S.D. Bajaj, J. - Vide agreement dated 28th August, 1975, Karnail Singh defendant-appellant agreed to sell his 10 Killas 18 Marlas of land camp raised in Khewat Nos. 156-57, Khatuni Nos. 74-210, Rectangle No. 23, Killa Nos. 16/2 and 25, situated in village Gajju Gazi, Tehsil and District Gurdaspur to Kishan Singh plaintiff-respondent for Rs. 27,000/- (Rupees twenty-seven thousand only on or before 15th December, 1975. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) was obtained as advance while entering into the agreement and the balance was agreed to be paid before the Sub Registrar. 2. Vendor-defendent-appellant did not execute the sale-deed in terms of the agreement dated 28th August, 1975. Plaintiff-respondent Kishan Singh filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 28th August, 1975, which was decreed by the learned sub Judge Ist Class, Gurdaspur, on 31st January, 1976. It would not be out of place to mention here that defendant-appellant Karnail Singh attempted selling the disputed land to one Ram Singh before 15th December, 1975. Vigilant buyer in plaintiff-respondent Kishan Singh could thwart this attempt of the defendant-appellant by filing a suit for permanent injunction. Defendant -appellant has however, done so during the pendency of the present R.F.A. in this Court, after depositing Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) allegedly received as advance in terms of the agreement of sale dated 28th August, 1975, and obtaining stay of the operation of the learned trial Court's judgment, vide order dated 27th April, 1977 of this Court. 3. Defendant-appellant has been asserting all through that he was paid Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) as advance as against Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) claimed by the plaintiff-respondent and that it was the plaintiff-respondent who had not adhered to the terms of the agreement of sale and was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was, therefore, averred that the claim for specific performance of the agreement of sale was wrongly decreed by the learned trial Court in favour of the plaintiff respondent. 4. Learned trial Court reached the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) was paid as advance and that the plaintiff respondent had all along been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On these premises, it decreed the suit for specific performance with costs observing that the plaintiff-respondent would be entitled to get the sale-deed of the land agreed to be sold, executed from defendant-appellant on payment of the balance amount of Rs. 17,000/- (Rupees seventeen thousand only). Learned trial Court also held that defendant appellant was appraised of all the terms incorporated in the agreement of sale and was all along not willing to perform his part of the contract. In a nutshell, the finding of the learned trial Court was lock, stock and barrel against the defendant-appellant on all the four issues fromed by it. Hence this Regular First Appeal. 5. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff-respondent cleverly took the defendant-appellant to a deed-writer of his choice, got the advance amount allegedly paid by him to defendant-appellant, entered as Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) in place of Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) actually paid; that the allegations made in the plaint did not meet the requirement of section 16 (c) of the specific relief act, 1963; that defendant-appellant was kept in the dark in regard to terms of the contract and that the learned trial Court wrongly formed the opinion regarding defendant-appellant being not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and, therefore, its decision is based on wrong premises. 6. After going through the averments made in the plaint and evidence recorded by the learned trial Court, it becomes abundantly clear that there is no tangible, factual or legal basis for the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for defendant-appellant. section 16(c) of the specific relief act, 1963, reads :- "16 Personal bars to relief. - Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person -(a) and (b) - (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation:- For the purposes of the clause (c),- (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court;" (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." It would thus appear that section 16(c) of the specific relief act, 1963, therefore, enacts that it would be a personal bar to the relief of specific performance in favour of a plaintiff who facts to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. 7. A distinction may be drawn between readings to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract. This includes his financial ability to pay the purchase price. But the more important question is whether he was willing to perform his part of the contract even if he had the financial capacity to do so. It is here that the plaintiff's conduct has to be properly scrutinized. 8. In the concluding part of paragraph 4 of the plaint it is clearly stated :- "The plaintiff has always been and is still prepared to perform his part of the contract but defendant No. 1 has breached the terms of the contract wailfully." Again, as P.W. 6, Kishan Singh plaintiff-respondent asserted, "I have been ready and willing and even now ready to get the sale-deed executed". In cross-examination, in reply to a question put to him by the learned counsel for defendant-appellant, the plaintiff-respondent stated that on 15th December 1975, while going to the Sub Registrar, he had taken Rs. 17,000/- (Rupees seventeen thousand only) along for payment to defendant appellant. This is adequate compliance of the legal provisions obtaining in section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 9. Learned counsel for defendant-appellant forcefully urged that, besides Rs. 17,000/- (Rupees seventeen thousand only), the plaintiff-respondent should have also carried with him the money required for the purchase of stamp paper for execution of the sale-deed and the plaintiff-respondent having not made any assertion in this regard is to be regarded deficient in resources necessary for execution of the sale-deed. This argument is again without merit. Plaintiff-respondent was never asked about the money required for purchase of stamp paper required for execution of the sale-deed. In its absence, it was unnecessary for him to assert that he had brought the money for this purpose as well on 15th December, 1975. The finding of the learned trial Court in regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff-respondent to perform his part of the contract is thus affirmed. 10. Secondly, besides being supported from the contents of the agreement of sale dated 28th August, 1975, the allegations of payment of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) as advanced by plaintiff-respondent to defendant-appellant is also made out from the oral depaistions of deed-writer Devi Dayal P.W. 5 and the corroborative depositions of two attesting witness in Kasturi Lal P.W. 3 and Ajit Singh P.W. 4. Oral interested the defendant denial of appellant Karnail Singh in this regard only creates oath against Kishan Singh P.W. 6 and, therefore, inspires little confidence. Finding recorded by the learned trial Court on issue No. 1 is also affirmed. 11. There is clear-cut evidence to show that defendant-appellant has been trying his level best to get rid of the land in suit after 28th August 1975, and ultimately succeeded in doing so after 27th April, 1977, when this Court stayed operation of the assailed judgment of the learned trial Court and defendant-appellant had deposited Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) for payment to plaintiff-respondent as refund of the advance money secured from him. Knowledge of the contents of Exhibit P. 3 on the part of defendant-appellant is evident from recitals in Exhibit D. 1, certified copy of the application filed by defendant-appellant before Sub-Registrar, Gurdaspur, on 15th December, 1975. Interested omission on the part of defendant-appellant to state therein the amount of advance secured by him from plaintiff-respondent on 28th August, 1975 also speaks volumes against defendant-appellant on this score. Defendant-appellant has, therefore, been evasively avoiding the execution of the sale-deed on all available pretexts in his eagerness to cash on greater amount of sale consideration from someone other than plaintiff-respondent. 12. It was not put to deed-writer Davi Dayal P.W. 5 that he was the choice of plaintiff-respondent or had indulged in foul play at his instance while stating in Exhibit P. 3 that defendant-appellant had secured from plaintiff-respondent a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) as advance as against actual payment of Rs. 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only). Both the attesting witnesses to sale-deed Exhibit P. 3, namely, Kasturi Lal P.W. 3 and Ajit Singh P.W. 4, have also stood by the deed-writer as also the plaintiff-respondent in this regard. There is thus no merit in the R.F.A. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel fee assassed at Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred only). Appeal dismissed.