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  • Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C.Act) Unnao.4.
  • sub-section (1) of section 319 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 319 of CrPC
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  • Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C.Act) Unnao.4.
  • sub-section (1) of section 319 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 319 of CrPC
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners Rajol, Chote Bhaiya and Ajai were summoned under section 319 CrPC to face trial for offences under sections 302/34 IPC in S.T. No. 166/2008 (State v. Vijay, Crime No. 1234/2007), police station Bangarmau, district Unnao, by an order dated 15.05.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge / Special Judge (E.C. Act), Unnao.

The petitioners had been named in the FIR but their names were omitted from the charge sheet. During trial PW-1 (Ramu @ Anil Kumar) deposed implicating the petitioners along with the accused who were charge-sheeted. The Additional Sessions Judge relied on PW-1's statement and passed the impugned order summoning the petitioners.

The petition under section 482 CrPC challenged the summoning order. The petition was heard and, with parties' consent, disposed of finally at the stage of admission.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a summoning order under section 319 CrPC is valid if the trial court has not recorded satisfaction that the evidence on record, if unrebutted, would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned.
  2. Whether section 319 CrPC may be invoked where investigation against the person sought to be summoned was already pending on the date of the summoning order.
  3. Whether a summoning order under section 319 CrPC can be based solely on the statement of a prosecution witness who has not been cross-examined, or whether cross-examination is a pre-condition before exercising powers under section 319.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not record any satisfaction that, on the basis of the evidence adduced, there was a possibility of conviction of the petitioners; hence the summoning order is bad.
  • Investigation against the petitioners was already pending on the date of the impugned order, and therefore the provisions of section 319 CrPC ought not to have been invoked.
  • The summoning order was passed solely on the basis of PW-1's statement without examining other witnesses or getting them cross-examined.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 1 SCC 345 The court has power under section 319 CrPC to add any person as accused if there is sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence. Accepted as foundational recognition of the power to add an accused where evidence indicates involvement.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983 (1) SCC 1) Power under section 319 CrPC is an extraordinary power and should be used very sparingly, only if compelling reasons exist. Relied upon to emphasize that invocation of section 319 is extraordinary and must be sparingly exercised.
Rakesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2001) (cited as 2001 SCC (Crl) 1090 / 6 SCC 248) Extended the meaning of 'evidence' in section 319 CrPC to include evidence collected during investigation and forming part of the case diary; held that 'evidence' does not necessarily mean only evidence tested by cross-examination. Noted as one view supporting that cross-examination is not a pre-condition; considered among authorities that temper the requirement of prior cross-examination.
Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq & Anr. (2007) 4 SCR 1023 Propounded that the trial judge must arrive at satisfaction under section 319 only after cross-examination of witnesses is complete, with no exception. Recognized as expressing a contrary view; the court noted that this view was later doubted and not followed consistently by later benches.
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2008 (16) SCALE 276) Asked whether section 319 application is maintainable before cross-examination is complete and what the test/guidelines are for exercising power; held that at the stage of issuing summons the court must see whether there is a prima facie case against the person sought to be summoned. Relied upon for the proposition that the term 'evidence' in section 319 does not necessarily mean evidence tested by cross-examination and that prima facie satisfaction is relevant at summons stage.
Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy (2007) 4 SCC 773 Held that 'evidence' under section 319 CrPC contemplates evidence of witnesses given in court and not materials in the charge sheet or case diary; view different from Rakesh and held to prevail. Accepted as the prevailing view that limits reliance on investigation-stage materials and emphasizes court-given evidence, and treated as prevailing over Rakesh's broader view.
Sarabjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr. 2009 (66) ACC 32 Before summoning an additional accused, the nature of evidence should make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power; evidence must be cogent and convincing; courts must apply stringent tests, including whether evidence would reasonably lead to conviction. Followed as authoritative on the need for a higher standard (strong suspicion / reasonable prospect of conviction) for invoking section 319; used to frame the court's requirement that a specific finding be recorded.
Brindaban Das & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, 2009 (66) ACC 273 Held that court must consider whether evidence would be sufficient to convict the person being summoned; summoning should not be based merely on the name surfacing in evidence. Used to reinforce that summoning under section 319 requires that the evidence be such as to enable conviction and materially assist the prosecution.
Michael Machado & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 262 Power under section 319 CrPC should be used sparingly and the evidence should indicate a reasonable prospect of conviction of the person sought to be summoned. Relied upon to stress that invocation of section 319 requires a reasonable prospect of conviction and is an extraordinary jurisdiction.
Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka (2004) 7 SCC 792 Held that power under section 319 should not be resorted to where chances of conviction are remote; emphasised prospects of conviction as a requirement. Applied to underscore that if evidence on record makes conviction unlikely, section 319 should not be invoked; supports quashing of summoning where prospect of conviction is remote.
Harbhajan Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr. 2009 (13) SCC 608 Observed that doubting Mohd. Shafi does not mean courts must await a Larger Bench; Mohd. Shafi is not an authority that in every case courts must wait till cross-examination is over. Used to support the proposition that courts need not in all cases wait for cross-examination to be complete before considering section 319, and Mohd. Shafi does not universally bind lower application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a survey of relevant authorities and distilled the principles governing exercise of power under section 319 CrPC:

  1. Section 319 CrPC is an extraordinary power that must be used sparingly and only where compelling or cogent reasons exist to take cognizance against a person not already charged (citing Municipal Corporation of Delhi; Michael Machado; Joginder Singh).
  2. There is judicial divergence on whether the term “evidence” in section 319 necessarily means evidence tested by cross-examination. Some decisions (Rakesh; Hardeep Singh; Harbhajan Singh) support that cross-examination is not an absolute pre-condition; others (Mohd. Shafi) require cross-examination first; a Three-Judge Bench in Y. Saraba Reddy limited reliance to court-given evidence rather than investigation materials.
  3. Subsequent authorities (notably Sarabjit Singh, Brindaban Das, Krishnappa) emphasized that a higher standard than mere prima facie is necessary when invoking section 319 — the evidence on record, if uncontroverted, should be of such a nature that it would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned.
  4. The court reconciled these authorities by holding that while a summoning order cannot be quashed solely because the witnesses relied upon were not cross-examined, the trial court is nonetheless required to consider whether the evidence, if unrebutted, would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. The accused sought to be summoned has no right to be heard or to cross-examine witnesses prior to being added; however, the trial court has discretion to allow relevant cross-examination or to put relevant questions to witnesses to test prima facie correctness.
  5. Applying these principles to the present case, the court found that the trial court failed to record any specific finding whether the evidence, if unrebutted, would be sufficient to convict the petitioners. Because the required substantive finding was absent, the impugned order could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under section 482 CrPC is allowed; the impugned order dated 15.05.2010 summoning the petitioners under section 319 CrPC is set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial court to reconsider the application under section 319 CrPC in light of the observations in this judgment and to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law expeditiously.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The summoning order against the petitioners is quashed and the trial court must re-examine the section 319 application, recording the requisite findings as to whether the evidence on record, if unrebutted, could reasonably lead to conviction.
  • The opinion reiterates established principles from higher authorities concerning the sparing use of section 319 and the quality of evidence required; it does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying and synthesising existing case law.

Order Date: 28.05.2010 (as recorded in the opinion).

    Rajol And Others Petitioner v. State Of U.P And Another

    1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned AGA for the respondent no. 1 and perused the impugned judgment and order.

    2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission.

    3. It appears that the petitioners Rajol, Chote Bhaiya and Ajai have been summoned under section 319 CrPC to face trial in regard to the offences under sections 302/34 IPC in S.T.No 166/2008 State v. Vijay (Crime No. 1234/2007), police station Bangarmau, district Unnao, vide the order dated 15.5.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C.Act) Unnao.

    4. The petitioners were named in the FIR but their names were left in the charge sheet. During the trial, PW-1 Ramu @ Anil Kumar was examined, who has deposed in regard to complicity of the petitioners alongwith the charge-sheeted accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, placing reliance on the statement of the said witness (PW-1), has passed the impugned order summoning the petitioners.

    5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not recorded any satisfaction that on the basis of the evidence adduced, there was a possibility of conviction of the petitioners, therefore, the summoning order is bad. It was also submitted that the investigation against the petitioners was already pending on the date of the impugned order, therefore, the provisions of section 319 CrPC ought not to have been invoked.

    6. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the Additional Sessions Judge has passed the summoning order only on the basis of the statement of the aforesaid witness without examining other witnesses and getting them cross-examined.

    7. In Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 1 SCC 345), the Apex Court while dealing with the ambit and scope of section 319 CrPC, held that the court has power to add any person as accused if there is sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence.

    8. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983 (1) SCC 1) the Apex Court after referring to the decision of Joginder Singh's case (supra) observed that the power under section 319 CrPC is an extra ordinary power, which should be used very sparingly only if compelling reasons exists for taking cognizance against the other person against whom some action has not been taken.

    9. In the case of Rakesh & another v. State of Hariyana, 2001 SCC (Crl) 1090, the Apex Court extended the meaning of the term ‘evidence’ used in section 319 CrPC to include not only the evidence given during the inquiry or trial but also the evidence collected during the investigation and forming part of the case diary. The Apex Court overruled the submission that the term ‘evidence’ used in section 319 CrPC would mean “evidence which is tested by cross- examination’ by holding that the question of testing the evidence by cross-examination would arise only after addition of the accused.

    10. But in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq & Anr., (2007) 4 SCR 1023, the Apex Court expressed a contrary opinion and propounded that the trial judge in terms of Section 319 CrPC was required to arrive at his satisfaction only after the cross-examination of the witnesses is over with no exception.

    11. Another Division Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of and Punjab and another 2008 (16) SCALE 276, doubted the correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq & another (supra) and referred the following two questions to a Larger Bench:

    (i) When the power under sub-section (1) of section 319 of the Code of addition of accused can be exercised by a Court? Whether application under section 319 is not maintainable unless the cross-examination of the witness is complete?

    (ii) What is the test and what are the guidelines of exercising power under sub-section (1) of section 319 of the Code? Whether such power can be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the accused summoned in all likelihood would be convicted?

    12. However, in Hardeep Singh's case (supra) the Apex Court held that at the stage of issuing summons or process, a court has to see whether there is a prima facie case against the person sought to be summoned or against whom process is sought to be issued.

    13. In regard to necessity of cross examination of the prosecution witnesses before invoking section 319 CrPC the Apex Court observed in Hardeep Singh's case that it is, thus, difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the term ‘evidence’ used in sub-section (1) of section 319 of CrPC would mean evidence which is tested by cross examination. The question of testing the evidence by cross-examination would arise only after addition of the accused. There is no question of cross-examining the witness prior to adding such person as accused. Section does not contemplate an additional stage of first summoning the person and giving him an opportunity of cross-examining the witness who has deposed against him and thereafter deciding whether such person should or should not be added as accused.

    14. A Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy (2007) 4 SCC 773, propounded that the term evidence under section 319 CrPC contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in the court and not the materials contained in the charge sheet or the case diary. In this way, the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has taken a view which is different from the view expressed in the case of Rakesh (supra) by a Two Judge Bench of the Apex Court. Therefore, the view expressed in Y. Saraba Reddy's case would prevail.

    15. In the case of Sarabjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another 2009 (66) ACC 32, which was decided much after the decision rendered in the cases of Rakesh (supra), Mohd. Shafi (supra) and Hardeep Singh (supra), another Division Bench of the Apex Court held that indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. The Apex Court further observed that an order under section 319 CrPC, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person. Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. After making these observations, the Apex Court further held that the courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned.

    16. In Sarabjeet Singh's case, the Apex Court further observed that mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing of charge, the Court must be satisfied that there exists a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of section 227 CrPC, the court must consider the entire materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction. Whether a higher standard be set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction under section 319 CrPC is the question. The answer to these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless a higher standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the ingredients thereof, viz., (I) an extraordinary case and (ii) a case for sparingly exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied.

    17. Another Division Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Brindaban Das and others v. State of West Bengal, 2009 (66) ACC 273, propounded the same principle and held that in matters relating to invocation of powers under section 319 CrPC, the Court is not merely required to take note of the fact that the name of a person who has not been named as an accused in the FIR has surfaced during the trial, but the Court is also required to consider whether such evidence would be sufficient to convict the person being summoned. The Apex Court further observed that the fulcrum on which the invocation of section 319, CrPC rests is whether the summoning of persons other than the named accused would make such a difference to the prosecution as would enable it not only to prove its case but to also secure the conviction of the persons summoned.

    18. In the case of Michael Machado & Anr. V. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2000) 3 SCC 262, the Apex Court propounded that power under section 319 CrPC vested in the Court should be used sparingly and the evidence on which the same was to be invoked should indicate a reasonable prospect of conviction of the person sought to be summoned.

    19. The prospects of conviction as one of the requirement for summoning a person as accused under section 319 CrPC has been propounded even in the case of Krishnappa v. State Of Karnataka, 2004 (7) SCC 792. It has been held in that case that invocation of the power under section 319 CrPC should not have been resorted to, since the chances of conviction on the basis of the evidence on record was remote. Applying the principles laid down in the cases of Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Michael Machado, the Apex Court further ruled that the power to summon an accused is an extraordinary power conferred on the Court and it should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the person other than the accused.

    20.In the case of Harbhajan Singh & Another v. State of Punjab & Another, 2009 (13) SCC 608, a division bench of the Apex Court has held that only because the correctness of a portion of the judgment in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra) has been doubted by another bench, the same would not mean that we should wait for the decision of the larger bench, particularly when the same instead of assisting the appellants runs counter to their contention. The Division Bench further held that decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra), therefore, in our opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that in each and every case the Court must wait till the cross-examination is over. The observation of the Apex Court in this regard is reproduced as follows:

    “13. We would assume that in all cases the court may not wait till cross-examination is over for the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction. In the aforementioned decision, the learned Judges had referred to a judgment of this Court in the case of Rakesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2001) 6 SCC 248 wherein it was held that even without cross-examination on the basis of a prima facie material which would enable the Sessions Court to decide whether the power under Section 319 of the Code should be exercised or not stating that at that stage evidence as used in Section 319 of the Code would not mean evidence which is tested by cross-examination.

    ..... The decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra), therefore, in our opinion, is not an authority for the proposition that in each

    and every case the Court must wait till the cross-examination is over.”

    21.A survey of the aforesaid decisions clearly reveals that the power under section 319 CrPC is an extra ordinary power, which may be used very sparingly only if compelling or cogent reasons exist against the person sought to be summoned. The term ‘evidence’ used in section 319 CrPC does not necessarily mean the evidence which is tested by cross examination. The view expressed in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra) in this regard, has not been subsequently followed by the Apex Court in the cases of Sarabjeet Singh (supra). The view expressed in the case of Sarabjeet Singh (supra) has also been expressed in the case of Rakesh (supra), Hardeep (supra) and Harbhajan (supra), therefore, a summoning order can not be set aside on the ground that the statements of the witnesses relied on by the court for passing the summoning order, have not been subjected to cross examination. It is true that a Division Bench of the Apex Court in Hardeep Singh's (supra) has referred the questions specified in paragraph 11 of this judgment to a Larger Bench but another Division Bench of the Apex Court in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra) has observed that the same would not mean that we should wait the decision of the Larger Bench. The accused sought to be summoned, has no right to be heard on the application under section 319 CrPC, therefore, he has no right to cross-examine the witnesses being examined for the purpose of section 319 CrPC. The accused already facing the trial may or may not like to make cross-examination of the witnesses in regard to the complicity of the person sought to be summoned. Sometimes such accused may act even contrary to the interest of such persons. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow the accused already facing the trial to cross examine the witness or witnesses in relation to the complicity of the person sought to be summoned so as to enable it to render a just and proper order under section 319 CrPC. In this view of the matter, there is no compulsion to get part or full cross-examination of the witnesses done before passing a summoning order under section 319 CrPC. In appropriate cases if the complicity of a person not facing the trial and is not before the court as accused, comes in light in the statement of a witness, it is also open to the court to put relevant questions to the witness to ascertain prima facie correctness of the statement regarding complicity of that person. The Trial Judges and Magistrates have to play pivotal roles in the matter and should not act mere as silent spectators. Therefore, the summoning order under section 319 CrPC can not be quashed only on the ground that the witnesses have not been cross examined.

    22. In the cases of Sarabjeet (Supra), Brindawan Das, Michael Machado (supra) and Krishnappa (supra), it has been clearly held that summoning order should be passed only when the evidence, if uncontroverted, is of such a nature as to reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned. The standard of evidence required for summoning an additional accused should be higher than the evidence required for framing charges because the jurisdiction under section 319 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly in an extra ordinary situation. Whether or not any evidence is of such a quality as to record conviction if it remains uncontroverted, is a variable question depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. However, the court considering the evidence for the purpose of section 319 CrPC is not legally required to evaluate the evidence as it is ordinarily done while rendering the final judgment but the court has to see whether or not, the evidence on record appeals to the reason for the purposes of section 319 CrPC and the story narrated by the witnesses against the person sought to be summoned is not improbable and absurd and a conviction is possible on such statements, if uncontroverted. A non observance of this legal requirement would render the summoning order illegal.

    23. In the instant case the court below while passing the order under section 319 CrPC, has not recorded any specific finding as to whether or not the evidence adduced under section 319 CrPC if unrebutted, would be sufficient to record a conviction against the petitioners. In absence of such finding, the impugned order can not be sustained.

    24.For the reasons discussed above, the petition under section 482 CrPC is allowed. The impugned order dated 15.5.2010 is set aside. The matter is remanded to the learned trial court to reconsider the application under section 319 CrPC in the light of the aforesaid observations and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law expeditiously.

    Order Date :- 28.5.2010

    RKSh

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    Rajol And Others Petitioner v. State Of U.P And Another
    (May 28, 2010)