R.S Narula, J.:— The question whether a writ, order or direction can or cannot be issued against a society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act (25 of 1961) has been argued from two aspects by Mr. Harnam Singh Wasu, the learned senior Advocate for Dharam Pal Soni appellant in this appeal under clause 10 of the letters patent against the judgment of B.R Tuli, J., dated March 26, 1969, dismissing his writ petition directed against the order of the second respondent, i.e the Jullundur Central Co-operative Consumers' Store Limited, dated June 8, 1968 (Annexure-D) purporting to terminate the service of the appellant. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition of the appellant on the ground that no direction can be issued to respondent No. 2 under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Firstly, it is contended that a co-operative society of the type of respondent No. 2 is a statutory authority entitled to make its own by-laws, and is, therefore, amenable to a writ, order or direction under Article 226. The learned Single Judge has referred to a large number of Judgments of different High Courts holding consistent views on this point. The controversy, however, appears to have been settled by the Lordships of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 : A.I.R 1969 Supreme Court 1306. In that case it was held that a company being a non-statutory body, and one incorporated under the Companies Act, there was neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus, nor was, there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. On that finding it was held that the Andhra Pradesh High Court was correct in holding that no writ petition for a mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus could lie against the company. J.M Shelat, J., who prepared the judgment of Court held that a mandamus can issue to an official of a society to compel him to carry cut the terms of the statute under or by which statute society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statute authorising their undertaking. Matters of employment under a society or a company are not functions under the statute under which such bodies are registered. Distinction between a society or a company constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfiling public responsibilities on the one hand, and a private society or a company merely registered under a statute on the other must be borne in mind in this respect.
3. Mr. Wasu then submitted that a writ, order or direction should issue Ito the respondent-society as it is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. That provision is in the following terms:
“In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘the State’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Govt. and the legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of Govt. of India.”.
4. Counsel submits that the respondent No. 2 society falls within the meaning of the expression “other authorities” in Article 12. His contention is that since he is complaining of violation of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, he is entitled to a suitable writ order or direction, being issued to the respondent-society as a matter of right. Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Sohan Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 529, and argued that direction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be against private persons only, but there is no bar to suitable order being made under theft Article against a co-operative society, registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. We are unable to spell any such finding from Shri Sohan Lal's case.
5. Reference was then made to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 1857. In that case it was held that the Electricity Board of Rajasthan was “State” within the meaning of the expression “other authorities” in Article 12 in the following swords:
“The dictionary meaning of the word ‘authority’ is a public administrative agency or corporation having quasi-government powers and authorised to administer a revenue-producing public enterprise. This dictionary meaning of the word ‘authority’ is clearly wide enough to include all bodies by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi governmental functions. The expression ‘other authorities’ is thus wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India, and there is no reason to narrow down this meaning in the context in which the words ‘other authorities’ are used in Article 12 of the Constitution… … … … … The expression ‘other authorities’ in Article 12 which thus includes all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law.”
6. It is significant that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have, while referring to other bodies, made it clear that such other bodies must be created by statute as was the case with the Rajasthan State Elec. Board. Respondent No. 2 society as any other ordinary co-operative society, is not created by the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, but is merely registered under that Act. Such a corporation cannot be said to have been created by a statute. Nor is respondent No. 2 a constitutional or statutory authority. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board (Supra) can possibly lead to the conclusion that an ordinary Co-op. society falls within the expression ‘other authorities’ used in Article 12 of the Constitution.
7. Mr. Wasu lastly relied on my Single Bench Judgment in Ram Chander Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1967 P.L.R 362, for the purpose of showing that a writ, order or direction can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution against a co-operative society. This particular question was not raised before me in that case. Even otherwise it appears that it was the order of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, under rule 80(i)(j) of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963 which had been called in question in that case, and in which an error of law apparent on its face was found with the result that an appropriate writ, order or direction was issued against the State of Punjab, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, and the Society itself.
8. The case is clearly distinguishable from the facts which led the appellant to file the writ petition which is now being argued before us at the appellate stage. In this case no order of any Govt. functionary or statutory authority under any statute or statutory rule is being called in question. I am unable to agree that my judgment in the case of Ram Chander Singh (supra) can possibly be used as an authority for the proposition that a co-operative society is amenable to a writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution in a case in which nothing but the resolution or decision of the co-operative society itself is being impugned.
9. In view of the latest authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual (supra), we are unable to find any force in this appeal, and accordingly dismiss the same though without any order as to costs.
10. Mehar Singh, C.J:— I agree.