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  • s. 25 of the Patents Act, 1883 (46 and 37 Vict., e. 57),
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Advocates
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  • s. 25 of the Patents Act, 1883 (46 and 37 Vict., e. 57),
Smart Summary

Judicial Committee Opinion — Structured Summary (from the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

The provided extract contains material from more than one matter heard by the Judicial Committee. Two distinct threads appear in the text:

  • Patent-related procedural matter (brief): A petitioner applied to the Crown in Council (petition dated around December 1839) for an extension of existing Letters Patent. The Committee directed that the public should be apprised of the intended application under a recent statute permitting caveats and objections and, in the absence of new procedural rules, that the existing practice under the former statute be observed. The petitioner was directed to advertise his intention and, having complied (by May 20, 1840), the petition came on for hearing before the Judicial Committee. Counsel for the petitioner produced witnesses to prove the merits of the petition and that the petitioner had not received adequate remuneration for his invention. Their Lordships expressed that the subject-matter was an ingenious invention and granted an extension for seven years.
  • Principal case: The main body of the text reports the appeal in a probate/Will contest: Pendock (or "Fendock") Barry of Tolerton Hall (described as the testator) died on 13 March 1833, aged 76, leaving the appellant (his son and heir) as his only next of kin. On 24 September 1827 the deceased executed a Will in duplicate at the office/house of Percy (his attorney). The Will appointed Samuel Butlin (the respondent) sole executor and residuary legatee and contained legacies (to Percy, to Butlin, and to the butler Whitehead). The appellant challenged the validity of the Will in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury on grounds that execution was procured by fraud and conspiracy of Percy, Butlin, and Whitehead and that the deceased was of unsound mind or otherwise incapable of making a Will. The Judge of the Prerogative Court (Sir Werbert Jenner) pronounced in favour of the Will on 5 September 1831. The appellant appealed to the Queen in Council. The Judicial Committee heard the appeal (arguments occupied several days, and the Committee reviewed the evidence extensively) and ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Prerogative Court, admitting the Will to proof and dismissing the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the onus (burden) of proof on a party propounding a Will, and whether simple proof of capacity and execution is sufficient to discharge that burden?
  2. Does the fact that a Will was prepared by a person who benefits under it (a legatee or the attorney who prepared it) shift the onus of proof or require a particular species of proof (such as instructions from the testator or reading over the instrument)?
  3. On the facts, whether the deceased (Mr. Barry) was of sufficient testamentary capacity when the Will was executed.
  4. Whether the allegations of fraud and conspiracy introduced by the appellant were proved, and if not, what are the consequences for costs (i.e., whether the appellant should be condemned in costs for giving in his allegation alleging conspiracy and fraud)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Will's execution was procured by fraud and conspiracy among Percy (the attorney), Butlin (the respondent, legatee and executor), and Whitehead (butler), at a time when the deceased was of unsound mind and incapable of making a Will or performing acts requiring judgment and reflection.
  • Given the circumstances (a will prepared by a person who benefited and the exclusion of the only son), the Court should scrutinize the proof and perhaps require higher or particular species of evidence to establish knowledge of the Will's contents by the testator.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The propounder (respondent) produced witnesses and documentary evidence to prove the merits of the Will, the execution, and the testator's knowledge of its contents.
  • Evidence included: the testator's handwriting on drafts/alterations, testimony that the testator asked witnesses to attend and declared the document to be his last Will, and other circumstances (attendance of respectable attesting witnesses) showing absence of clandestine fraud.

Table of Precedents Cited

The table below catalogs precedents and authorities as they appear in the provided text. Where the provided opinion explicitly links a precedent to a legal rule or explains its application, that is recorded. Where the text only lists a name or citation without an explicit statement of the doctrine cited, the table notes that the opinion did not explicitly state the rule or principle.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
~~~~~ v. Btkiize (3 Xyl. and K. 113) This citation appears in a list of authorities referred to; the provided text does not explicitly state the rule or principle for which it was cited. The Court included it among authorities referred to; the text does not describe a specific application.
Pmtt v, Burker (4 Bum, 507) The text lists this authority but does not specify the precise rule cited in the passages provided. Referenced among authorities; the opinion does not set out a particular application for this citation in the provided extract.
TU^ v. ~~~€~ (1 Hagg. Ecc. Rep. 384, 391) Listed among authorities; the extract does not state the specific rule or principle cited. Referred to in the list of authorities; no explicit application described in the provided text.
Gibsvrc v. Jeyes (6 Ves. 266) Listed among authorities; the provided text does not specify the doctrine referenced. Included in the list of authorities referred to by counsel; no explicit further application set out in the extract.
Paske v. (as reported in the text: Pnske v. ~ ~ ~ t t) (2 Phill. 323) Used as part of the authorities stating the traditional rule that where a party prepares a Will and benefits under it, suspicion arises and the Court should be vigilant; the text cites Paske as stating that the presumption/onus is against the instrument in such cases and that proof must go to knowledge of contents. The Court discussed Paske as an authority for the general doctrine of suspicion attaching to wills prepared by beneficiaries but expressly limited the strictness of that authority: the Court accepted the principle as one of caution and vigilance but rejected the view that it shifts the legal onus in every case or requires a particular species of proof in all cases.
Tucker/other reported authorities cited by name in the passage summarising Sir John Nicholl's statements (variously reported in the text) The Court refers to a body of authority reported by Sir John Nicholl and others regarding the approach to Wills prepared by legatees; the precise individual principles tied to each named authority in the passage are not set out in detail in the provided extract. The Court used these authorities collectively to explain the background rule but then clarified and limited the strict interpretation of the rule as sometimes reported.
Baker v. Batt (ante [2 Moo. P.C.] 317) Mentioned as a recent case in which the tribunal had acted upon the rule concerning wills prepared by beneficiaries; the text does not elaborate a separate doctrine beyond this reference. The Court noted that the tribunal had sanctioned and acted on the rule in that case; used as contextual support for the existence of the rule (as qualified by the Court).
See Burrough (?) v. Novel u? (2 Curteis, 225, 227-8) (as cited in text) Listed as a reference; the provided text does not state the rule or principle associated with this citation in the excerpt. Placed in a citation line; the provided extract does not explain how the Court applied it.
Mews' Dig. (references to titles and topics) Digest reference to topics (WILL, TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY, Undue Influence and Proof); not a single case but a digest heading cited for topical guidance. Used as a bibliographic/subject reference in the report; no distinct application discussed in the provided extract.
Follow-up/related cases listed in the footnote-like material (as they appear in the text): The text lists later cases that "followed" or are "on point," but in the provided extract the text does not attribute to each a specific rule as part of the Court's reasoning in this decision. These are cited as later authorities or comparisons; the extract does not show direct application by the Court in determining the present appeal.
Listed follow-on citations (verbatim as in the text): "1847 12 Jur. 967 ; G ~ r - d ~ o z ~ e v. BlncLEturn, 1866, L.R. 1 P. and D. 116; ~ ~ r e Z Z v. ~ u ~ t o n (1894), P. 151 ; ~ u ~ r e l l ~ v. C O ? . ~ ~ ~ U T ~ (1899), A.C. 567 ; Sharna Churn Kuridu v. K... (1899), L.R. 27 Ind. App.,XO; Cleare v. Gleare, 1869, L.R. 1 P. and D. p.657; Hastdow v. Stobie, 1865, 1 P. and D. 69; Armstrong v. Huddleston, 1838, 1 Moo. P.C. 492." The provided text lists these authorities as follow-ups or comparative authorities; the immediate opinion excerpt does not explain the precise principle taken from each within the present decision. These appear in annotation/citation notes as subsequent or related decisions; no specific application in the textual narrative of the judgment is described in the extract provided.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Judicial Committee's analysis proceeds in two linked strands: (1) statement and clarification of legal principles applicable to Will-proof cases, and (2) application of those principles to the facts and evidence adduced in the Prerogative Court and on appeal.

1. Statement and qualification of the governing legal principles

  • The Court reiterated the settled rule that the onus (burden) of proving a Will rests on the party propounding it. Ordinarily that onus is discharged by satisfactory proof of the testator's testamentary capacity and the formal execution of the document; from these facts the Court will infer the testator's knowledge of and assent to the contents.
  • The Court acknowledged a second more cautious principle long stated in authority: when a Will is prepared by a party who takes a benefit under it, that circumstance is one that naturally excites suspicion and calls for vigilant and jealous scrutiny by the Court of the supporting evidence.
  • Importantly, the Committee clarified and limited a strict or literal reading of some reported expressions of that doctrine (notably attributed to Sir John Nicholl in reported authorities). The Committee rejected the proposition that the mere fact of a beneficiary preparing a Will operates, as a rule of law in every case, to shift the legal burden of proof or to mandate a particular species of evidence (for example, written instructions or reading-over of the instrument) in every instance. In short, the Court held that the circumstance of preparation by a beneficiary is a suspicious circumstance of varying weight, not an automatic reversal of the onus of proof or a categorical requirement of a particular form of proof.
  • The Court observed that instructions and a reading-over of the instrument are the most satisfactory evidence of a testator's knowledge; however such evidence is not invariably required. The Court recognized that in some cases the absence of that particular species of proof will prevent establishment of the Will, but the Court has no right to demand it in every instance.

2. Application to the facts

  • The Committee reviewed at length the mass of evidence produced below (both oral testimony and documents) and indicated that, having done so, it was satisfied the Prerogative Court's decree was correct.
  • The Court characterised the deceased's mental and personal qualities based on the evidence: he was of "slender capacity," of a retired disposition, indulgent habits, drinking, somewhat frivolous and childish in amusements, but not insane; the evidence did not show delusions or such a degree of folly as to render him unfit to manage his own affairs. There was evidence of his attention to pecuniary matters (letters, account settlements and attendance at bankers).
  • The Committee noted significant circumstantial material tending to reduce suspicion: the deceased was estranged from his only son (the appellant) — a fact that supplied a rational explanation for excluding the son from inheritance — and he had little or no friendly intercourse with other relations. Thus it was plausible he would give to those with whom he did maintain relations (Percy, Butlin, and trusted servants such as Whitehead).
  • Documentary and testimonial evidence pointed to the testator's actual involvement and knowledge: a draft (Exhibit C) incorporating a memorandum was proved to have been transmitted to the deceased; the draft contains handwriting alterations in the testator's hand, which the Court regarded as proof that his mind was engaged on the subject. Further testimony (Gough) supplied evidence that the testator sent word to witnesses to attend for execution. Dr. Davidson (one attesting witness) swore that the deceased declared the document to be his last Will and Testament and requested that he and Mr. Chapman witness it, and expressed his belief that Mr. Barry was of sound mind and capable of acts requiring judgment and reflection.
  • The Court rejected the contention that the Will was the product of clandestine fraud. The apparent openness of the execution (the attendance of respectable witnesses) was strong evidence against a secret conspiracy. While Whitehead's authority and power (as a servant) over the testator was established, the opinion finds no proof that such authority was exercised in a way amounting to fraud or undue influence sufficient to defeat the Will.
  • On balance, weighing the suspicious circumstances (a will prepared by a beneficiary, the degree of the testator's weakness of mind, and the exclusion of the natural heir) against the affirmative evidence (handwritten drafts and alterations, express declarations by the testator, witness testimony, and attendant probabilities such as estrangement from the son), the Committee concluded that the suspicions were satisfactorily removed and that the Will expressed the testator's true intentions.
  • As to costs, the Committee acknowledged a degree of doubt about condemning the appellant in costs for having given in an allegation and taken steps to inquire into the Will; ordinarily an appellant is justified in requiring proof and need not be saddled with costs simply for calling for proof. But because the appellant's allegation included a charge in the nature of conspiracy and fraud (which failed), and because part of that charge appeared to have been introduced for a collateral purpose, adding materially to expense, the Committee refused to vary the decree below regarding costs and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Judicial Committee affirmed the decree of the Prerogative Court and held that the Will propounded by the respondent was valid and expressed the testator's true last wishes. The appeal was dismissed with costs; in particular the appellant was condemned in costs from the time of giving in his allegation (dated 7 November 1833) and in respect of the costs of the appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Will is established and admitted to proof; the respondent's position as executor and residuary legatee is upheld; the appellant's challenge fails and he is ordered to pay costs as described above.
  • On the law: The Court clarified the applicable legal principle concerning wills prepared by beneficiaries: while such a fact raises suspicion and calls for vigilant scrutiny, it does not in itself shift the legal onus of proof or impose a categorical requirement that the propounding party produce a particular species of evidence (such as direct written instructions or proof that the instrument was read aloud). Instead, the court must consider the weight of suspicion relative to the totality of evidence in each case. The opinion emphasises that the doctrine should be understood and applied with this qualification.
  • No novel precedent was established; the Committee stated its concurrence with the fundamental rule but qualified some reported expressions of it. The decision primarily applies the settled principles to the facts of the case and confirms the result below.

Note: This summary strictly reflects the information and statements contained in the provided opinion excerpt. No facts, conclusions, or additional context have been invented or inferred beyond what is present in the text.

    Barry v. Butlin

    BARRY II. BUTLIN cl8381 11 IOORE. 480

    a fresh petition to IXer Xajesty in Council, and on the: 5th of December 1839, moved

    by counsel, for a day to be fired for hetwing the matter of his original petition, for

    an extension of the then existing Letters Patent.

    Their Lordships were of opinion, that the public were entitled to be apprised o f

    the app~ication intended to be made under the recent Statute to enable parties to

    enter caveats and lodge objections, and that as no new rules had been framed for

    proceeding under the recent Act, those made under the former statute must be ob-

    served, and directed the petitioner to advertise his intention to apply, as required

    by the rules of practice under the former Act.

    The Petitioner having complied with this direction (May 20, 1840 *), and the

    existing practice, and no caveat being entered, the petition now came on for hearing

    before the Judicial Committee.

    Sir W. Follett, Q.C., and Mr. Godson, for the Petitioner-Produced witnesses to

    prove the allegations of merits [480] contained in the Petition, and that the Peti-

    tioner had not received adequate remI~nerat~on for his outlay, and the ingenuity

    of his invention ; and

    Lord Lyndhurst-On the part of their Lordships, espressed the opinion of the

    Committee, that the subject-matter of the Patent was an ingenious invention, and

    that as the reii~ur~eration appeared, from the evidence produced, only to have been

    received for the last three years, and during that period was not of an extraordi-

    nary kind, it could hardly be said, that the inventor had had sufficiently the benefit

    of his invention ; they considered, therefore, that they ought to grant an extension

    of the term for seven years.

    [Mews' Dig. tit. PATENT F, 2, a. The Extension of letters patent for inventions is

    now regulated by s. 25 of the Patents Act, 1883 (46 and 37 Vict., e. 57), and by

    rules scheduled 10 on 0. in C. of 26 Nov. 1897 (Stat. R. and O.), 1899, p. 1837.1

    ON APPEAL FROM THE P ~ E ~ O ~ A q ~ I V ~ COURT OF ANT ER^^^^.

    P ~ N ~ O C K BARRY B A R R Y , - ~ ~ ~ e Z ~ ~ ~ ; JAMES B ~ T L I N , - ~ e s ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ t

    [December 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, 18381.

    The onw of proving a Will being on the party propounding it, i s in general

    discharged by proof of capacity, and the fact of execution; from which the

    knowledge of and assent to its contents by the Testator will be assumed.

    The fact of a p&rty preparing a Will, with a Legacy to himself, is at most otily

    one of suspicion, of niore or less weight according to the circumstances, de-

    manding, however, the vigilant care of the Court in investigating the case

    before granting probate: and though evidettce of the instructions given by

    the deceased, and the reading over of the instrument are the most satis-

    factory proofs of the Testator's knowledge of the contents, they are nsf, Ihe

    only description of proof by which the cognizance of the contents of tliri Kill

    may be brought home to the deceased, eve11 in a case of doubtful capacity.

    A Will prepared by the deceased's solicitor, under which he took a c o n ~ i d e r a b ~ ~

    benefit, the only son of the deceased being excluded ; the deceased being of

    weak, though of testable capacity, under tlie circumbtances vronounced for,

    affirming the sentence of the Prerogative Court, with costs.

    A charge in the nature of conspiracy and fraud being introduced in an allega

    tion, by a party opposing probate ; for a collateral purpose not material t o

    the suit, the Judicial ~ o x ~ n i t t e e a ~ r m i n g the judgment of the P r e r ~ ~ a t i v ~

    * Present : Lord Lyndhurst, Mr. Justice Bosanquet, Sir Herbart Jenner, and tItc

    t Present: Lord Brougham, Mr. Baron Parke, Mr. Justice Bosanquet, and tlic

    _- _ ~ _ _ _ _ ~

    Right Hon. Dr. Lushing~n.

    Chief Judge of the Court of Bankruptcy [Sir Thomas Erskine].

    P.C. I. 1089 35

    11 OR^^ 481 BARRY "U. BUTLEN [1838]

    Court condemiied the party with costs, from the tinre of giving in his allega-

    tion, toget~~er with the costs af Appeal,

    Fendock Barry, of Tol~erton Hall, in the County of ~ o t t i n g h a ~ , the Testator,

    r e spec t~n~ the ~ r a ~ ~ d ~ t y of whose Will the presen~ Appal arose, died on the 13th

    Ej4811 of March 1833, at the age of seventy-six years, a widower, Iewing behind him

    the A~pe l~an t , his son and heir, mid only next of kin.

    On the 24th of September 1827, the deceased executed his Will in dup~ica~e, a t

    the house of Percy, his attorney, in the presence of two witnesses, whemby he ap-

    pointed the ~espo~ide~it,, Samw Butlin, sole Executor and ~ s i d u a r y Legatee, and

    amongst other Legacies be~ueathed to Percy 83000, to Butlin 82000, and to White-

    head, his butler, E3000.

    The v a ~ i d ~ ~ ~ of this Will was d~sputed by the ~ppel lant , on the g r o ~ n d that the

    ~ ~ e c u ~ ~ o n was pro cur^ by the fraud and consp~racy of Percy, ~ u t ~ ~ n , and White-

    head, a t a time whcn the deceased was of unsou~~d mind, and wholly ~ n c a ~ a b ~ e of

    making or executing a Will, or of doing any act r e q u ~ r i ~ ~ t h o u g ~ t ~ j u ~ g ~ e n t , and

    reflection.

    The ~ ~ p o ~ d e i ~ t propounded the above Will for F r ~ b a ~ in the ~ r e r o ~ ~ t i ~ e

    Court of Canterbury.

    A caveat ~ ~ a v i n g been entered by the ~ p p e l l a n ~ , a ~ l e ~ a t ~ o n s a d exhib~t$ were

    ~ ? r o u ~ h t in by both parties, and w~tnesses e x a ~ i n e d in support thereof.

    14823 The facts and circ~mstances pleaded, and ~ a t e r ~ a ~ to the issue, are stated

    very fully in the judgment.

    After various int~r~oeutory p r o c ~ d ~ n ~ s , the Judge of the PrerogFtive Court,

    Sir Werbert Jenner, on the 5th of Septe~~ber 1831 (reported 1 Curters, Ecc. Rep.

    614), pronounced for the force and validity of the Will.

    The Appe~ant ap~ealed from this sentence to the Queen in Council,

    Mr. Cresswe~l, Q.G., and Dr. A d d a ~ , for the Appellant.

    The Queen's Advocate (Sir John Dodson~, and ililr, Thesige~, Q.C., for the Be-

    ~ p o ~ ~ d e n t .

    The ~ o ~ ~ o w i n g a u t ~ ~ o r ~ t j e s w re ~,e~erred to: ~~~~~ v. Btkiize (3 Xyl. and K.

    113); Pmtt v, Burker (4 Bum, 507); TU^ v. ~~~€~ (1 Hagg. ECG. Rep. 384,

    391) ; Gibsvrc v. Jeyes (6 Ves. 266).

    Mr, Baron Parae (Dec. 24),-The rules of law accoxd~ng to which cases of this

    nature are to be decided, do not admit of any d~spute, so far as they are ~ ~ e s s & ~

    to the d e t e r ~ ~ n a t i o n of the present Appeal: and they have been acquiesced in on

    both sides. These rules are two ; the first that the o m s ~~b~~~ lies in every case

    upon the party p rop~und~ng a Will ; and he must satisfy the conscience of the Court

    that the ~ n s t r u ~ e n t so propounded is the last Will of a, free and capable Testator,

    The second is, that if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a

    benefit,, that is rt c i r c u ~ ~ t a ~ c e that ought genera~~y to excite the susp~cion

    the Court, and calls upon i t to be vjg~lant and jealous in e x a ~ i ~ i n g the evide~ce in

    support of the i ~ ~ s ~ r u ~ e n t , in favour of which it ought not to p ~ ~ i o u n c e unless the

    susp~cion i s removed, and it i s ~udicially sa t~~f ied that the paper propo~i~ded does

    express the true Will of the deceased,

    The

    former is und~sputed. The tatter is laid down by Sir John N~~ho l l , in substa~ce,

    in Paske v. U ~ ~ ~ € € (2 Phill. 323); ~~~~~~ v. Wyatt (1 Tfagg, Ecc. ftep. 388); and

    ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s € v. ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ - s (I Phill. 187) ; and i s stated by that very Ieasned and ex-

    perienced Judge to Iiave been handed down to him. by his predecessors, and this

    tribunal have s ~ ~ c t i o n e d and acted upon it, in a recent case; that of Baker. v. Batt

    (ante [2 Moo. P.C.] 317).

    Their hrdships are fully sensible of the wisdom. of this rule, and the ~ ~ p o r t a n c e

    of its pr~ct,~cal ~p l~ca t ion on all occasions. At the same time their ~ordships

    think it fit to observe, e s p e c ~ a ~ ~ y as there has been some discussion upon these

    points, t ~ ~ a r d s the dose of this i n q u ~ ~ , that some of the expressions reported to

    have been used by Sir John Nicholl in laying down this doctrine, appear to them to

    he somewhat e~uivocal, and capable of ~ e a d ~ n ~ into error in the ~ n v e s ~ , j ~ a t ~ o n and

    decision of questions of this nature. It i s said that where the party ~ ~ e ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ pre-

    1090

    These pr~nciples, to the extent that I have stated, are well estab~ished.

    BARRU ‘U. BUTLIN f18381 I1 XOORE, *

    pares the Will, “ the presumption and onus ~~0~~~~~~ is against the instrument^ and

    the proof must go not merely to the act of signing, but to the knowledge of the

    contents of the paper ” (Pnske v. ~ ~ ~ ~ t t , 2 Phill. 323) : and that. ‘‘ where the capacity

    i s doubtful, there must be proof of ~ ~ ~ ? , ~ c € i ~ ~ OF F e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ over ’’ ( ~ ~ Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s t v.

    Fkiekers, 1 Phill, 193). If, by these expressions, tlte learned [484] Judge meant

    merely to say, that there are cases of Wills prepared by a Legatee, so pregnarit with

    susp~cion, that they ought to be pro~~ct.~nced against in the absence of evidence in

    support of them, and that extending t,o clear proof of the actual knowledge of the

    contents, by the supposed Testator, and that instructions proceeding from him, ur

    the reading over the instrument by or to him, are the most satisfactory evidence

    of sucb knowledge; we fully coIicur in the proposition so understood; in all pro-

    b a b i ~ ~ t y the learned Judge intended no more than this. But if the words uscd are

    to be construed stvietly; if it is intended to be stated as a rule of law, that in every

    case in which the party preparing a Will derives a benefit under it, the olzus pro-

    bandi is shifted, and that not only a certain measure but a particular species of

    proof i s thereupon required from the party propounding the W-ill,--we feel bound

    to say that me assume &e doctrine to be incorrect.

    The strict meaning of the term 07~zcs p r o b d i i s thig that if no evidence is given

    by the party on whom the burthen is cast, the issue must be found against him.

    In all cases the O?WS is imposed on the party propounding a Will, it is in general

    d ~ s c ~ a r g e d by proof of capacity, and the fact of execution, from which the know-

    ledge of and assent to the contents of the instrument are assumed, and it cannot

    be that the simple fact of the party who prepared the Will being himself a Legatee,

    is in every case, and under all circumstances, to oretite a contrary presu~~ption, and

    to call upon the Court to pronounce against the Will, unless ldditional evidence

    is produced to prove the knowIedge of its contents by the deceased. A single

    instance, of not unfrequent occurrence, will test the truth of this p r ~ [ 4 ~ ] ~ p o s ~ t i o n .

    A man of acknowledged competence and habits of business, worth ~ l O O , O O ~ , leaves

    the bulk of his property to his family, and a Legacy of 350 to his con~dential

    attorney, who prepared the Will: would this fact throw the burthen of proof of

    actual cogn~zance by the Testator, of the contents ct.f the Will, on the party pro-

    pounding it, so that i f such proof were not supplied, the Will would be pronounced

    against a All that can be truly said is, that

    if a person, whether attorney or not, prepares a Ryill with a Legacy to himself, it is,

    at most, a suspicious c~rcuinstance, of more or less weight, according to the facts of

    each part~cular case; in some of no weight a t all, as in the case suggested, varying

    according to circumstances; for instance, the guctlzturn of the Legacy, and the pro-

    portion i t bears to the property disposed of, and numerous other contingencies :

    but in no case amounting to more than a circumsta~ce of suspicion, demand in^

    the vigilant care and circums~ect~on of the Court in investigati~g the case, and

    calling upon it not to grant probate wi t~ou t full and entire satisfact~on that the

    instrument did express the real intentions of the deceased,

    Nor can it be necessary, that ilz a Z E swk cuses, even if the ~estator’s c a p a c ~ t ~

    i s doubtful, the precise species of evidence of tile deceased’s knowledge of the Will

    is to be in the shape of instructions for, or reading over the ~ n s t r ~ i ~ ~ e n t . They

    form, no doubt, the most sa t i s fac to~ , but they are not the oidy s a t ~ s f a c ~ r y de.

    scription of proof, by which the c o ~ n i ~ ~ ~ ~ c c of the contents of the Will, may be brought

    home to the deceased. The Court would naturally look for such evidence; in some

    cases it might be impossible to [@6] establish a Will without it, but it has no right

    in every case to require it.

    I have said this much upon the rules of law applicable to this case, with the con-

    currence of all their Lordships who heard the argument,, not particularly with a

    view to the decision of this case, but in order to prevent any misconception upon a

    subject of so great practical importance; a t the same time their Lordships wish it

    to be d~stinctly u n ~ e r s ~ ~ o d , that entirely acqu~escing in the proprie~y of the rule,

    so qualified and explained, they should be extremely sorry if anything which has

    fallen from them should have the effect of i ~ p e d ~ n g its full operation.

    Tlie case which their Lordships have now to decide has been argued a t the bar

    wi th much industry and ability on both sides ; and all their Lords~~ips have besides

    had an ample opportuni t~~ of pe r i~s~ng and c o n s ~ d e r ~ ~ g with due care and a~tent io?~

    1091

    The answer is obvious, it would not.

    II xoom, 487 BARBP 'U. BUTLEN [I8381

    the i~iimense mass of evidence, more or less mater~al, which was adduced in the

    Court beIow-as the result of that. consideration has been to satisfy our minds, that

    the Decree of the Judge of the Prerogative Court was right, it i s not necessary $0

    go into the same minute statements, o r con~inent upon the evidence in the cause in

    detail, which we should have thought it our duty to have done i f we had happened to

    mrive at a different conclusion from that of the learned Judge. ~ ~ d o p t i n g the

    ~ r i ~ c i p ~ e s abov~ laid down, and a d ~ ~ t t e d on both sides, we are all quite satisfied

    that the deceased was compet,ent, .and that the paper propounded by the Respo~~dent

    is proved to be his true last Will, and to express his real ~ntentioi~s.

    A tolerably just estimate may be formed of the [487] character and mental

    powers of Mr. Barry, the deceased, from the parol evidence on both Bides, after

    making some allowance for the bias under which some of the witnesses speak, a ~ d

    the writtan docui~Ien~s, whicli are proved by the hand-~rritii~g of the deceased.

    Froni these sources it may be collected, that he WHS a person of slender capac~ty,

    of a retired dispwition, ii~do~eiit habits, and addicted to drinking, s o r ~ e ~ ~ i a ~

    singular in h i s appearaiice, frivolous, and even childish in his a~nusen3ents and

    occupations. On the other hand i t i s clear that be r a s not insane, and al thoug~~

    the evidence embraces a period of more than fifty years, and an accoui~t of most of

    the transactions of his life, there i s no satis€ac~ory evidence of a single act, denoting

    that he was l a b o u r ~ n ~ under delusions, or ~ndicating such a degree of folly ps to

    show that he was unfit to be trusted with the managemei~t of his own concerns.

    Though certainly not a man of business, tie w&s capable of t r a n s a c t ~ n ~ the ordinary

    affairs of life, and the letters produced under his hand, and the parol evidence of

    the annual settlement of his accounts, and attendsnce at the bankers, distinctly

    show, that he paid 'considerable attention to his pecuniary concerns, and was coni-

    petent to the conduct of his own affairs. It i s i i ~ t indeed disputed on one side

    but that he was of testable capacity, nor on the other, that he waa a person of weak

    mind: BS to the extent of that weakness there i s a difference, but a d n i i t t i i ~ ~ its

    existence, even to the degree represented on the part of the Appellant, the only con-

    sequence will be, that i t adds to the suspicio~ which unquestionably belongs to the

    circunistance of the attorney who prepared the Will, tnking no less than a fourth of

    the Estate, and the Legatees taking the whole to the exclusion of his own f n n ~ ~ ~ y ,

    [4@$] and calls upon us to watch the proof of the Will itself with increased jealousy

    and suspicion.

    The question is, whether these grounds of suspicion have been s a ~ i s ~ a c t o r i ~ ~

    removed, and the instrument proved to he the real Will of the Testator hiniself.

    Thai he should pass over his own relthons i s rendered highly probable under the

    unhappy circumstances of this case. If, all the other facts of the case being as they

    were, he had lived on terms of affectionate intercourse with his son ; had received

    him occas~onally as an ~nmate of the house, or had habi tua~~y correspo~ded with

    him, and had always expressed for him parental regard, the case would have been

    one of niuch greater susp~cion, and more d ~ ~ c u l t to decide than it i s ; but unhappily,

    there i s proof of estrangement from his only son, so clear and distinct as to admit

    of 130 doubt, and upon ~ i . o u ~ i ~ s which, whether the charges abainst the son were true

    or false, cannot assuredly be deemed irrational. Though Hr. Barry Barry had been

    guilty of violent conduet which is deposed to by some of the ~ ~ t n e s s e s , and that

    operating on the timidity of his father, might have sunietimes excited his fears ;

    i t i s clear from the correspondence, th& h i s father was on a f r ~ e n d l ~ foot in^ with

    him, and professed much regard for him, even after that gentleman had absconded

    to avoid being taken on a bench w a r r ~ n t , founded upon the eharge against him ;

    but after the time that he declined to take his trial at the assizes, in March 1814,

    and thereby afforded a strong ground for believing that the charge was true, all

    intercourse ceased, the deceased never wrote to, or saw his son a f te rwardshe held

    no con~mu~iicat~on whatever with him, and in December 1819, when in the absence

    of ~ ~ ~ i t e h e a d and Butlin, under whom control the deceased i s su~~posed ~~9~ to

    have been, Nr. Barry Barry went to his father's house, his father of his own acGord

    excluded him from his presence, and i t appears to be clear that from the month of

    Harc~I 1811, he ceased to speak of him except as an unfortunate and unhappy man.

    In this state of complete alienation from his son, it is by no nieanx unn~ tu ra l to

    1093

    suppose that he would not make him the object of his bounty, but that he would seek

    elsewhere for those on whom he would bestow it.

    After his daughter’s death in 1821, he had no relations except the Neales: from

    them also i t i s qua1Iy clear that his regards, i f he ever enterta~ned any, were es-

    tranged. With ~~enaock,who died in Septeniber 1816, he had unfort~~iately quarrelled,

    and he kept up no intercourse with the other ikiexnbers of that fa~~iiIy : under these

    circumstances i t is highly probable that he would uiake a Will in order to prevent his

    son enjoying his property, and that as none of his relations were on terms of friend-

    ship with him, he would bestow his bbunty on those persons who were; and none

    seem to have been in habits of intercourse with him xilore than Mr. Percy altd Mr.

    Butlin, and i t is by no means improbable that he would give a part to an old

    servant in whom he had reposed great coniidence and trust. It i s true that this

    con~dence was in some respect misplaced, and ~ ~ h i t e l ~ e a d seems to have taken

    liberties in his master’s house which he could hardly have sanctioned ; but still its

    does not appear that his master knew it, and he was entrusted to the last with the

    management of his domestic affairs.

    With these probabilities then in f ~ v o u r of the Will propounded, let us look a t

    the evidence of the fuetztm, which though not so strong as direct proof of written

    [~9~] inst~ructions, to the full extent of the Will, or direct proof that i t was read

    over, i s still of a very satisfactory nature, and, with the other circu~stances to which

    I have adverted, leaves the mind permanently satisfied that the instrument expresses

    his real vishes.

    In the first place it i s a fact beyond dispute that Mr. Percy, who prepared the

    Will, at all events meant that it should be fairly and openly esecuted in the presence

    of r e spec t~~ le witnesses. Mr. Sniith was c e r ~ a i n ~ ~ applied to by him for that

    purpose, and could not attend, Dr. Davidson and Mr. Chapman, all answering that

    descrjpt~on, did attend. This ci~cunistance i s strong to prove the absence of clandes-

    tinity and fraud,

    There were instruct~ons for the burial and funeral, in the hand~r i t i ng of the

    Testator. These prove no more than that his mind was directed on the subject of

    arrangement after his death; but they do not carry the case further, they do not

    lead necessarily to the inference that he had a Will in view ; but Exhibit C. is proved

    by a witness named Gough (and there i s no fair ground to disbelieve his evidence)

    to have been transmitted to the deceased. It incorporated the Memorandu~ D.,

    and was a draft of the Will, and that Draft, in a page of i t which contains tlte

    legacies to Whitehead and his wife, is twice altered in the hand-writing of the

    Testator ; which distinctly proves that his mind was employed on the subject, and

    affords reasonahltt evidence that he was cognisable of its contents. In addition i o

    this, Gough proves that i t was Mr. Barry who sent him to desire Mr. Chapman “ t o

    come and see him execute his Will.’’ We also sent him with the same message to

    Dr. Marsden, but that [&lI g e n t ~ e ~ a n was not at home; Dr. D a ~ ~ d s o x ~ , who did

    attest it, expressly swears that Yr. Barry declared it to be his last Will and Testa-

    ment, and requested him and Yr. C ~ a p ~ a n to witness it; and he adds his belief

    tphat Mr. Barry was of perfectly sound mind, memory, and understanding, and

    capable of doing any act which required thought, j u d g ~ e ~ t , and reflection. It is

    suggested that there was some secrecy in the preparation of the Will, in Mr. Percy’s

    oflice, for ~ightingale, who was an old cIerk, did not know it ; but we think that this

    does not raise any inference of this kind, as i t may naturally be accounted for by

    the practice of entrusting different matters of business to diffe~ent clerks, and if

    a fraud had been intended and cancooted between three Legatees i t i s rather mort!

    likely that Nightingale, who was an associate of Whitehead, should be employed,

    than Gough, who was not.

    We think, therefore, on the whole, that tnhe evidence of the ~~~~~~ coupled

    with the strong ~rob&b~li t ies of tbe case, is sufficien~ to remove the suspicions which

    naturally belong to the case of all Wills prepared by persons in their own favour,

    especially when made by those of weak capac~ty. The undue infiuence, and the

    ~ ~ p o r t u n ~ t y which, if they are to defeat a Will, must be of the nature of fraud or

    duress, exercised on a, mind in a state of debility, are insinuated but not proved.

    W h i ~ h e a d ’ ~ authority and power over his master is, no doubt, sufficient~y

    established ; but that such authority and power were in any way exercised to procure

    1093

    *

    11 XOORE, 492 MELLIN U. MELLIN [1838]

    this Will to be made is only conjecture; and there i s nothing like proof of authority

    or control of any kind on the part of Butlin or Percy.

    [4921 We are, therefore, of opinion that the Will ia established, and ought to be

    admitted to proof. We have entertained some doubt as to the propriety of that part

    of the decree which condemns the Appellant in the costs s u ~ e q u e n t o the giving in

    his allegation dated the 7th of November 1833. The case is one in which the

    Appellant was well justified in calling for the proof of the Will, and watching and

    sifting that proof, and he certainly ought not to have had to pay the costs of that

    inquiry. But as the case made by his allegation was a charge in the nature of

    conspiracy and fraud, and that charge has failed, and as a part of it, and that

    causing no small addition to the expense, is introduced for a collateral purpose,

    not material to the decision of this suit, we do not think we ought to vary the Decree

    of the Court below in respect to the costs, and the appeal must be consequently

    dismissed, and we think with cmts.

    See ~ u r ~ ~ q ~ g v. ~ o v e l u ~ , 2 Curteis, 225, 227-8.

    [Mews’ Dig. tit. WILL, I. TESTANESTABY CAPACITY, h. U d a e Inf lumce uad P r o d ,

    also VIII. d. 3 Orms of Proof, E. Costs. Followed in

    ~ ~ ~ t c ~ ~ e ~ ~ v. ~ ~ o r ~ a s , 1847 12 Jur. 967 ; G ~ r - d ~ o z ~ e v. BlncLEturn, 1866, L.R.

    1 P. and D. 116; ~ ~ ~ r e Z Z v. ~ u ~ t o n (1894), P. 151 ; ~ u ~ r e l l ~ v. C O ? . ~ ~ ~ U T ~ (1899),

    A.C. 567 ; and Sharna C h u r n Kuridu v. K ~ e t ~ ~ . o m o ~ ~ &si (1899), L.R. 27 Ind.

    App.,XO. Cf. also Cleare v. Gleare, 1869, L.R. 1 P. and D. a t p. 657; and

    Hastdow v. Stobie, 1865, 1 P. and D. 69. On point as to costs, see note t o

    Armstrong v. Huddleston, 1838, 1 Moo. P.C. 492.1

    S.C., below, 1 Curt. 614.

    E4931 ON APPEAL F R O M ~ H E ~ O N S ~ S T O ~ Y COURT OF YORK.

    JAKE MELLIN,--Appellmt; RICHARD JOHN SUTCLIFFE MELLIN,---Respo?t-

    dent* [8 and 12 Dec. 18381.

    The fact of a marriage celelxated in the Isle of Man, though averred in the libel

    and not controverted by the answer, is not sufficieiitly proved in a suit for

    divorce on account of adultery, by the production of a copy of the certificate :

    but further proof was supplied by the viva voce examination of a witness

    before the Judicial Committee under the 3 and 4 Will. IV., e. 41, s . 7.

    This was an Appeal from a sentence of divorce or separation by reason of

    adultery, in a cause promoted by Richard John Sutcliffe Mellin, of Belle Vue, in the

    p r i s h of Sandal Magna, in the Diocese of York, against Jane Mellin his wife.

    The sentence was proi~ounced after hearing the cause, by the O6cial Principal

    of the Co~sistory Court of York, on the 14th of July 1837, alimony liaving been

    assigned pending the suit.

    The marriage was averred in the libel, and though not controverted, was not

    admitted by the answer, and was only proved by a certificate, which purported to he

    :2 copy from the register of marriages in the parish church of Malew, in the Isle of

    Xan.

    The certificate stated the marriage to have been by special license a t Castletown,

    in the Island, on the 9th of June 1823; it was signed by the Vicar and the parties

    thereto, and appeared to have been solemnized in the presence of two witnesses. This

    certificate was made an exhibit, but the marriage was not proved by the examination

    of either of the witnesses.

    [49Q On the Appeal coming on, Dr. Phillimore took a prelimirlary objection on

    the part of the Appellant to the want of sufficient proof of the marriage, and cited

    ~ a r ~ l ~ v. H a r n l k (heard in the Arches Court, ~ i c h a e ~ a s Term, 1836), which was

    a suit originally begun in the Consistory Court of Bath and Wells, for divorce 011

    * Present : Lord Brougham, Mr. Baron Parke, Rfr. Justice Bosanquet, and the

    Chief Judge of the Court of Bankruptcy [Sir Thomas Erskinef.

    ~ -. __ __

    1094

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    Comments

    Barry v. Butlin
    (Dec 8, 1838)