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  • provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as the Act for short)
  • provisions of Section 79A as amended by Act 1 of 1991
  • provisions of the Section as amended by Act 1 of 1991
  • Act 1 of 1991 i.e (Second Amendment) Act 1991
  • provisions of Act 1 of 1991
  • provision by Act 1 of 1991
  • Amending Act (1 of 1991)
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as the Act for short)
  • provisions of Section 79A as amended by Act 1 of 1991
  • provisions of the Section as amended by Act 1 of 1991
  • Act 1 of 1991 i.e (Second Amendment) Act 1991
  • provisions of Act 1 of 1991
  • provision by Act 1 of 1991
  • Amending Act (1 of 1991)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Rajendra Babu, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner purchased a parcel of land (R.S. No. 78/2 of Dombargop, measuring about 10 acres 03 guntas) on 7 April 1982. On 5 April 1991 the Assistant Commissioner made an order holding that the transaction was hit by Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act ("the Act") on the ground that the petitioner’s income from non-agricultural sources exceeded Rs. 12,000. The petitioner challenged the correctness of that order and also questioned the constitutional validity of Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C of the Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The statutory background central to the dispute: Section 79 was originally introduced by Act 1 of 1974 (coming into effect 1 March 1974) and initially used the figure Rs. 12,000. Section 79/79A was later amended by Act 1 of 1991 to substitute Rs. 50,000 for Rs. 12,000; Act 31 of 1991 was enacted to rectify an omission and to read Rs. 50,000 in all relevant provisions. The amending legislation (Acts 1 of 1991 and 31 of 1991) is stated to have come into force on 5 February 1991.

The Court heard several learned counsel (some listed as assisting as Amicus Curiae). The petition ultimately was allowed in part: the impugned order (Annexure 'K') was quashed and the matter remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and the directions in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act as amended by Act 1 of 1991 (substituting Rs. 50,000 for Rs. 12,000) must be read as effective "on and from" 1 March 1974 (the stated commencement date in the provision) such that the amended threshold applies to transactions entered into after 1 March 1974, including those prior to 5 February 1991.
  2. Whether the provisions of Act 1 of 1991 operate prospectively (taking effect from the date the amending Act came into force, 5 February 1991) so that persons who purchased prior to 5 February 1991 cannot claim benefit of the increased threshold.
  3. Whether Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C of the Act are constitutionally invalid as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (raised by the petitioner, but not decided by the Court in this opinion).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The amendment made by Act 1 of 1991 (raising the threshold to Rs. 50,000) must be read as effective from the inception of the provision, i.e., from 1 March 1974, because Section 79A itself declares the date of commencement ("on and from the commencement of the Amended Act").
  • By increasing the threshold from Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 50,000, the amendment reduces the rigour of the restriction and is therefore beneficial; such a beneficial amendment should be read so as to apply to antecedent transactions.
  • The amended provision must be read along with the unamended provisions of the Act and, when so read, the amended figure must be treated as if always part of the enactment.
  • Because the provision is penal in nature it should be construed narrowly in favour of those affected; where two constructions are possible, the one more beneficial to those intended to be benefited should be adopted.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by the Government Pleader)

  • Relying on the court decision in Gayathri Ramaswamy v. State of Karnataka (W.P. No. 16976 of 1986, dated 20.12.1991), the Government Pleader contended that the provisions of Act 1 of 1991 are prospective in operation and therefore the benefit of Section 79A as amended by Act 1 of 1991 cannot be given to persons who purchased properties prior to 5 February 1991 (the date the amending Act came into force).

Arguments by Other Counsel / Amicus Curiae

  • Several learned counsel (assisting as Amicus Curiae) argued that the Gayathri Ramaswamy decision was wrongly decided and did not consider the parent Act's language and that the amended provision must be treated as operative from 1 March 1974, as the section itself specifies that commencement date.
  • They emphasized statutory construction principles and the view that where an amendment is beneficial it should be given effect to earlier transactions if the language permits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gayathri Ramaswamy v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 16976 of 1986 (dated 20.12.1991) Held that law is generally prospective unless an Act states otherwise or retrospective operation is inferred; applied to conclude provisions of Act 1 of 1991 were prospective. The Court considered this decision but expressed the view that it was not correctly decided on the specific point: the present Court rejected Gayathri Ramaswamy's interpretation and held that the amended words (Rs. 50,000) must be read into Section 79A as operative from the date specified in the Section (1 March 1974).
Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 324 (referred to as "Shamrao v. Parulekar" in the opinion) When a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself into the earlier Act, the earlier Act must be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act (subject to cases of repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity). The Court cited this principle to support the view that the amended provisions become part of the parent Act and should be read together with unamended provisions when applying the law, leading to the conclusion that Rs. 50,000 must be treated as the threshold from the date specified in Section 79A.
Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Limited, AIR 1956 SC 614 Explains that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment, various unamended provisions have to be read along with the amended provisions as though they are part of it (for determining meaning of a provision as amended). The Court relied on this principle to clarify that when applying the amended Act, unamended and amended provisions are read together; this supported the Court's conclusion that the amended figure (Rs. 50,000) is to be treated as part of Section 79A when construing its application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central interpretative question as whether the amended figure (Rs. 50,000) in Section 79A must be treated as operative "on and from 1st March 1974" (the date referenced in the section itself) or whether the amendment is effective only from the date the amending Act came into force (5 February 1991).

The Court accepted the general legal principle (as stated in Gayathri Ramaswamy) that a law is ordinarily prospective unless the statute expressly declares or necessary implication indicates retrospective operation. The Court nevertheless proceeded to examine the specific language of Section 79A and statutory construction authorities to determine the correct application.

The Court set out the text of Section 79A as amended to show that it opens with the words "On and from 1st March 1974" and then prescribes the disqualification threshold ("not less than rupees Fifty thousand from sources other than Agricultural lands"). Relying on established rules of construction (including the dictum from Parulekar and the exposition in Shri Ram Narain), the Court reasoned that when an Act is amended, the amended wording is to be read into the earlier enactment and the statute construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act (subject to repugnancy/inconsistency).

The Court observed that treating Act 1 of 1991 as operative only from 5 February 1991 (as held in Gayathri Ramaswamy) would create two classes of transactions and would render the opening words of Section 79A ("on and from the commencement of the Amended Act i.e., 1.3.1974") meaningless or surplusage. The Court considered this result unacceptable and concluded that the language of the Section permits no other construction than to read the amended figure (Rs. 50,000) as always being part of the enactment for the date specified.

Consequently, the Court held that the proper interpretation of Section 79A is to apply the amended threshold by reference to the entire provision as amended by Act 1 of 1991 and that the words "Rs. 50,000/-" should be treated as if they had always been in the statute for the purpose of the date specified in the Section.

Given this conclusion on statutory interpretation, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the petitioner's separate challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C under Article 14 and accordingly refrained from adjudicating those constitutional questions in this opinion.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The petition is ALLOWED IN PART. The Court held that Section 79A, as amended by Act 1 of 1991 (substituting Rs. 50,000 for Rs. 12,000), must be read by reference to the opening words of the Section ("on and from 1st March 1974") and that the amended threshold (Rs. 50,000) is to be treated as operative from the date specified in the Section. The Court expressed that the earlier decision in Gayathri Ramaswamy on this point was not correctly decided.

Immediate Consequence for the Parties: The impugned order at Annexure 'K' was quashed. The matter is remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in light of the Court's interpretation.

Broader Implications: The Court did not undertake or decide the constitutional challenge to Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C under Article 14; the opinion states that it is unnecessary to examine those questions in view of the statutory interpretation reached. The Court's statements about the earlier Gayathri Ramaswamy decision—that it "is not correctly decided"—are part of its interpretative analysis in this opinion. The opinion does not set out additional broader policy pronouncements beyond its application to the matter before the Court.

Order made: Rule is absolute. The matter is remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and the directions in this opinion.

    Vijayakumar Shankarayya Sardar v. State Of Karnataka

    Rajendra Babu, J.:—

    The petitioner purchased land comprised in R.S No. 78/2 of Dombargop measuring about 10 acres 03 guntas on 7.4.1982 The Assistant Commissioner made an order on 5.4.1991 holding that the transaction in question is hit by the provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’ for short) as the income of the petitioner is more than Rs. 12,000/- from non-agricultural sources. The correctness of the said order is called in question. The petitioner is also calling in question the constitutional Page: 2588validity of Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C of the Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

    2. Section 79 of the Act as stood originally, was introduced into the Act by Act 1 of 1974 and read as follows:—

    “79(1) On and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, no person who or a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income of not less than rupees twelve thousand from sources other than agricultural lands shall be entitled to acquire any land whether as land owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another.”

    The said provision came to be amended by Act 1 of 1991 i.e (Second Amendment) Act 1991 to the effect that in the sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act, for the words ‘rupees twelve thousand’, the words ‘rupees fifty thousand’ shall be substituted. By Act 31 of 1991, the Act was further amended to rectify the omission in Act 1 of 1991 so as to bring it in conformity with the amendment therein so as to read “in all the provisions of Section 79A the words ‘Rs. 50,000/-’ in place of words ‘Rs. 12,000/-’. The Amending Act (1 of 1991) and (31 of 1991) in regard to Section 79-A is stated to have come into force with effect from 5th February, 1991.

    3. Considering the importance of the matter, we have heard several learned Counsel appearing in similar matters and their names are all shown in the cause title as assisting the Court as Amicus Curiae.

    4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner and other learned Counsel that Section 79A(1) of the Act as amended by Act 1 of 1991 is effective right from the inception of the said provision, that is, 1.3.1974 and the provisions will have to be read as imposing a restriction on those having annual income in excess of Rs. 50,000/- per annum from sources other than agricultural lands from purchasing agricultural lands. It is submitted that by increasing the amount from Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- the rigour of the restriction is reduced and therefore the amendment is a beneficial provision.

    5. The learned Government Pleader who appeared for the respondents, relying upon a Decision of this Court in Gayathri Page: 2589Ramaswamy v. State of Karnataka W.P No. 16976 of 1986 DD. 20.12.1991, contended that the provisions of Act 1 of 1991 are prospective in operation and therefore the benefit of the provisions of Section 79A as amended by Act 1 of 1991 cannot be given to persons who have purchased properties prior to 5.2.1991 on which date the Amending Act (1 of 1991) came into force.

    6. Learned Counsel appearing for different parties impressed upon us that the Decision rendered in W.P No. 16976/86 - Gayathri Ramaswmy's case referred to supra - is wrongly decided and it does not deal with the matter in the right perspective. It is submitted that Section 79A of the Act read as it is, must be that the amended provision by Act 1 of 1991 stood introduced into the Act even from 1.3.1974 for, the Section itself declares the date on which the said provision comes into force, that is, “on and from, the commencement of the Amended Act.” A person is disabled from acquiring land who has an assured annual income of not loss than Rs. 50,000/- from sources other them agricultural lands. It is submitted that subsequent to the amendment of Section 79 of the Act, the amended provisions have to be read along with unamended provisions of the Sections and if so read, no other view is possible except to hold that all transactions that have taken place from 1.3.1974 are governed by the amended provisions.

    7. The learned Counsel referred to various Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court on the manner of interpretation and of understanding as to when an Amendment Act comes into force and how such provisions have to be interpreted, so on and so forth. It was also argued that the provision is penal in nature and therefore has got to be read in a restrictive manner and the rigour of restriction has been reduced by reason of the amendment of the provisions and therefore the benefit thereof will have to be given even to anterior facts though the law is prospective in operation. It is also suggested where two constructions are possible, that one which is more beneficial to those who are intended to be benefited, should be given rather than a construction which defeats such a course. It is Page: 2590unnecessary to refer to these aspects of the matter or to the Decisions referred to or relied upon in support of these propositions.

    8. In Gayathri Ramaswamy's case W.P No. 16976 of 1986 DD. 20.12.1991 it is held that law is always prospective in operation unless stated to be retrospective in the Act itself or inferred by necessary implication arising therefrom. With respect we agree with this statement of the law.

    9. For proper appreciation of the matter, the provisions of Section 79A of the Act can be read as follows:—

    “On and from 1st March 1974, no person who or a family or a joint family which has an assured annual income of not less than rupees Fifty thousand from sources other than Agricultural lands shall be entitled to acquire any land whether as land owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another.”

    10. In Gayathri Ramaswamy's case, Act 31 of 1991 and the provisions thereto are referred to, to hold that the said provisions will come into effect from 5.2.1991, which only means, that these provisions get incorporated into the parent Act as from 5.2.1991 and no more. The criticism of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and those assisting as Amicus Curiae is that, the attention of this Court was not drawn to the provisions of the Parent Act after amendment at all but only to the date on which the Amending Act came into force.

    11. In Statutory Constructions by Crawford at Section 78 it is stated:—

    “Where a Section or a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist and the new Section supersedes it and becomes a part of the law just as if the amendment had always been there.”

    On the rule of Statutory Constructions it is useful to refer to Shamrao v. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay AIR 1952 SC 324 wherein it is observed:—

    “…. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and Page: 2591construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all.”

    In Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Limited AIR 1956 SC 614, it was stated that:—

    “Now there is no question about the correctness of this dictum. But it appears to us that it has no application to this case. It is perfectly true as stated therein that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provisions as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act as amended is, whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part.”

    The upshot of this discussion is that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment, the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are the part of it.” The amended part of the provision having got incorporated into the Act the provision of Section 79A of the Act as such should be read. Section 79A of the Act has the opening words on and from the commencement of the Amended Act”. The amended Act, as stated earlier, is defined to be Act 1 of 1974 which came into effect from 1.3.1974 From that date, no one can acquire an agricultural land if his income from sources other them agricultural lands is in excess of Rs. 50,000/-. If the interpretation given in Gayathri Ramaswamy's case W.P No. 16976 of 1986 DD. 20.12.1991 is to be adopted, then it gives rise to two sets of transactions:—

    (1) those by which from the commencement of the amendment Act, i.e from 1.3.1974, acquired lands prior to 5.2.1991,

    (2) those by which acquired lands subsequent to 5.2.1991

    But Section read as it is subsequent to amendment, does not give scope for such a construction at all. If the amended provision were to be effective from 5.2.1991, then the expression “on and from the date of commencement of Amended Act i.e 1.3.1974” will have no meaning at all. Legislature, noticing that the Section itself has provided as to in respect of what transactions the restriction is applicable which are entered into from particular date, there was no necessity to make the same retrospective at all. We cannot attribute either ignorance to the Legislature of the opening words of Section 79A of the Act or treat the same as surplusage. Section simply stated “from the date of the commencement of the Amended Act which is 1.3.1974”, those having annual income in excess of Rs. 50,000/- from non-agricultural sources cannot acquire agricultural lands. It is not a case where the Legislature classifies transactions depending upon a particular date. On the other hand, the Legislature gives rise to certain consequences that would follow if a transaction takes place after a particular date. It is only a restriction in relation to a transaction. If that is so, there is no scope for interpretation that there can be two classes of transactions. As the provision stands, the date of the commencement of the entire provision is 1.3.1974 and none other. In this view of the law, with great respect to the learned Judge who decided Gayathri Ramaswamy's case, we must say that the said case is not correctly decided and the interpretation to be placed on Section 79A of the Act is only by reference to the entire provisions of the Section as amended by Act 1 of 1991 and it must be held that the said words “Rs. 50,000/-” as always being there in the enactment because the language of the Section permits no other construction. In view of this state of law, it is unnecessary to examine the constitutional validity of the provisions raised herein. We refrain from doing so. If and when necessary, the petitioner is at liberty to raise the same. In the circumstances, the Petition stands allowed in part. The impugned order at Annexure ‘K’ shall stand quashed and the matter shall stand remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in the light of this order. Rule is absolute accordingly.

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    Vijayakumar Shankarayya Sardar v. State Of Karnataka
    (Aug 16, 1993)