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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for partition filed by Kailashi (a minor, son of Ram Chander), through his mother and guardian Mst. Ram Dulari, against Shankar and Ram Dayal (brothers of Ram Chander and uncles of the minor). The plaintiff alleged that his grandfather Bhagwanta (died 1937), his father Ram Chander (died 1920) and himself formed a joint Hindu family and that the plaintiff was entitled to one-third share on partition; he sought partition of that share and mesne profits from August 1937, when he claimed exclusion from enjoyment of the property.

The defendants contended that Bhagwanta's property was self-acquired (he did not inherit from his father), that certain items were the defendants' personal property, that Bhagwanta had executed a will dated 19 May 1936 excluding the plaintiff, and that Ram Chander had separated from the family roughly 17–18 years before the suit (receiving property worth about Rs. 2,000). They also asserted that the mule-trading business had been carried on by the defendants for 25 years and that Bhagwanta and the plaintiff had no concern in that business.

The trial court found for the defendants: it held Ram Chander had separated from the family (died a separated member), that the property was self-acquired by Bhagwanta, that the will was valid and that no part of the property was divisible; the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Was Ram Chander a separated member of the alleged joint Hindu family, thereby affecting the plaintiff's claim to a coparcenary share?
  2. Whether the properties and income claimed in the suit were joint family property (acquired as part of a joint family/business) or were self-acquired property of Bhagwanta (and thus not subject to partition with the plaintiff)?
  3. What is the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the documents and oral admissions relied upon by the defendants (including a notice purportedly sent by an advocate, an agreement dated 9 February 1926, and Bhagwanta's will of 19 May 1936)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The family was joint and, on partition as of the date of suit, the plaintiff's share was one-third by Hindu law; he therefore sought partition and mesne profits from August 1937.
  • The alleged separation of Ram Chander was not proved; several documents relied upon by the trial court to find separation were not admissible in evidence.
  • There was evidence that the mule-trading business produced the funds used to acquire the properties and that the sons (including Ram Chander) helped in that business, implying that the business and property were joint family assets.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Bhagwanta's property was self-acquired (he did not inherit from his father), and not ancestral joint family property.
  • Certain items claimed by the plaintiff were the defendants' personal property; Bhagwanta left a will (dated 19 May 1936) excluding the plaintiff and vesting the property in the defendants.
  • Ram Chander had separated from the family about 17–18 years before the suit and had been allotted property at partition; reasons for separation were given variously (immorality of Mst. Dulari or a wish not to engage in the mule business).
  • Documents such as a notice purportedly sent by an advocate on behalf of Mst. Dulari, and an agreement of 9 February 1926, supported the defendants' account (including assertions about separation and the character of Mst. Dulari).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain (1932) I.L.R 54 All. 564 Cited for the proposition that ordinarily an adult member may start a separate business and that such separate business does not bind junior members; if adult members jointly start a business it may be joint family business. The court relied on this authority to support the legal principle that a business started by the father alone remains his separate business unless there is evidence of agreement or conduct establishing it as joint family business.
Jamna Prasad v. Durga Dei, A.I.R. 1933 All. 138 Held property to be joint family property where there was an ancestral nucleus and evidence the property had been thrown into common stock. The court noted the factual differences: the point before the court did not arise in that case; it distinguished Jamna Prasad because there was an ancestral nucleus and proof of common stock in that case.
Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti (1904) I.L.R 27 Mad. 32 Where father and two sons were jointly engaged in trade and there was no indication of contrary intention, property acquired by trade was presumed joint with the incident of survivorship. The court observed that the cited case involved a family that consisted of the three members jointly carrying on the trade — a factual situation different from the present case where the business was begun by the father alone.
Karsondas Dhararnsey v. Gangabai (1908) I.L.R 32 Bom. 479 Discussed distinctions between joint property, joint family property and ancestral family property; considered whether property acquired by trade remained self-acquired or became joint. The court noted that the specific point did not arise in that case and quoted Beaman, J.'s caution that facts and admissions can show an intention not to make property joint; used this to show that intentions matter and facts differ by case.
Laldas Narandas v. Motibai (1908) 10 Bom. L.R. 175 Held that when father and sons acquire property by joint exertion and throw it into a common stock, it manifests an intention to treat it as joint family property. The court acknowledged the rule but observed the factual differences: that case involved joint exertion and a common stock, whereas in the present case the business was started by the father alone and the nature of the sons' assistance was not satisfactorily proved.
Haridas Narayandas v. Devkuvarbai (1926) I.L.R 50 Bom. 443 Recognised that a business started by a father and later joined in by an adult son might, by implied consent and conduct, become a joint business. The court accepted the principle as applicable in appropriate facts but found no satisfactory evidence here showing such an implied transfer or conversion of the business into a joint family business.
Parbhulal Dullabhram v. Bhagvan Parbhu, A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 412 Held property to be acquired by a joint Hindu family where the business itself was a joint family business and sons conducted business in their own names after insolvency of the father. The court treated the decision as factually distinct and not controlling because there the business was a joint family business — unlike the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through several discrete analytical steps, applying evidentiary assessment and established legal principles to the facts:

  1. Assessment of Evidence on Separation:
    • The trial judge's finding that Ram Chander had separated was examined. The court reviewed inconsistent accounts of the cause of separation (immorality of Mst. Dulari in pleadings; reluctance to join mule business in deposition), noting variations in witnesses' explanations but attributing part of the discrepancy to the passage of time (over 20 years).
    • The court found some oral evidence of separation (statements by Ram Dayal and witnesses to a panchayat where Ram Chander purportedly received a house, tonga and money), but noted absence of contemporaneous written partition document and limited corroboration.
  2. Admissibility and Weight of Documentary Evidence:
    • A notice purportedly sent by advocate Pandit Dwarka Nath Raina on behalf of Mst. Dulari was examined; the court held that the notice could not be used as substantive evidence against the plaintiff because there was no proof that Mst. Dulari had given the instructions said to have been given to the advocate. At most it could be used to contradict Mst. Dulari's testimony.
    • The court observed that even if the notice were supposedly sent on behalf of the minor, it could not be used as substantive admission against the minor under section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act (as stated in the opinion).
    • The agreement dated 9 February 1926 (Ex. 1) was scrutinised: although it contained recitals indicating the family was joint and Bhagwanta the karta, the court was reluctant to place great reliance on it because it was executed in circumstances (apparently to appease Mst. Dulari), was kept in her custody, presented for compulsory registration only later, and defendants' testimony suggested thumb impressions had been procured by force.
  3. Examination of Bhagwanta's Guardianship Application and Will:
    • Bhagwanta's application (26 June 1926) seeking guardianship of the minors — alleging Mst. Dulari's immorality — contained assertions that he was the karta and that the minors lived with him. The court noted the self-serving character of such statements made to strengthen his guardianship application and cautioned against uncritical reliance.
    • Bhagwanta's will (19 May 1936) asserted the family was separate and that Ram Chander had separated; the court noted the will but treated the issue of separation as not of overriding importance in light of the ultimate question whether the properties were joint family properties at all.
  4. Analysis of Property Acquisition and Business Origins:
    • The court analysed the provenance of key properties: several immovable properties had been purchased by Bhagwanta (e.g., sales of 1910 repurchase and later purchases in 1919 and 1931), with payments shown to have come from Bhagwanta personally (cash payments, mortgages). No ancestral nucleus was proved from which the properties could be traced.
    • On the mule-trading business, the court found it was started by Bhagwanta long before 1914, at a time when two of his sons were minors; thus, it was primarily his separate enterprise. While the sons may have assisted when they grew up and derived maintenance from him, the court held the mere fact of such assistance and shared benefit did not establish that the business became joint family business.
    • The court emphasised that whether a business becomes joint depends on facts and inferred intentions; absent clear evidence (express agreement or conduct amounting to implied consent) that Bhagwanta intended to treat the business as joint, the business remained his separate property and so did property acquired from its income.
  5. Evaluation of Precedents and Legal Principles:
    • The court reviewed relevant authorities cited by counsel, distinguishing them on their facts (e.g., presence of ancestral nucleus, clear evidence of joint exertion, or families consisting of adult members who started business jointly). The court repeated the settled principle that property acquired by an individual without ancestral aid is self-acquired unless there is proof of an intention to treat it as joint.
    • Applying these principles to the present facts, and in absence of satisfactory evidence that the sons' assistance converted the business into a joint family business, the court concluded the disputed properties were Bhagwanta's self-acquired property.
  6. Conclusion:
    • Because the court found no satisfactory proof that the business or property was joint family property, it was unnecessary to decide defendants' separate plea that some items belonged to them personally. The result was that the plaintiff's claim for partition failed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's suit for partition and claim to a one-third share failed because the court held the properties in dispute were not proved to be joint family property but were the self-acquired property of Bhagwanta.
  • The court accepted the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff had not established a right to the alleged joint family share; therefore, no partition relief or mesne profits in favour of the plaintiff were ordered by this court.
  • The court did not adjudicate in detail on the separate assertion that some items were the defendants' self-acquired property, as that issue became unnecessary once it found none of the property to be joint family property for the plaintiff to claim.

Broader implications:

  • The decision applies established principles about self-acquired property and the circumstances under which a separate business may be converted into joint family business: namely, there must be satisfactory evidence (express agreement or conduct implying consent) that the business was intended to be treated as joint. The court emphasised fact-sensitive inquiry over mechanical presumptions.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it distinguishes earlier authorities on their facts and applies settled law to the specific factual matrix before it.

    Kailashi v. Shankar

    Malik, J.:— This appeal has arisen out of a suit for partition filed by Kailashi, son of Ram Chander, minor, under the guardianship of his mother, Mst. Ram Dulari, against the defendants, Shankar and Ram Dayal, brothers of Ram Chander and uncles of the minor. Plaintiff's case was that his grandfather, Bhagwanta, died in the year 1937 and his father, Ram Chander, died in the year 1920 and that Bhagwanta with his sons and grandson formed a joint Hindu family. If the family was joint plaintiff's share on partition on the date of suit was one-third, according to Hindu law. The plaintiff claimed partition of his one-third share and further claimed mesne profits from August, 1937, when the plaintiff was excluded from the enjoyment of the property. Defendants' case was that Bhagwanta did not inherit any property from his father and whatever property was acquired by him was his self-acquired property. The defendants further alleged that certain items included in the plaint were the personal property of the defendants and that as regards the property that belonged to Bhagwanta he had left a will, dated the 19th of May, 1936, under which the plaintiff was entirely excluded and the entire property came to the defendants. The defendants' further pleaded that about seventeen Page: 136or eighteen years before the suit there was a partition between Bhagwanta and his three sons and Ram Chander was given property worth about Rs. 2,000 and was separated. The reason given for this partition was that Mst. Dulari was not of good character. The defendants also pleaded that for the last twenty-five years the defendants had been carrying on the business of purchasing and selling mules and Bhagwanta had no concern with this business nor had the plaintiff any connection with it.

    The lower court has held in favour of the defendants that Ram Chander had separated from the family and had died as a separated member. That the property was the self-acquired property of Bhagwanta, that he had before his death given away this property under his will, which was a perfectly valid document that no part of the property was thus divisible and that the plaintiff's suit must fail.

    The plaintiff has filed this appeal against the decree of the lower court. It has been argued before us that the alleged separation of Ram Chander is not proved and that most of the documents relied on by the court below for its finding, on the question of separation, were not admissible in evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the cause of separation has been variously given by the defendants from time to time. In the written statement, paragraph 12, the cause of separation was given as the immorality of Ram Dulari, while Ram Dayal, defendant, in his deposition stated that Ram Chander separated from the family two years before his death as he did not wish to take part in the mule transport business. Kundan, another witness for the defendant, stated that Bhagwanta had said that his son did not want to live with him and that was the reason why he was giving him his share and allowing him to separate. The oral evidence of separation consists of the evidence of Ram Dayal, defendant, who has stated that when Ram Chander wanted to separate as he did not want to take part in the mule transport business, there was a panchayat called by Bhagwanta and a house and tonga and Rs. 500 in cash and ornaments worth about Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,000 were given by Bhagwanta to Ram Chander as his share. Kundan and Badal are the two other witnesses to this panchayat and separation. It is pointed out that there was no written document executed and there is no contemporaneous document to show that there was a partition. The evidence of partition is, however, to some extent Page: 137supported by the evidence of Raghubar Dayal, a witness for the plaintiff, who stated in his examination-in-chief that Ram Chander had lived separate from the other members of the family for some time, though he added that he did not hear of any partition. As regards the reason for partition, we cannot attach much importance to the discrepancy in the evidence of the witnesses. The reasons may have been more than one and each witness was emphasising the reason that he may have thought was the real cause. After all the witnesses were now deposing to an incident which took place more than twenty years ago.

    Great reliance was placed by the learned Judge on a notice supposed to have been sent by Pandit Dwarka Nath Raina, Vakil, on behalf of Mst. Dullo, widow of. Ram Chander. This notice, however, cannot be used as evidence against the plaintiff. This notice purports to have been sent by Pandit Dwarka Nath Raina on instructions from Mst. Dullo. No evidence has been given of any such instructions having been given by Mst. Dullo. All that the defendants have proved by the production of Om Narain is that he has proved the signature of Dwarka Nath Raina. Even if it be assumed that this notice was sent under instructions given by Mst. Dullo and the facts recited in this notice were the facts that Mst. Dullo gave to the learned Vakil, it may be used to contradict Mst. Dullo's evidence and to show that she was not a reliable witness; it cannot be used as substantive evidence against the plaintiff to prove that the family was really separate. It was suggested by learned counsel for the defendants that it must be deemed that Mst. Dullo sent this notice on behalf of the minor. The notice itself does not purport to be on behalf of the minor, but even if it were so, the admission could not be used against the minor as substantive evidence of the partition under section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    There are two documents on which very great reliance has been placed on behalf of the plaintiff. The first is an agreement, dated the 9th of February, 1926, Ex. 1, printed at page 32 of our paper-book. The defendants and Mst. Dulari for self and as guardian for her children entered into this agreement. It appears that after the death of Ram Chander, Mst. Dulari who was a young widow contracted illicit intimacy with Ram Dayal, her husband's younger brother, and she had conceived and the conception was about three months advanced. It was at that time that this agreement was entered into and a provision was Page: 138made for the maintenance of Mst. Dulari. There are certain recitals in this document which go to show that the entire family and the family property was joint and Bhagwanta was the eldest member and karta of the family. Bhagwanta himself signed this document as a witness. For some reason the document was handed over to Mst. Dulari and it was not presented for registration immediately after its execution. It was on the 7th of May, 1926, that Mst. Dulari presented this agreement for registration and Ram Dayal and Shankar objected to the registration of the document on the ground that their thumb-impressions had been obtained by fraud. The document was, however, compulsorily registered. In his deposition Ram Dayal has stated that his and his brother's and father's thumb-marks were obtained on this document by force and they did not know what was written in it. We are not prepared to accept this evidence of Ram Dayal, but at the same time we are not prepared to place much reliance on this agreement. It was evidently executed to appease Mst. Dulari as the document itself was kept in her custody, though, why it became necessary to appease her, it is now impossible to say. As we have already said, this document was presented for compulsory registration in May and soon after that there was trouble between Dulari and the other members of the family and notices were exchanged in June, 1926.

    On the 26th of June, 1926, Bhagwanta filed an application to be appointed guardian of his minor grand-children on the ground that Mst. Dulari was immoral and was not a fit person to be the guardian of her minor children. The learned District Judge on the 16th of July, 1926, appointed him guardian to the person of the minors holding that it was clearly established that the widow Mst. Dulari, was not of good character. In this application for guardianship Bhagwanta stated that he was the karta or managing member of the joint Hindu family and these minors were living with him and he was looking after them. Great reliance is placed on this statement of Bhagwanta's. Again we cannot lose sight of the fact that Bhagwanta by this statement wanted to strengthen the application for his own appointment as guardian of these minors. In his will, however, Bhagwanta on the 19th of May, 1936, stated that the family was separate and that Ram Chander had separated from him in his lifetime. However, the question whether Ram Chander had or had not separated is, to our mind, not a matter of any very great importance. Even if Page: 139it be assumed that Ram Chander had died as a member of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself, his father and his brothers, the plaintiff would not be entitled to claim any share in the properties in suit unless he could establish that they were joint family properties. It is conceded that katcha dilapidated houses that Bhagwanta had inherited from his father, Bhuranand, had been sold in payment of debts due and they had been repurchased by Bhagwanta under a sale deed dated the 2nd of September, 1910. After the repurchase he rebuilt the houses and he purchased other property detailed in the plaint. The first two items contained in List (A), we are told, were purchased on the 2nd of September, 1901, by Bhagwanta for Rs. 200. This sum of Rs. 200 was raised by a mortgage of the same date, so this was clearly property acquired by Bhagwanta himself. Later on he rebuilt the houses at considerable expense. The third item was purchased under a sale-deed of the 6th of February, 1919, for Rs. 2,300. The whole of it was paid for in cash and the fourth item was purchased under a sale deed, dated the 27th of October, 1931. The rest of the property consists of movable property. No evidence has been shown to us to prove that there was any ancestral nucleus from which the property in suit could be acquired.

    Learned counsel has not placed any reliance on any acquisition made with the aid of ancestral nucleus, but what he has urged is that Ram Chander and the other sons of Bhagwanta helped Bhagwanta in his business of buying and selling mules and therefore the business must be deemed to be joint family business and all income from the same must be deemed to be joint family income and the property acquired with such income must also be joint family property. From the evidence on record we find that Shankar was the eldest son of Bhagwanta born about the year 1890, Ram Chander was the second son born about the year 1895 and Ram Dayal was the youngest born about the year 1896. We have no clear evidence as to when this business of dealing in mules was started, but from the evidence we can gather that it was started by Bhagwanta long before 1914. The business flourished during the last war and Bhagwanta made money. When the business was started Ram Chander and Ram Dayal must have been minors, while Shankar was a young man who may have just attained majority. The business must, therefore, have been the personal business of Bhagwanta. It is alleged Page: 140that when the sons grew up they started helping Bhagwanta in the business and therefore it must be deemed that the business became the joint family business and it was no longer the separate business of Bhagwanta. What part actually the sons of Bhagwanta took in the carrying on of the business is neither clear nor has it been proved. The plaintiff produced some witnesses who generally said that it was joint business and they all worked together, but learned counsel for the appellant placed no reliance on the evidence of these witnesses and did not even care to read it to us. His entire argument was based on two sentences in the deposition of Ram Dayal who in his examination-in-chief stated that the money for all these purchases and constructions came from their mule transport business, and then in cross-examination he said that before Ram Chander's separation the whole income of the mule business was joint and they were living with their father. It is argued that this statement of Ram Dayal goes the whole length of proving the plaintiff's case. We, however, do not agree with this contention of learned counsel. It is true that the sons of Bhagwanta were living with him and were being maintained by him, that they were all deriving benefit from the income of the mule transport business and that they were also helping their father in the successful carrying on of the business, but that would not be enough to make the business which was started by the father the joint business of the family. Several rulings were cited before us by learned counsel for the appellant, but, to our mind, it is not so much a question of law but a question of inference from facts. It is now well settled that it is open to a member of a joint Hindu family to start a business of his own and if he starts it, it would be his separate business and any property acquired by him from the income of such business would be his separate property. A fortiori if several members of a joint Hindu family join together to start a business, it would be their separate business and any property acquired by them from such business would be their separate property. It is further clear that any property acquired by a member of a joint Hindu family which is his separate property, if thrown into the joint stock, becomes joint family property. The law is well settled that ordinarily adult members of a joint Hindu family have no right to start a new business which would bind the junior members of the family and make them liable for the losses thereof. (See the decision of the Privy Council in Page: 141Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain (1932) I.L.R 54 All. 564. If, however, a family consists of only adult members and all the adult members join together to carry on a new business as members of a joint Hindu family and acquire property for and on behalf of the joint family no doubt the property would be joint family property. Even if they acquire property from their own business but throw it into the joint stock, it will no doubt become joint family property. But if a business is started by an adult member of the family separately, the mere fact that his sons who are dependent on him and are being maintained by him give him some help in the carrying on of the business would not necessarily make the business cease to be his own business and make it the joint business of himself and his sons. It is no doubt true that when the sons grow up the father and the sons may so conduct themselves that from their conduct it may be apparent that it was either expressly or impliedly agreed that the business which at its start was a separate business of the father had become the joint business of the father and the sons, by some arrangement between them. In the case before us there is no evidence, pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, barring those two sentences in the deposition of Ram Dayal, for the basis of his argument that the business was a joint family business. From the fact that there was absolutely no ancestral nucleus, that the business was started by Bhagwanta when his sons were minors or, at any rate, two of them were minors and his sons lived with him and were maintained by him and that as they grew up, they helped him in the business, though what was the nature of the help has not been deposed to by the witnesses, we do not feel justified in holding that the business became at any point of time a joint family business. It must be remembered that Ram Chander died at the very young age of about twenty-five in the year 1920. The question may well arise at what point of time the separate business of Bhagwanta became the joint family business of himself and his sons? Was it on the first occasion when one or more of his sons gave him some help or on which of such subsequent occasions? No text of Hindu law has been pointed out to us which would make such business the joint family business of the father and sons. In the seventh edition of Mayne's Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, which was the Page: 142last edition edited by Mayne himself, dealing with this question, at page 349 he said:

    “If a single individual acquired a fortune by his own exertions, without any assistance from ancestral property, his issue would certainly take no interest in it. If several brothers did the same the property would be joint as between themselves. It would certainly be self-acquired as regards all collaterals, and it is difficult to see why it should not be the same as regards their issue, unless they those voluntarily to admit latter to a share of it.”

    In the tenth edition edited by S. Srinivas Iyengar, following certain decisions quoted in the volume, the learned author has stated, at page 359, that the property acquired by joint labour of members of a joint Hindu family would be joint family property and the presumption would be that, it was so unless an intention not to treat the property as joint family property but the joint self-acquisition of the acquirers was proved.

    The cases quoted by learned counsel for the appellant have all been considered in Mulla's Hindu Law, ninth edition at page 247, paragraph 228, and following certain authorities quoted therein the learned author has said that the property is to be deemed to be joint property unless proof was given that the property was acquired not as members of a joint Hindu family but as members of an ordinary trade partnership resting on contract. As we have already said, we think there is hardly any question of law involved, nor could there be any question of presumption. The matter should be decided on the circumstances and facts of each case.

    The first case relied, on by learned counsel for the appellant is a decision of Sen and Bajpal, JJ., reported in Jamna Prasad v. Durga Dei A.I.R 1933 All. 138. The point that has arisen before us did not arise in that case. There was a nucleus of ancestral property with the aid of which the property in dispute had been acquired. Even if there was no nucleus, there was evidence that, the property had been thrown into the common stock. On these findings the Court held that the property was joint family property.

    The next case cited was reported in Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti (1904) I.L.R 27 Mad. 32 (35) where a Bench of the Madras High Court held that “The family is not shown to have had any ancestral property, but it acquired property by trade in which the father and the two sons were jointly engaged. There being Page: 143no indication of an intention to the contrary it must be presumed that the property thus acquired was held, by the members of the family as joint property with the incident of the right of survivorship.” Evidently the family in that case consisted of the three members who were carrying on the trade and there is nothing to show from the report that the trade or business was started by the father and the sons merely gave him occasional help when they grew up.

    In Karsondas Dhararnsey v. Gangabai (1908) I.L.R 32 Bom. 479, Beaman, J., has discussed what is joint property, joint family property and joint ancestral family property, at great length. The point before us for consideration did not arise in that case. Mulji Jaitha had started business without the aid of any ancestral funds. The business flourished due to his personal exertions. It was at a much later tsage that he associated his son, Soonderdas, with him in the business. Soonderdas predeceased him and his father took the whole estate by survivorship. Then the question arose whether this property was his self-acquired property over which he had full powers of disposition. At an earlier stage it had been accepted that the property was the joint family property of Mulji Jaitha and Soonderdas. Beaman, J., however, at page 495 said:

    “Let me guard myself against being supposed to think that in the circumstances of this family which have been fully narrated in a previous judgment, and about which there is no dispute, it need have necessarily followed that what Mulji Jetha made in trade by his own exertions became joint family property between himself and his son Soonderdas. Indeed I think that had the matter come to the proof and had there been no admissions, such facts as are undisputed clearly point to Mulji Jetha, and Soonderdas too for that matter, having intended not to make this joint family property.”

    In Laldas Narandas v. Motibai (1908) 10 Bom. L.R 175, Chandavarkar, J., has held that where the father and sons, members of a joint Hindu family, acquire property with their joint exertions and throw it all into one common stock, they should be deemed to manifest their intention to deal with one another and with outsiders as members of a coparcenary system under the Hindu law. In the brief judgment of that case the facts are not fully noted, and we have already said that where a family consists of adult members and they jointly start a business as members of a joint Hindu family and acquire property as such, it may be, that the property, Page: 144so acquired may become joint, family property. The observations of Chandavarkar, J., therefore, do not necessarily go against the view expressed by us.

    The case reported in Laldas Narandas was followed by another Bench of the Bombay High Court in Haridas Narayandas v. Devkuvarbai (1926) I.L.R 50 Bom., 443. In that case the business was started by one Narayandas without the aid of any ancestral nucleus and the business flourished. Later on a son Haridas was born to him. When he reached the age of majority he was associated with Narayandas in his business and gradually as the father grew older and feeble the son took upon his shoulders a greater share in the management of the business, and it may have been possible, therefore, under those circumstances to hold that the business which to start with was the separate business of the father became by a sort of implied consent the joint business of the father and the son.

    The last case cited by learned counsel is reported in Parbhulal Dullabhram… v. Bhagvan Parbhu…. A.I.R 1927 Bom. 412. In that case one Parbhu Makan formed a joint Hindu family with his sons and owned certain properties. Parbhu Makan sold one of the houses in 1909 and in 1911 he applied to be adjudicated an insolvent and was so adjudicated. After his adjudication his sons began to conduct the family business in their own names and repurchased the house sold by the insolvent. The Court held that the property had been acquired by the joint Hindu family of the insolvent and his sons and the share of the insolvent vested in the receiver. The facts of that case are entirely different from the facts before us. The business-itself was a joint family business and Parbhu Makan, the father, was a member of the joint Hindu family. The Court held that the property was acquired by the joint family of which the insolvent and his sons were proprietors and therefore the insolvent's share vested in the receiver in insolvency.

    So far as the facts of the case before us are concerned on our finding that the business was started by Bhagwanta without the help of his sons and was therefore his own separate business, that there is no satisfactory evidence as to what part his sons took in the business—all that learned counsel has urged being that, they helped him in the business—as they would probably be expected to do as dependants on him being his sons and being maintained by him, we find it impossible to hold that the Page: 145association of his sons with Bhagwanta has been proved to be such that it must be held that expressly, or by necessary implication, Bhagwanta decided to treat this business as the joint family business of himself and his sons. In the absence of satisfactory proof that the business at any time became joint family business, properties acquired with the funds of this business must also be the properties of Bhagwanta.

    The defendants have raised a plea that some of the items claimed by the plaintiff were acquired by them separately and Bhagwanta had nothing to do with the same. As we are of opinion that it is not proved that any part of the property is joint family property, we need not go into this question as to whether any part of the property was the self-acquired property, of the defendants.

    We dismiss this appeal with costs.

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