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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 885
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 885
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 3 April 1979 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Advocate Mohd. Ashfaq was returning to his residence in Mohalla Kapoorpur, Ghazipur. Near Saeed Khan’s house he encountered four men—Mukhtar, Abrar (the present appellant), Mateen, and Usman—each allegedly armed with a country-made pistol. Sensing danger, Ashfaq ran toward his nearby home while shouting for help. The men pursued him and Abrar fired a shot that struck Ashfaq from behind. Neighbours Muzur (PW 6), Durga Ram (PW 7) and Bissu responded to the alarm and witnessed the shooting.

Ashfaq was taken to the District Hospital, Ghazipur, where Dr. S.N. Pandey (PW 8) treated multiple gun-shot wounds. That night three dying declarations were recorded: (1) a statement to junior advocate Ram Singh (PW 5) forming the First Information Report (FIR) registered at 10:30 p.m.; (2) a statement to Sub-Inspector Ram Hit Shukla (PW 9) at 10:50 p.m.; and (3) a formal dying declaration before Tahsildar Vir Bahadur Prasad (PW 2) at 11:50 p.m. after medical certification of fitness. Ashfaq succumbed to his injuries the following day in Varanasi; the offence was then altered from Section 307 to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

During trial, the two eyewitnesses named in the FIR turned hostile. Relying on perceived inconsistencies among the three dying declarations, the Trial Court treated the murder as “blind” and acquitted all four accused. The State appealed. The High Court found the discrepancies immaterial, accepted the dying declarations, upheld acquittal for Mukhtar, Mateen, and Usman, but convicted Abrar under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Abrar sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the three dying declarations of the deceased were sufficiently reliable and consistent to form the sole basis for convicting Abrar under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether identification of the assailants was credible given alleged absence of lighting at the scene.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the Trial Court’s acquittal of Abrar.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The conviction rested exclusively on three dying declarations that allegedly contained material discrepancies; therefore they should not have been relied upon.
  • With both eyewitnesses turning hostile, no independent evidence linked Abrar to the shooting.
  • It was implausible that Ashfaq could have identified the assailants because there was no proof he carried a torch or that adequate street lighting existed at the place of occurrence.

State's Arguments

  • All three dying declarations consistently named the four accused, demonstrating reliability.
  • The three co-accused were acquitted only because they had not fired, not because the declarations lacked credibility.
  • The dying declaration recorded by the Tahsildar was especially trustworthy, having been made after the doctor certified the victim fit to speak.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasized that the case hinged on the dying declarations. It noted that each declaration—FIR, Section 161 CrPC statement, and the Tahsildar’s recorded statement—uniformly named Abrar as the shooter. The Court regarded minor variations about lighting or the presence of a torch as natural discrepancies given the victim’s pain and the circumstances of recording. It found the Trial Court’s reliance on those minor differences to justify acquittal “clearly wrong.”

The Court underscored additional corroborative factors: (a) a prompt FIR lodged within an hour of the incident, and (b) established motive rooted in longstanding animosity, including Abrar’s prior testimony against Ashfaq or his family members. It attached significance to the medical certification of the victim’s fitness before the Tahsildar’s declaration and to the doctor’s in-court confirmation of that certification.

Assessing these elements collectively, the Court concluded that the dying declarations met the legal test of reliability. Consequently, the High Court had correctly convicted Abrar while granting benefit of doubt to the other accused.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; conviction and life sentence of Abrar under Section 302 IPC affirmed.

The decision upholds the principle that multiple consistent dying declarations, even in the absence of corroborating eyewitness testimony, can form an adequate basis for conviction when found reliable. No new legal precedent was articulated beyond reaffirming established standards for evaluating dying declarations; the immediate consequence is the continued incarceration of the appellant.

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    Abrar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .

    H.S Bedi, J.— This appeal by way of special leave arises out of the following facts: at about 9.30 p.m on 3-4-1979, Mohd. Ashfaq, a practising advocate, residing in Mohalla Kapoorpur of Ghazipur Town, was returning home after visiting Suhasini Talkies. As he reached near the house of Saeed Khan, he found the four accused, Mukhtar, Abrar, Mateen and Usman, all armed with country-made pistols, standing near the door of the house. Mohd. Ashfaq recognised them in the light of the torch that he was carrying. Apprehending danger, Mohd. Ashfaq ran towards his house which was close by, raising an alarm. The accused chased him shouting at each other that he should be done away with on which Abrar, the appellant herein, fired at him from the rear.

    2. The alarm raised by the victim attracted Muzur, PW 6; Durga Ram, PW 7 and one Bissu to the place of incident and they too saw the shot being fired. As per the prosecution story, the attack on the victim was on account of old enmity and litigation between him and the accused Mukhtar and Abrar. Mohd. Ashfaq was immediately rushed to District Hospital, Ghazipur where he was attended to by Dr. S.N Pandey, PW 8 who was then on emergency duty. He found multiple gunshot injuries over the left side of the back in an area 12 cm × 14 cm, 9 in number measuring 1 cm × 1 cm, though there was no blackening or tattooing.

    3. In the meanwhile, Ram Singh, PW 5, Advocate and Mohd. Ashfaq's junior, reached the hospital at 9.45 p.m on getting information of the incident. Mohd. Ashfaq thereafter dictated a report to him and after it had been signed by him, it was taken to the police station and an FIR under Section 307 IPC was registered by Head Constable Lalta Yadav. A memo was also received in the police station at 10.35 p.m from Dr. S.N Pandey about Mohd. Ashfaq's admission on which Sub-Inspector Ram Hit Shukla, PW 9 reached the hospital at 10.50 p.m and recorded another statement of Mohd. Ashfaq. A third dying declaration was recorded the same night by the Tahsildar, Vir Bahudar Prasad, PW 2, at 11.50 p.m after taking a certificate from the doctor that the injured was fit to make a statement. Mohd. Ashfaq died the next day in the hospital at Varanasi and a case under Section 302 IPC was thereupon entered against the accused.

    4. The dead body was also subjected to a post-mortem examination and it revealed much the same injuries as detected at the time of the medical examination in District Hospital, Ghazipur but on the opening of the body the large and small intestines and the kidneys were found to be lacerated. The doctor opined that the death had occurred due to shock and haemorrhage resultant to abdominal injuries. The accused were, accordingly, arrested and ultimately brought to trial for an offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC.

    5. The prosecution in support of its case, relied primarily on the evidence of Dr. A.K Dwivedi, PW 1, who had conducted the post-mortem examination; Executive Magistrate-cum-Tahsildar Vir Bahadur Prasad, PW 2; Ram Singh, Advocate, PW 5; Mujur, PW 6 and Durga Ram, PW 7; the two eyewitnesses named in the FIR (but who did not support the prosecution), Dr. S.N Pandey, PW 8, the doctor of the District Hospital who had certified as to the mental condition of the victim at the time of the recording of the dying declaration by the Tahsildar, and the investigating officer Sub-Inspector Ram Hit Shukla, PW 9. The accused were then questioned under Section 313 CrPC. They pleaded false implication due to enmity.

    6. The trial court observed that as the two eyewitnesses had turned hostile, the case rested exclusively on the three dying declarations of the deceased in the form of the FIR, the statement of the deceased recorded by the investigating officer under Section 161 CrPC and the statement recorded by the Tahsildar. The trial court held that as there were several discrepancies inter se these three statements, they could not be relied upon and accordingly taking the murder as a blind one, acquitted the accused.

    7. The matter was thereafter taken in appeal by the State Government to the High Court. The High Court has, by its judgment, which is now impugned before us, reversed that of the trial court holding that the so-called discrepancies were insignificant, that they could occur in any statement recorded in the court and the discrepancy with regard to the presence or otherwise of a light which figured in one statement and did not figure in the other was of little or no consequence in the facts. The Court then examined the dying declarations and observed that insofar as accused Mukhtar, Mateen and Usman were concerned, no direct and positive role had been assigned to them in the three dying declarations of the deceased and it was the single shot attributed to Abrar, the present appellant, which had killed the deceased. The Court also held that if Mukhtar, Mateen and Usman had also been carrying country-made pistols, they would in normal circumstances, have used them as well.

    8. The Court also observed that there was no bar in relying only on a part of a dying declaration as the only test was the test of reliability. The Court observed that the third dying declaration had been recorded by the Tahsildar after he had taken a certificate from the doctor that Mohd. Ashfaq was fit to make a statement. The Court also held that the statement given in the dying declarations that the deceased was carrying a torch by which he had been able to identify the accused was to be accepted, as he was an educated man and would ordinarily be expected to carry a torch. It was also observed that as the incident had happened in Ghazipur, which was a district headquarters, street lights were also available as was clear from the evidence as well as the site plan. The High Court, accordingly, maintained the acquittal of Mukhtar, Mateen and Usman, but allowed the appeal with respect to Abrar, the appellant herein. He was, accordingly, sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC.

    9. Mr Quadri, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised several arguments before us during the course of hearing. He has pointed out that in the background that the two eyewitnesses had turned hostile and had not supported the prosecution, the only evidence against the appellant, were the three dying declarations and as these were discrepant in material particulars, no reliance could be placed on them as well with the result that there was no evidence against the appellant. He has also submitted that it would not have been possible for the deceased to have recognised the four assailants as there was no evidence to show that he was either carrying a torch or there was any electric light available at the site where he had been shot.

    10. The learned counsel for the State has, however, supported the judgment of the High Court by pointing out that the dying declarations were categorical inasmuch that the four accused had been named in each one of them and that the three accused who had been acquitted had got the benefit of doubt only on the ground that no shot had been fired by them. It has been submitted that there was in any case absolutely no reason to discard the dying declaration recorded by the Tahsildar at 11.50 p.m after he had taken a certificate from the doctor about the victim's fitness to make a statement.

    11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties very carefully. It has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the entire prosecution story would depend on the dying declarations. It must be borne in mind that all three dying declarations, the first one which formed the basis of the FIR, the second recorded by the ASI as a statement under Section 161 CrPC and a third recorded by the Tahsildar are unanimous as all the accused find mention therein. The High Court has by way of abundant caution, already given the benefit to three of the assailants on the plea, that they, though armed, had not caused any injury to the deceased. The motive too has also been established as there appeared to be deep animosity between the parties and that the accused Abrar, the appellant had, in fact, appeared as a witness in several cases in which Mohd. Ashfaq or his son were the accused.

    12. It is true that there are some discrepancies in the dying declarations with regard to the presence or otherwise of a light or a torch. To our mind, however, these are so insignificant that they call for no discussion. It is also clear from the evidence that the injured had been in great pain and if there were minor discrepancies inter se the three dying declarations, they were to be accepted as something normal. The trial court was thus clearly wrong in rendering a judgment of acquittal solely on this specious ground. We, particularly, notice that the dying declaration had been recorded by the Tahsildar after the doctor had certified the victim as fit to make a statement. The doctor also appeared in the witness box to support the statement of the Tahsildar. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that no fault whatsoever could be found in the dying declarations.

    13. The prompt lodging of the FIR is another circumstance in favour of the prosecution. The incident happened at 9.30 p.m on 3-4-1979 and the FIR was recorded at 10.30 p.m i.e within an hour of the incident under Section 307 IPC.

    14. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

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    Comments

    Abrar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .
    (Dec 16, 2010)