Kotwal, J.:— This appeal under the Letters Patent is aimed at over-setting the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby he has passed a decree in the amount of Rs. 91,727 in favour of the respondent against the appellants with costs. The facts which have led to the filing of this appeal may be briefly recounted as below:
In response to a tender notice issued by the Chief Engineer, Western Command, Simla, the respondent offered to supply 14,439 Charpoys (cots) fitted with mosquito net frames with gutties and clumps at the rate of Rs. 19 per charpoy for the use of troops stationed in Jammu. This offer was accepted by the Chief Engineer Western Command on 8-12-1956 and a deed of contract came to be executed between the President of India and the respondent, according to which, the entire supply was to be completed by 31-12-1957. The respondent had supplied only 2045 charpoys, when on 21-10-1957 further work was suspended by the Engineer-in-charge vide a notice sent by him to the respondent in terms of clause 6 of the agreement. This was followed by another notice issued by the Officer Commanding 969 Works Section on 31-3-1958 informing the respondent that the remaining charpoys were to be supplied by him without mosquito net frames at a rate less by Rs. 4.33 from the rate already fixed per charpoy and calling upon him to indicate whether these terms were acceptable to him. The respondent, in reply thereto, even though questioned the right of the Officer Commanding to make the proposed deviation in the terms of the contract, yet offered to supply the remaining charpoys without mosquito net frames, but only at a rate to be reduced by Rs. 1.50 per charpoy instead of Rs. 4.33 as suggested by the Officer Commanding. The contract was ultimately cancelled with effect from 29-5-1958 by the Headquarters Western Command Engineers Simla Branch by a notice dated 22-5-1958 sent to the respondent in terms of Cl. 28 of the agreement and the respondent was further told that the supply according to the contract would be completed through other sources at his cost. The respondent without losing much time filed a suit for perpetual injunction on 31-5-1958 against the appellants and others in the court of Sub-Judge, Jammu, restraining them from carrying out the work either departmetally or through other agency and further directing them to accept the supplies from the respondent in terms of the agreement. The defendants, it appears, made an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for staying the proceedings in the suit in terms of Cl. 36 of the agreement which made provision for arbitration. The court trying the suit vide its order dated 16-8-1953 stayed the suit and allowed the parties to refer their disputes to an arbitrator. Thereafter, the disputes were referred to the sole arbitration of one M.L Baheja, who entered upon the reference and ultimately made his award on 19-4-1963. The award favoured the appellants. Consequently an application to make the same a rule of the court was moved by the appellants in the High Court. A learned Single Judge of this Court (J.N Bhat J.), who heard the application as well as the objections to the award filed by the respondent, eventually set aside the award on 29-3-1966. The appellants challenged the order of the learned Single Judge in a Letters Patent appeal but without any success and the appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 9-5-1968.
2. The present suit was brought by the respondent on the plea that the appellants had no right to vary the terms of the contract unilaterally and cancel the same on the failure of the respondent to agree to the terms proposed by them as the contract was not a lump sum contract within the meaning of Cl. 5 of the agreement. He also alleged that he was always ready to make the supplies in accordance with the terms of the contract and the work orders issued thereunder from time to time but the department did not accept the supplies. The respondent relying upon a number of facts and circumstances pleaded that his suit was within time and Page: 105claimed a decree for Rs. 1,05,000 against the appellants on account of damages for breach of contract, refund of security deposits, payment of balance price of charpoys supplied, interest on the amount illegally withheld by the appellants and expenses incurred by him during arbitration proceedings. The appellants resisted the suit mainly on the ground that cancellation of the contract under Cl. 28 of the agreement was fully justified as the respondent had failed to make the supplies in time. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred under the provisions of O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC besides the same being barred by limitation. The appellants also denied that the respondent had ever offered to supply charpoys which the appellants refused to accept. It may also be mentioned that before filing the written statement, the appellants moved an application on 2-9-1969 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge trying the suit. An appeal was then taken by the appellants against the said order to a Division Bench of this Court but later on the appellants decided not to press the same with the result that the appeal was dismissed by the Court on 29-3-1974.
3. A number of issues covering the controversy between the parties were raised by the court. The parties joined the issues and led evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned Single Judge who tried the suit eventually passed a decree in the amount of Rs. 91,727 only with proportionate costs in favour of the respondent against the appellants holding:
(i) that the suit was not barred under O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC.
(ii) that the suit was not barred by limitation;
(iii) that the controversy raised in the suit was not covered by any arbitration clause;
(iv) that the cancellation of the contract was illegal and unjustified;
(v) that the respondent was entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 49,576 as compensation for the charpoys yet to be delivered by him according to the profit he would have earned in the event of delivery being complete;
(vi) that the respondent was entitled to refund of his security deposit amounting to Rs. 10,000.
(vii) that the respondent was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 10,265 on account of balance price of the charpoys supplied by him;
(viii) that the respondent was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 21,886 on account of interest; and
(ix) that the respondent was not entitled to get the costs of arbitration proceedings.
4. At the very outset, it may be pointed out that Mr. Malhotra frankly conceded that a sum of Rs. 10,000 is lying with the appellants on account of security deposits made by the respondent. He has also admitted the fact that out of a total number of 14439 charpoys to be supplied by him, the respondent supplied 2045 charpoys and a balance of Rs. 10,265 still remains to be paid to him on account of the price of the charpoys so supplied. He has, however, assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge on the grounds:
(i) that the cancellation of the contract was fully justified because the respondent had failed to make the supplies within the stipulated time;
(ii) that the margin of profit could not be made the basis for awarding compensation for the alleged breach of contract;
(iii) that the suit was not maintainable in view of Cl. 36 of the agreement;
(iv) that the suit was barred under the provisions of O. 2 R. 2 of the CPC.;
(v) that the suit was barred by limitation; and
(vi) that the respondent was not entitled to any interest which in any case was exorbitant.
5. There can be no manner of doubt that Cl. 28 of the agreement (I.A.F.W 1815-Z) empowered the Accepting Officer to cancel the contract in case the respondent-contractor failed to make supplies. Two questions which therefore, fall for determination are:
(i) did the respondent fail to make supplies within reasonable time? and
(ii) was the contract actually cancelled on that account?
6. The respondent's case is that the supplies could not be completed within the stipulated period because the Army authorities declined to accept the same and not because he was unable to make the supplies in time. He had at every relevant time adequate stock of charpoys with him but the Army authorities deliberately avoided to pass the same for taking delivery. This part of the respondent's statement also finds support from the statement of P.W.R.C Page: 106Kumar who has deposed that in the year 1956-57 he used to visit the workshop of the respondent which was situated quite near to the MES office where the witness was then posted and found huge stock of charpoys fitted with mosquito net-frames lying there. To this extent the respondent's case stands unrebutted as the lone witness, namely R.N Khanna examined by the appellants has expressed his inability to say as to whether or not stock of charpoys was lying with the respondent at the relevant time. It surely cannot stand to reason that the respondent would have refused to supply charpoys within time even as they were ready for delivery. Assuming that the respondent had failed to make supplies within the stipulated period, nevertheless, the appellant could not take any benefit of this breach and cancel the contract as late as on 22-5-1958. According to D.W.R.N Khanna the respondent had to supply 1882 charpoys till 8-3-1957 according to the first work order, 4817 charpoys till 30-6-1957 according to the second work order, 3870 charpoys till 30-9-1957 according to the third work order and 3870 charpoys till 31-12-1957 according to the fourth work order. He on the other hand, according to this witness, supplied only 2045 charpoys till 31-10-1957 against the first and the second work orders. Obviously therefore, when the authorities accepted delivery of charpoys as late as on 31/10/1957, the respondent on their own showing had already committed breaches of at least the second and the third work order. The respondent ought to have supplied till then 10569 charpoys; the last date of the third work order expiring on 30-9-1957. It is equally interesting to find that before that i.e on 21-10-57 the Engineer-in-charge, 969 Works Section had ordered suspension of work in respect of the second, third and fourth work order with effect from 19-10-1957 under Cl. 6 of the agreement. It was, therefore, too late in the day to cancel the contract on 22-5-1958 on the ground that the respondent had failed to make supplies with due diligence. The authorities could and ought to have exercised this option, the moment the respondent had committed breach of the second work order. They could not be permitted to exercise both these options of accepting the supplies in contravention of the second and third work order and cancelling the contract because of the said contravention. They could have exercised only one of the two options. The conduct of the authorities in accepting the delayed short supplies in respect of the second work order till 31-10-1957 when there had been a total breach of the third work order, had unmistakably signified their acquiescence in the continuance of the contract and therefore, could not put an end to it on 22-5-1958 when they had themselves kept the work suspended between 19-10-1957 and 22-5-1958. (See Section 39 of the Contract Act). The answer to the first question must be therefore, in the negative.
7. Turning now to the second question, it may be noticed that the reason given by the respondent for refusal on the part of the authorities to take the delivery of charpoys is that charpoys with mosquito net-frames did not fit in the bunkers as such they wanted charpoys without such frames and that too at their own rate. The respondent having questioned their right to make any deviation in the design and rate of the charpoys, and also having failed to oblige them by accepting their offer, the authorities, according to the respondent, cancelled the contract. There is ample proof on the file to support this version. Reference in this connection may be made to letters at 4-10-1957, 21-3-1958 and 27-8-1958 written by the Army authorities to the respondent. Surprisingly enough in none of these letters any grievance was made by the authorities that the respondent had failed to make supplies with due diligence. On the other had the respondent was being asked every time whether he was prepared to accept the change in design and reduction in the rate of charpoys as suggested by the authorities. As would transpire from the last letter in the series which appears to have been written on 27-8-58 i.e long after the contract had been cancelled, willingness to accept charpoys from the respondent was expressed by the authorities provided he agreed to supply the same without mosquito net frames and also at a reduced rate suggested by them. This clearly shows that absence of due diligence in making supplies on the part of the respondent was not indeed the reason for cancellation of the contract but the reason was the refusal on the part of the respondent to accept the proposed deviation in the design and rate of charpoys. Not to speak of this correspondence even DW R.N Khanna has submitted in his statement that the root cause of the differences Page: 107between the parties which culminated into cancellation of the contract was the change in design and rate of charpoys made unilaterally by the Army authorities. Answer to the second question too must be in the negative.
8. The Army authorities in the absence of any covenant in the agreement to that effect, undoubtedly, could not make any such deviation unilaterally, as it would tantamount to substituting a new contract for the old one without the consent of the other party. Clause 5 of the agreement could not come to their rescue as this clause applied to only lump sum contracts, whereas the contract in question was not a lump sum contract but only a rate contract. The conclusion therefore, becomes inescapable that the cancellation of the contract by the Army authorities was wholly illegal and without any justification.
9. Under Section 73 of the Contract Act where the buyer commits breach of contract by refusing to accept goods offered to him by the seller, the measure of compensation is the difference between the contract price and the actual price of the goods. This is amply borne out from the language of the section as well as from illustration (d) appended to it. Failure to earn expected profit by the seller out of the bargain would be covered by the expression “any loss or damage caused to him thereby” used in Section 73 (Also see Cohen v. Cassim Nana, (1875) ILR 1 Cal 264). In the present case the respondent has claimed a sum of Rs. 49,576/- on account of the profit which according to him he would have earned by supplying 12394 more charpoys which still remained to be supplied out of the total number of 14439 charpoys in terms of the contract; he having supplied only 2045 charpoys. He has stated that keeping in view the contract price and the actual cost thereof, he would have earned a profit of Rs. 5/- per charpoy. His statement is fully corroboated by the statement of PW S.N Raina a consulting Engineer and corroborated to some extent by the statement of PW R.C Kumar. Whereas according to PW S.N Raina one such charpoy in those days would have cost Rs. 13.92, PW R.C Kumar has put its cost at Rs. 15/-. In any case, therefore, the respondent should have earned at least a profit of Rs. 4/- per charpoy. Calculated at this rate the total amount of profit in respect of 12394 charpoys would come to Rs. 49576/-. There is no rebuttal to this evidence from other side. The respondent is therefore, clearly entitled to this sum.
10. Elaborating his third ground, Mr. Malhotra has contended that with the cancellation of the contract, the arbitration clause (No. 36) in it did not automatically perish and unless the reference to arbitrator was also superseded in terms of Section 19 of the Arbitration Act, mere setting aside of the award made by the arbitrator M.L Raheja did not render the arbitration clause inoperative, as such the present suit was not maintainable as long as the arbitration clause survived. The Division Bench which decided the appeal, argued the learned counsel, did not favour the view taken by the learned single Judge that the arbitration clause died with the cancellation of the contract, but upheld the judgment of the learned single Judge on other grounds. Section 19 of the Arbitration Act no doubt gives discretion to the court to supersede or not to supersede the reference and unless the court also supersedes the reference, mere setting aside of the award by it cannot render the arbitration clause non est and take away the remedy of the affected party to refer the dispute to the same or other arbitrator. It is equally well settled that an agreement to refer a dispute to an arbitrator does not ipso facto take away the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit relating to the same dispute. Where, therefore, a suit is brought during the subsistence of an arbitration agreement, the defendant can only apply under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to the court to stay the suit. Here again the court has a discretion whether or not to stay the suit and if it finds that the defendant was not willing either before the commencement of the suit or during its pendency to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration it shall decline to stay the suit. In this case, the appellant had made an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for staying the proceedings in the suit which was rejected by the learned single Judge on 11-6-1971. An appeal was taken by the appellant to a Division Bench of this Court. During the pendency of the appeal Mr. V.S Malhotra counsel for the appellants made the following statement:—
“I have no objection if the suit is tried by the single Judge. I don't insist on the matter being referred to arbitrator. The appeal may be disposed of in Page: 108the light of this statement. I have received a letter from the Department instructing me to make this statement.” Statement to the same effect was also made by one P.D Bhatia an employee of the appellants. It was in this background that the appeal was dismissed by the Court on 29-3-1974 with the following observations:
“In view of the statements of M/s. P.D Bhatia Assistant Surveyor Works and V.S Malhotra Advocate for the Union of India recorded today, the appeal need not be decided on merits and the same is dismissed as not pressed. The trial Court shall proceed with the suit and dispose it of according to law.” This conduct of the appellants unmistakably shows that they were not any more willing to take the dispute to the anvil of the arbitrator. They had every right to abandon the remedy of arbitration even if they had opted for the same at an earlier stage. Simply because the verdict of the court went against them, the appellants could not be permitted to retrace steps and contend that the matter had to be decided by the arbitrator alone. The learned single Judge was therefore, perfectly justified in proceeding with the trial of the suit till its logical conclusion. In this view of the matter whether or not the Division Bench upheld the finding of the learned single Judge superseding the reference on one ground or the other would be wholly inconsequential.
11. So far as the applicability of O. 2 R. 2 of the CPC is concerned, it cannot be gainsaid that where a person is entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action, he must sue for all those reliefs and if he omits to sue for any one or more of such reliefs, except with the leave of the Court, his subsequent suit for the same would be barred. Mr. Malhotra's contention is that cause of action in the earlier suit and the present suit was the same, namely, cancellation of the contract, therefore, argued the learned counsel, the respondent ought to have included in his earlier suit all the reliefs claimed by him in the present suit. Having failed to do so, his present suit was barred under the provisions of O. 2 R. 2(3) of the CPC and the learned single Judge was not right in holding that causes of action in the two suits were different.
12. Mr. Gupta appearing for the respondent has on the other hand contended that causes of action in the two suits were quite different even though they emanated from the single act of cancellation of the contract, as such, the mischief of O. 2 R. 2 of the CPC could not be attracted, for to apply this provision cause of action in both the suits should have been the same and indivisible. Two questions which, therefore, fall for determination are;
i. Was the cause of action in both the suits the same?
ii. What is the real connotation of the term “relief” employed in sub-rule (3)?
13. The expression “cause of action” had not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure but it is generally understood to mean: “every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact but every fact which is necessary to be proved.” (See Cooks v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107). Cause of action is to be distinguished from the relief or reliefs which flow from it. Whereas a cause of action is the coming into existence of a fact or a bundle of facts taken together, reliefs flowing from it are merely its legal offshoots. Cause of action will not cease to be a single and indivisible one simply because two or more reliefs flow from it. The case would be of course, different where different reliefs arise out of different facts or sets of facts even though all such facts constitute a single transaction. There can be no manner of doubt that but for the cancellation of the contract, the respondent would have no cause to file either of the suits. If was on the other hand the factum of unauthorised cancellation of the contract alone which gave him two options under law, i.e either to question the validity of the cancellation of the contract and compel the appellants to perform the same as it originally stood, or to accept the cancellation and claim damages arising out of its breach. The reliefs claimed by the respondent either in the earlier suit or in the present suit were therefore, only the legal off-shoots of the factum of unauthorised cancellation of the contract. Clearly, therefore, it was the single act of cancellation of the contract, to be proved by the same evidence in both the cases, which gave cause to the respondent to bring two different suits, no matter that different evidence was required to substantiate different claims in these suits. In these Page: 109circumstances, therefore, it is not possible to subscribe to the view taken by the learned single Judge that causes of action in the two suits were different. The cause of action in both the suits was undoubtedly the same.
14. Turning now to the other question, the term “relief” as understood by sub-r. (3) means a relief which a plaintiff could have claimed in addition to the relief claimed by him in his earlier suit and which the court could have granted him along with the relief originally prayed for. It certainly cannot mean and include a relief which a plaintiff could have claimed only as an alternative to the relief originally claimed and which the court could have granted only in the alternative and not in addition to the one originally prayed for. In Shripad v. Sidram, AIR 1951 Bom 167, the plaintiff had earlier sued for possession of the mortgaged property but his suit was dismissed on the ground that he had not paid full mortgage money to the mortgagor. Thereafter he brought another suit for recovery of mortgage money actually paid by him through sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgage deed gave him a right to either sue for possession of the mortgaged property or to sue for recovery of mortgage money in case the mortgagor failed to pay the mortgage money within a period of three years from the date of mortgage. It was proved that the mortgagor had failed to pay the mortgage money within the stipulated period. An objection was taken by the defendant in the later suit that as the relief of recovery of mortgage money could have been claimed by the plaintiff in the alternative in his earlier suit, his subsequent suit for the same was barred under O. 2 R. 2 of the CPC. The Court repelled the contention of the defendant and observed (at p. 168):—
“Now looking at the plain wording of O. 2 R. 2 sub-r. (3), it seems to us that the proper construction to be placed on that sub-rule is that a person entitled to more that one relief in respect of the same cause of action must sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if under an instrument under which he claims he can only sue for one of two or more alternative reliefs, then bar under O. 2, R. 2 does not apply. It is not the mere existence of more than one relief only that brings the bar under O. 2 R. 2 into operation. If he is entitled to more than one cumulative reliefs, but sues for only some of those reliefs and does not choose to sue for the remaining reliefs, then his right to sue for the latter reliefs is barred under O. 2. R. 2. If on the other hand he is entitled to only one relief out of several alternative reliefs and he sues for one of them, his remedy to sue for other alternative reliefs is not barred, for he cannot be said to have been entitled to more than one relief.”
15. Following Shripad's case (supra) a similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in Rangasami Goundan v. K.R. Rangai Goundar, AIR 1955 Mad 545.
16. Applying this test to the facts of the present case, it cannot be controverted that the respondent could have neither claimed in his earlier suit, in addition to the reliefs claimed therein, the relief now claimed by him, nor could have the court granted him these reliefs in addition to the reliefs claimed by him in the earlier suit. The relief claimed in the earlier suit was in essence the relief of specific performance of the contract on the ground that the contract subsisted; its cancellation by the appellants being unauthorised. The relief claimed in the present suit on the other hand proceeded on the basis that the contract stood cancelled even though unauthorisedly. How could then the Court grant in the earlier suit, in addition to the reliefs claimed therein, the relief claimed in the present suit, save by giving at one and the same time two inconsistent findings; one that the contract between the parties subsisted; and, other that the same did not subsist. The reliefs claimed in the two suits were mutually exclusive and could have been as such claimed only in the alternative. This being the position, the present suit could not be said to be barred under the provisions of O. 2 R. 2 of the CPC. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Malhotra viz Shankar Sitaram v. Balkrishan Sitaram, AIR 1954 SC 352, Haridas Mondal v. Anath Nath Mittra , AIR 1961 SC 1419 and Union Of India, New Delhi… v. P.V Jagannath Rao…., AIR 1968 Madh Pra 204 are clearly distinguishable as in all these cases the plaintiff had omitted to sue for the relief which he could have claimed in addition to the relief already claimed by him in the earlier suit.
17. The contract in question is admittedly in writing and not registered. The period of limitation provided for a suit for compensation arising out of a breach of such a contract is three years Page: 110the terminus a quo being the date of the breach. Article 86 of the Limitation Act would undoubtedly apply to such a case. The breach in this case took place on 22-5-1958 when the contract was illegally cancelled. Soon after its cancellation i.e on 31-5-1958, the respondent brought the earlier suit for injunction and specific performance of the contract which was eventually stayed by the court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and the disputes referred to the arbitrator vide its order dated 16-8-58. From that day onwards the parties hotly contested the proceedings both before the Arbitrator and the Court till the Division Bench dismissed on 9-5-1968 the appellants' appeal preferred by them against the order of the learned single Judge setting aside the award. If the period between 31-5-1958 and 9-5-1968 is excluded in computing the three years period of limitation provided under Article 86, then on 9-5-1968 a period of three years, less by only eight days, i.e the days which the respondent lost between 22-5-1958 when the limitation started, and 31-5-1958 when the earlier suit was brought, was still there for filing the present suit. The present suit was brought on 19-5-1969 i.e, after wasting a further period of only one year and ten days, which means the suit was brought within time provided the time between 31-5-1958 and 9-5-1968 could be excluded.
18. It cannot be denied that the earlier suit was brought by the respondent with due diligence, i.e, after losing only eight days, and the same was also in good faith, it being already held that the cancellation of the contract was unwarranted. Furthermore, it cannot be disputed, that the court had to stay the proceedings on 16-8-1958 because the disputes had to be referred to an arbitrator at the option of the appellants, which was a ground akin to the ground of absence of jurisdiction. All the conditions laid down in sub-s. (1) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act thus stood satisfied and the period between 31-5-1958 and 16-8-1958 had to be excluded. Likewise under sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, where an award is eventually set aside by the court, the period between the commencement of arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute referred. This may be in the form of a suit or even arbitration. Furthermore, the court setting aside the award means not only the court of first instance but includes even a court of appeal or revision. As already mentioned, the arbitration proceedings commenced on 16-8-58 and lasted till 9-5-1968, therefore, the entire period between 16-8-1958 to 9-5-1968 had also to be excluded. It therefore, follows that the present suit was brought well within time.
19. Finally, Mr. Malhotra has argued that there being no evidence of an agreement or usage to pay interest, the learsed single Judge was not justified in awarding the same which otherwise too was excessive. Interest may be awarded under any of the following circumstances:
(i) Where there is an agreement to pay interest;
(ii) Where there is an usage to pay interest;
(iii) Where there is any law making specific provision for interest, and
(iv) Where the course of dealings between the parties justifies payment of interest by way of damages on equitable grounds.
20. True, there was neither an agreement to pay interest, nor was there any usage under which it could be claimed, nor was there any law which made a specific provision for awarding interest in such cases; nevertheless, interest in the circumstances of this case could be granted in favour of the respondent by way of damages on equitable grounds. As already found, the appellants had no right to cancel the contract, and consequently no right to forfeit the security deposits and the balance price of the charpoys supplied, which indeed belonged to the respondent and which he also became entitled to receive as soon as the contract was cancelled. The appellants without any justification deprived the respondent of the use of his own money and thereby wrongfully withheld the same to his detriment. This naturally resulted in a loss to the respondent for which he had every right in equity to be compensated at the cost of the appellants. The total period, as correctly found by the learned single Judge was eighteen years during which the respondent's money was wrongfully withheld by the appellants. Interest for this period has been awarded at the rate of 6% per annum, which by any standard cannot be said to be unreasonable. No Page: 111fault can therefore, be found with the judgment of the learned single Judge on this score as well. None of the grounds taken by Mr. Malhotra having succeeded, the appeal fails, which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
21. Appeal dismissed.