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citation codes
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Acts
  • sub-section (1) of section 4 read with sub-section (4) of section 17 of land acquisition act (hereinafter referred
  • Regulation of the Cold Storage Act, 1975.
  • sub-section (4) of section 17
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Advocates
Acts
  • sub-section (1) of section 4 read with sub-section (4) of section 17 of land acquisition act (hereinafter referred
  • Regulation of the Cold Storage Act, 1975.
  • sub-section (4) of section 17
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The lead petition (Writ Petition No. 11134 of 1985) relates to Agra Ice Factory and Cold Storage, a registered partnership firm which in 1967 built a cold storage on specified plots near Naraich - Hathras Road, Agra. The cold storage was registered with the Directorate of Industries, U.P. on 15-11-1968 and licensed under the Regulation of the Cold Storage Act, 1975.

The State issued notifications under the Land Acquisition Act (notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 read with sub-section (4) of section 17) dated 27-8-1976, and a Section 6 notification dated 28-8-1976, acquiring a large number of plots including those occupied by the petitioner. A Section 9 notice was published on 12-9-1976. The petitioners represented to both the Government of India and the Government of U.P. seeking release of their lands from acquisition. The Government of U.P. communicated that lands occupied by existing industrial units could be exempted from acquisition on payment of 50% betterment fee but, believing that possession had already been taken, asked the Corporation to release such lands by executing conveyance deeds in favour of the owners.

The U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation (the Corporation) later (in 1985) offered to allot plots on lease on payment of development charges (Rs. 8 per square yard) and required confirmation of acceptance. The petitioners filed writ petitions in 1985 for (inter alia) release of their lands from acquisition and for quashing the Corporation's letters of 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985; they also sought quashing of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government and the Corporation filed counter-affidavits and the petitions were heard together and decided by this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government was competent to release the petitioners' land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that actual possession had not been taken and therefore vesting under Sections 16 and 17 had not occurred.
  2. Whether the notifications under the Land Acquisition Act (Sections 4 and 6) were issued without application of mind, i.e., in a mechanical manner.
  3. Whether the urgency provision in sub-section (4) of Section 17 was justified and whether provisions of Section 5-A could be dispensed with.
  4. Preliminary questions raised by respondents: (a) whether a firm (being neither a natural nor a juristic person) has locus standi to file writ petitions under Article 226; and (b) whether the petitioners' challenge to the notifications is barred by delay and laches.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The State Government was fully competent to release the petitioners' land from acquisition under Section 48 because actual possession was not taken by the State and therefore the land had not vested in the State under Sections 16 and 17.
  • The acquisition notifications were issued mechanically without application of mind.
  • There was no justification for invoking the urgency clause in sub-section (4) of Section 17 and for dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act.

Respondents' Contentions (Government and Corporation)

  • Preliminary objection that the petitioners, being firms, have no locus standi to file writ petitions under Article 226 as a firm is neither a natural nor a juristic person (reliance placed on a Division Bench decision in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill v. U.P. State Electricity Board).
  • Preliminary objection that the petitioners are guilty of excessive delay and laches in challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6, since the notifications were issued in 1976 and the writ petitions were filed in 1985.
  • Respondents generally disputed the petitioners' substantive contentions (specific disputation of each factual point was not developed in detail in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s Agarwal Stone Mill v. U.P. State Electricity Board, 1993 ACJ 361 Division Bench held that a firm has no right to file a writ petition because it is neither a natural nor a juristic person. The Court held this decision to be in conflict with higher authority and other Full Bench authority and treated it as per incuriam; it therefore rejected it as a binding precedent on the question of locus standi of a firm.
M/s Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller, AIR 1974 SC 1539 Supreme Court held that a firm can maintain a writ petition as it stands for all partners collectively; the petition is to be deemed filed by all partners. The Court followed this Supreme Court decision to hold that the writ petitions by the firm are maintainable and rejected the contrary Division Bench decision as per incuriam.
Umesh Chand v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, AIR 1984 All 46 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that an association (registered or unregistered) can file a petition under Article 226 in various circumstances to enforce rights of its members. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision to support that an association/firm may maintain a writ petition and to bolster the position that the earlier Division Bench decision was per incuriam.
Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others, W.P. No. 8374 of 1992; 1995 (2) JCLR 569 (All) (FB) Full Bench discussion on parameters of the per incuriam rule (decisions given in ignorance of previous binding authority may be per incuriam). The Court cited this Full Bench exposition to explain when a decision can be treated as per incuriam and to justify rejecting the earlier Division Bench decision that ignored higher authority.
Punjab Land and Recreation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 Explanation of the Latin expression per incuriam and circumstances in which a decision may be treated as per incuriam. The Court quoted this Supreme Court explanation to underpin its application of the per incuriam principle.
State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 Exposition on the meaning of 'incuria' and the application of per incuriam in judicial practice. The Court cited this authority while discussing the per incuriam doctrine and the limits of applying that rule.
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718 (1944) 2 All ER 293 English authority explaining that a decision may be per incuriam when given in ignorance of a statute or binding authority. The Court referred to this English authority as part of the doctrinal background on per incuriam.
Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 Supreme Court held that a writ petition challenging a notification under the Land Acquisition Act filed after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. The Court applied this principle to hold that the challenge to notifications under Sections 4 and 6 (issued in 1976) filed in 1985 (about nine years later) must be dismissed for delay and laches.
Jetmull Bhoraj v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 1363 Held that 'possession' referred to in Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is possession taken under Section 16 or Section 17(1). The Court relied on this authority to interpret that possession contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 must be actual possession for vesting to occur and hence the Government could release land until such actual possession was taken.
Balwant Narain Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat, AIR 1975 SC 1767 Declaration that when State takes possession under the Land Acquisition Act it must be actual possession; symbolical or paper possession is not sufficient. The Court used this decision to emphasize that vesting requires actual physical possession and to assess the parties' pleadings on whether actual possession had been taken.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion addressing preliminaries before reaching the substantive reliefs:

  1. Locus standi preliminary objection: The respondents relied on a Division Bench decision that a firm cannot maintain a writ petition. The Court found that the Supreme Court in M/s Andhra Industrial Works (AIR 1974 SC 1539) had held that a firm can maintain a writ petition because it represents all partners collectively. The Court also relied on a Full Bench decision (Umesh Chand) recognising rights of associations to file writs. Because the Division Bench decision relied upon did not consider these higher authorities, the Court held that decision to be per incuriam and therefore not binding. On this basis the Court rejected the objection and held the firm's writ petitions maintainable.
  2. Delay/laches preliminary objection: The Court observed that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued in 1976 while the writ petitions challenging them were filed in 1985 — a delay of about nine years, which the Court described as "highly excessive." Relying on Hari Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1984 SC 1020), the Court held that challenges to notifications after such delay must be dismissed on the ground of laches. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenged the Section 4 and 6 notifications.
  3. Substantive question of release of land under Section 48: The Court analysed the legal meaning of possession for vesting under the Land Acquisition Act. Citing Jetmull Bhoraj, it held that "possession" in Section 48 is the possession taken under Sections 16 or 17, and citing Balwant Narain Bhagde, it emphasised the requirement of actual physical possession (not symbolic or paper possession) for vesting. The petitioners had specifically pleaded that actual possession was never taken; respondents' counter-affidavits asserted possession was taken but did not specify how or show that actual physical possession had in fact been taken. Given the absence of a clear showing of actual possession by the respondents, the Court concluded the Government was competent to release the land from acquisition until it had taken actual possession.
  4. Relief and directions: Because the Government had previously decided to release the petitioners' land but had not passed an order under Section 48 (on an assumption that possession had already been taken), the Court directed the Government to reconsider the question of release afresh in accordance with law and to do so expeditiously (preferably within six months from presentation of a certified copy of the order). The Court also quashed the Corporation's letters dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985 (annexures 14 and 16/26 as referred to in the petition).

Holding and Implications

Result: The writ petitions were partly allowed.

Core rulings and direct effects on the parties:

  • The Court held that the firm (petitioner) has locus standi to maintain the writ petitions (rejecting the contrary Division Bench decision as per incuriam and following the Supreme Court and Full Bench authorities).
  • The challenge to the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (dated 1976) was dismissed on the ground of excessive delay and laches (petitioners filed in 1985; delay of about nine years), applying the principle in Hari Singh v. State of U.P.
  • The Corporation's letters dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985 were quashed.
  • The Government of U.P. was directed to consider afresh, in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible (preferably within six months from presentation of a certified copy of the order), whether to release the petitioners' land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, bearing in mind that vesting requires actual physical possession under Sections 16 or 17.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Implications for precedent: The Court explicitly held that the Division Bench decision in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill (which denied locus standi to a firm) could not be accepted as binding because it was rendered in ignorance of higher authority (i.e., per incuriam). Thus the opinion clarifies that a firm may maintain a writ petition if consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling that a firm represents its partners collectively.

Disposition

Petition partly allowed. The specific orders of the Corporation (dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985) were quashed, and the Government was directed to re-examine the question of release under Section 48 within the timeframe indicated.

    Agra Ice Factory and Cold Storage,Agra v. State of U.P.& Ors.

    R.A.Sharma, J.-

    All these writ petitions, which involve common questions of facts and law, have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, Agra Ice Factory and Cold Storage v. State of U.P. and, others. Writ Petition No. 11134 of 1985 has been made the leading case, from which the relevant facts shall be given hereinafter.

    2. Petitioner is a registered partnership firm. It has built a cold storage on plots Nos. 4142, 4144, 4145, 4146, 4151, 4152/1, 4152/2 and 4154, located by the side of Naraich - Hathras Road, Agra (total area being 2 Bighas 2 Biswas and 10 Biswansis), in 1967 with the permission of the Government of India under Cold Storage Order, 1964. This Cold Storage was registered with the Directorate of Industries, Government of U.P. on 15-11-1968 and was granted a licence under the Regulation of the Cold Storage Act, 1975. Petitioner is carrying on the business of cold storage since then.

    3. A notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 read with sub-section (4) of section 17 of land acquisition act (hereinafter referred to as the act) was issued on 27-8-1976 for acquiring large number of plots including the plots in question over which the petitioner has established the cold storage for planned industrial development in district Agra through U.P. State Indus­trial Development Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Corpora­tion). On 28-8-1976 notification under Section 6 of the Act was also publi­shed. On 12-9-1976 a notice under Section 9 of the Act was published in a Hindi news paper 'AMAR UJALA'. The petitioners, who have established their industries over several plots, which were acquired by the aforesaid notifications, made representation before the Govern men t of India and the Government of U.P., complaining against the impugned acquisition and requesting for release of their land from acquisition. The Government of India vide its letter dated January 29, 1977 informed the petitioners that it has taken up the matter with the Corporation, who has informed it that the matter is being considered for release of the plots over which industrial units were existing at the time when the above notifications were issued. Petitioners were, therefore, advised to approach the Corporation in this connection. The District Magistrate, Agra vide letter dated June 6, 1977 asked for the details of the plots over which industrial units are existing for exemption from acqui­sition. The Government of U.P. vide its letter dated October 13, 1977 inform­ed the Director of the Corporation that the Government has decided to exempt the land over which industrial units exist from acquisition on payment of 50% betterment fee by these units. The Government of U.P., however, instead of itself releasing the petitioners' land from acquisition wrote a letter dated November 26, 1977 to the Corporation requiring it to release the land over which the industrial units exist from acquisition by execution of convey­ance deeds in their favour. The Government adopted this course for releas­ing the petitioners' land from acquisition, because in its opinion possession of the land had already been taken and, therefore, land cannot be exempted from acquisition by it in view of the provisions contained in Section 48 of the Act. Petitioners thereafter continued to represent the matter in this connec­tion before the State Government and the Corporation. The Corporation vide its letters dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985 (Annexures 14 and 16 to the writ petition) informed the petitioners that the Corporation can allot plots on lease on payment of development charges at the rate of Rs. 8 per spuare yard and required the petitioners to confirm their acceptance of the proposal. Petitioners thereafter have filed these writ petitions before this Court for release of their land from acquistion and for getting the aforesaid two letters quashed. Prayer for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act has also been made. Incidental and consequen tial reliefs have also been claimed.

    4. Both the Government and the Corporation have filed counter affida­vits and the petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavits in reply thereto. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

    5. Learned counsel for the petitioners have made three submissions in support of these petitions, namely, (i) the State Government was fully compe­tent to release the land of the petitioners from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act, because its actual possession was not taken by it and, therefore, there was no vesting of the land in the Government under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act, (ii) notifications under the Act acquiring the land were issued without application of mind in a mechanical manner, and (iii) there was no justifica­tion for applying the urgency clause contained in sub-section (4) of section 17 and dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act. Sri Chandra Prakash learned counsel for the Corporation and the learned Standing Counsel, apart from disputing the above contentions, has raised two preliminary objections, namely, (i) the petitioners, being firms, have no locus standi to file these writ petitions ; and (ii) petitioners are guilty of excessive delay and laches, so far as their challenge to the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is concerned.

    6. Before dealing with the questions raised by the petitioners, it is necessary to decide the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. As regards the first objection, their contention is that a firm is neither a natural nor a juristic person and, therefore, it has no locus standi to file writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india, challenging the acquisition proceedings. In their support they have placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill v. U.P. State Electricity Board, 1993 ACJ 361. It is true that the Division Bench in the above case has laid down that firm has no right to file the writ petition, because it is neither a natural nor a juristic person.

    7. The question as to whether a firm can maintain a writ petition was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller, AIR 1974 SC 1539. The Supreme Court rejected the prelimi­nary objection and held that firm can maintain a writ petition as it stands for all the partners collectively and the writ petition filed by it is to be deemed to have been filed by all the partners. The relevant extract from the said decision of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:

    "We find no merit in the preliminary objection that the writ petition, on behalf of the 'firm' is not maintainable. Since 'firm' stands for all the partners, collectively, the petition is to be deemed to have been filed by all the partners, who are citizens of India. We, therefore, negative this objection."

    8. Right of the firm to maintain the writ petition having been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case, it was not open to this Court to take contrary view in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill v. State Electricity Beard (supra). It appears that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was not placed before the Division Bench which decided M/s Agarwal Stone Mill's case (supra). It may also be mentioned that a Full Bench of this Court in Umesh Chand v. Krishi Vtpadan Mandi Samiti, AIR 1984 All 46 FB, has upheld the right of an association of persons registered or unregistered to file a writ petition for enforcement of the rights of its members. Relevant extract from the judgment of the Full Bench is as under :

    "To summarise, the position appears to be that an association of persons, registered or unregistered, can file a petition under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights of its members as distin­guished from the enforcement of its own rights -

    (1) In case members of such an association are themselves unable to approach the court by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position "little Indians."

    (2) In case public injury leading to public interest litigation provided the association has some concern deeper than that of A way-farer or busybody i.e. it has a special interest in the subject-matter.

    (3) Whether the rules or regulations of the association specifi­cally authorise is to take legal proceedings on behalf of its members, so that any order passed by the court in such proceedings will be binding on the members."

    When an unregistered association can file a writ petition for enforcement of the rights of its members, there will be no justification to deny such a right to a registered firm. Unfortunately the decision of the Full Bench also does not appear to have been placed before this Court in M/s Agarwal Stone Mill U.P. State Electricity Board (supra). The decision of the Division Bench referred to above, has been given in ignorance of decisions of Supreme Court in M/s Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller (supra) and of Full Bench in Umesh Chand V. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (supra) and, therefore, it cannot be accepted as a binding precedent, being per incuriam. Whenever a decision is rendered by a Court in ignorance of relevant statutory provisions or decision of higher court or the court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, such a decision becomes per incuriam and does not have binding effect. In this connection reference may be made to a Full Bench decision in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 8374 of 1992, decided on 6-2-1995 [since reported in 1995 (2) JCLR 569 (All) (FB)] by five Hon'ble Judges of this Court, relevant extract from which is reproduced below :

    "This is what now brings us to what constitute the parameters of the per incuriam rule. As the Supreme Court in Punjab Land and Recreation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 explained : "The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertance. A decision can be said generally to be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of this Court. Further. 'In England a decision is said to be given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords."

    A similar exposition of the per incuriam rule is to be found in State of U. P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, namely, that 'Incuria' literally means 'carelessness' in practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718 : (1944) 2 All ER 293."

    It is strictly within these parameters and not beyond, that that the per incuriam rule can legitimately be applied."

    The writ petitions filed by the firm are, as such, maintainable. The first preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is accordingly rejected.

    9. The second objection raised by the learned counsel regarding delay is however liable to be accepted. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued is 1976. These writ petitions have been filed in 1985, challenging those notifications. There is thus delay of about nine years, which is highly excessive. There is no plausible explanation given by the petitioners for challenging those notifications after such a long gap of time. Supreme Court in Hari Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 held that the writ petition challenging the notification under the Act filed after the delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. Therefore, this writ petition, so far as it relates to the challenge to the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, However, the first contention of the petitioners relating to the release of their plots from acquisition is liable to be decided by this Court, because there is no delay as regards this relief.

    10. As regards the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be mentioned that the Government has the power to release any land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act till its posses­sion is taken by it. Supreme Court in Jetmull Bhoraj v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 1363 has held that, "possession referred to in Section 48 neces­sarily is the possession taken either under Section 16 or under Section 17(1)." Possession contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is the actual possession and neither symbolical nor the possession on paper only. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Balwant Narain Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat, AIR 1975 SC 1767 relevant extract from which is reproduced below:

    “We think it is enough to state that when the State Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor, could possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land."

    In the instant case it has specifically been pleaded by toe petitioner that actual possession of the land was never taken by the respondents, but this has not been seriously disputed by respondents. In their counter affidavits the respon­dents have stated that they have taken possession of the land, but how such possession was taken has not been specified. They are also silent on the question as to whether the actual possession was taken by them. In para­graphs 21, 27, 69, 74 and 76 of the writ petition, petitioner has specifically pleaded that actual possession of the land was not taken by the respondents The reply of these paragraphs is contained in paragraphs 25, 27 and 29 of the counter affidavit of the Government in which the above position is not seri­ously disputed. Same is the position with regard to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation as is clear from its paragraph 59. On the other hand in paragraph 29 of the Government's counter affidavit and in paragraph 59 of the Corporation's counter affidavit the physical possession of the plots in question of the petitioners has been admitted.

    11. Government of U. P. has, in fact, taken a decision to release the land of the petitioners from acquisition; but it did not pass any order under Section 48 of the Act on the assumption that the possession of the land has already been taken. In this connection it did not consider whether actual possession was or was not taken. Unless the actual possession is taken by the Government under Section 16 or 17 of the Act, the land does not vest in it and the owners of the land continue to be its owner. The Government is, therefore, fully competent to release the land from acquisition till such time its actual possession is taken by it. In view of the facts aud circumstances of the case the Government has to consider the question of release of the land from acquisition afresh in accordance with law.

    12. These writ petitions ate accordingly allowed partly. The orders dated 27-4-1985 and 29-5-1985 (Annexures 14 and 26 of the writ petition) are quashed. The Government of U. P. is directed to consider the question of release of the petitioners' land from acquisition afresh in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before it. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

    Petition partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Agra Ice Factory and Cold Storage,Agra v. State of U.P.& Ors.
    (Aug 3, 1995)