Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of(a) The Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007;(b) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;(c) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment Proceedings Act, 1966;(d) The Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996
  • Abolition Act, Samvat 2007: (i) proceedings under Section 12 of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Samvat 2007;(i)
  • Section 3) under Section 19-B of the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;(b)
  • Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as the Constitution
  • Section 47. That section reads:The provisions of this Act
  • Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962
  • Sections 5 and 6 of Big Landed Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 56 of the J. and K. Tenancy Act, samvat 1980;(h)
  • Rule 20 of the Agrarian Rules, 1973, a Circle
  • Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu
  • Section 3 of the Agrarian Reforms Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings Act 1962,
  • sub-section (1) of S. 51 of this Act;
  • sub-section (1) of S, 12:Provided
  • Section 46 of the Tenancy Act
  • Land Revenue Act, Samvat 1996
  • Section 52 of the new Act.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 51
  • Section 51. Section 52
  • Sections 3, 4, 5, 7
  • Section 14(b)
  • Section 1(3)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of(a) The Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007;(b) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;(c) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment Proceedings Act, 1966;(d) The Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996
  • Abolition Act, Samvat 2007: (i) proceedings under Section 12 of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Samvat 2007;(i)
  • Section 3) under Section 19-B of the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;(b)
  • Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as the Constitution
  • Section 47. That section reads:The provisions of this Act
  • Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962
  • Sections 5 and 6 of Big Landed Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 56 of the J. and K. Tenancy Act, samvat 1980;(h)
  • Rule 20 of the Agrarian Rules, 1973, a Circle
  • Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu
  • Section 3 of the Agrarian Reforms Act
  • Consolidation of Holdings Act 1962,
  • sub-section (1) of S. 51 of this Act;
  • sub-section (1) of S, 12:Provided
  • Section 46 of the Tenancy Act
  • Land Revenue Act, Samvat 1996
  • Section 52 of the new Act.
  • sub-section (1) of S. 51
  • Section 51. Section 52
  • Sections 3, 4, 5, 7
  • Section 14(b)
  • Section 1(3)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mufti, J.; Jaswant Singh, J.; Ali, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses whether the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 (the "new Act") operates retrospectively on pending cases and, if so, with what consequences. The new Act was enacted in 1972, received the Governor's assent on 27-11-1972 and was published in the Government Gazette on 9-12-1972. The Act was to come into force from a date appointed by Government (Section 1(3)). The judgment records that the new Act, as originally enacted, came into force on 1st May 1973 and that the Government specified 1-5-1973 as the date by notification SRO 183 dated 23-4-1973. The Act was shortly thereafter amended retrospectively by Ordinances Nos. 1 and 5 of 1973.

The new Act creates a comprehensive legislative scheme for land reform in Jammu & Kashmir, introducing statutory concepts such as "personal cultivation", "ceiling area" and "family", and provides for extinguishment and vesting of certain land rights in the State (Sections 3–5 and related provisions). It also sets out a special administrative and adjudicatory machinery (including Circle Officers and Rules) and contains provisions (Section 36 and Section 47) about the relationship between the new Act and other laws and courts.

The matters brought before the Court comprised a number of civil and revenue matters pending when the Act became operative. The opinion notes that cases Nos. 1–12 were civil appeals (first or second) instituted before the appointed date, case No. 13 was a revenue first appeal arising under Section 46 of the Tenancy Act instituted before the appointed date, and case No. 14 was a civil revision arising out of a pending civil suit instituted before commencement of the new Act. The Court delivered a comprehensive judgment addressing general and specific questions of law raised by these pending matters and directed that the cases be placed before respective benches for appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 operates retrospectively on pending cases; and if so, what is the effect?
  2. Whether the special machinery and provisions of the new Act (including Sections 3, 4, 5 and related provisions) displace or affect pending civil and revenue actions and how to determine whether a pending action survives or collapses after the Act becomes operative.
  3. Whether Section 52 (and its proviso) abates pending applications, suits and proceedings arising under the specified Acts and how Section 52 should be read with Section 51.
  4. Whether Section 36 (which ousts jurisdiction of civil courts over matters required to be decided by officers/authorities under the new Act) operates to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 103 of the State Constitution, and whether the bar created by Section 36 is absolute.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion records only limited detail about party submissions. The following arguments or contentions are explicitly recorded in the opinion text:

Arguments urged before the Court

  • It was urged that Section 52 was not applicable to pending appeals and revisions arising under the specified Acts; that contention was advanced by invoking the doctrine of ejusdem generis, asking the Court to read the word "proceedings" narrowly (i.e., as "similar proceedings"). (See paragraph 31.)
  • In a single-bench case (Taramani Radial v. Thakur Dass), Mr. Joginder Singh argued that Section 3 of the new Act operated to extinguish ownership where the owner was not in personal cultivation on the material date and that a suit pending in a civil court thus abated under Section 52. He also argued that the qualifying words in Section 52 ("under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51") restrict the operation of Section 52 to proceedings pending before the Government; the single-bench rejected those contentions (as recounted in the opinion). (See paragraphs 75–76.)
  • The opinion notes that, at the hearing before the High Court, counsel for the parties addressed mainly general questions and, according to the opinion, did so "in a casual manner". The Advocate General, invited to present the Government's view, was described as unable to do much because the Government officers who could brief him apparently lacked clear conception of the Act. (See paragraph 81.)

The opinion does not contain a more detailed, party-by-party catalogue of submissions (for example detailed factual contentions or line-by-line legal arguments beyond the items above).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 Principle that even if jurisdiction of a tribunal is excluded by statute, civil courts retain jurisdiction to examine cases where statutory provisions have not been complied with or where the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental judicial procedure. The judgment cites this Privy Council authority to support the proposition that exclusion of jurisdiction by statute does not wholly oust the civil courts where there is non-compliance with fundamental statutory requirements or principles of judicial procedure. (See paragraphs 20–21.)
Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 Clarification that non-compliance must be of fundamental provisions of the statute or of fundamental principles of judicial procedure to render proceedings before a statutory authority illegal and void. The Court applies this Supreme Court authority to limit civil-court intervention: orders of officers under the new Act can be challenged before a civil court only where there is non-compliance with fundamental provisions or violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure, i.e., defects going to the root of the order. (See paragraphs 21–22.)
(1974) 1 SCC 567; AIR 1974 SC 1069 Referenced as a recent Supreme Court decision supportive of the view that civil courts' jurisdiction is limited by special statutes but that certain supervisory jurisdiction remains. Jaswant Singh, J. notes that this Supreme Court decision supports the view regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts; the citation is used as supportive authority for the High Court's conclusions on jurisdiction. (See paragraph 82.)
Thakur Kartar Singh v. Gaffar Lone, 1973 J & K LR 851 (Single Bench) The single bench's observations (as recited): (i) court must consider who was in cultivating possession on the material date; (ii) there is a presumption land has vested in the State in similar cases; (iii) civil courts have jurisdiction to determine vesting. The High Court (Mufti, J.) reviews these propositions and expressly disagrees with aspects of that single-bench ruling, stating that the single-bench conclusions are not correct in light of the analyses in the present judgment. (See paragraphs 24–26, 73.)
Taramani Radial v. Thakur Dass, 1973-1 Kash LJ 393 (Single Bench) Single bench held (as recited) that Section 52 does not apply unless the pending case is relatable to one of the Acts listed in Section 51(1); discussed scope and interpretation of Section 52. The High Court accepts the proposition that Section 52 applies only to cases relatable to the Acts in Section 51(1) but disagrees with the view that civil courts retain power to decide vesting questions in circumstances contrary to the conclusions reached in this judgment. (See paragraphs 26–29, 77–79.)

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a structured manner. The principal steps, based strictly on the text of the opinion, are:

  1. Rule of construction for pending actions: The Court restates the settled rule that where the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of parties are typically determined according to the law in force when the action was commenced, unless the new law manifests an intention to the contrary (either expressly or by necessary implication). The exception is enactments dealing purely with procedure, which (unless language forbids) may operate retrospectively on pending actions. The Court emphasizes legislative intention as decisive and notes it can be ascertained from the object and scheme of the Act or from express provisions. (See paragraph 3.)
  2. Object and scheme of the new Act indicate retrospective effect: The Court analyses the Act's preamble and scheme and concludes the new Act is comprehensive, alters vested rights, creates new rights and remedies, prescribes new procedures and confers new jurisdiction. Because the Act abridges existing rights and thoroughly treats the subject-matter, the Court reasons that the Act is "in fact retrospective" and must reasonably be construed as applying to pending actions where necessary to achieve its objectives. (See paragraphs 4–5.)
  3. Section 47 as key indicium of legislative intention: The Court gives particular weight to Section 47 ("The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law..."), holding that Section 47 makes the new Act and its rules the primary rule of action. Section 47 contains nothing to limit its operation to causes of action arising after commencement; therefore, Section 47 indicates applicability to causes of action arising before or after commencement, and hence to pending actions. (See paragraphs 5–6.)
  4. Principle for survival or collapse of pending actions: The Court formulates a test: a pending action will survive if the right claimed is not acquired by another under the new Act, not lost or destroyed, and the remedy is not barred or changed by the new Act; conversely it will collapse if the right is acquired, lost or destroyed, or the remedy is barred or changed by the new Act. Application of this test depends on the facts of each case and the specific provisions of the new Act and Rules bearing on the relief claimed. (See paragraph 6.)
  5. Interpretation of Sections 51 and 52: The Court analyses Sections 51 and 52 together. Section 51 provides that specified Acts listed in subsection (1) (Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Tenancy Acts, Land Revenue Act, Consolidation Act) shall, to the extent inconsistent, cease to apply where the new Act applies. Section 52, on its literal wording, appears to abate all pending actions arising under those specified Acts. The Court finds an apparent conflict between the two sections (Section 51 suggests limited abrogation; Section 52, if read literally, purports a total abatement). Applying the primary rule that provisions must be read harmoniously, the Court construes Section 52 to abate only those pending actions arising under the specified Acts which are incompatible with the new Act (subject to proviso exceptions), rather than to abate all such pending actions irrespective of consistency. (See paragraphs 7–11, 29–31.)
  6. Section 36 and the special machinery; exclusivity of jurisdiction: The Court analyses Section 36, which broadly bars civil courts from settling questions required to be settled by officers or authorities under the new Act and provides that orders of such officers shall not be called in question in civil courts. The Court holds that Section 36 intends the special machinery created by the Act to be the primary forum for deciding questions arising under the Act and, on principle, that the jurisdiction conferred on officers and authorities under the Act must be regarded as exclusive for such matters. The Court therefore directs that when a question of vesting under the new Act arises in a pending suit, the civil court should "stay its hands" pending determination of the question by the competent authority under the new Act. (See paragraphs 16, 17, 62.)
  7. High Court's constitutional supervisory jurisdiction preserved: The Court holds that Section 36 cannot oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, since the Constitution is supreme and legislation cannot divest the High Court of its constitutional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the High Court can, in appropriate cases, interfere with orders made by Circle Officers or other authorities under the new Act. (See paragraph 19.)
  8. Circumscribed role for civil courts where statutory authority has acted fundamentally unlawfully: Citing the Privy Council and the Supreme Court (Secy. of State v. Mask & Co.; Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh), the Court explains that civil courts retain jurisdiction to examine cases where there has been non-compliance with fundamental statutory requirements or violations of fundamental principles of judicial procedure that render proceedings illegal and void. Such intervention is limited to defects that go to the root of the order. (See paragraphs 20–22, 69.)
  9. Practical operation on sample categories of suits: The Court applies the general principles to a range of illustrative pending suits (pre-emption claims, suits for declaration and injunction, co-owner suits, eviction suits, landlord ejectment with claim for arrears, etc.). For each category the Court explains that the fate of the suit depends on whether the land vested in the State or in another person under Sections 3–5, and whether the remedy has been barred or changed. The Court emphasizes that vesting questions (jurisdictional facts such as who was in personal cultivation on the material date and whether ceiling limits are exceeded) are to be determined by the authority empowered under the Act. (See paragraphs 14–15, 32–55.)
  10. Delegated authority and Rule 20: The Court notes Rule 20 of the Agrarian Rules, 1973, which invests Circle Officers with power and jurisdiction to make mutation orders consistent with Sections 2, 4 and 5, and states that such officers have authority to declare whether rights and title have vested in the State or any person. The Court treats that jurisdiction as carrying with it the power to determine collateral facts and to refuse or make mutation orders accordingly. (See paragraph 16.)
  11. Procedure for raising Act-based pleas in pending cases: The Court states that parties may raise pleas based on the new Act in pending cases by amending pleadings, filing supplementary grounds of appeal or revision, or by other appropriate procedural devices depending on stage. The court retains discretion whether to permit amendments. (See paragraph 30.)

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court holds that the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 applies to pending actions to the extent the Act manifests an intention to apply to them (expressly or by necessary implication). Section 47 and the comprehensive object and scheme of the Act indicate applicability to pending causes of action where necessary to effect the legislative scheme. Section 52 must be read in harmony with Section 51 and, accordingly, abates only those pending actions arising under the specified Acts which are incompatible with the new Act (subject to the provisos). Section 36 ousts the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts over matters required to be determined by officers or authorities under the Act, but it does not oust the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 (or Section 103 of the State Constitution). Civil courts may still examine orders of the Act's authorities where there is non-compliance with fundamental statutory provisions or violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure that render proceedings void.

Implications (direct consequences addressed in the opinion)

  • Pending suits and proceedings will either survive or collapse depending on whether rights in the land in question were vested in the State or in any other person under Sections 3–5 of the new Act, and whether remedies have been barred or altered by the Act. The Court provides a factual-functional test (rights acquired/lost/destroyed; remedy barred/changed) to determine survival.
  • Vesting questions—who was in personal cultivation on the material date, whether the ceiling area is exceeded, and related jurisdictional facts—are determined by the authority empowered under the new Act (for example, Circle Officers under Rule 20), and civil courts should generally defer determination of such issues until they are decided by the competent authority under the Act.
  • Section 52 does not operate as a blanket abatement of all pending actions arising under the specified Acts; it abates only those pending actions that are inconsistent with the new Act, subject to the provisos listed in Section 52.
  • The High Court retains supervisory and constitutional jurisdiction (Article 226 / Section 103) and may, in appropriate cases, intervene in matters decided under the Act; ordinary civil courts are largely ousted from deciding questions that the Act requires to be determined by its specialized machinery, except where fundamental statutory or procedural infirmities render the orders void.
  • Practical consequence for case management: parties in pending cases must (if necessary) seek permission to amend pleadings or file supplementary grounds to raise Act-based pleas; courts have discretion to permit such procedural steps. (See paragraph 30.)
  • The opinion records concerns about imperfections in drafting of the Act and suggests the Government consider examining the Act from a drafting point of view and contemplate amendments (observed by Mufti, J. and echoed by Ali, C.J.). The Court expressed hope that the Government would consider designating senior revenue officers with suitable judicial experience to exercise key functions under the rules. (See paragraphs 81 and 83.)

Order: The Court concluded with the directive "Order accordingly" and directed that the cases be placed before the respective benches for appropriate orders in the light of this judgment. (See paragraph 84.)


Note: This summary is confined to the statements, findings and reasoning explicitly contained in the provided opinion text. No information has been added beyond what is contained in that opinion.

    Rahim And Others v. Amma Bar And Others

    Mufti, J.:— These cases raise a point of law of general importance, namely:

    Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 acts retrospectively on the pending cases? If so, what is the effect?

    2. The Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1972 (shortly called, ‘the new Act’) was enacted by the State Legislature in the year 1972. It received the assent of the Governor on 27-11-1972 and was published in the Government Gazette on 9-12-1972. Under Section 1(3) it was to “come into force with effect from such date as the Government may appoint by a notification in the Government Gazette.” The new Act, as originally enacted, admittedly came into force on 1st of May, 1973. Soon after it was amended retrospectively by Ordinances Nos. 1 and 5 of 1973. The operative provisions of the new Act were to take effect from a date to be specified by the Government expressively described as ‘appointed date’, in the Act. By notification SRO 183 dated 23-4-1973, the Government specified 1-5-1973 as the date from which these provisions would become effective. On the terms of its preamble, the new Act was designed to “provide for comprehensive legislation regarding land reforms in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” The objects of the land reforms contemplated by the new Act mainly appear to be; (a) to abolish the system of absentee landlordism including the allied forms of intermediaries; (b) to make the tiller the owner; (c) to set a ceiling on land-holdings. To put life into these objectives a legislative scheme was formulated and fashioned into the new Act. By virtue of this scheme, new concepts of ‘personal cultivation’, ‘ceiling area’ and ‘family’ were introduced and definite meaning was given to these expressions in the new Act. The Legislature provided that all rights and title in land not held in personal cultivation on 1st day of September, 1971 (hereinafter called, ‘the material date’) shall extinguish and vest in the State. The only exception provided was that in favour of a mortgagee without possession whose rights in the mortgaged land were kept intact. Even as regard Page: 35lands held in personal cultivation, whether in ownership right, tenancy right or otherwise, it was provided that if the lands so held along with orchards owned by an individual and, where such individual was a member of a family, by all the members of the family, jointly or severally, exceeded the ceiling area on the material date, the excess land shall vest in the State. For this purpose the expressions ‘land’ and ‘orchard’ were defined in the Act. The land owners who exceeded the ceiling area were allowed to select in the prescribed manner the land they desired to retain for themselves within the ceiling limit. Subject to the rights of mortgagee without possession, lands within ceiling area were vested in ownership right in the individuals or families, as the case might be, holding the same in personal cultivation on the material date. Lands which became surplus, were to be disposed of by the Government in the prescribed manner. Provision was, however, made for resumption of land by land-owners not in personal cultivation on the material date, though only under certain conditions and upto a limited extent. It was enacted that such a land-owner could resume a unit of land not exceeding three standard acres for personal cultivation on condition that his monthly income including that of other members of the family, if any, to which he belonged, did not exceed Rs. 500/- per month and that he was an inhabitant of the area to which the new Act applied. The new Act made it necessary for the owner, in whose favour the resumption was allowed, to bring the resumed land into his personal cultivation within a period of eight months from the date he entered into possession failing which, it provided, his rights in such land shall extinguish. The intendment of the new Act was to ensure even distribution of land ownerships on the basis of immediate possession, properly so-called or in the extended sense contemplated by the expression “personal cultivation”, and to snap the relationship of landlord and tenant and allied …………… relationships reflecting mediate possession. While, therefore, providing that, the ceiling area shall not be exceeded at any time after the commencement of the new Act, the Legislature also directed that, after such commencement, no tenancy shall be created nor even any acquisition made, voluntarily or otherwise, except for personal cultivation or for industrial, commercial or horticultural purposes. The Legislature even provided that any acquisition, transfer or dispossession of land made, after the commencement of the new Act, which contravenes the provisions of the Act, shall be inoperative and the land so acquired, transferred, or disposed of shall vest in the State. So much for the plan regarding even distribution of land ownerships. Feeling perhaps that this plan may remain lopsided, unless care was also taken to ensure even distribution of agricultural income, that is, income accruing from the land and orchards, the Legislature, in its wisdom, incidentally, directed that annual tax shall be imposed in the case of orchards in excess of 12½ standard acres. Another limb of the Agrarian Reforms was to stabilise the position of tenants, landless persons and persons belonging to scheduled caste over lands owned by others underneath and appurtenant to their dwelling houses. The Legislature forbade the eviction of occupiers from such houses and conferred on them a right to acquire the land underneath and appurtenant to these houses on payment of price to be determined under the new Act. In order to carry out the purposes of the new Act, a machinery was provided under the Act and the Rules made thereunder with jurisdiction and power to determine questions and matters peculiar to the new Act, in respect of which, alongside, the jurisdiction of the civil courts was ousted. That was broadly the scheme of Agrarian re-organisation contemplated by the new Act.

    3. Having noticed the object and scheme of the Act let me now consider the question whether the new Act applies to pending actions. It is a settled rule of construction that when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are determined according to the law, as it existed when the action was commenced unless the new law manifests an intention to the contrary, either expressly or by necessary implication. The only exception to this rule are enactments dealing merely with matters of procedure and, unless the language forbids that construction, such enactments apply retrospectively to the pending actions. Thus the question whether or not an Act of the legislature applies to pending actions is a matter of legislative intention. Such intention may be gathered from the object and scheme of the Act or from the express provisions thereof.

    4. The object of the new Act, as we have noticed above, was to bring about a radical transformation in the existing pattern of land ownership. By its preamble it professes “to provide comprehensive legislation”, and inferentially, because of its comprehensiveness, it purports completely and thoroughly to treat the subject and operate as a primary, if not the sole, rule of action. From its scheme, it is clear that it takes away or abridges vested rights acquired in respect of land under the existing laws; creates new rights and obligations; provides new remedies and prescribes new procedures: and, confers new jurisdiction. In that sense it is in fact retrospective and must as well reasonably be construed as retrospective in the other sense that it applies to the pending actions, the reason is that when the new Act interferes with the existing rights, whether substantive or those relating to action, respect for pending actions cannot be assumed. In any case all possibility of confusion and doubt appears to be prevented by Section 47. That section reads:

    “The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or any custom or usage or in any contract, express or implied, or in any instrument inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”

    5. To my mind, this section holds a key to the construction of the new Act and the rules made thereunder. It clearly provides that the provisions of the new Act and the rules made thereunder shall be primary rule of action. There is nothing in it to limit its operation to causes of action arising after the new Act came into force. On its terms and, in any case, bearing in mind the principles of the new Act, it must be held to be applicable to causes of action, whether arising before or after the commencement of the new Act. If that is so, as it really is, I must hold that the new Act and the rules made thereunder apply to the actions pending when the Act came into force, I need hardly add that the sanctity accorded to the rules by Section 47 will be available in respect of such rules only as are consistent with the new Act, for the principle is well settled that the rules made in pursuance of a delegated authority to that effect must be consistent with the statute under which they are framed.

    6. In the new Act and the rules thereunder applying to the pending actions, the resultant effect is that a pending action will continue or collapse according as it survives or not the new Act and the rules made thereunder. That will generally depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the relief claimed therein; and, the particular provision of the new Act and the rules thereunder having bearing on it. Broadly speaking, a pending action will survive if, by or under the new Act, the right be not acquired; and, even if not so acquired, it be not lost or destroyed either; and, the remedy too be not barred or changed. It will not survive if, in consequence of the new Act, the right be acquired, lost or destroyed, and even if not so acquired, lost or destroyed, the remedy be barred or changed.

    7. In the view expressed above it was not perhaps necessary for the Legislature to make a specific provision for pending actions unless it wanted to be more specific and desired to provide savings. The legislature has, in its wisdom, chosen to make such provision by Section 52, in respect of pending actions arising under the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007; Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980; Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment Proceedings) Act, 1966, Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act 1996, and, Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962 (hereinafter called ‘the specified Acts’). Section 52 reads:

    “All applications, suits and proceedings pending before any Revenue Officer, Civil or Revenue Court, any authority acting under the J. and K. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1962, or the Government on the appointed date under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51 shall abate:

    Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to—

    (a) applications or proceedings for recovery of rent (accrued due prior to the date appointed under Section 3) under Section 19-B of the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;

    (b) suits for sums payable on account of village cesses or village expenses;

    (c) suits by co-sharer in village, holding or tenancy for a share of the profits thereof or for a settlement of accounts;

    (d) suits for recovery of over-payments of rent or of land revenue or of any other demand for which a suit lies in revenue court;

    (e) suits relating to emoluments of village officers;

    (f) suits for sums payable on account of land revenue or of any other demand recoverable as an arrear of land revenue under any enactment for the time being in force;

    (g) applications and proceedings under Section 56 of the J. and K. Tenancy Act, samvat 1980;

    (h) appeals or revision applications against orders passed under Section 5 or 6 of the J. and K. Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Samvat 2007: (i) proceedings under Section 12 of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Samvat 2007;

    (i) proceedings under the J. and K. Land Revenue Act, Samvat 1996 to the extent to which these are consistent with this Act;

    (j) proceedings saved under the proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 51 of this Act; and every such application, suit or proceeding may be instituted or continued in accordance with the law under which such application, suit or proceeding, is or was instituted.”

    8. Before dealing with this section let me read Section 51. That section, leaving out the portions not relevant provides:

    “With effect from the appointed date the provisions of—

    (a) The Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007;

    (b) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980;

    (c) The Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment Proceedings Act, 1966;

    (d) The Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 and rules, standing orders or orders passed thereunder; and

    (e) The Jammu and Kashmir Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1962 and the rules passed thereunder;

    shall so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, cease to apply in the areas to which this Act applies.”

    9. Though the word ‘in’ has been inappropriately used in this section, but analysing it properly what it says is that, barring exceptions provided in the new Act, the specified Acts shall cease to apply to lands to which the new Act applies; and, that they shall so cease to apply to the extent of their inconsistency with the new Act. It follows that the specified Acts will continue to apply to the lands not covered by the new Act and that, even as respects lands, to which the new Act applies, they will cease to apply only to the extent of their inconsistency with the new Act. The implication clearly is that a pending action arising out of the specified Acts will lose its efficiency and fail, if it is repugnant to the provisions of the new Act, while it will retain its efficiency and continue, if it is consistent with the new Act. On logical construction of Section 51, therefore, the new Act does not drive out all the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts but only such of those pending actions as are inconsistent with it.

    10. Let me now revert to Section 52. On a literal construction of this section all the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts, except those mentioned in the proviso, shall abate. So viewed the section makes a clean sweep of all the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts irrespective of the fact whether such actions are or are not consistent with the new Act. One could understand the logic if the axe fell on the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts which are repugnant to the new Act but one simply wonders to find that the axe would equally fall on such pending actions even if they, are consistent with the new Acts. Clearly, therefore, the ordinary sense of the words used in this section leads to obvious absurdities and anomalies. Even so I take it that we are bound to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used in this section unless we can find anything in any other part of the new Act that will alter, modify or qualify the language used in this section. It is not difficult to see that thing in Section 51. Section 52 is nothing but a phase of the subject-matter dealt with in Section 51. The latter section abrogates the specified Acts to a limited extent and the consequences too are limited. The effect of such abrogation on the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts, as we have already noticed, is that they will not sink in lump. Some of them will sink and some others not depending on which of them has lost the efficiency and on which not. On the other hand Section 52, judged by its terms, provides that the pending actions arising out of the specified Acts must sink, one and all. Manifestly the two sections are conflicting. It is one of the primary rules of construction that the provisions of a statute must, as far as possible, be read, so as to produce harmony and not discord. In my opinion, therefore, Sec. 52, must, in spite of the difficulties created by the Draftsman in its logical construction, be held to apply, of course subject to exceptions in the proviso, only to those pending actions arising out of the specified Acts as are incompatible with the new Act. The principle governing the determination of the question of compatibility will be the same as laid down by me in respect of the pending actions generally while dealing with the effect that the new Act has on the pending actions. On the terms of Section 52 such actions will include applications, suits and allied proceedings including appeals, reviews and revisions arising out of the specified Acts.

    11. Before us it was urged that Section 52 was not applicable to pending appeals and revisions arising under the specified Acts. The argument was based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis and we were asked to read the word ‘proceedings’ as if the Legislature had used the words ‘similar proceedings’. But this principle applies if there is nothing to indicate that a wider sense was intended. Now a slight consideration of clause (h) of the proviso to Section 52 providing saying in respect of appeals and revisions arising under Sections 5 and 6 of Big Landed Estates Abolition Act seems to be sufficient to show that the word ‘proceedings’ must be interpreted in its wider sense as including, among other matters, appeals and revisions; and, moreover, it is unimaginable that the legislature should have allowed the law to operate differently within the same class of cases as it would amount to if the applications and the suits are declared to have abated where they are at the trial stage and declared to have remained alive if they are at the appellate or revisional stage.

    12. So far my approach to the problem, whether a pending action will continue or collapse after the new Act became operative, was purely juristic. I have hinted at the broad principles which will be the determining factor. I have said, if I may repeat, that a pending action will continue if, by or under the new Act, the right be not acquired and even if not so acquired, it be not lost or destroyed either, and, the remedy too be not barred or changed. It will collapse if, in consequence of the new Act, the right be acquired, lost or destroyed; and, even if not be acquired, lost or destroyed; the remedy be barred or changed, let me try to explain what it means in actual practice. Before doing so it will be necessary to draw a statutory sketch of Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 and 40, as I may have to refer to these sections in the course of such elucidation.

    13. These sections provide:

    Section 3. “Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the right of ownership of any person Page: 38and the right of any intermediary in land not held by him in his personal cultivation on the first day of September, 1971, shall extinguish and shall vest in the State with effect from the appointed date.

    Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the right of a mortgagee without possession, if any, on the land.

    Section 4. “Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force.—

    (a) Where any land, including that retainable under Section 53, held by an individual in his personal cultivation whether a owner or as tenant or otherwise along with orchards owned by him, in excess of the ceiling area on the 1st day of September, 1971, the excess land shall vest in the State with effect from the appointed date subject to the right of a mortgagee without possession, if any, on the land;

    (b) where aggregate land, including that retainable under Section 53, held by the members of a family, whether jointly or severally or both, in their personal cultivation as owners or as tenants or otherwise, along with orchards owned by them, is in excess of the ceiling area on the 1st day of September, 1971, the excess land shall vest in the State with effect from the appointed date, subject to the rights of mortgagee without possession, if any, on the land;

    Provided that each such individual or each such member of the family, as the case may be, shall have the option of selecting in the prescribed manner, the land he desires to retain with himself within the limits provided for in sub-section (1) of S, 12:

    Provided further that no land in a demarcated forest shall be so selected.

    Provided also that portions of land shown in a survey number as not cultivated for reasons of such portions being under well, boundary, path, private Kuhl or for similar other reasons shall be held by such individual or family in addition to ceiling area.”

    Section 5. “The land vested in the State under Section 3 shall, subject to the provisions of Section 4 and to the rights of the mortgagee without possession thereon, if any, and on payment of such levy in full as may be prescribed, vest in ownership rights in the person holding such land in personal cultivation on the first day of September, 1971 or in the person claiming through him, anything contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding.”

    Section 7. “Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, any person whose monthly income including that of other members of the family, if any, to which he belongs, does not exceed Rs. 500.00 p. and who was, on the first day of September, 1971, an inhabitant of the area to which this Act applies and was an owner of land not held by him in his personal cultivation may resume a unit of land not exceeding three standard acres for personal cultivation and for that purpose apply to the prescribed authority, in the prescribed manner within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the appointed date. The prescribed authority shall hold an enquiry into the application in the prescribed manner and pass appropriate orders thereon;

    Provided that the selection of the unit of land proposed to be resumed under this section shall be made in the prescribed manner;

    Provided further that no resumption for personal cultivation under this section shall be allowed from any land situate in a demarcated forest;

    Provided also that any person serving in the Defence forces on any date between the 1st day of April, 1965 and the 1st day of September, 1971, or on his death in military operations during that period, his widow and/or dependents, shall have a right to resume land upto the ceiling area if the land is in the ownership of such person on 1st day of September, 1971, or is inherited by him after the first day of September, 1971 during his continuance in service in Defence Forces, or is inherited by such widow and/or such dependent from such person;

    Provided also that if any person having right to resume the land under the preceding proviso fails to apply for resumption within the period mentioned above, the prescribed authority shall itself determine the land resumable by such person in the prescribed manner as if the application of such person was duly made before it;

    Provided also that the aggregate land held by an individual, or by all members of a family including that resumed under this section by such individual or, a member of such family, as the case may be, does not, along with orchards owned by the individual or all the members of the family, exceed the ceiling area, where such individual or a member of such family falls within the purview of the third proviso and three standard acres in other cases;

    Provided also that no individual tenant, or the family if any, of which such tenant is a member, is left as a result of such resumption with an aggregate area, including orchards, of less than two standard acres, provided, however, that the person applying for resumption shall be paid compensation at prevailing market rates, in such manner and in such instalments as may be prescribed, for such land or portion thereof which, but for this proviso, he was eligible to resume;

    Explanation.-For purposes of this proviso, the expression “two standard acres” shall include surplus land, if any, allotted under Section 10 to such tenant or family of which such tenant is a member.”

    Section 40. “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in any law for the time being in force or in any contract, instrument, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of a Court, Page: 39Where on any land a person, who has been a tenant, or is a member of a scheduled caste, or is landless, is in occupation of a dwelling house built at the expense of such person or his predecessor-in-interest on a site belonging to an owner or any other person, such person shall not be evicted from such dwelling house.

    (2) The prescribed authority may suo motu and, upon an application of such person, shall, after giving notice to such owner or such other person, as the case may be, and after holding an inquiry and determining the price of the site of the dwelling house and the land immediately appurtenant thereto, by an order in writing require such person to deposit the amount of such price either in lump within one year or in four equal annual instalments with simple interest at four percent, per annum on or before such dates as may be fixed by the prescribed authority. On the deposit of such price in lump or of the last instalment of such price, as the case may be, the site shall be deemed to have been transferred to such person free from any encumbrance and the amount deposited shall be paid to such owner or other person, as the case may be.

    (3) The prescribed authority shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, grant a certificate in the prescribed form to such person declaring him to be the purchaser of the site and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the sale for purposes of registration.”

    14. Now take a pending action for pre-emption by a tenant-cultivator under Section 14(a) firstly of the Right of Prior Purchase Act. Here the right claimed by the suitor is propriety possession by pre-emption. By virtue of Sections 3, 4 and 5 the land in suit vested, from the appointed date, either in the suitor as tenant-cultivator or in the State or in none of them depending on whether the land in question is land, to which the new Act applied, and if it so applied, whether the tenant cultivator exceeded or not the ceiling limit. Suppose it is found that the land in question vested in the suitor, he has acquired the right under the new Act and the suit must then collapse. Next suppose that it is found to have vested in the State and not in the tenant cultivator. In that case the right gets destroyed and the suit must collapse. Then suppose it is found to have vested in the State and not in the tenant Cultivator. In that case the right gets destroyed and the suit must collapse. Then suppose it is found that it has neither vested in the suitor nor in the State, but the vendee continues to be the owner. In that case the right subsists and the suit must continue. In the same case assume that the suit is by a co-sharer in the holding under Section 14(b) secondly of the Right of Prior Purchase Act. Here the suitor claims ownership and possession by pre-emption. By virtue of Sections 3, 4 and 5 the land in suit vested, from the appointed date, either in the vendee or in the tenant, if any, under him or in the State or in none of them depending again on the related questions stated above, suppose it is found that the land vested in the vendee or his tenant the suit will collapse because the suitor has lost the right. Next suppose it is found that it vested in the State, the suit will collapse because the right has got destroyed. Then suppose it vested neither in the vendee nor in his tenant and nor also in the State. In that case, the suit will continue as the right subsists. Next take a pending suit for declaration of title and injunction, the plaintiff being in possession of the land in suit. On the reasoning given above the land in suit continued, from the appointed date, either to vest in the plaintiff or it vested in the State. In the first case the suit will continue because the right subsists. In the second case the suit will collapse because the right has got destroyed. Then take a pending case for joint possession by the plaintiff co-owner out of possession against the defendant co-owner in possession. On the reasoning given above the land vested, from the appointed date, either in the defendant co-owner or in the tenants, if any, or in the State or continued to be owned by the parties, as before, depending on whether or not the new Act applied to the land in suit: and if it so applied, whether it vested in the tenant, the defendant co-owner, or the State. In case the land in question was not affected by the new Act the rights of the parties over it continue to be as before and the suit will continue as the right subsists. In case it vested in the defendant co-owner as actual possessor thereof, the right must be held to have been lost and the suit must collapse. Same will be the case if the land in question vested in the tenant. If the land in question vested to the State, the right has got destroyed and the suit must collapse. Here I have assumed that the plaintiff co-owner does not fulfil the conditions set out in Section 7. If he fulfils those conditions, his right subsists to the limited extent provided in that section but the remedy gets changed because the authority before whom he has to seek the relief is the prescribed authority. Then consider a pending action for eviction of a person from land underneath and appurtenant to his dwelling house. Suppose it is found that the person sued against was a tenant or is a member of the scheduled caste or is a landless person. In either case the action must collapse by virtue of Section 49 because the right though kept alive under it, the remedy has been barred. Suppose it is found that the person in occupation was neither a tenant nor a person belonging to schedule caste nor also a landless person. In that case the right and the remedy both subsist and the action will continue. In the same case assume that the plaintiff has claimed as additional relief for damages or arrears of Page: 40The right to recovery such damages or rent is not affected by the new Act nor also the remedy in respect thereof has been barred or changed under the Act and as such the suit will partly survive in case the occupier was a tenant or is a person belonging to the scheduled caste or in a landless person. If the case be otherwise, the suit will survive and continue in its entirety. Then consider a case where the landlord had sued his tenant for ejectment and arrears of rent. On the reasoning given earlier the land in question either vested in the tenant or in the State or in none of them. In the first case the action for ejectment will collapse because the right in respect thereof is lost while that for arrears of rent will continue because it pertains to a period when the tenancy was valid, and the right subsists. In the second case, the right to seek ejectment gets destroyed and the action must fail to that extent, but the right to recover the arrears, of rent or damages subsists and it will continue. In the third case the action will continue as the right to seek ejectment and the right to recover damages or arrears of rent both subsist.

    15. In the instances just considered, as might as noticed, the fate of an action, whether instituted before or after the new Act became operative, depends ultimately on the question whether or not a particular land has vested in the State or in any other person. By virtue of Sections 3, 4 and 5 the decision on this point depends on the fact whether it is land, to which the new Act applied, and if it so applied, who was in cultivating possession thereof on the material date and whether or not it exceeded the ceiling limit. These are jurisdictional facts and whosoever has got power under the new Act to determine the main question stated above, has got the power to determine these facts. In fact his power to declare whether a particular land has or has not vested in the State or in any other person depends on the determination of these facts, which he may do either on the admission of the parties or otherwise by holding a proper inquiry in accordance with the Rules.

    16. By Rule 20 of the Agrarian Rules, 1973, a Circle Officer has been invested with the power and jurisdiction to make a mutation order consistently with Sections 2, 4 and 5 directing that the rights and title in land have vested in the State or in any other person, as the case may be. The power and jurisdiction to make a mutation order obviously carries with it the power to refuse to make each job order, if necessary. The exercise if this power and jurisdiction by the Circle Officer, one way or the other, as we have noticed in the preceding paragraph, is dependent upon the determination of the collateral fact mentioned therein. The question arises whether this power and jurisdiction is exercisable by the Circle Officer exclusively or concurrently with a civil court or other officer of authority before whom such question arises; I will consider this question with reference to the following two classes of cases separately:

    Cases falling under Section 9 of the CPC usually described as civil cases; Cases falling under the specified Acts and allied Acts, commonly known as Revenue cases.

    Section 36 of the new Act reads:—

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force—

    (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act or the rules made thereunder required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by any officer or authority appointed under this Act or the rules made thereunder.

    (2) No order of any officer or authority mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be called in question in any Civil Court.”

    17. This section bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters specified therein. The section is widely worded. It forbids the civil courts from dealing with or adjudicating upon any question or matter which is by or under the new Act or the Rules made thereunder required to be dealt with or adjudicated upon by an officer or authority appointed under the new Act or the rules made thereunder. It also provides that any order by such officer or authority shall not be open to question in any civil court. This section has obviously reference to the jurisdiction exercised by the civil courts in respect of civil cases falling under Section 9 of the CPC. There is no corresponding provision barring the jurisdiction in like manner of courts or authorities having jurisdiction to try and determine Revenue cases. On principle, however, the bar must be treated to be equally applicable to such courts and authorities, the reason is that the new Act clearly indicates that the questions or matters arising thereunder should be dealt with and determined by the special machinery created by or under it or the rules made thereunder and being a special Act dealing with a particular subject comprehensively, the jurisdiction conferred on the officers and authorities constituting such machinery must be held to be exclusive. In this background if a question is raised before any civil court or officer or authority whether or not a particular, land has vested in the State or in any other person under the new Act, such court or officer or authority shall not have power and jurisdiction to decide this question or even determine the collateral facts on which the decision of that question rests. Where, therefore, any such question is raised in a pending action or an action instituted after the Act became operative, the court or the officer or authority before whom such question is raised Page: 41should appropriately stay its hands in the matter pending determination of that question by the competent authority under the new Act.

    18. From what has been stated above two questions incidentally emerge which deserve notice. These are: Whether Section 36 can operate to exclude the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; Whether the bar created by Sec. 46 (sic) (S. 36) against the exercise of jurisdiction by the civil courts is absolute.

    19. In my opinion Section 36 does not either on its terms, or on principle stand as a bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as the Constitution is supreme and any Act of the Legislature cannot operate to divest the High Court of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution. Accordingly in appropriate cases the High Court can interfere with an order made by a Circle Officer or any other authority under the new Act.

    20. Then comes the question regarding civil courts. In the words of the Privy Council in Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., (AIR 1940 PC 105) it is well settled that—

    “Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of the judicial procedure.”

    21. Dealing with these observations, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (AIR 1964 SC 322) observed:

    “Non-compliance with the provisions of the Statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the Statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, that might also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute.”

    22. Accordingly where a Circle Officer makes or refuses to make an order declaring that a particular land has vested in the State or in any other person, the order can be challenged before a civil court on merits if it was passed in violation of the fundamental provisions of the new Act or of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In what cases such a plea can be raised, it is not necessary for me to state in this case. Broadly speaking such a plea may be available where the Circle Officer has exercised jurisdiction assuming facts necessary for the exercise thereof or determined the same without following the procedure prescribed in the rules.

    23. At this stage may be noticed two single bench judgments of this court in Thakur Kartar Singh v. Gaffar Lone, (1973 J and K LR 851) and Taramani Radial v. Thakur Dass, (1973-1 Kash LJ 393).

    24. The first case was a suit for possession of land measuring 7 kanals and 7 marlas. The plaintiff claimed the land on the basis of title pleading that the defendant has forcibly occupied the same. The defendant contended that he was a tenant. An application was made that the suit had abated. Dealing with the application, my learned brother, Mr. Mian Jalal-ud-Din, J. observed:

    “The question involved in the present suit is as regards the status of the defendant. According to the plaintiff the defendant is in unauthorised occupation of the land and therefore is a trespasser. But according to the defendant he is a tenant of the land in dispute. The question whether the defendant is in unauthorised occupation of the land or is a tenant shall have to be decided and determined by the prescribed authority under the Act. Under Section 3 of the Agrarian Reforms Act the right of ownership of any person is to extinguish on the 1st day of September, 1971 and the same is to vest in the State with effect from the date the Act comes into force. So according to Section 3 the ownership rights of the plaintiff have vested in State. Under Section 5 the land so vested in the State under Section 3 shall vest in ownership rights in the person holding such land in personal cultivation on the first day of September, 1971, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. In this way the plaintiff's ownership in the land has vested in the State and as such in my opinion he cannot maintain the present suit.”

    25. These observations may be read as laying down three propositions of law namely: That the question to be considered by a civil court is who was in cultivating possession on the material date;That there is a presumption under the new Act in a case like the one before the learned Single bench that the land in suit has vested in the State; and That the civil court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not a particular land has vested in the State. Page: 42If that be so, as it seems, I would say, with respect, that the law laid down in this decision is not correct in view of what I have stated hereinbefore in this judgment.

    26. The second case was a suit for declaration that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of the land and manager of temple known as Thakur Dwara Nursing Jee Maharaj situate over the suit land. An application was made by the defendant that the suit had abated under Section 52 of the new Act. Dealing with the application, my learned brother, Mr. D.D Thakur, J. as he then was, observed:—

    “The argument of Mr. Joginder Singh is that since it is a suit which was pending in a civil court on the date appointed for the commencement of the Act, therefore it must abate under Section 52 thereof. He has tried to substantiate his argument by making reference to Section 3 and argued that by force of Section 3 of the Act the ownership of the land the subject-matter of the dispute stands extinguished and vests in the State, as the plaintiff was not in personal cultivation of the suit land, on the crucial date. According to him the moment the fact of the plaintiff being out of possession is proved, the ownership of the property must vest in the State as a necessary consequence and therefore there is no question of the suit being continued in respect of the property which has vested in the State. The argument does not appear to be correct. It is true that Section 3 of the Act contemplates extinction of the ownership rights in the land which is not in the personal cultivation of the owner, but the words ‘personal cultivation’ have a significance. A person may not be in personal cultivation of the land because he has let out the land to a tenant. He may be at the same time out of possession because he is dispossessed by a trespasser. In the latter case however it cannot be said that the mere fact that the trespasser has succeeded in taking away the possession of the owner, the extinction of his right must follow. The fundamental purpose which the J. and K. Agrarian Reforms Act was intended to achieve was to bring about the abolition of ownership of lands which were not held in personal cultivation by the owner but were held by tenants. The intention could not be to come to the rescue of a trespasser or to a person in forcible occupation and thereby confer a right on him which in the ordinary course he was not entitled to. This interpretation of Section 52 of the Act is consistent with the definition of the term “personal cultivation” contained in Section 2 sub-section (7), Explanation 2 of the Act which expressly states that where land has been occupied unauthorisedly the person who but for such an unauthorised occupation would have been personally cultivating such land shall be deemed to be in personal cultivation. The first argument of Mr. Joginder Singh therefore cannot prevail.

    His next contention is that in Section 52 the words “under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51 abate” qualify only the proceedings which are pending before the Government. According to him the suits pending in the civil courts need not arise out of any of the acts mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 51. This interpretation also is not possible to be placed on Section 52 of the Act. Before a suit cart fall within the purview of Section 52 of the Act two conditions must stand satisfied. Firstly that the suit be pending on the date of application of the Act in a civil court or any other authority mentioned in Section 52 and secondly that the suit must have arisen out of any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51. The Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51 have absolutely no bearing on the issues involved in the suit. The suits which arise out of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 51 of the Act alone are to abate under Sec. 52 of the Act. A suit like the present one does not fall within the purview of Section 52 of the Act. The present suit cannot therefore be said to have abated.”

    27. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the judgment that Section 52 does not apply to a pending case unless such case is relatable to one of the Acts mentioned in Section 51(1). However, the judgment may, in relation to a case in which Section 52 is invoked, be read as laying down two propositions of law;

    28. That the question to be considered by the Court or other authority seized of the case is who was in personal cultivation of the disputed land on the material date in the sense contemplated by Section 2(7);That the court or other authority has power and jurisdiction to decide whether or not the disputed land vested in the State under Section 3 from the appointed date.

    29. If that be so, as it really is, I would say with respect that the law so laid down is not correct in the view expressed by me earlier in this judgment.

    30. There is one point which, though not so important, deserves consideration as it is likely to arise in the pending cases generally. That point is: how can a party show that a pending case is or is not maintainable under the new Act when it could not raise necessary pleas or objections connected therewith as the Act was not in force at the time of filing of such case. The simple answer is that the party can seek permision to raise additional grounds of claim or objections based on the Act either by way of amendment of its pleadings or by way of filing a supplementary memorandum of grounds of appeal or revision or in any other appropriate manner depending on the nature of the case and the stage at which it is. There is no procedural difficulty in doing so. Page: 43Of course, the court may or may not grant the prayer depending on whether it is genuine or not.

    31. Having dealt with the general question raised in the beginning and the allied questions, let me now proceed to deal with the cases before us. Cases at Nos. 1 to 12 are civil appeals, first appeal or second appeal, instituted before 1-5-1972, the date on which the new Act came into force. Case at No. 13 is a revenue first appeal arising out of the application under Section 46 of the Tenancy Act which was instituted before the said date. Case at No. 14 is a civil revision arising out of a pending civil suit instituted before the commencement of the new Act. These appeals and the revisions were pending when the Act became operative. At the hearing before us the learned counsel for the parties touched only questions of general nature and those too in a casual manner, perhaps, because they had little conception of the new Act. Even the Advocate General who was invited by us to project the view held by the then Government on the questions raised before us, could not do much, perhaps, because the Officers of the Government, who could brief him, do also have no clear conception of what the new Act provides. If the few provisions that came up for interpretation before us can be a pointer as they really are, the new Act is not well drafted and this appears to me to be one of the main reasons which has made its underlying scheme obscure and rendered it difficult for most of the people to comprihend its scope and content. I apprehend that the imperfections in drafting might even lead to avoidable and unnecessary litigation. The Government will be well advised to have the Act examined from drafting point of view and take steps to remove the drafting errors and imperfections, if any, detected as a result of such examination. As at present advised by the language, object and scheme of the new Act I have dealt with and determined all the questions that were raised at the bar in the cases before us. Let these cases be placed now before the respective benches for appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.

    Jaswant Singh, J.:— I have gone through the elaborate and comprehensive judgment prepared by my learned brother, Mufti, J. and agree with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by him. I have only to add that the view expressed by my learned brother regarding jurisdiction of civil courts receives support from a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported as (1974) 1 SCC 567 : AIR 1974 SC 1069.

    Ali, C.J:— I agree with the judgment proposed by my learned brother, Mufti, J., who has succinctly analyzed the various provisions of the Act and has held that in most matters the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. I would, however, like to add that the main object of the Act is to secure the land for the tiller and to take away the surplus land from the landlord and distribute it to the landless. I find, however, that under the rules the Circle Officers have been invested with very wide powers in respect of attesting mutations, deciding important rights of the parties, determining the question of possession prior to the relevant date as also pronounce upon the question as to whether possession is authorised or not. The junior officers, like the Naib Tehsildars, have been designated as Circle Officers and I feel that if these junior officers are not able to exercise powers properly, this will defeat rather than advance the objects of the Act. In all these matters which are undoubtedly matters of moment, the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely ousted and even in cases where findings have been given by senior judges presiding over the civil courts, the same may be wiped out for a fresh determination under the Act to be made by Circle Officers. In these circumstances the Government would consider the desirability of designating senior revenue officers who have sufficient and varied judicial experience to decide the matters referred to above. My learned brother has also pointed out that the Act is not happily drafted and contains several lacunae. We understand that the Government is contemplating a wholesome Amendment of the Act and we hope that in doing so, the observations made by me as also by my learned brother will be duly kept in mind.

    32. Order accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rahim And Others v. Amma Bar And Others
    (Mar 7, 1975)