property is maintainable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or only through objections in execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  3. Whether the enforcement of an arbitral award providing for recovery from sale proceeds of mortgaged property affects the rights of a subsequent purchaser claiming title to the property.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner purchased the property after the arbitral awards and started construction thereon.
  • The petitioner received notice to stop construction due to an order attaching the property in execution of the arbitral awards.
  • The petitioner alleges that the mortgage documents relied upon by RFL are forged, as the original title deed was held by Punjab and Sind Bank.
  • The petitioner claims to be the rightful owner of the property and asserts that the arbitral awards’ direction to sell the property for satisfying monetary claims is void and without basis.
  • The petitioner contends that enforcement of mortgage is not arbitrable and relies on the Supreme Court decision in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. to argue that the arbitral awards are contrary to law and public policy.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 532 Enforcement of mortgage is not arbitrable; scope of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act The Court distinguished the facts, noting that the present awards concerned monetary claims and directions for sale proceeds, not enforcement of mortgage itself, thus differing from the precedent.
Indus Ind Bank Ltd. v. Ram Laxman Hotels Ltd., 162 (2009) DLT 332 A petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act can be preferred only by a party to the arbitration proceedings, not by a third party The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the petitioner, a non-party, cannot maintain a Section 34 petition.
Mukesh Nanji Gala v. Heritage Enterprises (High Court of Bombay) Same principle as above regarding non-party’s inability to challenge arbitral awards under Section 34 The Court found the Bombay High Court’s view consistent with its own on non-party locus to challenge arbitral awards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the maintainability of the petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act by the petitioner, who was not a party to the arbitration agreement or proceedings and against whom no arbitral award was passed. It noted that the petitioner’s grievance related solely to the attachment and sale of the property in execution of the awards, not the monetary claims allowed therein.

The Court observed that Section 36 of the Arbitration Act allows enforcement of arbitral awards as decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Execution of decrees, including attachment and sale of property, is governed by Order XXI of the CPC, which provides specific procedures for objections to attachment (Rule 58) and adjudication of such claims with the force of a decree.

The Court concluded that the proper remedy for the petitioner to challenge the attachment of the property is by filing objections in the execution proceedings rather than by filing petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Further, the Court emphasized the settled legal position that only parties to arbitration proceedings can file petitions under Section 34, and a non-party like the petitioner lacks locus to do so.

The Court also rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the principle that enforcement of mortgage is not arbitrable by distinguishing the facts of the cited Supreme Court decision, which dealt with Section 8 applications and not enforcement of arbitral awards as decrees.

Finally, the Court noted that the petitioner’s attempts to stay the awards and their execution are not sustainable under the principle that injunctions cannot restrain a person from prosecuting proceedings in a court not subordinate to the court granting such injunction.

Holding and Implications

The petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the petitioner are dismissed as misconceived.

The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner, being a non-party to the arbitration, cannot challenge the arbitral awards through Section 34 petitions. The petitioner’s remedy lies in filing objections within the execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure. No new precedent was set by this ruling; it reaffirms established legal principles regarding the scope of Section 34 and execution of arbitral awards.

    M/S. Tara Logitech Private Ltd. Petitioner v. M/S. Religare Finvest Limited & Anr. S

    I.A No. 26203/2014 in OMP No. 1656/2014 & I.A No. 26205/2014 in OMP No. 1657/2014 (both for exemption)

    1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

    2. The applications are disposed of.

    OMP Nos. 1656/2014 & 1657/2014

    3. Both these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are preferred with respect to the arbitral awards dated 7th August, 2013 of Sh. Nitin Chadha, Advocate in the claims of the respondent M/s Religare Finvest Ltd. (RFL) against (i) Ashish Gupta, (ii) Suresh Kumar Gupta, (iii) Sneh Gupta & (iv) Ruchi Gupta (hereinafter called “Guptas”). While the arbitral award subject matter of OMP No. 1656/2014 is for recovery by RFL of Rs. 2,78,68,302.5 with interest and cost etc. from Guptas, the arbitral award subject matter of OMP No. 1657/2014 is for recovery by RFL of a sum of Rs. 83,82,538.83 besides interest and costs etc. from Guptas. Both arbitral awards also provide, that sale proceeds of mortgaged property being house No. 76, Harsh Vihar, Pitam Pura, Delhi-110 034 would be adjusted towards the satisfaction of the amount payable by Guptas under the arbitral awards.

    4. Though the petitioner, in neither of the petitions has impleaded Guptas as party thereto, but has in OMP No. 1656/2014 impleaded the sole arbitrator Nitin Chadha, Advocate as a party thereto. In my view, the arbitrator is not required to be impleaded as a party to a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the name of Sh. Nitin Chadha, Advocate as respondent No. 2 in OMP No. 1656/2014 is deleted.

    5. The petitioner was admittedly not a party to the arbitration agreement or the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral awards also are not against the petitioner. These petitions have still been filed, pleading that:

    (i) The petitioner had purchased property bearing No. 76, Harsh Vihar, Pitam Pura, Delhi-110 034 aforesaid vide sale deed dated 13 December, 2013 from M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd., Delhi vide a registered sale deed.

    (ii) The petitioner immediately after purchasing the said property started the work of construction thereon.

    (iii) To the shock and surprise of the petitioner, the petitioner on 23rd August, 2014 received a notice from Sh. Sanjay Kumar, Sub-Inspector, Police Station Rani Bagh, Delhi asking the petitioner to stop construction as the property in question had been directed to be attached by this Court vide order dated 13 August, 2014 in Execution Petition No. 87/2014.

    (iv) On enquiry by the petitioner, it transpired that the Guptas had taken some loan from RFL and had mortgaged the said property on the basis of certain documents by creating equitable mortgage and had failed to repay the said loan and therefore the property was ordered to be attached as aforesaid.

    (v) The petitioner however learnt that RFL had also filed OMP No. 1212/2012 and vide order dated 21st December, 2012 wherein the Guptas were restrained from creating any third party interest in the said property.

    (vi) It has also come to the knowledge of the petitioner that another Execution Petition bearing No. 86/2014 is also pending before this Court.

    (vii) On further enquiry, it was learnt that the said property was actually in the name of Sneh Lata Gupta who was mother of Ashish Gupta and wife of Suresh Kumar Gupta who had mortgaged the said property to avail credit facility from Punjab and Sind Bank, Connaught Circus, New Delhi in the year 2008; that the said property was sold to M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Gulshan Kumar Ahuja vide sale deed dated 31 March, 2012; that the original title deed was released by Punjab and Sind Bank to Sneh Lata Gupta only after payment of the entire balance consideration; that since the order of restraint aforesaid was passed against the Guptas on 21 December, 2012 and sale in favour of M/s Bhatia Estates Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Gulshan Kumar Ahuja had already taken place, the documents mortgaged with RFL are forged documents and the original documents were lying with Punjab and Sind Bank at the time when credit facility was granted by RFL to the Guptas.

    (viii) The arbitral awards subject matter of both these petitions are ex parte.

    (ix) The petitioner is the rightful owner of the property and the order of the Arbitral Tribunal directing sale of the property is void and without any basis.

    6. I have enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner as to how these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are maintainable and whether not the remedy if any, in the facts aforesaid, of the petitioner is under Order XXI Rules 58 and 98 to 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

    7. The senior counsel for the petitioner has referred to paras No. 50 and 57 of Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 532 to contend that the enforcement of mortgage is not arbitrable and the arbitral awards are thus contrary to law and public policy of India and liable to be set aside.

    8. The Supreme Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. (supra) was concerned with the scope of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. There, the SBI Home Finance Ltd. had filed a mortgage suit in the High Court of Bombay and in which suit an application under Section 8 was filed. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the suit was to be disposed of under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act by referring the parties to arbitration. The said application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court inter alia on the ground of the appellant having subjected itself in the preceding 20 months to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Supreme Court held, i) that though the subject matter of the suit fell within the scope of arbitration agreement, ii) that though the appellant could not in the facts be said to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court, and, iii) that the application under Section 8 having been filed before the filing of the written statement, High Court was not justified in rejecting the same on the ground of delay, but the subject matter of the suit was not arbitrable.

    9. The position here is quite different. In the two arbitration proceedings culminating in the arbitrable awards subject matter of these two petitions, RFL had made a monetary claim against the Guptas along with a claim for a direction to Guptas to hand over vacant physical possession of the property with further directions for sale thereof for satisfaction of the monetary claims. The arbitral awards allow the monetary claims of RFL and merely observe that RFL shall be entitled to recover the claims awarded from the sale proceeds of the property. From the narration in the petitions, it appears that the property aforesaid has been attached in execution of the arbitral awards insofar as allowing the said monetary claims.

    10. The senior counsel for the petitioner agrees that the petitioner has no grievance insofar as the arbitral awards allow the monetary claims of RFL against Guptas. It is stated that the grievance of the petitioner is with respect to the part of the awards which provide that the said monetary claims can be satisfied from the sale proceeds of the said property and from the attachment of the subject property in execution of the said arbitral awards.

    11. The only question thus for adjudication at the instance of the petitioner is whether the rights of the petitioner in the property are unaffected by the aforesaid attachment of the property in execution proceedings.

    12. Section 36 of the Arbitration Act provides for the enforcement of the arbitral award under the CPC, in the same manner as if it was a decree of the Court. Order XXI of the CPC provides for execution of a decree of the Court. Rule 30 thereunder provides for execution of a decree for payment of money inter alia by attachment and sale of the property of the judgment debtor. Rule 54 under Order XXI provides for attachment of immovable property by prohibiting, the judgment debtor from transferring and charging the property in any way and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. It appears that the order dated 13 August, 2014 supra in Execution Petition No. 87/2014 has been made in exercise of such powers. Rule 58 of Order XXI provides for preferring claim or objection to the attachment of any property on the ground that the property is not liable to such attachment and for adjudication of such claim. Such adjudication has a force of a decree. section 47 of the cpc provides that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

    13. It thus follows that the question which the petitioner is seeking to be adjudicated by filing these petitions under Section 34 is a question, the mode for adjudication whereof is by filing objections as aforesaid in the execution proceedings in which the attachment has been ordered and not by way of filing these petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

    14. Even otherwise, it is the settled position in law that a non party to an arbitration and arbitration proceedings cannot prefer objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. I had an occasion to deal with the said aspect in Indus Ind Bank Ltd. v. Ram Laxman Hotels Ltd. 162 (2009) DLT 332; on a conspectus of case law, it was held that a petition under Section 34 can be preferred only by a party to the arbitration proceedings and not by a third party. I find the High Court of Bombay also to have taken the same view in Mukesh Nanji Gala v. Heritage Enterprises. Even otherwise, there is no agreement for arbitration of the dispute between RFL and the petitioner qua the aforesaid property. Needless to state that merely because an arbitration award provides that the monetary claims allowed thereunder would be recovered by sale of some property, cannot entitle the claimant thereunder to enforce the right of such sale against a non party to arbitration and if such claimant enforces the award as a decree, such non party to the arbitration has to file objections in accordance with the procedure provided hereinabove.

    15. I may mention that the petitioner has also filed applications for stay of the arbitral awards aforesaid and their execution. The execution as aforesaid is pending before this Court. Though a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, strictly speaking, is not a suit but the principle enshrined in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is that no restraint against any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought can be granted. For this reason also, these proceedings are not the remedy for the relief sought by the petitioner.

    16. The petitions are clearly misconceived and are dismissed.

    No costs.

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    M/S. Tara Logitech Private Ltd. Petitioner v. M/S. Religare Finvest Limited & Anr. S
    (Dec 23, 2014)