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  • sections 147, 148, 324, 307, and 302
  • sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Acts
  • sections 147, 148, 324, 307, and 302
  • sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 21-12-2002 the 3rd respondent submitted a complaint to Chapadu Police Station (Kadapa district) alleging that the previous night his uncle, M. Laxmi Reddy, who had gone to the field at about 10:00 pm to water crops, was attacked after the writ petitioner, the petitioner’s two sons and four others removed a bund. When Laxmi Reddy objected, he was allegedly attacked and sustained bleeding injuries and died on 22-12-2002. Crime No. 75 of 2002 was registered on that complaint, with the petitioner shown as A-1 and his sons as A-2 and A-4.

The petitioner submitted a representation on 24-12-2002 to the Superintendent of Police (the 1st respondent) claiming alibi (he said he was a chronic TB patient and remained at home at the relevant time). Acting on that representation, the 1st respondent issued a memo dated 6-1-2003 stating the plea of alibi was proved and instructing the Circle Inspector (2nd respondent) to delete the petitioner’s name from the list of accused.

Subsequently, after further enquiry and following representations by the 3rd respondent (including a representation dated 25-1-2003 and a writ petition WP No.4164/2003 challenging the 6-1-2003 memo), the 1st respondent issued an impugned memo dated 28-2-2003 stating that further enquiry revealed the alibi contentions of A-1 and A-4 were not true and directing the Sub Divisional Police Officer to arrest A-1 and A-4 under section 302 IPC. The petitioner challenged this latter memo by way of the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the memo dated 6-1-2003 issued by the 1st respondent (Superintendent of Police) directing the Circle Inspector to delete the petitioner's name on the basis that the plea of alibi was proved, invested the petitioner with a legally enforceable right.
  2. Whether the 1st respondent could exercise the powers of investigation (or direct deletion/inclusion of names of accused) while the Circle Inspector (the officer in-charge of the police station) was conducting the investigation — i.e., the scope and ambit of section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and whether it permits simultaneous or parallel exercise of investigative powers by a superior officer.
  3. Whether the impugned memo dated 28-2-2003 (which reversed the earlier memo and directed arrests) was legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner pleaded alibi, asserting he was at home due to chronic TB and did not go out on the date of the incident.
  • Counsel for the petitioner argued that the 1st respondent's memo dated 6-1-2003 was issued under the power conferred by section 36 CrPC (the power of a superior police officer) and that, having taken the view that the plea of alibi was proved, the 1st respondent could not subsequently take a different view; hence the impugned order was impermissible.
  • It was also contended that the impugned order disclosed non-application of mind because A-4 had already surrendered and was released on bail (in CR. M. P. No. 43 of 2003), so the question of arrest did not arise.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Learned Government Pleader for Home argued that the investigation into Crime No.75/2002 continued with the Circle Inspector (2nd respondent) and the 1st respondent never undertook the investigation himself; therefore memo dated 6-1-2003 could not be traced to the exercise of power under section 36 CrPC.
  • The Government Pleader submitted that tentative opinions during the course of investigation may vary and the investigating authority can examine the matter from various angles; what matters ultimately is the report to be submitted to the court under section 173 CrPC after completion of investigation.
  • Counsel for the 3rd respondent reiterated that the petitioner used influence to obtain the 6-1-2003 memo and that the 1st respondent, having realised he could not undertake a parallel investigation, issued the 28-2-2003 memo to correct the earlier mistake; the 3rd respondent had challenged the 6-1-2003 memo by WP No.4164/2003.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghunath Sharam v. State The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court noted that this decision (as cited) did not directly consider the scope of section 36 CrPC; any discussion was incidental.
Ram Autar v. State of Bihar The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court observed that this decision did not directly address the scope and ambit of section 36 CrPC; any reference was incidental to other issues.
R. Sarala v. T. S. Velu The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court recorded that this decision did not directly involve the scope of section 36 CrPC and therefore did not materially assist on that specific question.
CBI v. State of Rajasthan (as cited) The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court indicated that this precedent did not directly address section 36 CrPC and any relevant discussion was incidental.
T. Antony v. State of Kerala The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court noted that this case did not directly consider the ambit of section 36 CrPC.
M. C. Abraham v. State of Maharashtra The opinion does not set out a distinct rule from this case; it was cited by parties. The court observed this decision did not directly address the scope of section 36 CrPC; any mention was incidental.
H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi The Supreme Court set out that "investigation" in normal parlance comprises five steps: (1) proceeding to the spot; (2) ascertaining facts and circumstances; (3) discovery and arrest of suspected offender; (4) collection of evidence (examination of persons, recording statements, searches, seizure); and (5) formation of opinion whether to place the case for trial by filing a charge-sheet under section 173 CrPC. The court relied on this formulation to explain that investigation is a staged process, that tentative opinions during investigation may vary, and that no one can claim a right on the basis of tentative opinion before the investigation culminates in a report/charge-sheet under section 173 CrPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, based strictly on the material in the opinion:

  1. Interpretation of section 36 CrPC: The court observed that section 36 authorises a police officer superior in rank to the officer-in-charge of a police station to exercise the same powers as can be exercised by that officer within his station. The court noted this is consistent with the administrative law principle that superior officers may exercise powers conferred on their inferiors.
  2. No simultaneous/parallel exercise of investigative power: The court held that neither section 36 nor any similar provision permits simultaneous and parallel exercise of the same investigative powers by both the SHO and a superior officer over the same subject matter. Once the SHO has taken up the investigation, he must proceed and conclude it according to the CrPC, subject to general superintendence by superiors. Superintendence is not the same as undertaking the investigation.
  3. Effect of a superior assuming investigation: If a superior police officer chooses to exercise powers under section 36 in a way that effectively assumes the investigation, the superior then becomes the investigating agency and the SHO is denuded of investigative control. The CrPC does not provide for concurrent investigations by both.
  4. Application to the present facts: The court found nothing on the record to show that the 1st respondent (SP) had taken upon himself the power to investigate Crime No.75/2002. Instead, the 1st respondent's counter-affidavit indicated that the 2nd respondent (Circle Inspector) was carrying out the investigation. Given this, the court concluded there was no legal basis for the 1st respondent to direct the SHO to delete or include any name among the accused.
  5. Defects in memo dated 6-1-2003: The 6-1-2003 memo did not disclose what powers were being exercised by the SP, the manner of any investigation taken up by him, or the material basis for the memo. The court characterised the memo as demonstrating a lack of proper comprehension of the CrPC provisions by the officer who issued it. Therefore the memo could not be regarded as creating any valid or legally enforceable right in favour of the petitioner.
  6. Effect of the impugned memo dated 28-2-2003: The impugned memo effectively nullified the earlier memo of 6-1-2003. Because the court found that the earlier memo did not confer any enforceable right on the petitioner, retracing that earlier, unsustainable step did not attract objection. In other words, the 28-2-2003 memo was simply undoing an earlier invalid action.
  7. Investigation as a process and the tentative nature of interim opinions: Relying on H. N. Rishbud, the court emphasised investigation is a multi-stage process and that opinions formed during its course are tentative; the final outcome and legal consequences flow from the report to be submitted under section 173 CrPC. Hence, no individual can claim a right merely on the basis of interim or tentative investigative opinions such as those appearing in the memos dated 6-1-2003 and 28-2-2003.
  8. Conclusion from analysis: Because memo 6-1-2003 did not vest any legally enforceable right in the petitioner, and because the impugned memo was a corrective step undoing that unsustainable memo, the court found no basis to interfere with the impugned memo.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is dismissed. The court found no basis to interfere with the impugned memo dated 28-2-2003, and ordered no costs.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the impugned memo dated 28-2-2003 stands and the 6-1-2003 memo did not create any legally enforceable right for the petitioner. The court emphasised that investigative opinions expressed during an ongoing investigation are tentative and that the final position will be determined by the police report/charge-sheet under section 173 CrPC and ultimately by the trial court. The opinion does not announce or establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of the existing principles concerning section 36 CrPC and the provisional nature of interim investigative opinions.

    Elluru Pedda Dastagiri Reddy v. Superintendent Of Police And Ors.

    (1) The 3rd respondent submitted a complaint on 21 - 12 - 2002 to the chapadu ps, kadapa district, alleging that on the previous day, his uncle by name m. Laxmi reddy went to his filed for watering the crop at about 10 - 00 pm and that the writ petitioner and his two sons along with 4 others named in the complaint went to the same field and removed the bund. It was alleged that when laxmi reddy objected to the same the writ petitioner and other accused attacked him resulting in bleeding injuries. Laxmi reddy died on 22 - 12 - 2002. Cr. No. 75 of 2002 was registered on the basis of the complaint. The petitioner was shown as a - l and his sons as a - 2 and a - 4.

    (2) The petitioner submitted representation on 24 - 12 - 2002 to the superintendent of police, cuddapah, the 1st respondent herein. It was his case that he was a chronic tb patient and he was advised not to be out during night times. According to him, he did not go out even on the date of incident and he was very much in the house at the time of the incident. He pleaded alibi. Acting on the representation, the 1st respondent issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 to the effect that plea of alibi is proved and instructed the 2nd respondent, the circle inspector of police to take necessary action to delete the name of the petitioner.

    (3) The 1st respondent issued another memo dated 28 - 2 - 2003 to the effect that a further enquiry into the alibi petition submitted by the petitioner i. E. , a - 2 and his son a - 4 in cr. No. 75 of 2003 under various sections revealed that their contention is not true. Consequently, he directed the sub divisional police officer, proddatur to arrest a - l and a - 4, under section 302 ipc. The petitioner challenge the same. According to him, once the 1st respondent has taken a view that the plea of alibi by the petitioner was found proved, it was not open to him to take a different view. It is also his case that the impugned order discloses non - application of mind inasmuch as a - 4 had already surrendered before this court and was released on bail in cr. M. P. No. 43 of 2003 and the question of arrest of a - 4 does not arise.

    (4) The 1st respondent filed counter - affidavit. It is stated that on receipt of representation dated 24 - 12 - 2002, he called for a report from the 2nd respondent. A report is said to have been submitted by the 2nd respondent to the effect that no one had spoken against the petitioner during the enquiry. Memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 is said to have been issued on the strength of the report. It is also stated that the 3rd respondent filed a representation dated 25 - 1 - 2003 in this regard. A further investigation is said to have been caused and based on the same, the impugned memo is stated to be issued.

    (5) The 3rd respondent filed a counter - affidavit. He denied the allegations of the petitioner. He has also stated that oncoming to know that the 1st respondent issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003, he submitted a representation dated 25 - 1 - 2003 to him and has filed w. P. No. 4164/2003 in this court. He pleads that there is no illegality or infirmity with the impugned order.

    (6) Sri. D. Suderashan reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was not involved in the offence at all and he was implicated wholly on account of certain political rivalries. According to him, on a consideration of the application submitted by the petitioner, the 1st respondent verified and examined the matter and issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003, directing the 2nd respondent to delete the name of the petitioner from the list of the accused. He submits that the 1st respondent issued this memo in exercise of power under section 35 of cr. P. C. , and it was impermissible for the 1st respondent to issue the impugned order.

    (7) Learned government pleader for home, on the other hand submits that the investigation into cr. No. 75 of 2002 continued with the 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent never undertook the investigation by himself and as such the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 cannot be traceable to the power under section 36 of cr. P. C. It is also his contention that even assuming that the 1st respondent is said to have issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 directing deletion of the name of the petitioner from the list of the accused, no exception can be taken to the impugned order, since it is competent for the investigating authority to examine the matter from various angles. According to him the tentative opinions during the course of investigation may keep on varying what ultimately matters is the report that is required to be submitted to the court after investigation.

    (8) Sri. L. J. Veera reddy, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, in addition to repeating the contentions of the learned government pleader, has also submitted that even while the matter was under investigation, the petitioner has approached the 1st respondent with an application by using this clout. According to him, the 1st respondent issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 without properly investigation into the matter. He submits that his client has filed wp. No. 4164 of 2002 challenging the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003. Having realised that he cannot undertake a parallel investigation, the 1st respondent has issued the impugned order. He submits that the impugned order is nothing but a step to correct the mistake committed while issuing memo dt. 6 - 1 - 2003.

    (9) The petitioner was shown as accused no. L (a - l) in cr. No. 75/02, which related to the offences under sections 147, 148, 324, 307, and 302 read with 149 ipc. On coming to know the same, the petitioner submitted a representation on 24 - 12 - 2002 before the 1st respondent taking the plea of alibi. The 1st respondent issued memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 to the following effect:

    "in view of the proval of alibi of elluru pedda dastagiri reddy (a - l) in cr. No. 75/2002 u/s. 147, 148, 324, 302 read with 149 ipc of chapadu ps, c. I. Of police, proddatur rural is instructed to take necessary action to delete the name of the above accused from the list of accused. "

    Challenging this memo, the 3rd respondent herein filed w. P. No. 4164 of 2003. He has also submitted representation dated 25 - 1 - 2003. Claiming to have undertaken further enquiry, the 1st respondent issued the impugned order dated 28 - 2 - 2003, which reads as under:

    "further enquiry on the alibi petition of illuru pedda dasthagiri reddy, a - l and iiiuru chandra obul reddy, a - 4, of annavaram village of chapadu (m) in cr. No75/2002 under sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302 read with 149 ipc of chapadu ps revealed that a - l iiiuru pedda dasthagiri reddy and a - 4 iiiuru chandra obul reddy represented in the alibi petition that they were not involved in the above said case is not true. Hence, sdpo is directed to arrest the accused a - l and a - 4 under sec. 302 ipc. "

    (10) It needs to be observed that the impugned memo dated 28 - 2 - 2003, sets at naught, the directions issued by the 1st respondent through his memo dt. 6 - 1 - 2003. The petitioner can have genuine grievance if the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 invests him with a legally enforceable right. It is only in the event of an affirmative answer emerging from this query that the necessity would arise to further examine as to the legality or otherwise of the impugned memo.

    (11) The learned counsel for the petitioner traces the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 to the power of the 1st respondent under section 36 of cr. P. C. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent. The circle inspector of police, has taken up the investigation into the crime. Section 36 of cr. P. C. , empowers any police officer, who is superior in rank to the one in - charge of the police station, to exercise the same power through out the local area to which he is appointed. The section reads as under:

    "police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, through out the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. "

    (12) The learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents have cited several decisions, such as raghunath sharam v. State, ram autar v. State of bihar, r. Sarala v. T. S. Velu, cbiv. State of rajasthan, t. T. Antony v. State of kerala, and m. C. Abraham v. State of maharashtra. On a perusal of these decisions, it is evident that in none of the said cases, the scope and ambit of section 36 directly feel for consideration. If at all there was any discussion on this aspect, it was rather incident to the main issue in the respective cases.

    (13) Section 36, in unequivocal terms, empowers a superior police officer to exercise such of the powers as are conferred on a station house officer (sho). It is in consonance with the settled principle of administration law that a superior officer is always competent to exercise such powers as are conferred upon his inferiors. An important aspect, which needs to be noticed in such instances, is that there can be no simultaneous exercise of powers by them.

    (14) Neither section 36 nor any other analogous provision empowers simultaneous and parallel exercise of power by the concerned sho as well as the superior authorities as regards the same subject matter. The code of criminal procedure delineates the nature and extent of powers conferred upon method of discharge and exercise of such powers by the sho in relation to investigation into and prosecution of offences, once investigation is taken up by the sho, he has to proceed with the same and conclude it in the manner provided for under the cr. P. C. , subject to the general superintendence by the superior officers. Even while the general power of superintendence continues in the superior officers, the obligation and powers to investigate into the matter continues to be with the sho.

    (15) Power of superintendence by a superior police officer cannot be mistaken for the power to undertake the investigation itself, by superior officer under section 36 of cr. P. C. Even while the investigation continues to be with the sho. As and when a superior police officer chooses to exercise the power under section 36, for all practical purposes he becomes the investigating agency. Once such officer assumes to himself the power or task of investigation into a crime, the sho becomes denuded of such power and ceases to be in - charge of investigation of the crime. The cr. P. C. , does not provide for simultaneous and parallel investigation by the sho, on one hand, and the superior police officer, on the other. In fact such a course of action may prove to be hazardous in several cases. Depending on the gravity of the crime and complexity in the investigation, a superior officer may choose to take up the investigation into a particular incident. In a given case the government itself may direct the investigation to be undertaken by a superior police officer. As observed earlier, in such instances, the whole investigation into the crime comes to be undertaken by such superior police officer.

    (16) There is nothing on record to indicate that the 1st respondent has taken upon on himself the power to investigate into the crime no. 75/2002 of ps chapadu. On the other hand, the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent suggests that the 2nd respondent is investigating into the matter. That being the case, there was no legal basis for the 1st respondent to direct the station house officer to delete or include any name in the list of accused. Memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 does not disclose the nature of powers exercised and the manner of investigation taken up by him, or the material on the basis of which he issued the memo. If at all anything, the said memo discloses lack of proper comprehension of the scope of the provisions of cr. P. C. , on the part of the officer who issued it. Therefore, it cannot be said that any valid and legally enforceable right had accrued to the petitioner on the basis of the said memo.

    (17) The impugned order has the effect of nullifying the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003. It was not as if, by the time the impugned order came to be passed, the name of the petitioner stood deleted from the list of the accused, and on the basis of the impugned order it is sought to be reinducted. Even before any step could be taken in pursuance of the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003, the impugned order dated 28 - 2 - 2003 came to be issued. Once it emerged that the memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 did not invest the petitioner with any legally enforceable right and that the impugned memo is nothing but retracing an otherwise unsustainable step, no exception can be taken to the impugned order.

    (18) The matter can be examined from another angle, even on the premises that it was permissible in law for the 1st respondent to have directed deletion of the name of the petitioner from the list of accused in exercise of the power of superintendence, it has to be noticed that the result of investigation can be discerned only from the report that may be submitted by the police before the court under section 173 cr. P. C, on completion of the investigation. During the course of investigation, several developments are bound to take place. Depending on the disclosures or the information that may be gathered in the course of investigation, names of persons who figured in the complaint may be deleted and names of those, which do not find place in the complaint, may be included. The compliant submitted to the police would only trigger of the investigation. It cannot constitute the sole basis for the investigation nor the contours of investigation be confined to the contents of the complaint.

    (19) Investigation is a process comprising of several stages and aspects. In h. N. Rishbud v. State of delhi, the supreme court held that investigation, in the normal parlance, comprises of five steps, viz. ,

    1. Proceeding to the spot; 2. A scertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; 3. Discovery and arrest of suspected offender; 4. Collection of evidence relating to commission of the offence, which may comprise of examination of persons and recording their statements and search of places or seizure of thing; and 5. Formation of opinion as to whether, on the material collected, the case of the accused be placed for trial before the magistrate, by filing a charge sheet under section 173 of cr. P. C. During the course of investigation, the pendulum of suspicion may keep on oscillating through out all these stages. It is only when such pendulum comes to standstill, that the investigation can be said to have been completed. No individual can claim a right on the basis of tentative opinion that may have emerged during the ourse of investigation. The investigation agency would submit a report, be it in the form of a charge sheet or a final report, depending on the outcome of investigation. The truth or otherwise of the allegations against the accused would be decided only by the concerned court of trial. The cr. P. C. , does not provide for the examination or verification by courts of every stage of investigation. Viewed form this angle, the opinions contained in memo dated 6 - 1 - 2003 and the impugned memo dated 28 - 2 - 2003 can be said to be only tentative, which ultimately have to yield and give way to the final opinion that may be indicated in the charge - sheet or final report, as the case may be.

    (20) Hence, this court does not find any basis to interfere with the impugned memo. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

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    Elluru Pedda Dastagiri Reddy v. Superintendent Of Police And Ors.
    (Jan 14, 2003)