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  • section 10 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 10 (2) (xi) of the Income-tax Act,
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1922
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  • section 10 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 10 (2) (xi) of the Income-tax Act,
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1922
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Hardayal Hardy, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee is a limited company engaged in distribution and exhibition of cinematography films. For the previous year ending 28 February 1957 (assessment year 1957-58) the assessee advanced amounts to producers for three pictures (one named "Rajput") under contracts that provided for the assessee first to recoup advances from box-office realisations and thereafter share collections with producers. All three pictures failed and the assessee could not recoup advances totalling Rs. 80,664/-, which it claimed as a bad debt (or loss) in the relevant accounting year.

The Income-tax Officer accepted that the debt was genuine and had become bad but treated it as connected with the acquisition of a capital asset and disallowed it as a capital loss under Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held the advances represented amounts paid for acquisition of distribution rights that constituted stock-in-trade and allowed the sum as a permissible deduction. The Income-tax Officer appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which inspected the agreements and concluded the assessee had acquired only distribution rights (stock-in-trade) and that the loss of Rs. 80,664/- was a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1).

The Commissioner of Income-tax obtained a reference to the High Court under section 66(1) (as described in the opinion) by posing the following question of law for the Court's opinion (quoted in the opinion and reproduced below in Legal Issues): whether the Rs. 80,664/- loss was a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1) in computing business profits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the loss of Rs. 80,664/- was a trading loss deductible under section 10(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in computing the business profits?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The advances were made against pictures (some under production) and the payments were for the acquisition of distribution rights that, by their nature, were capital assets; the money paid was intended to earn profits and therefore represented capital outlay — any loss on recoupment was a capital loss, not a trading loss.
  • The Revenue relied on the Supreme Court decision in A.V. Thomas and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (48 I.T.R. 67) to contend earlier favourable authority (Basumal Jagat Narain) was no longer good law.
  • The Revenue also relied on Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (27 I.T.R. 34) for principles distinguishing capital expenditure from revenue expenditure.
  • Procedurally, the Revenue sought to challenge the Tribunal's factual finding that distribution rights were stock-in-trade and to raise the question whether those rights were capital assets; invoked tests about scope of reference under Scindia Steam Navigation.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The advances were given in the course of the assessee's distribution business and effectively acquired distribution rights that constituted stock-in-trade; therefore the unrecovered advances constituted a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1).
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax and Excise Profits Tax, Madras v. South India Pictures Ltd. (29 I.T.R. 910) as supporting authority.
  • Pointed out that the Revenue had accepted the Tribunal's factual position in the statement of case and raised no objection to it before the Tribunal or in the Court, so the High Court must accept the Tribunal's findings of fact.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Basumal Jagat Narain (38 I.T.R. 447) Held that an irrevocable advance to a producer against distribution rights in films was an admissible deduction in the hands of the distributor (as relied upon by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner relied on this decision to allow the deduction; the Court noted the case was relied upon below but the Revenue said it might not be good law in view of A.V. Thomas; the Court did not treat Basumal as decisive against the assessee, and the Tribunal's factual finding made Basumal less central to outcome.
A.V. Thomas and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (48 I.T.R. 67) Supreme Court decision relied on by the Revenue to contend earlier favourable authority (Basumal) was no longer good law. The Revenue invoked this decision to challenge Basumal; the Court recorded the Revenue's contention but proceeded on facts and Tribunal findings, not deciding Basumal's continuing authority solely on A.V. Thomas.
Commissioner of Income-tax and Excise Profits Tax, Madras v. South India Pictures Ltd. (29 I.T.R. 910) Was relied on by the assessee; contains discussion about composite agreements (financing and distributing parts) and whether films remain capital assets or become agency distribution rights. The Court analysed South India Pictures and distinguished it: there the agreement was composite and the financing part had been worked out; in the present case there was only an agency/distribution agreement and no security or financing element as in South India Pictures, so the decision did not dictate against the assessee.
Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (27 I.T.R. 34) Accepted principles (from Benarsidas Jagannath) for distinguishing capital from revenue expenditure; sets out tests to make the distinction. The Court observed the Revenue relied on this authority but found that the principles enumerated there were not helpful in deciding the present case; the Court treated the tests as not exhaustive and emphasised the need to decide on facts.
Benarsidas Jagannath, In re (15 I.T.R. 195) Principles (Full Bench of Lahore High Court) used for distinguishing capital and revenue expenditure and accepted in Assam Bengal Cement. Referenced as the source of principles adopted in Assam Bengal Cement; the Court said those principles did not assist the Revenue in this specific factual matrix.
Short Bros. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (12 Tax Cases 935) Rowlatt J.'s observation that sums were to be received "in the course of its doing the agency business from a running business" (i.e., receipts/amounts in the course of agency business are revenue). The Court applied this formulation to show the unrecovered advance was an amount to be received in the ordinary course of the assessee's distribution (agency) business and thus was revenue in nature.
Gotan Lime Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajasthan and Delhi (59 I.T.R. 718) Holds that tests to distinguish capital and revenue are not exhaustive or universal and that each case depends on its own facts. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the present case must be decided on its specific facts rather than by mechanically applying prior tests.
Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore v. Commissioner of Income-tax (17 I.T.R. 473) Held that a contract entered into to secure raw materials (tendu leaves) was wholly for supply of raw materials and the expenditure was on revenue account, not capital. The Court treated this case as a close parallel, using it to illustrate that agreements to secure goods/raw materials (or equivalents) may give rise to revenue expenditure rather than capital outlay, supporting the view that distribution rights here were akin to stock-in-trade.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal III v. Imperial Chemical (P) Ltd. (74 I.T.R. 17) Affirms that a High Court in a reference under section 66(1) must confine itself to facts as found by the Appellate Tribunal and not reappraise evidence or substitute findings of fact. The Court relied on this authority to stress that it is bound to accept the Tribunal's factual findings (that distribution rights were stock-in-trade) unless perverse or unsupported, and thus refused to reappraise the factual conclusion urged by Revenue.
India Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Madras (60 I.T.R. 52 SC); Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Shri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (63 I.T.R. 609 SC); Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. (68 I.T.R. 200 SC) Similar principle: High Court should not reassess facts on a section 66(1) reference and must treat Tribunal's findings of fact as conclusive unless there is no evidence or perverse finding. These cases were cited to reinforce the limitation on the Court's scope when hearing a reference: the Court accepted the Tribunal's factual findings and did not entertain a reappraisal urged by the Revenue.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (42 I.T.R. 589) Sets out tests to determine when a question is one "arising out of" the Tribunal's order (four enumerated points regarding questions raised/considered before Tribunal). The Court relied on Scindia to assess the proper scope of the reference and to refuse the Revenue's attempt to widen the reference to a question that was not raised or considered by the Tribunal.
Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Indian Molasses Private Limited (78 I.T.T. 474) Noted that if a question of law is raised before the Tribunal, even if an aspect was not raised there, that aspect may be urged before the High Court. The Court examined this decision and observed that, although such aspects might be urged, in the present case the Revenue had not raised the alternative question before the Tribunal and the Court declined to permit the Revenue to raise it for the first time on the reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the sole question as whether the Rs. 80,664/- loss was a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1) in computing business profits.

1. Facts and Tribunal finding: The Tribunal had examined the distribution agreements (for the three pictures, including the Jubilee Pictures agreement of 4-2-1952) and found that the assessee acquired only the right of distribution in the southern Circuit. The Tribunal held these distribution rights amounted to the assessee's stock-in-trade and concluded the unrecovered advances represented a trading loss under Section 10(1).

2. Distinguishing South India Pictures: The Court distinguished the South India Pictures decision relied on by the assessee: in that case there were composite agreements with both financing and agency/distribution parts, and the financing part had been worked out so the question focused on the remaining distribution agency. In the present case there was only an agency/distribution agreement: the distributor had no security rights, no liability to complete the pictures, and no right to treat the pictures as its property or to distribute them as capital assets after the agency period. The pictures remained the producers' property and were to be returned after the agency period. These factual differences led the Court to treat the present arrangement as akin to acquiring items of stock-in-trade for the distribution business.

3. Characterisation as stock-in-trade and revenue: Applying the Tribunal's factual finding, the Court held that payments to producers for distribution rights were payments in the course of the assessee's distribution business. The Court invoked Rowlatt J.'s observation in Short Bros. that amounts receivable in the course of agency business are to be regarded as arising from a running business — supporting treatment as revenue/trading loss.

4. Rejection of Revenue's tests: The Revenue's reliance on Assam Bengal Cement (and the Benarsidas principles) was not accepted as determinative; the Court emphasised the Supreme Court's instruction (Gotan Lime Syndicate) that no exhaustive universal test exists and each case must rest on its facts. The Court therefore found those tests unhelpful in changing the characterisation reached by the Tribunal.

5. Analogy to supply-of-raw-materials cases: The Court found Mohanlal Hargovind (tendu leaves) to be a close parallel where payments to secure supply/raw material were held to be revenue in nature. This analogy reinforced the conclusion that the distribution rights acquired were functionally the equivalent of stock-in-trade or trading items, not capital assets.

6. Factual finding binding: The Court underscored the procedural limitation that on a section 66(1) reference the High Court must accept the Appellate Tribunal's findings of fact unless perverse or unsupported by evidence (citing Imperial Chemical and other Supreme Court authorities). The Court observed the Revenue had accepted the Tribunal's factual approach in the statement of case and had not, effectively, raised or pursued a contrary factual finding below. Thus the Court refused to reappraise or overturn the Tribunal's factual conclusion.

7. Scope of reference: Relying on Scindia Steam Navigation and Indian Molasses, the Court examined whether the Revenue could raise a new question (that distribution rights were capital assets) on the reference. The Court concluded the controversy before the Tribunal was about revenue vs capital character of the receipts and specifically whether the rights acquired were the assessee's stock-in-trade; the Tribunal decided they were. The Court therefore declined to allow the Revenue to expand the question at this stage and refused to entertain the fresh contention that the rights were capital assets.

8. Conclusion of analysis: On the Tribunal's facts and in the context of the agreements, the Court agreed the distribution rights were stock-in-trade and that the unrecovered advances of Rs. 80,664/- represented a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The question was answered in favour of the assessee: the loss of Rs. 80,664/- is a trading loss deductible under Section 10(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, in computing the assessee's business profits.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The assessee's claim for deduction of Rs. 80,664/- as a trading loss is upheld and allowed in computing business profits for the relevant year.
  • Costs: The assessee was awarded its costs and counsel's fee of Rs. 200/- was allowed.
  • Scope and precedent: The Court emphasised that its decision rested on the facts found by the Tribunal (that distribution rights constituted stock-in-trade) and on authorities limiting the High Court's reappraisal of facts on a section 66(1) reference. The opinion does not purport to lay down a universal test superseding prior authorities; rather it decided the question by applying established principles to the Tribunal's factual findings. No broader novel legal rule beyond the reasoning stated was announced in the opinion.

Disposition: Reference answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue; assessee to have costs (counsel's fee Rs. 200/-).

    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, New Delhi v. M/S. All India Film Corporation Ltd. New Delhi Petitioner

    Hardayal Hardy, J.:— The respondent, which will hereafter be referred to as the assessee, is a limited company carrying on the business of distribution and exhibition of cimatography films. The previous year relevant to the assessment year 1957-58 ended on 28-2-1957. In the course of its film distribution business, the assessee made substantial and “Rajput”. The contract with the producers provided that the assessee would first of all recoup the advanced amount out of the realisations on exhibition of the pictures and thereafter the collections would be shared between the producers and the assessee in specified shares.

    All the three pictures turned out to be failures and the assessee could not even recoup the advances, not to speak of earning any profits out of these three pictures. The total advances which could not be recouped amounted to Rs. 80,664/-. The assessee claimed it as a bad debt during the relevant accounting year. The Income-tax Officer accepted the debt as genuine and that it had become bad during the previous year under consideration. He however held that it was not a trade debt but was a debt which had arisen in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset. The claim was accordingly disallowed by him as a capital loss and not as a bad debt within the meaning of Section 10 (2) (xi) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
    On appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was held that the assessee had given advances to the producers for acquisition of distribution rights of the pictures which constituted the stock-in-trade of the assessee. It was also found that no capital asset as such was acquired or proposed to be acquired by the assessee by giving advances against the three pictures. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner also found that the financial condition of the producers became bad and as such they were not in a position to re-pay the assesse's advances. The un-recouped advances therefore represented trading loss of the assessee during the previous year under consideration and was accordingly admissible as a permissible deduction. In this connection the Appellate Assistant Commissioner referred to the decision of the Punjab High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Basumal Jagat Narain (38 I.T.R 447) (1) and observed that in that case it was held that an irrevocable advance to a producer against distribution rights in films was an admissible deduction in the hands of the distributor. In that view of the matter, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed that the sum of Rs. 80,664/- should be allowed as a. permissible deduction before arriving at the profits of the assessee.
    Against the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Income-tax Officer preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It was pointed out by the Revenue that the case of Basumal Jagat Narai was no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in A.V Thomas and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (48 I.T.R 67) (2). The contention urged on behalf of the Revenue was that as the assessee had made advances against pictures under production they could not be treated as a bad debt within the meaning of section 10 (2) (xi) and could not therefore be allowed as a permissible deduction. The Tribunal however pointed out that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had not allowed the claim as a claim for bad debt within the meaning of section 10 (2) (xi), but had allowed a trading loss probably under Section 10 (1) of the Act, although there was no reference in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to that particular sub-section.
    On a perusal of the various clauses of the said agreement between the assessee and Messrs. Jubilee Pictures dated 4-2-1952 and similar clauses in the agreements relating to the other two pictures the Tribunal formed the opinion that what the assessee company had acquired was only the right of distribution of these pictures in the southern Circuit and that right, according to the Tribunal, constituted the stock-in-trade of the assessee. The Tribunal accordingly held that the loss of Rs. 80,664/- was a trading loss admissible under Section 10 (1) of the Act. It seems that apart from the order an application was also made to the Tribunal under Section 35 of the Act to rectify certain mistakes apparent from records.
    At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the following question of law was referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this Court: —
    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the loss of Rs. 80,664/- was a trading loss deductible under section 10 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in computing the business profits ?”
    When the question of making a reference was under discussion before the Tribunal an objection was raised on behalf of the assessee to the maintainability of the commissioner's application by the Appellate Bench of the Tribunal at Delhi as according to the assessee, such an application could only be filed at the headquarters of the Tribunal at Bombay. The objection was, however, over-ruled and it is no longer necessary to deal with that aspect of the matter.
    The only question that requires consideration is whether the sum of Rs. 80,664/- was a trading loss deductible under Section 10 (1) of the Act in computing the business profits of the assessee. On behalf of the assessee reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax and Excise Profits Tax, Madras v. South India Pictures Ltd. (29 I.T.R 910) (3) whereas the Revenue has relied upon another decision of the same Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (27 I.T.R 34) (4).
    It seems to us that on the view taken by the Tribunal the right of distribution of the three pictures constituted the stock-in-trade of the assessee and if therefore whatever advances were made by the assessee to the producers and there was any loss in the re-payment of those advances, the loss has to be treated as a trading loss. This is what the Tribunal appears to have said: —
    “Having regard to the terms under which the advances were made by the respondent company to the producers, we are of the opinion that what the assessee company acquired was only the right of distribution of these pictures in the Southern Circuit which, in our opinion, constituted the stock-in-trade of the respondent company. Clause 6 of the letter dated 6th February, 1952 re-produced in paragraph 12 (supra) clearly shows that in the event of advanced amounts being not re-couped within a period of 12 months from the release of the picture, the assessee company was entitled to refund of such amount as remained un-recouped. This also showed that what the assessee acquired was in the nature of stock-in-trade of its business.”
    The contention urged by the Revenue is that by its agreement the assessee had acquired the right of distribution of these films which was a capital asset as it was as a result of exploitation of the films that the assessee was to earn profits. The money paid by the assessee was to earn profits. The money paid by the assessee was, therefore, for the acquisition of a capital asset and if in the recoupment of money the assessee suffered any loss the same could be the loss of a capital asset. It was contended that the case of South India Pictures, instead of supporting the argument of the assessee helped the Revenue. Reliance was placed on the following passage in the judgment of Das J. in that case: “Further, in the present case there is no suggestion that any part of the moneys advanced by the assessee for the production of the films was outstanding. Assuming that to start with the films constituted capital assets, the entire capital outlay had been recovered and the security had been extinguished and that part of the agreements which constituted financing agreements had been fully worked out and had come to an end and the three films ceased to be capital assets and the assessee was holding the films only under that part of the agreements which constituted the distributing agency agreements which only were subsisting.”
    In the first place, the above observations were made as an alternative argument which was actually not accepted by the majority. The decision proceeded on the other point. In that case there were three composite agreements. The first part of each agreement was described as a financing agreement for the pictures had still to be produced. According to that part of the agreements, the moneys advanced by the distributor were to be held as a security till they were returned by the producer. The second part of the agreement dealt with what was called as an agency for distribution of the films. The first part of the agreement had been worked out and no money was due to the distributor from the producer. It was in respect of the second part of the agreement that the question of termination of the arrangement had arisen and it was held that this did not radically or at all affect or alter the structure of the assessee's business which continued as before.
    In the present case there is only one agreement, namely, the agency for distribution of the films. The distributor had no doubt advanced moneys to the producer for acquiring the rights of distribution but it did not have any security rights over the pictures. The distributor was also under no liability to complete the pictures as was the case before the Supreme Court. The distributor had no right to distribute these very pictures to others to earn any income, profits or gains. The pictures continued to be the property of the producers and after the period of the agency came to an end the pictures were to be returned to them. The assessee was not precluded from entering into an arrangement with other producers for procuring other pictures if the producers failed to provide the pictures.
    The acquisition of these pictures was like acquiring other items of stock-in-trade in the film distribution business of the assessee. It cannot, therefore, be said that the assessee acquired capital assets for carrying on its distributing agency business. The amount which the assessee had still to receive back from the producers, was not the price of any capital assets sold or surrendered to the assessee nor was it the amount paid to the assessee for the surrender or sterilization of the asset; but was, as said by Rowlatt J. in Short Bros. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (12 Tax Cases) 935 (5) to be received by the assessee in the course of its doing the agency business from a running business.
    Counsel for the Revenue next relied upon the case of Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (27 I.T.R 34) (4). The Supreme Court had accepted in that case the principles enunciated by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Benarsidas Jagannath, In re: (15 I.T.R 195) (6) for distinguishing capital expenditure from revenue expenditure. The tests are laid at page 44 of the report. It seems to us that none of the principles laid down in that judgment can be of any help to the Revenue in the decision of this case.
    The question of distribution between revenue expenditure and capital expenditure was recently considered by the Supreme Court in Gotan Lime Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajasthan and Delhi (59 I.T.R 718) (7) and it was said that none of the tests laid down in the various authorities, English as well as Indian, to distinguish between the two kinds of expenditure is exhaustive or universal. Each case must depend on its own facts, and close similarity between one case and another is not enough, because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases one should avoid the temptation to decide by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another.
    In Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore v. Commissioner of Income-tax (17 ITR 473) (8) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was concerned with the case of grant of a “contract of collecting and removing tendu leaves. The point raised was whether the instalments, payable by the assessee were expenditure made in acquiring one of the raw materials of assessee's manufacture, as capital expenditure within the meaning of the Income-tax Act of 1922. It was held that “the contract was entered into by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of supplying themselves with one of the raw materials of their business, that they granted no interest in land, or in the trees or plants, that under them it was the tendu leaves and nothing but the tendu leaves that were acquired that the right to pick the leaves or to go on to the land for the purpose were merely ancillary to the real purpose of the contracts and if not expressed would be implied by law in the sale of a growing crop and that, therefore, the expenditure incurred in acquiring the raw material was in a business sense an expenditure on revenue account and not on capital account, just as much as if the tendu leaves had been bought in a shop.”
    The case is a close parallel to the present case and affords guidance for the view we are taking in the present case.
    That apart,, even if it is assumed that the advance payments were meant to enable the assessee to acquire distribution rights in the films which led to the earning of income, profits or gain from the business and were, therefore, a capital asset, it is doubtful if in the present case, the question can be answered in favour of the Revenue. The Tribunal as we have already seen, has held the rights of distribution as the stock-in-trade of the assessee and any payment made for the acquisition of such stock-in-trade has got to be held as revenue expenditure.
    Mr. Karkhanis, learned counsel for the assessee, pointed out that in the statement of case, this aspect of the controversy was accepted by the Revenue and no objection was raised either before the Tribunal or by an application filed in this Court. The jurisdiction which this Court exercises in such matters, has to be in keeping with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal which have to be accepted as correct. Our attention was drawn to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal III v. Imperial Chemical (P) Ltd. (74 I.T.R 17) (9) where it was said: —
    “It is well established that the High Court is not a court of appeal in a reference under section 66 (1) of the Act and it is not open to the High Court in such a reference to embark upon a reappraisal of the evidence and to arrive at findings of fact contrary to those of the “Appellate Tribunal. It is the duty of the High Court while hearing the reference to confine itself to the facts as found by the Appellate Tribunal and to answer the question of law in the context of those facts. It is true that the findings of fact will be defective in law if there is no evidence to support it or if the finding is perverse. But in the hearing of a reference under section 66 (1) of the Act it is not open to the assessee to challenge such a finding of fact unless he has applied for the reference of the specific question under Section 66 (1) “.
    The same view was taken by their Lordships in India Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Madras (60 I.T.R 52 SC), (10), Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Shri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (63 I.T.R 609 SC) (11) and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. (68 I.T.R 200 SC) (12).
    Counsel for the Revenue cited on the other hand, two other decisions of the Supreme Court. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (42 I.T.R 589) (13) which is a leading case on the subject, their Lordships were considering the question as to the circumstances under which the High Court could direct Tribunal to refer under Section 66 (2) a question which was specified by the applicant in his application under Section 66 (1) of the Act. No such question as to whether the right of distribution of films amounted to a capital asset was raised before the Tribunal. While dealing with the question their Lordships were pleased to lay down the following test: —
    “ (1) When a question is raised before the Tribunal and is dealt with by it, it is only one arising out of its order.
    (2) When a question of law is raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to deal with it, it must be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is, therefore, one arising out of its order.
    (3) When a question is not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, that will also be a question arising out of its order.
    (4) When a question of law is neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a question arising out of its order not withstanding that it may arise on the findings given by it.”
    The argument of the learned counsel for the Revenue is that sometimes the question is framed in such general terms that, construed literally, it might take in questions which were never in issue. In such cases true scope of the reference will have to be ascertained and limited by what appears on the statement of the case. Having regard to the question as framed, it was open to this Court to construe the question in such a way as to determine the true scope of the reference. The controversy before the Tribunal was whether the loss of Rs. 80,664/- was a revenue-receipt or a capital receipt and that brought in the question as to whether the right acquired by the assessee constituted its stock-in-trade. As it appears the question decided by the Tribunal was as to whether the loss amounted to a trading loss deductible under Section 10 (1) of the Act. The Tribunal having held that the acquisition of the right of distribution of these pictures constituted the stock-in-trade of the assessee. On that point no objection was raised by the Commissioner of Income-tax. We cannot, therefore, elaborate the scope of the reference by allowing the counsel for the Revenue to bring in that question at this stage. Even otherwise we are of the view that the right did constitute the stock-in-trade of the assessee and was not a capital asset.
    A reference was also made by the learned counsel for the Revenue to a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Indian Molasses Private Limited (78 I.T.T 474) (14). An examination of the judgment however shows that if a question of law is raised before the Tribunal even if an aspect of that question is not raised that aspect may be urged before the High Court. In the present case, no attempt was made by the applicant to raise this question although there could be no doubt that such a question could have been raised and could have been considered by the Tribunal.
    Under these circumstances, we do not feel called upon to allow the learned counsel for the Revenue to raise that question before us. The result of the fore-going discussion is that in computing the business profits of these assessee the loss suffered by it is a trading, loss deductible under Section 10 (1) of the Act. The question is therefore answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee will also have its costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-.
    Reference answered.
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    Comments

    The Commissioner Of ... v. M/S. All India Film ...
    (Jan 13, 1971)