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Disposition
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  • Section 5 of the Evidence Act (implied)
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Act
  • Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Evidence Act (implied)
  • Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Act
  • Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was serving as Deputy Chief Engineer, Railway Electrifications, South Central Railway, Vijayawada. A railway contractor (PW 1 M. Venka Reddy) had completed three electrification-related contracts between 1992-1995. When PW 1 approached the appellant on 19-4-1995 for finalisation of the last bill, the appellant allegedly demanded Rs 3000 as illegal gratification, reminding the contractor that nothing had been paid on earlier bills.

Unwilling to pay, the contractor lodged a written complaint with the CBI on 19-4-1995. A pre-trap exercise was organised the next morning by PW 7 (Inspector S.B. Shankar) with PW 2 (shadow witness G.T. Kumar). During the trap on 20-4-1995, the contractor paid tainted currency notes to the appellant; sodium-carbonate tests on the appellant’s fingers and trouser pocket turned pink, and the tainted notes were recovered.

After investigation the appellant was charged under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Special Judge, CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam (judgment dated 15-2-1999 in C.C. No. 17/1997) convicted and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and fine on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed his appeal on 29-7-2005 (Criminal Appeal No. 499/1999). The present appeal was heard by the Supreme Court on leave granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded and voluntarily accepted illegal gratification, a sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  2. Whether the complainant-contractor, allegedly an “accomplice”, required independent corroboration before the appellant’s conviction could be sustained.
  3. Whether strained relations between the appellant and the contractor rendered the prosecution version inherently improbable.
  4. Whether mere recovery of tainted money, without proof of demand and acceptance, could sustain the conviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Because of prior hostility and a pending bill dispute, it was improbable that the appellant would demand a bribe; Ext. 2 (letter dated 11-3-1995) showed that the contractor had threatened false implication.
  • The contractor was an accomplice; under decisions such as Panalal Damodar Rathi and Meena v. State of Maharashtra, conviction could not rest on his uncorroborated testimony.
  • Mere possession or recovery of tainted notes did not establish guilt; demand and voluntary acceptance must be proved, relying on C.M. Girish Babu and State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Wankhede.

Respondent’s Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G.V. Nanjundiah v. State (Delhi Administration), 1987 Supp SCC 266 Absence of demand undermines prosecution; recovery alone suspicious. Distinguished; the Court found clear evidence of demand and acceptance in the present case.
Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SCC 526 Need for corroboration when complainant’s version of demand is unsupported by panch witness. Court held it inapplicable because the shadow witness and chemical test corroborated the complainant.
Meena v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 When evidence is contradictory, corroboration is essential. Distinguished; present evidence was found consistent and reliable.
Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1969 SC 17 Person forced to pay a bribe is not an accomplice; corroboration not a legal necessity. Relied upon to reject the appellant’s plea that PW 1 was an accomplice whose evidence needed corroboration.
State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500 Evidence of witnesses who paid bribe can be accepted without corroboration if reliable. Cited to reinforce that PW 1’s testimony could be acted upon.
C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 (quoting Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 4 SCC 725) Mere recovery of money is insufficient; demand and voluntary acceptance must be proved. Principle accepted, but Court held both demand and acceptance were in fact proved.
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede, (2009) 15 SCC 200 Demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for conviction under the Act. Principle accepted; Court found evidence satisfied this requirement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The Supreme Court examined the testimonies of PW 1 (contractor), PW 2 (shadow witness) and PW 7 (trap-laying officer). It found their accounts consistent: PW 1 handed over the tainted notes after the appellant asked PW 2 to leave; sodium-carbonate tests proved contact with the money.

2. Plea of Improbability Due to Strained Relations: The Court rejected the argument that hostility made a demand unlikely, noting that the defence letter (Ext. 2) merely showed prior disputes, not impossibility of demand.

3. Whether PW 1 Was an Accomplice: Relying on Dalpat Singh and Basawan Singh, the Court held that a complainant who is forced to give a bribe is not an accomplice; hence his evidence did not legally require corroboration, though corroboration existed through PW 2 and chemical tests.

4. Need for Corroboration: The Court differentiated between wholly reliable and partly reliable witnesses. PW 1 was found wholly reliable; nevertheless, corroboration was present through PW 2’s testimony and chemical-test results.

5. Demand and Acceptance: The Court accepted the appellant’s legal proposition—demand is indispensable—but concluded, on facts, that demand and voluntary acceptance were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Distinguishing Cited Authorities: Earlier decisions requiring corroboration or finding absence of demand were distinguished because the factual matrix in this case included clear demand, acceptance, and scientific confirmation.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

The appellant’s bail bonds were cancelled and he was directed to surrender to serve the remainder of the sentence. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties and does not purport to lay down new legal principles, but it reinforces existing jurisprudence that proof of demand and acceptance can rest on credible testimony corroborated by trap evidence and chemical tests.

    C.M Sharma v. State Of Andhra Pradesh Through Inspector Of Police.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    C.K Prasad, J.— The appellant, at the relevant time was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer, Railway Electrifications, South Central Railway. He was put on trial for commission of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

    2. The Special Judge for CBI cases at Vishakhapatnam by judgment and order dated 15-2-1999 passed in CC No. 17 of 1997 held the appellant guilty of the aforesaid offences and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and a fine of Rs 2000, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 7 of the Act. The appellant was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs 2000, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. Both the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.

    3. Aggrieved by the same he preferred appeal and the High Court by its judgment dated 29-7-2005 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 499 of 1999 had affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same the appellant has preferred this appeal with the leave of the Court.

    4. According to the prosecution, the appellant at the relevant time was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer, Railway Electrification, South Central Railways, Vijayawada. PW 1, M. Venka Reddy (hereinafter referred to as “the contractor”), during the years 1992-1994, was awarded the contracts of railway electrification between Railway Stations Bhongir and Sanathnagar and Maulali and Sanathnagar bypass under Agreement No. 29 dated 3-4-1992 and Agreement No. 41 dated 20-11-1992 respectively. Further by Agreement No. 3 dated 18-10-1994 work to provide height gauges at railway crossing between Vijayawada and Gannavaran was awarded to him.

    5. According to the prosecution the contractor completed the works to the satisfaction of the Railway Authorities and in respect of the works covered by aforesaid Agreements Nos. 29 and 41 he received the payment. The contractor also completed the work covered under Agreement No. 3 dated 18-10-1994 aforesaid in the month of March 1995. The appellant was the competent authority to pass the bills and accordingly the contractor met him on 19-4-1995 and requested to finalise the bill. It is alleged that the appellant told the contractor that he had passed the final bill and demanded Rs 3000 as illegal gratification and reminded the contractor that he did not pay any amount in respect of earlier bills. The contractor expressed his inability to pay the illegal gratification but the appellant insisted and asked him to bring the money on 20-4-1995.

    6. The contractor was not willing to pay the illegal gratification and accordingly he met the officials of the Central Bureau of Investigation and gave a written report (Ext. P-1 dated 19-5-1995). Being satisfied with the bona fides of the allegation, a pre-trap exercise was undertaken by PW 7, S.B Shankar in which PW 2, G.T Kumar besides the contractor participated. PW 2, G.T Kumar at the relevant time was posted as Inspector of Central Excise and on the instructions of the Office Superintendent, he had gone to participate in the pre-trap exercise.

    7. It is alleged that the contractor along with the shadow witness PW 2, G.T Kumar went to the office of the appellant but he asked the shadow witness to go out of the chamber. The shadow witness left the chamber. However, the contractor brought the shadow witness in the chamber and explained to the appellant that he is his financer. Despite that the shadow witness was asked to leave the chamber and he went out. Thereafter the appellant demanded the money and the contractor handed over the tainted money to him, which he received from his right hand and kept in right side pocket of the trousers. A signal was given, whereupon PW 7 S.B Shankar, the Inspector along with his team entered in the chamber, apprehended the appellant and conducted sodium carbonate test on the fingers of both the hands and right trouser pocket of the appellant, which turned pink. The tainted notes were lying on the floor of the office, which were recovered.

    8. After usual investigation, the investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet and the appellant was put on trial, where he abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution had examined altogether seven witnesses and got exhibited a large number of documents. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution PW 1, M. Venka Reddy is the contractor, whereas PW 2, G.T Kumar is a shadow witness; PW 7, S.B Shankar, at the relevant time was Inspector of the Central Bureau of Investigation, who had conducted the pre-trap exercise and laid the trap in which the appellant was apprehended after he had accepted the bribe. The plea of the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of false implication due to enmity with the contractor. In order to prove the defence, he had examined DW 1, Bodh Raj Sharma, Chief Engineer, Construction as defence witness.

    9. The trial court on appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. While doing so it considered the defence version and rejected the same. Accordingly the appellant was convicted and sentenced as above by the trial court, which has been affirmed in appeal by the High Court.

    10. Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that there being strained relationship between the appellant and the contractor it is highly improbable that he would demand the illegal gratification from him. In this connection he has drawn our attention to the evidence of the contractor in his cross-examination wherein he had stated that as his bill was pending in the office of the accused, he entertained an idea to make complaint against the appellant. Our attention also has been drawn to the evidence of DW 1, Bodh Raj Sharma and the letter dated 11-3-1995 (Ext. 2) written by the appellant to the Chief Engineer, in which he had stated that since he has flatly refused to clear the bill as per the contractor's claim, he had threatened him to rope in some false case. In the aforesaid background, it has been highlighted that demand of illegal gratification alleged to have been made by the appellant is absolutely untrue. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in G.V Nanjundiah v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1987 Supp SCC 266 and our attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the judgment:

    “26. Therefore, the very foundation of the prosecution case is shaken to a great extent. The question as to the handing over of any bribe and recovery of the same from the accused should be considered along with other material circumstances one of which is the question whether any demand was at all made by the appellant for the bribe. When it is found that no such demand was made by the accused and the prosecution has given a false story in that regard, the court will view the allegation of payment of the bribe to and recovery of the same from the accused with suspicion.”

    11. We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr Rai and the decision relied on has no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case. From the evidence of the contractor PW 1, M. Venka Reddy and the shadow witness PW 2, G.T Kumar it is evident that both of them entered into the chamber of the appellant. The appellant asked the shadow witness to go out and PW 2 accordingly left the chamber. However, he was brought back by the contractor stating that PW 2, G.T Kumar is his financer but the appellant again asked him to go out and within a few minutes after PW 2, G.T Kumar left the chamber the appellant demanded the money, whereupon he delivered the tainted notes. The appellant kept them in the right trouser pocket. After the signal PW 7, S.B Shankar, Inspector of the Central Bureau of Investigation came and sodium carbonate test was conducted on the right hand fingers and the right trouser pocket and the solution turned pink.

    12. PW 7, S.B Shankar, Inspector of the Central Bureau of Investigation had stated in his evidence that on 19-4-1995 he received a complaint against the appellant of demanding illegal gratification from the contractor and he conducted a pre-trap proceeding on 20-4-1995 at about 8 a.m in the presence of PW 2, G.T Kumar and others. He has further stated that he laid the trap on the same day at 11.45 a.m and recovered the tainted currency notes under the office table of the appellant when the appellant had thrown the said notes on being questioned by him. In the face of the specific and positive evidence of these witnesses which cannot be said to be inherently improbable, the plea of the appellant that the prosecution case is fit to be rejected on the ground of improbability does not appeal to us. It is accordingly rejected.

    13. As regards the decision of this Court in Nanjundiah 1987 Supp SCC 266 the same does not advance the case of the appellant. Whether the case of the prosecution deserves acceptance or not is decided on appreciation of evidence and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid in this regard. In the said case the Court on facts did not accept the case of the prosecution. Here in the present case as stated above, there does not seem any reason to reject the evidence of the contractor, the shadow witness and the Inspector who laid the trap.

    14. Mr Rai, then submits that the conviction of the appellant is not fit to be sustained only on the evidence of the contractor without any corroboration. He submits that the contractor is an accomplice and, therefore, before sustaining the appellant's conviction it is essential that his evidence is corroborated by evidence of other witnesses. Reference has been made in this connection to a decision of this Court in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 4 SCC 526 and our attention has been drawn to para 9 thereof which reads as follows:

    “9. It will be seen that the version of the complainant that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had brought the money and that the complainant told him that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the panch witness PW 3. According to panch witness on the complainant asking the appellant whether his work will be achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative and the appellant told the complainant what was to be given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3 does not mention about the appellant asking the complainant whether he had brought the money and on the complainant replying in the affirmative asking the complainant to pay the money to the second accused. Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by the appellant would show that there is no corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand for the money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect, therefore, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied on.”

    15. Yet another decision on which reliance is placed is the decision of this Court in Meena v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 5 SCC 21 in which it held as follows:

    “10. … The corroboration essential in a case like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence and acceptance of bribe is very much wanting in this case. Even the other panch witness, PW 5 categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of Police, PW 6 arrived, the appellant gave the same version that PW 1 tried to force into her hands the currency note which she turned down by pushing it away, and his evidence also does not lend credibility to the case of the prosecution. The contradictory version of PW 1 of the very incident when earlier examined in departmental proceedings renders his testimony in this case untrustworthy. PW 3, the Head Copyist, seems to be the brain behind all this and that PW 1 as well as Jagdish Bokade appear to be working as a group in this affair and despite the blunt denial by PW 3, his closeness to PW 1 and Jagdish Bokade stands well substantiated. All these relevant aspects of the case seem to have been completely overlooked by the courts below.”

    16. We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr Rai. The word “accomplice” has not been defined under the Evidence Act and therefore presumed to have been used in the ordinary sense. A person concerned in the commission of crime, a partner in crime and associate in guilt is an accomplice. He takes part in the crime and is privy to the criminal intent. In our opinion a witness forced to pay on promise of doing or forbearing to do any official act by a public servant, is not a partner in crime and associate in guilt and therefore cannot be said to be an accomplice. It has long been a rule of practice, which has become equivalent to the rule of law, that the evidence of an accomplice is admissible but to be acted upon, ordinarily requires corroboration. The contractor who gave bribe, therefore, cannot be said to be an accomplice as the same was extorted from him.

    17. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this Court in Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1969 SC 17 , 1969 Cri LJ 262 in which it has been held as follows: (AIR p. 20, para 5)

    “5. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and other prosecution witnesses to whose evidence we shall presently refer, should be considered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars before being accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be considered as accomplices as the same was extorted from them. Though PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be considered as interested witnesses as regards their evidence relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh AIR 1958 SC 500 , 1958 Cri LJ 976 , 1959 SCR 195.
    (emphasis supplied)

    18. Further, corroboration of evidence of a witness is required when his evidence is not wholly reliable. On appreciation of evidence, witnesses can be broadly categorised in three categories viz. unreliable, partly reliable and wholly reliable. In case of a partly reliable witness, the court seeks corroboration in material particulars from other evidence. However in a case in which a witness is wholly reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Seeking corroboration in all circumstance of the evidence of a witness forced to give bribe may lead to absurd result. Bribe is not taken in public view and, therefore, there may not be any person who could see the giving and taking of bribe. As in the present case, a shadow witness did accompany the contractor but the appellant did not allow him to be present in the chamber. Acceptance of this submission in abstract will encourage the bribe-taker to receive illegal gratification in privacy and then insist for corroboration in case of prosecution. Law cannot countenance such a situation.

    19. In our opinion it is not necessary that the evidence of a reliable witness is necessarily to be corroborated by another witness. Not only this corroboration of the evidence of a witness can be found from the other materials on record. Here in the present case there does not seem any reason to reject the evidence of the contractor PW 1, M. Venka Reddy. His evidence is further corroborated by the evidence of the shadow witness PW 2, G.T Kumar. The shadow witness has stated in his evidence that when he entered into the chamber, the appellant was asked by the Inspector as to whether he had received any amount from the contractor, he denied and then removed the currency notes from his trouser pocket and threw the same. He had further stated that sodium carbonate test was conducted in which the solution turned pink when the appellant's fingers and the right side trouser pocket were rinsed. From the aforesaid one can safely infer that the evidence of the contractor is corroborated in material particulars by the shadow witness.

    20. In Panalal Damodar Rathi (1979) 4 SCC 526 relied on by the appellant, the version of the complainant was not supported by the panch witnesses and in the face thereof this Court gave the accused the benefit of doubt, which is not the situation in the present case. Similarly in Meena (2000) 5 SCC 21, faced with contradictory evidence and plea of the accused this Court found corroboration necessary to uphold conviction.

    21. Mr Rai, lastly submits that from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the worst which can be said against the appellant is that currency notes were recovered from him. That itself, in his submission, does not constitute the offence. He submits that to bring home the charge the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had demanded the illegal gratification and accepted the same voluntarily. In support of the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in C.M Girish Babu v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 and our attention has been drawn to SCC para 18 of the judgment which reads as follows:

    “18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1979) 4 SCC 725 this Court took the view that (at mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe.”

    22. Another decision on which reliance is placed is the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede (2009) 15 SCC 200 in which it has been held as:

    “16. Indisputably, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the provisions of the Act. For arriving at the conclusion as to whether all the ingredients of an offence viz. demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount of illegal gratification have been satisfied or not, the court must take into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on the record in their entirety.”

    23. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Rai that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to constitute the offence under the Act. Further mere recovery of currency notes itself does not constitute the offence under the Act, unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. In the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that both the ingredients to bring the Act within the mischief of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(ii) of the Act are satisfied.

    24. From the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution it is evident that the appellant demanded the money from the contractor as he had passed his bills. There is further evidence that when the contractor went along with the shadow witness on the date told by the appellant for payment of the bribe, the appellant asked the shadow witness to leave the chamber and thereafter the demand for payment of illegal gratification was made and paid. The positive sodium carbonate test vis-à-vis the fingers and right trouser pocket of the appellant go to show that he voluntarily accepted the bribe. Thus there is evidence of demand of illegal gratification and the voluntary acceptance thereof.

    25. All the submissions made on behalf of the appellant being devoid of any substance, we do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender to serve out the remainder of the sentence.

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    C.M Sharma v. State Of Andhra Pradesh Through Inspector Of Police.
    (Nov 25, 2010)