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Judgment Summary — Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of a written contract of sale of certain land, and for possession of the land with mesne profits from the date of institution of the suit. The defendants first party had allegedly contracted to sell the land to the plaintiffs for Rs. 1,700 but subsequently sold the land to the defendant second party and put him into possession. The suit was instituted in the court of the 2nd Munsif at Bhagalpur (pecuniary jurisdiction limit Rs. 2,000) and was valued at Rs. 1,709 (the consideration), with court-fee paid under Section 7(x)(a) of the Court-fees Act.

A dispute arose over the proper mode of valuation for court-fee: defendants contended the plaint should be valued by market value under Section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act; plaintiffs contended valuation should be by the amount of consideration under Section 7(x)(a). The learned Munsif held the suit should be valued at market value, found the market value exceeded Rs. 2,000, and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge. The Additional District Judge upheld the view but remanded for a clear finding on market value. The plaintiffs brought a revision application to this Court. A single judge referred the matter to a division bench because of the importance of the question, and the division bench heard the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court-fee payable on the plaint in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale (which also prays for possession and mesne profits) is to be calculated according to the amount of the consideration under Section 7(x)(a) of the Court-fees Act, or according to the market value of the land under Section 7(v)(c) of the Court-fees Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The suit should be valued according to the market value of the property under Section 7(v) of the Court-fees Act because the property has passed into the hands of the defendant second party, who was not a party to the contract; in substance the suit is one for possession and mesne profits.
  • They relied strongly on Madan Mohan v. Gaja Prosad (14 Cal LJ 159) and on Rambahadur v. Banwari Lal (AIR 1929 Pat 642) in support of that contention.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The suit is essentially for specific performance of the contract of sale and remains so even though it also prays for possession and mesne profits; therefore the court-fee paid under Section 7(x)(a) (according to the amount of consideration) was sufficient.
  • They relied on an unreported decision of this Court (Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh v. Mt. Ramdhan Kuer, Civil Revision No. 270 of 1925) and on several reported decisions of other High Courts to support their position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madan Mohan v. Gaja Prosad, 14 Cal LJ 159 Held that where plaintiff seeks specific performance and also asks that defendant execute conveyance and deliver possession, the suit is in substance one for possession and should be valued under Section 7(v) according to market value. The Court recorded that defendants relied on this decision but expressly disagreed with it and declined to follow it for the present case.
Rambahadur v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1929 Pat 642 (single judge) Followed the view in Madan Mohan (i.e., treating such suits as in substance for possession). The Court noted this decision followed Madan Mohan but held, with respect, that it could not agree with that approach in the present matter.
Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh v. Mt. Ramdhan Kuer, Civil Revn. No. 270 of 1925 (Pat) (unreported) Considered a suit for specific performance with a prayer for possession; treated the suit as one for specific performance and referred the point for decision by a larger bench; later bench agreed with the view that it was a suit for specific performance. The Court treated this unreported decision as persuasive and as supporting the plaintiffs' contention; it forms part of the authorities that conclude the point in favour of treating such suits as for specific performance (the Court stated the point is concluded by this decision and by Jagropan v. Krishnadeo).
Sundara Ramanujam v. Sivalingam Pillai, 47 Mad 150 Held that the relief of possession arises from the relief granting execution and delivery of the sale-deed; delivery of possession is part of specific performance and the claim for possession is part of specific performance. The Court endorsed this reasoning as supporting the view that possession relief is integral to specific performance and that a prayer for possession does not change the character of the suit.
Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain, AIR 1950 All 415 Allahabad High Court took a contrary view on whether a separate suit for possession could lie given Order 2, Rule 2 CPC. The Court noted the contrasting view but stated it was not necessary to decide that question in the present suit.
Muhi-ud-din Ahmad Khan v. Majlis Rai, 6 All 231 Held that the right to possession springs out of the sale-contract and relief by giving possession is comprised in the relief by specific performance of the sale-contract. The Court cited this decision as authority for the proposition that possession relief is part of specific performance.
Nihal Singh v. Sewa Ram, 38 All 292 Tudball J. followed the view that possession relief arises from specific performance. Used as supporting authority for the same principle.
Muljibhai Pitambardas v. Bai Chanchal, ILR (1945) Bom 32 Bombay High Court shared the view that possession relief is part of specific performance. Cited as one of the High Court authorities aligning with the view that possession is integral to specific performance.
Faqir Chand v. Ram Datt, 5 Lah 75 Lahore High Court shared the view that possession relief springs from the sale-contract. Cited as further supporting authority.
Jagropan v. Krishnadeo, 27 Pat 887 Bench of this Court (Patna) following the unreported Chander Sekhar decision held that in a suit for specific performance with recovery of possession and injunction the court-fee payable was under Section 7(x), and a prayer for possession made no difference. The Court treated this decision as binding/instructive and stated that, so far as they were concerned, the point was concluded by this decision and by Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh.
Suryanarayanacharyulu v. Ravi Narasimhaswami, ILR (1939) Mad 367 (SB) Special Bench held a particular case (lease situation with collusion and strangers in possession) was a suit for possession and not specific performance; facts distinguished from typical specific-performance-with-possession cases. The Court carefully distinguished the facts of that Special Bench decision and held it did not shake the authority of Sundara Ramanujam; used to show the limited scope of that decision.
Krishna Aiyar v. Shamanna, 23 Mad LJ 610 Principle that a court may award compensation under Section 19 Specific Relief Act even if the plaintiff does not specifically request it. Cited to support the proposition that a claim for mesne profits/compensation does not change the nature of a suit for specific performance.
Callianji Harjivan v. Narsi Tricum, 19 Bom 764 Similar proposition that courts can award compensation under Section 19 even without a specific request by the plaintiff. Used as additional authority to show inclusion of a compensation prayer does not alter the character of the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured way and adhered closely to statutory provisions and precedent cited in the opinion:

  • The Court first framed the decisive question: whether court-fee is payable according to consideration (Section 7(x)(a)) or market value (Section 7(v)(c)).
  • Characterisation of the suit:
    • The Court concluded the suit is essentially one for specific performance of a contract of sale: the right to possession "sprang out of the contract of sale" and relief by giving possession is comprised in specific performance.
    • The addition of a prayer for possession (and mesne profits) does not alter the character of a suit whose primary relief is specific performance; Form No. 47 of Appendix A, Code of Civil Procedure expressly contemplates a prayer for possession in a suit for specific performance.
  • Application of Section 27, Specific Relief Act:
    • The Court relied on Section 27 which permits specific performance to be enforced against either party or any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract. Therefore, a transferee from the contracting party who derives title subsequent to the contract stands in the same position as the contracting party for purposes of specific performance.
    • The fact that the defendant second party was not a party to the original contract does not alter this conclusion because he derived title from the first defendant by a sale-deed executed subsequent to the contract.
  • On the contention that the presence of a third party in possession makes the suit one for possession:
    • The Court distinguished decisions relied upon by defendants (e.g., Madan Mohan; Rambahadur) and rejected the broad view that inclusion of a possession prayer converts every such suit into one for possession for valuation purposes.
    • It explained that decisions which treated a claim as one for possession involved different factual matrices (for example Suryanarayanacharyulu involved collusion and strangers in possession and a completed registered lease), and so those decisions did not undermine the principle that possession relief arising from the contract remains part of specific performance.
  • On possible defenses and consequences:
    • The Court noted the defendant second party could defeat the plaintiffs' claim only by proving he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, in which event the suit for specific performance would fail against both the transferee and the original contracting party.
  • On mesne profits / compensation:
    • The Court observed that a prayer for mesne profits (compensation for loss due to delay) is properly within the relief available in suits for specific performance. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act imposes a duty on the Court to award compensation where appropriate, whether or not the plaintiff specifically requests it.
    • Authorities cited (Krishna Aiyar v. Shamanna; Callianji Harjivan v. Narsi Tricum) support that a court may award compensation even without an express prayer and therefore the inclusion of mesne profits does not change the nature of the suit.
  • Conclusion of reasoning:
    • On an anxious consideration of the authorities and the statutory scheme, and particularly relying on prior decisions of this Court (including the unreported Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh decision and Jagropan v. Krishnadeo), the Court concluded that the plaint was correctly stamped under Section 7(x) of the Court-fees Act and that the Munsif was wrong to return the plaint.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision application is allowed; the orders of the Courts below are set aside and the trial court is directed to accept the plaint as properly stamped and to proceed with the suit.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The plaint filed by the plaintiffs is to be treated as properly stamped under Section 7(x) (i.e., valued by the amount of the consideration) and the trial court is directed to hear the suit on its merits rather than return the plaint for presentation to a different court.
  • On legal principle: The Court applied and followed earlier decisions of this Court (including Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh and Jagropan v. Krishnadeo) and several High Court decisions to hold that a suit for specific performance which includes a prayer for possession (and mesne profits) remains a suit for specific performance for the purpose of court-fee valuation. The Court explicitly disagreed with decisions that would treat such suits automatically as suits for possession for valuation purposes (e.g., Madan Mohan v. Gaja Prosad).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion relies on existing decisions and statutory provisions to resolve the matter; it does not purport to lay down an entirely novel legal principle beyond the application and reconciliation of cited authorities. The decision resolves the valuation question in favor of treating such suits as for specific performance when possession is claimed as a relief arising from the contract.

This summary is restricted to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or authorities beyond that text.

    Diamond Coal Co.Ltd v. State of Bihar and another

    Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J.

    1. This application in revision is by the plaintiffs. The suit giving rise to this application was for specific performance of a contract of sale of certain land and for possession thereof with mesne profits from the date of the institution of the suit.

    2. The plaintiffs' case, in short, is that the defendants first party entered into an agreement in writing and contracted to sell to them the land in dispute by a certain date for a consideration of Rs. 1700/- but they did not perform the contract and sold the land to the defendant second party and put him into possession thereof. On these allegations the suit was instituted in the court of the 2nd Munsif at Bhagalpur, the pecuniary limit of whose juris-diction was Rs. 2000/-.

    3. The suit was valued at Rs. 1709/-, the amount of the consideration money, and court-fee was. paid thereon under Section 7(x)(a), Court-fees Act. It may be stated that this amount was also the value for the purpose of jurisdiction under Section 8, Suits Valuation Act.

    4. There was a dispute as regards the amount of court-fee payable on the plaint. The contention of the defendants was that the suit should be valued according to the market value of the property under Section 7(v), Court-fees Act, The plaintiffs, on the other hand, urged that the suit should be valued at the amount of the consideration money under Section 7(x)(a), Court-fees Act, and that the court-fee paid was sufficient. The learned Munsif overruled the contention of the plaintiffs and held that the value of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction should be the market value of the land in suit. He accordingly held an enquiry and having found that the value of the land in suit was in excess of Rs. 2000/-, the limit of his pecuniary jurisdiction, returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. Thereupon the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge, before whom the appeal came up for hearing, upheld the view of the learned Munsif but remanded the case directing the learned Munsif to give a clear finding as to the market value of the land in dispute. The plaintiffs have, therefore, come up to this Court in revision.

    5. The case came up for hearing before a single judge of this Court, who has, on account of the importance of the question raised before him, referred it to a division bench and it has now come before us for hearing.

    6. The question for decision is whether the court-fee on the plaint is payable according to the amount of the consideration under Section 7(x)(a) or on the amount at which the court may estimate the land with reference to the value of similar land in the neighbourhood under S, 7(v)(c), Court-fees Act, that is, on the market value of the land,

    7. The contention of the defendants is that the property having passed into the hands of the defendant second party, who was not a party to the contract, the suit is, in substance, one for possession and mesne profits and ought to be valued under Section 7(v), Court-fees Act, at the market value of the land, and in support of this contention they have strongly relied on the case of -- 'Madan Mohan v. Gaja Prosad 14 C LJ 159, and on a single Judge decision. of this Court in -- 'Rambahadur v. Banwari Lal', AIR 1929 Pat 642. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the suit is for specific performance of a contract, pure and simple, even though there is a claim for possession and mesne profits, and the court-fee paid is sufficient because it falls under Section 7(x)(a), Court-fees Act, which specifically provides for suits for specific performance of contract of sale and states that the court-fee payable in the case of such a suit would be according to the amount of consideration, and in support of their contention they rely upon an unreported decision of this Court -- 'Chander Sekhar Pra-sad Singh v, Mt. Ramdhan Kuer', Civil Revn. No. 270 of 1925, D/- 22-10-1925 (Pat) and also on several reported decisions of other High Courts.

    8. In my opinion, the contention of the plaintiffs must prevail. The suit is essentially one for specific performance of contract. The right to possession sprang out of the contract of sale and when the court is asked to give relief by giving possession, such a relief is comprised in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale. The addition of the prayer for possession makes no difference. Under Section 27, Specific Relief Act, specific performance of the contract may be enforced against (a) either party thereto, or (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract. If the land in suit had not been transferred by the defendants first party to the defendant second party subsequent to the contract, the plaintiffs could ask not only that the defendants be compelled to execute the necessary conveyance but also for delivery of possession to them after the execution of the necessary conveyance. But as the defendant second party is claiming under the defendants first party by a title arising subsequent to the contract of sale in favour of the plaintiffs, and not under any other title, he stands in the same position was the defendants first party and, therefore, if the suit for specific performance of the contract be decreed, the court must order possession to be delivered to the plaintiffs, either by the defendants first party or by the defendant second party, or by both. The fact that the defendant second party is not a party to the contract makes no difference in law be- cause he derives title from the defendants first party under a sale-deed executed subsequent to the contract. The cause of action for delivery of possession is not different from the cause of action for the specific performance of the contract itself. It is also clear from para 6 of form No. 47 of the First Schedule to Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure that a prayer for possession is a proper prayer in a suit for specific performance. Therefore, the addition of a prayer for possession does not change the character of the suit even if a third party is in possession if such a person does not claim to be in possession under a paramount title.

    9. If the plaintiffs do not claim possession in the suit for specific performance of the contract, it is doubtful whether a separate suit lor possession can lie by reason of the provision of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P. C. The Madras High Court has held in -- 'Sundara Rama-nujam v. Sivalingam Pillai', 47 Mad 150 that such a suit would not lie, whereas the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view in -- 'Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain', AIR 1950 All 415, but it is not necessary for us to decide this question in the present suit.

    10. The defendant second party can defeat the suit only on the ground that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, and if at the hearing he substantiates his case that he is a purchaser for value without notice, the suit for specific performance of the contract must fail, not only against him but also against the defendants first party. The plaintiffs cannot get possession unless they prove the contract and make out a case for specific performance thereof. In -- 'Muhi-ud-din Ahmad Khan v. Majlis Rai 6 All 231, which was essentially a suit for specific performance of contract and in which a question of limitation was involved, it was held that "the right to possession springs out of the sale-contract, and the relief by giving possession is comprised in the relief by specific performance of the sale-contract." This view was followed by Tudball J. as Tax-Ing Judge in -- 'Nihal Singh v. Sewa Ram 38 All 292. A similar question also arose in -- -- 'Sundara Ramanujam v. Sivalingam Pillai 47 Mad 150, and in the course of his judgment Krishnan J. observed : "The relief by way of giving possession arises from the relief granting the execution and delivery of the sale-deed, as without a registered sale-deed, title cannot be transferred under the Transfer of Property Act where the value is over Rs. 100; without the latter relief being granted, the former cannot : see -- 'Mahi-ud-din' Ahmad Khan v. Majlis Rai 6 All 231. Nevertheless both the rights, viz., the right to the sale deed and the right to possession spring out of the same contract though one necessarily precedes the other. The delivery of possession is a part of the specific performance of a contract of sale unless the terms thereof show that the vendee was not under an obligation to deliver possession. The claim for delivery of possession is as much a part of specific performance as the claim for the payment of the price is, when the seller brings the suit for specific performance." The view taken by the Allahabad and Madras High Courts is also shared by the Bombay and Lahore High Courts (vide -- 'Muljibhai Pitambardas v. Bai Chanchal ILR (1945) Bom 32, -- 'Faqir Chand v. Ram Datt 5 Lah 75. The "point directly arose for decision in an unreported case of this Court already referred to -- 'Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh v. Mt. Ramdhan Kuer', Civil Revn. No, 270 of 1925, D/- 22-10-1925 (Pat). In that case a suit was filed for specific performance of a contract and there was also a prayer for recovery of possession of the property. The plaintiff paid court-fee under Clause (v) of Section 7, Court-fees Act, treating the suit as one for recovery of possession. The Court below asked the plaintiff to pay court-fee under Clause (x) of Section 7 of the full consideration money, treating the suit as one for specific performance of contract. The case came up for hearing before Jwala Prasad, J. He, however, in the absence of any decision of this Court on the point and in view of the conflict of authorities on the question involved, referred the case for decision by a larger bench. The matter came up for decision before a division bench, and Das, J., with whom Adami,' J. agreed, held : "I entirely agree with the view which has been-taken by the Court below. The learned Vakil relies upon the case of -- 'Madan Mohan v. Gaja Prosad 14 cal LJ 159, but in that case the question of Court-fee was not directly involved. I have no doubt that the learned Judge was right in looking at the suit as a suit for specific performance."

    11. The defendants have strongly relied on the authority of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in -- 'Madan Mohan v. Gaja Pro-sad 14 Cal LJ 159. Mookerjee, J, held in that case that where the plaintiff not only seeks specific performance of a contract of sale, but also asks that the defendant may be compelled to execute a conveyance and to deliver posses- sion of the property to him, the suit is in substance one for possession of the property and should be valued under Section 7, Clause (v), Court-Fees Act, according to the value of the subject matter. This decision was followed by a single judge of this Court in -- 'Rambahadur v. Banwari Lal' AIR 1929 Pat 642, and it appears that the unreported bench decision of this Court, already referred to, was not brought to his notice. For the reasons given by me, I am, with all respects, unable to agree with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in -- V 'Madan Mohan's case 14 Cal LJ 159, and by the single judge of this Court in -- 'Ram-bahadur's case', AIR 1929 Pat 642. The learned counsel for the opposite party invited our attention to a Special Bench decision of the Madras High Court in -- 'Suryanarayana-charyulu v. Ravi Narasimhamswami ILR (1939) Mad 367 (SB) and contended that the view taken in -- 'Sundara Ramanujam v. Siva- lingam Pillai 47 Mad 150 has been shaken. I am unable to accept this contention. In the Special Bench case of the Madras High Court a lease had been granted for a term of twenty years which was to expire sometime in 1933. In 1929, however, the son of the grantor (who was since dead) granted a lease of the same property to another person for twenty years, the period to commence from June, 1935. A deed of lease was duly executed and registered in favour of the second lessee The second lessee sued for specific performance of they contract of lease, for possession of the properties and for the recovery of mesne profits, averring in his plaint that his lessor had, in collusion with the lessees under the first lease, put them into possession of the properties and refused his demand for possession. On these facts it was held that the suit was one for possession and not one for specific per- formance. It may be observed that this case is clearly distinguishable. The first lessees did not derive title from the grantor of the second lease subsequent to the execution of the lease in favour of the second lessee. On the expiry of the first lease, the lessees under the first lease took possession of the leasehold, according to the allegation in the plaint, in collusion with the grantor of the second lease. Therefore, the suit was one for possession against strangers to the contract who were, according to the plaintiff, unlawfully withholding possession from him and did not fall within the mischief of Section 27, Clause (b), Specific Relief Act. Leach, C. J. in distinguishing the case of -- 'Sundara Rama-nujam v. Sivalingam Pillai 47 Mad 150, observed : "In this case defendants 2 to 16, are not according to the plaint, persons claiming under" the first respondent, but persons who have been put in possession of the property in collusion with the petitioner in order to defeat the first respondent." Therefore, it cannot be said that the correctness of the decision in -- 'Sundara Ramanujam v. Sivalingam Pillai 47 Mad 150, has in any way been shaken. Moreover, recently in --Jagropan v. Krishnadeo 27 Pat 887, a bench of this Court, following the unreported decision in -- 'Chander Sekhar Prasad Singh v. Mt. Ramdhan Kuer', Civil Revn. No. 270 of 1925, D/- 22-10-1925 (Pat), has held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale, in which there was a claim for recovery of possession and a prayer for injunction, the court-fee payable was under Section 7(x), Court-fees Act, and it would make no difference simply because there was a prayer for posses-sion. Therefore, on an anxious consideration a of all the points raised before us, I am of the opinion that the case falls under Section . Court-fees Act, and the learned Munsif was wrong in returning the plaint.

    12. I would accordingly allow the application set aside the orders of the Courts below and direct the trial court to accept the plaint as properly stamped and to proceed with the suit. Reuben, J.

    13. I agree. So far as we are concerned the point is concluded by the decisions in-- -- 'Chander Prasad Sekhar Singh v. Mt. Ramdhan Kuer', Civil Revn. No. 270 of 1925, D/-22-10-1925 (Pat) and -- 'Jagropan v. Krishna-dec 27 Pat 887.

    14. The impleading of a third party, relied on by learned Counsel for the respondents as distinguishing the decision in -- 'Sundara Ramanujam v. Sivalingam Pillai 47 Mad 150. makes no difference. Section 27, Clause (b), Specific Relief Act, 1877, makes it clear that a suit for specific performance lies against a third party. In fact, where the property in suit has, subsequently to the contract, been transferred to a stranger, the transferee is a neces-.sary party to a suit for specific performance of the contract for, before it can grant the relief sought, the Court has to investigate whether the transferee is a 'bona fide' purchaser for value without notice.

    15. 'Suryanarayanacharyulu v. Ravi Nara-simhaswami ILR (1939) Mad 367 (SB), was not a case of specific performance. There the lease in favour of the plaintiff had been executed and registered and his title was complete. Further, as pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice, the third party who was im-pleaded did not come within the mischief of Section 27, Clause (b).

    16. The only new feature of this case is that there is a prayer for "mesne profits", that is to say, for compensation for loss suffered by the plaintiffs owing to delay in the performance of the contract of sale. A grant of compensation is within the powers of a Court before which a suit has been instituted for specific performance. In fact, it is a duty laid on the Court by Section 19, Specific Relief Act, which provides : (1) that where the Court refuses specific performance but considers that there has been a breach entitling the plaintiff to compensation, the Court 'shall' award him compensation, and (2) even where specific performance is granted, if the Court decides that it is not sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case and that some compensation should also be made, it "shall" award him compensation.

    17. The section provides in its first para graph that the plaintiff may ask for compen- sation, but the clauses just referred to laying a duty on the Court to grant compensation are not made dependent on such a request and the Court can grant compensation without such a request. -- 'Krishna Aiyar v. Shamanna 23 Mad LJ 610; -- 'Callianji Harjivan v. Narsi Tricum 19 Bom 764. Therefore, the inclusion in the plaint of a prayer for compensation does not alter the nature of the suit, and court-fee is payable thereon as on a plaint for specific performance.

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    Diamond Coal Co.Ltd v. State of Bihar and another
    (Sep 12, 1952)