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  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 167(2)
  • Section 11 of the [no specific Act mentioned]
  • Article 21 of the Constitution, Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
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  • Section 6, Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
  • Article 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 167(2)
  • Section 11 of the [no specific Act mentioned]
  • Article 21 of the Constitution, Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Constitution (no specific article mentioned), with reference to Antulay case
  • Section 6, Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
  • Article 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
  • Article 6(1), European Convention on Human Rights
  • Article 21, Constitution (read into as an essential part)
  • Article 21 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, while posted as Defence Estate Officer (Kashmir Circle) between 2006-2010, issued No-Objection Certificates (NOCs) declaring about four acres of land abutting an Air Force Station to be private property. In January 2011 he was asked to explain why the NOCs were factually incorrect. Admitting the mistake but denying mala fides, he attributed the error to staff notes. On 30-9-2011 he was placed under suspension.

The suspension was successively extended:

  • 28-12-2011: first extension for 180 days;
  • 26-6-2012: second extension for 180 days;
  • 21-12-2012: third extension for 90 days;
  • 22-3-2013: fourth extension for 90 days.

The appellant challenged the extensions before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). By order dated 22-5-2013 CAT held that an employee cannot be indefinitely suspended and directed reinstatement if no charge-memo issued before 21-6-2013. The Union of India obtained reversal of that direction from the Delhi High Court on 4-9-2013, which held that CAT had substituted its decision for that of the executive. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal further extensions were granted; the investigation concluded on 1-8-2014 when sanction for prosecution was obtained, and a charge-sheet was eventually served, although the appellant had already remained under suspension continuously since 30-9-2011.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether prolonged or indefinite suspension of a government employee without service of a charge-sheet violates principles of natural justice, the right to a speedy trial, and constitutional guarantees under Article 21.
  2. Whether a judicial forum (CAT) may set temporal limits on the executive’s power to continue a suspension.
  3. The criteria and procedural safeguards required for renewal of a suspension order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Suspension lasting several years is per se punitive and contrary to decisions such as O.P. Gupta v. Union of India and K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P.
  • Selective action was taken: subordinate officials who prepared the erroneous notes were not proceeded against.
  • Some extension letters were allegedly back-dated, showing mala fides.
  • Indefinite suspension offends the fundamental right to a speedy trial and human dignity recognised in Article 21 and in international instruments.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Suspension was initially imposed in contemplation of a departmental enquiry, which had to await completion of CBI investigation as per Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) guidelines.
  • Each extension was authorised within the currency of the previous order and supported by contemporaneous, recorded reasons, satisfying the requirements laid down in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector.
  • Sanction for prosecution was granted on 1-8-2014, and the charge-sheet was expected before expiry of the last extension; hence no prejudice was caused.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector (2012) 4 SCC 407 Administrative orders must disclose reasons. Held inapplicable because detailed reasons existed for every extension.
O.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 328 Suspension is injurious and should not be lightly or indefinitely continued. Cited to underscore the need to curb protracted suspensions.
K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P. (1999) 6 SCC 257 Selective and indefinite suspensions are impermissible. Reinforced the appellant’s grievance of discriminatory treatment.
State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 Unexplained delay in proceedings presumptively prejudices the employee. Used to illustrate presumption of prejudice from delay.
Union of India v. Dipak Mali (2010) 2 SCC 222 Validity of continued suspension when reasons are recorded in time. Court distinguished it, finding reasons were indeed recorded here.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US 213 (1967) U.S. authority striking down indefinite postponement of prosecution. Illustrative of the universal recognition of the right to speedy trial.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 Right to speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21. Formed constitutional backdrop for limiting suspension duration.
Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 Procedure lacking reasonable expedition offends Article 21. Quoted to emphasise that speedy proceedings are integral to fairness.
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 Comprehensive guidelines on the right to speedy trial. Relied on to justify judicial imposition of temporal limits on suspension.
State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 Court may mould relief where delay in disciplinary action is excessive. Noted while considering appropriate remedial directions.
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 Judicial concern with undue delay in investigation. Cited when drawing analogy with CrPC detention limits.
United States v. Ewell, 383 US 116 (1966) & Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972) Relativity of “speedy” and balancing of factors in delay analysis. Quoted while explaining that each case requires a contextual approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged that the executive had recorded reasons for each extension, thereby complying with the doctrine of natural justice. Nonetheless, it found the broader practice of keeping employees under suspension for indeterminate periods to be inconsistent with:

  • the constitutional guarantee of a “fair, just and reasonable” procedure under Article 21, which subsumes a right to expeditious proceedings;
  • international human-rights norms protecting reputation and the presumption of innocence;
  • common-law principles against punitive pre-trial restraints.

Drawing an analogy to the statutory ceiling of 90 days for pre-charge detention under Section 167(2) CrPC, the Court held that a similar temporal discipline should govern departmental suspensions. Citing the Constitution Bench decision in Antulay and other precedents, it ruled that courts are competent to impose safeguards when executive action threatens to become oppressive. It therefore pronounced a prospective rule:

The currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if, within that period, no memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served. After service of charges, any further extension must be supported by a reasoned order. Transfer or restrictions on access to records may be used instead of prolonged suspension to protect the investigation.

The Court clarified that its direction supersedes the CVC guideline that departmental enquiries must await completion of criminal investigation.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISPOSED OF. No order as to costs.

Although the appellant had by now been served with a charge-sheet, the Court granted liberty to challenge any further suspension. More broadly, the judgment sets a binding rule limiting suspensions without charge to a maximum of three months and requiring recorded reasons for subsequent extensions, thereby influencing public-service disciplinary practice nationwide and overriding conflicting administrative instructions.

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    Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union Of India Through Its Secretary And Another

    Vikramajit Sen, J.— Leave granted. The appellant assails his suspension which was effected on 30-9-2011 and has been extended and continued ever since. In November 2006, he was posted as the Defence Estate Officer (DEO), Kashmir Circle, Jammu and Kashmir. During this tenure it was discovered that a large portion of the land owned by the Union of India and held by the Director General, Defence Estates had not been mutated/noted in the revenue records as defence lands. The appellant alleges that between 2008 and 2009, office notes were prepared by his staff, namely, Shri Vijay Kumar, SDO II; Smt Amarjit Kaur, SDO III; Shri Abdul Sayoom, Technical Assistant; and Shri Noor Mohd., LDC, that approximately four acres of land were not defence lands, but were private lands in respect of which NOCs could be issued. These NOCs were accordingly issued by the appellant. Thereafter, on 3-4-2010, the appellant was transferred to Ambala Cantt. However, vide letter dated 25-1-2011 the appellant was asked to give his explanation for issuing the factually incorrect NOCs. In his reply the appellant admitted his mistake, denied any mala fides in issuing the NOCs, and attributed the issuance of the NOCs to the notes prepared by the subordinate staff of SDOs/Technical Officer. It was in this background that he received the suspension order dated 30-9-2011.

    2. Various litigation was fruitlessly initiated by the appellant in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, as well as in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, with which we are not concerned. The appellant asserts that since the subject land was within the parameter wall of the Air Force Station, no physical transfer thereof has occurred. On 28-12-2011, the appellant's suspension was extended for the first time for a further period of 180 days. This prompted the appellant to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (CAT), and during the pendency of the proceedings the second extension was ordered with effect from 26-6-2012 for another period of 180 days. The challenge to these extensions did not meet with success before CAT. Thereafter, the third extension of the appellant's suspension was ordered on 21-12-2012, but for a period of 90 days. It came to be followed by the fourth suspension for yet another period of 90 days with effect from 22-3-2013.

    3. It appears that the Tribunal gave partial relief to the appellant in terms of its order dated 22-5-2013 OA No. 587 of 2013, order dated 22-5-2013 (CAT) opining that no employee can be indefinitely suspended; that disciplinary proceedings have to be concluded within a reasonable period. CAT directed that if no charge memo was issued to the appellant before the expiry on 21-6-2013 of the then prevailing period the appellant would be reinstated in service. CAT further ordered that if it was decided to conduct an inquiry it had to be concluded “in a time-bound manner”. The appellant alleges that the suspension was not extended beyond 19-6-2013 but this is not correct. The respondent Union of India filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court contending that the Tribunal had exercised power not possessed by it inasmuch as it directed that the suspension would not be extended if the charge memo was served on the appellant after the expiry of 90 days from 19-3-2013 (i.e the currency of the then extant suspension order). This challenge has found favour with the Court in terms of the impugned judgment dated 4-9-2013 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3437.

    4. The writ court formulated the question before it to be

    “Whether the impugned directions circumscribing the Government's power to continue the suspension and also to issue a charge-sheet within a time-bound manner can be sustained?” (Ajay Kumar Choudhary case 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3437, SCC OnLine Del para 6)

    It opined that the Tribunal's view was

    “nothing but a substitution of a judicial determination to that of the authority possessing the power i.e the executive Government as to the justification or rationale to continue with the suspension”. (Ajay Kumar Choudhary case 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3437, SCC OnLine Del para 7)

    The writ petition was allowed and the Central Government was directed to pass appropriate orders

    “as to whether it wishes to continue with the suspension or not having regard to all the relevant factors, including the report of CBI, if any, it might have received by now. This exercise should be completed as early as possible and within two weeks from today”. (Ajay Kumar Choudhary case 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3437, SCC OnLine Del para 8)

    5. This has led to the filing of the appeal before this Court. In the hearing held on 11-7-2014 SLP (C) No. 31761 of 2013, order dated 11-7-2014 (SC), “By an order dated 13-6-2014, the suspension of the petitioner has been continued for a period of 90 days with effect from 15-6-2014. The learned Additional Solicitor General says that the investigations are complete and sanction for prosecution is awaited and it is expected that sanction will be granted within two weeks. List the matter after three weeks.”, it was noted that by letter dated 13-6-2014 the suspension of the appellant had been continued for a period of 90 days with effect from 15-6-2014 (i.e the fourth extension), and that investigation having been completed, sanction for the prosecution was to be granted within a period of two weeks. When the arguments were heard in great detail on 9-9-2014 by which date neither a charge-sheet nor a memorandum of charges had been served on the appellant. It had been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that this letter, as well as the preceding one dated 8-10-2013, had been backdated. We had called for the original records and on perusal this contention was found by us to be without substance.

    6. The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the original suspension was in contemplation of a departmental enquiry which could not be commenced because of a directive of the Central Vigilance Commission prohibiting its commencement if the matter was under the investigation of CBI. The sanction for prosecution was granted on 1-8-2014. It was also submitted that the charge-sheet was expected to be served on the appellant before 12-9-2014 (viz. before the expiry of the fourth extension). However, we need to underscore that the appellant has been continuously on suspension from 30-9-2011.

    7. It is necessary to record that all the relevant files were shown to us, on the perusal of which it was evident that reasons were elaborately recorded for each extension of suspension and within the currency of the then prevailing period. Therefore, the reliance of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector (2012) 4 SCC 407, is of no avail since the salutary requirement of natural justice, that is, of spelling out the reasons for the passing of an order, has been complied with.

    8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, however, has rightly relied on a series of judgments of this Court, including O.P Gupta v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 328 , 1987 SCC (L&S) 400 , (1987) 5 ATC 14, where this Court has enunciated that the suspension of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be continued for an unreasonably long period; that, therefore, an order of suspension should not be lightly passed.

    9. Our attention has also been drawn to K. Sukhendar Reddy v. State of A.P (1999) 6 SCC 257 , 1999 SCC (L&S) 1088, which is topical in that it castigates selective suspension perpetuated indefinitely in circumstances where other involved persons had not been subjected to any scrutiny. Reliance on this decision is in the backdrop of the admitted facts that all the persons who have been privy to the making of the office notes have not been proceeded against departmentally.

    10. So far as the question of prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned, this Court in State of A.P v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 , 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 has observed that it would be fair to make this assumption of prejudice if there is an unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings. However, the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dipak Mali (2010) 2 SCC 222 , (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 593 does not come to the succour of the appellant since our inspection of the records produced in original have established that firstly, the decision to continue the suspension was carried out within the then prevailing period and secondly, that it was duly supported by elaborate reasoning.

    11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay.

    12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is, to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably, the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of Common Law Jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that — “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.

    13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that:

    “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

    14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:

    “6. (1) in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….”

    and in its second sub-article that:

    “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

    15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina 18 L Ed 2d 1 , 386 US 213 (1967).

    16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 , 1994 SCC (Cri) 899 the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision:

    “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
    87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 , 1980 SCC (Cri) 23 while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus:
    ‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.’”

    17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 , 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it. Keeping these factors in mind CAT had in the case in hand directed that the appellant's suspension would not be extended beyond 90 days from 19-3-2013. The High Court had set aside this direction, viewing it as a substitution of a judicial determination to the authority possessing that power i.e the Government.

    18. This conclusion of the High Court cannot be sustained in view of the following pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Antulay (1992) 1 SCC 225 , 1992 SCC (Cri) 93:

    “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard-and-fast rules. These propositions are:
    (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.
    (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.
    (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:
    (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
    (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
    (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.
    (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, ‘delay is a known defence tactic’. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is—who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation.
    (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on—what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
    (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101 , 407 US 514 (1972) ‘it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate’. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in United States v. Ewell 15 L Ed 2d 627 , 383 US 116 (1966) in the following words: (L Ed p. 628)
    ‘The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’
    However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.
    (7) We cannot recognise or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101 , 407 US 514 (1972) and other succeeding cases.
    (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
    (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order—including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded—as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
    (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.
    (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.”

    19. State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 , 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 , (1995) 29 ATC 546 deserves mention, inter alia, because action was initiated on 25-3-1992 and a memorandum of charges was issued on 9-7-1992 in relation to an incident which had occurred on 1-1-1987. In the factual matrix obtaining in that case, this Court reversed and set aside the High Court decision to quash the inquiry because of delay, but directed that the officer concerned should be immediately considered for promotion without taking the pendency of the inquiry into perspective.

    20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 , 1986 SCC (Cri) 511 and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay (1992) 1 SCC 225 , 1992 SCC (Cri) 93, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973 to moderate suspension orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.

    21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.

    22. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the appellant has now been served with a charge-sheet, and, therefore, these directions may not be relevant to him any longer. However, if the appellant is so advised he may challenge his continued suspension in any manner known to law, and this action of the respondents will be subject to judicial review.

    23. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms and we desist from imposing costs.

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    Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union Of India Through Its Secretary And Another
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