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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent issued four cheques to the appellant in connection with a transaction. The appellant presented these cheques to the banker, but they were returned with the endorsement "refer to the drawer." The appellant represented the cheques twice more on the respondent's instructions, but they were dishonoured again. Subsequently, the appellant issued a registered notice dated 7.6.91 demanding payment under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("the Act").

The respondent filed a suit (T.S 32/91) against the appellant seeking two declaratory reliefs: (1) that the appellant is not entitled to receive any amount from the respondent, and (2) that the provisions of Section 138 of the Act are not applicable to the four cheques. The respondent also filed an interlocutory application under Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C., seeking an injunction restraining the appellant from instituting any proceeding under Section 138 of the Act concerning the cheques. The Assistant District Judge No. 2, Gauhati, granted an interim exparte injunction order on 5.7.91, which is now challenged by the appellant in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil court can grant an interim injunction restraining a party from instituting or prosecuting criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
  2. Whether the interim exparte injunction order granted by the lower court was legally valid given the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C.
  3. Whether the lower court was correct in restraining the appellant from instituting criminal proceedings in a court not subordinate to the civil court.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act apply only to final decrees and not to pendente-lite (interim) injunctions.
  • An interim or temporary relief can be granted as ancillary to the main relief in a suit, even if a final relief of similar nature is barred by statute.
  • The court has the power to grant temporary relief restraining criminal proceedings despite the statutory bar on final injunctions.

Appellant's Arguments

  • The interim injunction restraining criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Act is impermissible because such proceedings are criminal, not civil.
  • The lower court was not aware that Section 138 proceedings are criminal in nature and that injunctions restraining criminal prosecution are barred by Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The injunction order was passed exparte without proper notice, leading to a palpably erroneous order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Gungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 Prohibition on granting injunctions restraining criminal proceedings under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act Supported the view that if final injunctions are barred by statute, interim injunctions of similar nature cannot be granted.
Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited, (1983) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1983 SC 1272 Clarification that injunctions cannot restrain criminal proceedings under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act Followed to hold that the civil court cannot restrain criminal courts from proceeding under Section 138 of the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court observed that the impugned interim exparte injunction restrained the appellant from instituting criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is a criminal offence, not a civil matter. This fundamental distinction was overlooked by the lower court.

The court referred to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C. and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, emphasizing that Section 41 prohibits granting injunctions to restrain criminal proceedings or proceedings in courts not subordinate to the court granting the injunction.

Specifically, Clause (b) and Clause (d) of Section 41 were relevant, barring injunctions restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting criminal proceedings or proceedings in courts not subordinate to the civil court. Since the criminal court is not subordinate to the civil court, the injunction was impermissible.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that interim injunctions could be granted even if final injunctions are barred, relying on precedent from the Supreme Court which held that the statutory bar applies equally to interim relief.

Finally, the court noted procedural impropriety in the lower court passing an exparte order without notice, which likely contributed to the erroneous order.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the interim exparte injunction restraining the appellant from instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was improperly granted and is set aside.

The appeal is allowed without costs. The decision directly affects the parties by removing the injunction restraining criminal proceedings, but the court did not set any new precedent beyond reaffirming the established legal principles regarding injunctions and criminal proceedings under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. The civil court’s jurisdiction is limited and cannot fetter the criminal court’s authority to entertain complaints under Section 138 of the Act.

    Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Purbanchal Trade Centre

    U.L Bhat, C.J:— This appeal is directed against the interim exparte order of injunction granted in a suit, namely, T.S 32/91 against defendant (appellant) at the instance of the plaintiff (respondent) by the Assistant District Judge No. 2, Gauhati.

    2. Respondent issued four cheques to the appellant in connection with a transaction between them. Appellant presented the same to the Banker but they were returned with the endorsement “refer to the drawer.” According to the appellant cheques were represented on two further occasions on instructions of the respondent and were dishonoured. The appellant thereupon issued registered notice dated 7.6.91 to the respondent demanding payment, as contemplated under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the Act”) The suit was filed on 5.7.91 praying for two declaratory reliefs, namely, (1) declaration that the appellant is not entitled to receive any amount from the respondent, and (2) declaration that provisions of Section 438 of the Act are not applicable in the matter of four cheques. Respondent also filed an interlocutory application being Misc. Case No. 29/91 under Order 39 Rule 1, C.P.C seeking an order of injunction restraining the appellant from instituting any proceeding under Section 138 of the Act in relation to the four cheques. The lower court passed an interim exparte order of injunction on 5.7.91 This order is now challenged. We have heard both, sides.

    3. An appeal against an order of interim exparte injunctio would lie under Order 43 Rule 1(r) C.P.C but the appellate court would not ordinarily admit the appeal in the light of Order 41 Rule 11 C.P.C in the absence of exceptional circumstances. The manner in which the exparte order has been passed in this case, and the contents of the impugned order, which clearly indicate that the lower court was not conversant with the relevant principles of law, has pursuaded us to admit the appeal and hear the parties.

    4. The impugned order restrains the appellant “from instituting such proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881”. A proceeding under section 138 is not a civil proceeding but a criminal proceeding in relation to an offence punishable under section 138. The impugned order would suggest that the lower court was not aware of this important circumstance.

    5. The lower court before passing the impugned order should have paused for a moment and referred to, the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. If these provisions, in particular the provisions of Section 41, had been adverted to, perhaps the lower court would not have misled itself into granting the impugned order.

    6. There is dispute between the parties regarding the nature of transaction between them, as to the circumstance under and the purpose for which the cheques were issued. That being so it is open to either of the parties to seek remedy in a civil court and if such remedy is sought, the Civil court is bound to give a decision. If, however, either of the parties seek recourse to a competent criminal court, there is no reason why the criminal court should be restrained from examining the complaint in the light of Section 138 of the Act and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 lays down in, what cases injunction cannot be granted. Under Clause (a) an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings. The legislature enacted the bar and also the exception. According to Clause (b), an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. According to Clause (b) injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter.

    7. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the above provisions apply only in regard to the decree to be passed is a suit and not in respect of pendente-lite order of injunction. An interim or temporary relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. If the power to grant temporary relief is conferred to achieve such a purpose, it cannot be that the temporary relief can be granted in a case where a final relief of a similar nature cannot be granted on account of statutory bar. If the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits the grant of decree or injunction in cases covered thereunder, it must necessarily follow that the court cannot grant a temporary relief of a similar nature. We are fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Gungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 followed in Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank Limited, (1983) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1983 SC 1272.

    8. The case in hand falls squarely under Clause (b) as well as Clause (d) of section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The lower court in which the civil suit is pending and the criminal court in which appellant may chose to file a criminal complaint are not in the same hierarchy of courts. The criminal court is not subordinate to the civil court in the instant case. That being so, Clause (b), which bars an injunction being granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought, clearly applies to the facts of the case. Since what is sought to be restrained is institution of any proceeding in criminal matter, the bar under clause (d) is also attracted. Hence the lower court could not have passed the impugned order of injunction.

    9. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that he civil court can examine the applicability of Section 138 of the Act to the facts of the case since a declaratory relief in that behalf has been claimed. Since the matter has to be considered by the civil court in the suit, we do not propose to express any opinion in this behalf. For the purpose of this appeal it is sufficient to hold that an order of injunction of the nature issued in this case cannot be granted and the hands of the criminal court cannot be fettered by the civil court. This is what was held by the Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India Limited in a case which attracted Clause (b) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Supreme Court observed:

    “The Legislature manifestly expressed its mind by enacting Section 41(b) in such clear and unambiguous language that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person, the language takes care of injunction acting in personum, from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Section 41(b) denies to the court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is not subordinate to the court from which the injunction is sought.”

    The above principle would apply also to a case governed by Clause (d) of Section 41.

    10. The lower court is in serious error in granting interim exparte order of injunction. The lower court should have refrained from passing an exparte order and should have ordered notice to the defendants in which case a palpably errorneous order of this nature would not have been passed. We, therefore, set aside the impugned, order. Since the matter has been elaborately argued before us and we have taken a view, no useful purpose will be served in proceeding with the injunction application.

    11. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but without costs.

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    Comments

    Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Purbanchal Trade Centre
    (Sep 24, 1991)