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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act as also the provisions of Bihar Finance Act, 1981,
  • Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules.
  • Bihar Finance Act, 1985, and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983,
  • provisions of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution
  • ARTICLE 366 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision of Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act
  • provision of Section 21 of the Bihar Finance Act
  • Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983,
  • Section 2(j) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981,
  • FINANCE ACT 1981
  • ARTICLE 286 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules
  • Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act,
  • Section 16(8) of the Bihar Finance Act.
  • MADHYA PRADESH GENERAL SALES TAX ACT
  • Section 25A of the Bihar Finance Act.
  • Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and rules
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 11
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 3,
  • Sales Tax Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act as also the provisions of Bihar Finance Act, 1981,
  • Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules.
  • Bihar Finance Act, 1985, and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983,
  • provisions of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution
  • ARTICLE 366 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provision of Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act
  • provision of Section 21 of the Bihar Finance Act
  • Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983,
  • Section 2(j) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981,
  • FINANCE ACT 1981
  • ARTICLE 286 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules
  • Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act,
  • Section 16(8) of the Bihar Finance Act.
  • MADHYA PRADESH GENERAL SALES TAX ACT
  • Section 25A of the Bihar Finance Act.
  • Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and rules
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 11
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 3,
  • Sales Tax Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ application seeking, inter alia, declarations that:

  • the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act and provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, insofar as they seek to impose sales tax on works contracts, are ultra vires the Constitution of India;
  • Section 21(1)(a)(i) as inserted by the Bihar Finance Act, 1985, and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983, are ultra vires, illegal and void ab initio; and
  • the orders imposing penalty on the petitioner for assessment years 1985-86 and 1987-88, the demand notices for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88, and the notices of assessment for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88 (annexure-4 series) be quashed.

Factual matrix (as alleged by the petitioner): the petitioner entered into various works contracts with respondent No. 5 to carry out civil construction jobs. The material content in these contracts was said to be about 25%–30% of the whole contract value. The petitioner asserted that most materials (notably steel and cement) were supplied by the principal either free or on a cost recovery basis and that title to those materials at all times remained with the principal and never passed to the petitioner. The petitioner also stated that works were performed by hired labourers.

The petitioner described the tax consequences he faced: a sales-tax assessment for 1985-86 assessed total tax at Rs. 22,157.29, with Rs. 9,189 deducted at source by respondent No. 5 and deposited in the Government treasury, and the balance paid by the petitioner. The assessing authority (respondent No. 4) levied penalties aggregating Rs. 13,848 under Section 25(3) and a penalty of Rs. 3,800 under Section 16(8) for late filing (attributable by the petitioner to labour strikes). The petitioner also received assessment notices for 1986-87 and 1987-88.

Procedurally, at admission the Division Bench passed an interim order permitting the respondent to continue assessment but restraining the issuance of a notice of demand until disposal of the writ application. The Court noted uncertainty in the law on whether labour charges and other components of works contracts are taxable and directed appropriate consideration of binding authorities.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act and provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, insofar as they impose sales tax on works contracts, are ultra vires the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether Section 21(1)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act (as amended w.e.f. 1985) and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983, are ultra vires, illegal and void ab initio in that they permit inclusion of labour charges in taxable turnover for works contracts.
  3. Whether the penalty orders and demand notices (annexure-4 series) issued to the petitioner for assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 should be quashed, including whether the assessing authority properly accounted for 4% deduction at source under Section 25A of the Bihar Finance Act.
  4. Whether the order imposing penalty under Section 16(8) for late filing of returns is sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented to the Court)

  • Challenge to vires of Section 21(1)(a)(i) (as amended in 1985) and Rule 13-A: these provisions improperly include labour charges in taxable turnover for works contracts, which is not permissible under the Constitution and the relevant definitions in the law.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Builders Association of India v. Union of India (1989 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151) to contend that only that portion of a works contract involving an actual transfer of goods falls within the Clause (29A) definition of "sale" under Article 366 and Article 286 constraints; labour charges should not be taxable merely because they are part of a works contract.
  • Submission that the definition of "gross turnover" in Section 2(j) of the Bihar Finance Act cannot be applied in the manner adopted by Section 21(1)(a)(i) and Rule 13-A to include labour charges within taxable turnover.
  • Contended that, in fact, materials were supplied by the principal and title never passed to the petitioner, supporting the contention that there was no taxable sale of those goods by the contractor.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' specific legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Builders Association of India v. Union of India [1989] 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151 (also reported [1989] 2 SCR 320) Held that the definition of "sale" in Clause (29A) of Article 366 is subject to Article 286; an assessee is liable to pay sales tax only in relation to transactions which involve a sale of goods (i.e., actual transfer of property in goods). The Court relied on this decision to hold that only transactions involving transfer of goods are taxable and to question the inclusion of labour charges under Rule 13-A and Section 21(1)(a)(i). It was a primary authority informing the conclusion that labour charges could not properly be included within taxable turnover merely by Rule 13-A.
Jamshedpur Contractors' Association v. State of Bihar [1989] 75 STC 132 (Division Bench of this Court) Decision of the Division Bench that Rule 13-A is ultra vires the Constitution (in light of Builders Association decision and other authorities). The Court cited this Division Bench decision as having held Rule 13-A ultra vires and relied upon it to conclude that Rule 13-A (which brings labour charges within taxable turnover) is illegal and unenforceable.
N.M. Goel & Co. 1988 (38) ELT 733 (SC) Holds that if employer supplies materials and the contractor is made liable to pay their price, the contractor is deemed to have sold the goods to the employer and is liable to tax; observations in that earlier decision conflicted in part with Builders Association decision. The Court distinguished and reconciled Goel & Co. with the Builders Association decision: Goel & Co. remains authority for the proposition that when there is an agreement under which the employer supplies materials but makes the contractor liable to pay their price, that transaction may amount to a sale by the contractor and attract sales tax.
Kedar Nath Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 955 Authority for the principle that a provision may be read down to uphold constitutionality; offers guidance on interpretative approaches where constitutionality is in question. The Court cited this decision to note the accepted principle that statutes may be given a restricted meaning or read down where necessary to uphold constitutionality, subject to limitations expressly mentioned in the opinion.
All Saints High School v. [1980] 2 SCR 924 Referenced as part of authorities establishing principles about reading statutes in context and restricted meanings to preserve constitutionality. Used to support the Court's observation about interpretative approaches to statutes and constitutionality (cited alongside Kedar Nath Singh).
Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436 Quoted for the principle that words of a statute must be read in context: the whole statutory context (including preamble, existing state of law and mischief) should inform interpretation. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize the legitimacy of giving a statute a restricted meaning in its proper context when addressing constitutional challenges and interpretation issues.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. [1972] 83 ITR 26 (SC) Principle that an order imposing penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless there is deliberate defiance, contumacious or dishonest conduct, or conscious disregard; discretion must be exercised judicially. The Court applied this principle to conclude that penalty (annexure-4) could not be sustained where the assessing officer failed to take into account relevant facts (such as the 4% deduction at source) and where there was legal uncertainty. This supported quashing of those penalty/demand orders.
Gujarat Travancore Agency v. [1989] 177 ITR 455 (SC) Cited in relation to principles governing imposition of penalty under statutory provisions like Section 16(8). The Court referenced this decision when considering the validity of the penalty imposed under Section 16(8) for late filing and found that the assessing authority had given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and had assigned cogent reasons for imposing that particular penalty; the Court declined to interfere with that order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the statutory definitions and the relevant precedents, with care to the limited factual material before it:

  1. The Court recorded that counsel for the petitioner did not press the challenge to the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Builders Association, which addressed important constitutional facets of the taxation of works contracts.
  2. The Court set out the statutory definitions at issue: "gross turnover" (Section 2(j)), "works contract" (Section 2(ww)) and "taxable turnover" (Section 21(1)(a)(i) — deduction in case of works contract for labour charges "in the manner or to the extent prescribed"). The formulaic percentages and categories for deduction of labour charges under Rule 13-A were also reproduced.
  3. The Court identified the core legal difficulty: Rule 13-A and Section 21(1)(a)(i) bring labour charges within the scope of taxable turnover, whereas the Supreme Court in Builders Association affirmed that only transactions amounting to a "sale" (actual transfer of property in goods) fall within Clause (29A) of Article 366 and are subject to sales tax.
  4. The Court acknowledged established interpretative principles — including the ability to read down a provision to uphold constitutionality and to give restricted meanings to statutory provisions — citing authorities on statutory construction, but observed that a statute will not be read down merely to cure every infirmity.
  5. Applying these principles and the authorities, the Court concluded that Rule 13-A and Section 21(1)(a)(i) had indeed brought labour charges within their sweep and that this aspect had to be held illegal and unenforceable in light of the Builders Association rule that tax attaches only to transactions involving a sale of goods.
  6. The Court reconciled the decision in N.M. Goel & Co. (an earlier Supreme Court decision) with the Builders Association line of authority: Goel & Co. stands for the proposition that where there is an agreement under which the employer supplies materials but the contractor is made liable to pay for them, that arrangement may constitute a sale by the contractor and attract sales tax. Thus, the Court observed that factual questions about contractual arrangements and transfer of property remain relevant and may justify taxation in specific circumstances.
  7. The Court noted the petitioner's failure to produce the contracts or other specific facts showing whether and to what extent the works contracts involved transfer of material so as to bring them within "taxable turnover". Because those factual matters were not before the Court, it directed that the assessing authority determine them in light of the governing decisions.
  8. On the penalty/demand notices (annexure-4 and annexure-4/1), the Court found that the assessing officer had failed to consider that respondent No. 6 had already deducted 4% at source under Section 25A and therefore misdirected himself in law. Given the concurrent uncertainty in the law (numerous writ petitions pending and relevant Supreme Court decisions), the Court considered imposition of penalty in that context and concluded the impugned orders and demand notices could not be sustained without reconsideration.
  9. Conversely, regarding the penalty under Section 16(8) for late filing (annexure-4/3), the Court found that the petitioner had been given a hearing, that the assessing officer had recorded reasons for rejecting the petitioner's explanation (strike by labourers), and that the Court did not find illegality in that order; accordingly, it declined to interfere with the Section 16(8) penalty.
  10. The Court therefore directed that where assessment proceedings for the relevant years had not been concluded, the assessing authority should conclude them while keeping in view the cited Supreme Court and High Court authorities and after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ application was allowed in part. In particular, the Court QUASHED the order dated 16th December, 1983 contained in annexure-4 and the demand notices contained in annexure-4/1 to the writ application.

Consequential directions and implications:

  • The assessing authority (respondent No. 4) is directed to re-examine the matters contained in the quashed orders after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and to conclude any pending assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 in accordance with the Supreme Court decisions (notably Builders Association and N.M. Goel) and the Division Bench decision in Jamshedpur Contractors' Association's case.
  • The Court held that Rule 13-A and the relevant application of Section 21(1)(a)(i) (to the extent that they include labour charges within taxable turnover) are illegal and unenforceable, and the assessing authority must determine, on the facts and contractual documents, whether any part of the contracts actually involves a transfer of property in goods (which may be taxable under the Sales Tax Act) or not.
  • The penalty imposed under Section 16(8) (annexure-4/3) for late filing of returns was not interfered with by this Court because the petitioner had been heard and the assessing officer recorded cogent reasons; the petitioner did not make out a case to set that penalty aside.
  • No order as to costs was made.

The Court did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities; rather, it directed the assessing authority to apply those authorities to the facts of the petitioner's case. No new precedent was asserted to have been created by this opinion.

    Ashok Kumar Ghosh v. Union of India

    S.B. Sinha, J.

    1. In this writ application the petitioner inter alia has prayed for a declaration that the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act as also the provisions of Bihar Finance Act, 1981, in so far as it seeks to impose sales tax on works contract are ultra vires the Constitution of India and further for a declaration that Section 21(1)(a)(i) as inserted by the Bihar Finance Act, 1985, and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983, are also ultra vires, illegal, void ab initio and further for quashing of the orders imposing penalty upon the petitioner for the assessment years 1985-86 and 1987-88 as also the demand notices for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88 and the notices of assessment for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88 as contained in annexure-4 series to the writ application.

    2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.

    3. Allegedly the petitioner had entered into various contracts with the respondent No. 5 and pursuant thereto had been carrying on various construction jobs of civil nature. According to the petitioner, the material contents involved in the works contract is about 25 per cent and 30 per cent of the entire works contract. The petitioner has further asserted that most of the materials specially steel and cement are supplied by the principal either free of cost or on cost recovery basis and the title of the said property at all times remains with the principal and never passes on to the petitioner. It is further alleged that the said contract jobs are performed by the hired labourers. It has further been asserted that sales tax payable by him on the whole contract is 8 per cent plus 1 per cent turnover plus 5 per cent surcharge on sales tax payable which is about 9.5 per cent in terms of the notification issued by the State of Bihar under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and rules framed thereunder. The petitioner has further asserted that his principal had been deducting 4 per cent from the amount payable to the petitioner from his running account bills in terms of Section 25A of the Bihar Finance Act.

    4. The petitioner was assessed for the year 1985-86 and the total tax was assessed at Rs. 22,157.29 out of which the amount of Rs. 9,189 was deducted at source from the running account bills of the petitioner by respondent No. 5 and deposited in the Government treasury and the balance amount of Rs. 13,038.29 was paid vide challan No. 2 dated 12th August, 1988.

    5. According to the petitioner the assessing authority namely respondent No. 4 without taking into consideration the aforementioned facts levied penalty under Section 25(3) at the rate of two and one half per cent per month for the first three months and at the rate of 6 per cent per month for the balance period, aggregating a sum of Rs. 13,848. The petitioner has further contended that he could not file his return for the first and second quarters of the assessment year 1987-88 within the stipulated period in view of strike resorted to by the labourers wherefor the respondent No. 4 had imposed a penalty of Rs. 3,800 upon him in terms of Section 16(8) of the Bihar Finance Act. The aforementioned orders of penalty are contained in annexure-4 and 4/3 to the writ application.

    6. The petitioner has further contended that he has been issued with notices of assessment for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88.

    7. Mr. Pawan Kumar the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner did not press the question of vires of Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Builders Association of India v. Union of India reported in1989 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151.

    8. The learned counsel however, submitted that in the aforementioned decision, the Supreme Court did not go into the question of the vires of the legislation made by the State Legislature which may be capable of being challenged on the grounds other than the question of vires of the said Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that the vires of the provision of Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act as amended with effect from 1985 as also Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules are open to question in this writ application. Mr. Pawan Kumar further submitted that the gross turnover is defined in Section 2(j) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, on the basis whereof, sales tax in respect of works contract is to be assessed, cannot be done in the manner as provided for under Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the Bihar Finance Act and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules. According to the learned counsel the said provisions are ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as the amount of the labour charges prescribed by reason of Rule 13-A has also been included for the purpose of calculating taxable turnover. The Supreme Court in the case of Builders Association of India [1989] 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151, has clearly held that only such portion of works contract would come within the purview of Clause (29A) of Article of the Constitution whereby and whereunder actual transfer of goods takes place from the contractor to the principal in execution of the works contract.

    9. The learned counsel further submitted that in this view of the matter labour charges involved in execution of works contract cannot be brought within the purview of the aforementioned Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

    10. "Gross turnover" has been defined in Section 2(j) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, which reads as follows : "(i) For the purposes of levy of sales tax, in respect of sale of goods, aggregate of sale prices received and receivable by a dealer, including the gross amount received or receivable for execution of works contract or for the transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) during any given period (and also including the sale of goods made outside the State and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or export), but does not include sale prices of goods which have borne the incidence of purchase tax under Section 4.

    (ii) For the purposes of bearing in the incidence of purchase tax, aggregate of purchase prices paid or payable by a dealer during any given period in respect of purchase of goods or class or description of goods which have borne the incidence of purchase tax under Section 4.

    (iii) For the purposes of Section 3, the aggregate of the amounts under Sub-clauses (i) and (ii)."

    11. "Works contract" has been defined in Section 2(ww) of the said Act which reads as follows : " 'Works contract' means any agreement for carrying out for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration the construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of any building, road, bridge or other immovable or movable property."

    12. "Taxable turnover" has been defined under Section 21 of the said Act which reads as follows : (1) "For the purpose of this part the taxable turnover of a dealer shall be that part of his gross turnover which remains after deduction therefrom-- (a) (i) in case of works contract the amount of labour charges in the manner or to the extent prescribed ;

    (ii) sale price on account of sales exempted under Section 7 ; (b) amount of sales tax actually collected as such, if any, along with the sale prices received or receivable in respect of sales of goods ; (c) sale prices on account of sales to a registered dealer other than a dealer liable to pay tax under Sub-section (8) of Section 3, of goods mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 11 and specified in his registration certificate as being required for resale by him inside Bihar or in course of inter-State trade or commerce : "

    13. Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983, which was inserted by Notification bearing No. S.O. 1142 dated 8th October, 1986, which reads as follows : "13-A. Deduction in case of works contract on account of labour charge.-- Deduction under Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 on account of labour charges in case of works contract from gross turnover shall be equal to the following percentage in respect of different types of works contract : PERCENTAGE Per cent (1)(a)Earthwork in all types of soil and in all works oncanals, roads, embankments, small dams, etc., by manual labour ; and exclusive labour rate contracts.100 (b)Earthwork in all types of soil in all works on canals, roads, embankments, dams, etc., by machines.20 (c)Construction of earth dams with earth moving machines.26 (2)(a)Construction of masonry/concrete dams, barrages, bridges of more than 16 metres length, water towers and P.H.E.D. installations and lift-irrigation installations, etc.30 (b)Stone masonry in dams and other such works.35 (3) Construction of canal structures, bridges up to 16 metres length, all types of building and lining of canals.30 (4)(a)Construction of pucca roads (excluding earthwork)16 (b)Construction of pucca roads (including earthwork in formation of new roads)26 (5) River taming and flood protection works involving boulder and brick pitching (excluding earthwork)40 (6) In the case of electrical contracts20 (7) In the case of contracts30 (8) In the case of sanitary contracts33-1/3 (9) In the case of retreading contracts50 (10) In the case of textile dyeing and printing works contracts60 (11) In the case of photography and printing contract30 (12) In the case of sculptural contract or contracts relating to arts70 (13) In the case of refrigeration, air-conditioning or other machinery rolling shutters, cranes, installation contracts15 (14) In the case of other contracts30."

    14. In Builders Association [1989] 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151, the Supreme Court has inter alia held that the definition of sale as contained in Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India is subject to Article 286 of the Constitution of India. It has further been held that for the purpose of imposing liability of sales tax upon the assessee, no factor other than what has been contemplated under the aforementioned provisions of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution can be taken into consideration. In other words an assessee is liable to pay tax only in relation to such transaction which involves sale of goods.

    15. It is now well-known that a provision of the law can be read down in order to uphold its constitutionality is concerned. In this case reference may be made to Kedar Nath Singh v. AIR1962SC955 and in All Saints High School v. [1980]2SCR924 . It is further well-known that a restricted meaning can be given to such a statute. Reference in this connection may be made in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in [1957] AC 436, wherein the necessity of rule of interpretation of a statute in its proper context has been emphasised in the following terms : "I wish at the outset to express my dissent from it, if it means that I cannot obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the meaning of the relevant enacting part. For words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation : their colour and content are derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use 'context' in its widest sense, which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy". However, a legislature cannot be presumed to have intended to violate the provision of the Constitution, but the same does not mean that a statute will be read down, even if it be ultra vires.

    16. There is no doubt that Section 21(l)(a)(i) of the said Act and Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules have brought within its purview even the element of labour charges within its sweep and the same must be held to be illegal and unenforceable. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Builders Association [1989] 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151, this aspect of the matter has recently been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Jamshedpur Contractors' Association v. State of Bihar [1989] 75 STC 132 and other analogous cases being C.W.J.C. No. 1034 of 1984(R) and other analogous cases disposed of on 2nd August [1989] 75 STC 132, wherein it has been held that Rule 13-A is ultra vires the Constitution. In the aforementioned decision the Division Bench further referred to the decision of N.M. Goel & Co. v. 1988(38)ELT733(SC) and read the same in the light of the decision of the Constitution Bench in the Builders Association's case [1989]2SCR320 by holding as follows : "...From the judgment in Goel & Co. 1988(38)ELT733(SC) , it appears that the company was a building contractor and was registered as dealer under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The tender of the company for construction of godown and ancillary building was accepted by the Central Public Works Department (C.P.W.D.). In the tender so submitted by the company, the prices of the materials to be used for construction including cost of iron, steel and cement were included. The C.P.W.D., however had agreed to supply from its stores iron, steel and cement for construction work and to deduct the prices of materials so supplied and consumed in the construction from the final bill of the company. The company was assessed to purchase tax under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and was as such liable for payment of entry tax for iron, steel and cement, the entry for the same having been effected at the instance of the company because it had ultimately used the materials for the construction work. Under the Madhya Pradesh Entry Tax Act, it was assessed also to entry tax. The company challenged the assessment of purchase tax and also assessment of entry tax and the matter came to the Supreme Court. This case was decided earlier than the Builders Association [1989]2SCR320 . But the same was not brought to the notice of the Bench hearing the Builders Association's case [1989]2SCR320 . Some observations made in Goel & Co. 1988(38)ELT733(SC) are no doubt in conflict with the judgment of Builders Association [1989]2SCR320 as in the former the effect of Forty-sixth amendment to the Constitution was not considered, viz., observation made in Goel & Co. 1988(38)ELT733(SC) that for building materials supplied by the contractor in works contract there is no question of sale or purchase, is directly in conflict with the judgment of the Builders Association [1989]2SCR320 and that no more can be held to be a good law. However, in Goel & Co. 1988(38)ELT733(SC) , it was held that if there is an agreement between the parties by which the employer undertakes to supply materials which are to be consumed for execution of the works contract and the price of which the contractor is made liable to pay, the contractor shall be deemed to have sold the goods to the employer and the contractor is liable to pay tax under the Sales Tax Act. In view of this legal position, notwithstanding the submission made on behalf of the States in Builders Association [1989]2SCR320 , it must be held that if there is an agreement between the contractor and the employer under which the employer agrees to supply building materials to the contractor to be used in the work, and the contractor is made liable to pay the price of those materials, there is sale of goods by the contractor and he shall be liable to pay tax on such sale. The legal position now is when there is a transfer of property in goods by the contractor in execution of works contract, sales tax law is attracted." True it is that in the aforementioned decision the provision of Section 21 of the Bihar Finance Act was not taken note but this does not alter the ratio of the decision inasmuch as evidently Rule 13-A was framed in terms of Section 21(1)(a)(i). It is thus clear that the question of law raised by the petitioner has to be determined by the assessing authority keeping in view the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. Needless to add that before the assessing authority, various questions which are peculiar in the facts and circumstances of each case may arise which cannot be conceived of at this stage. The petitioner has also not annexed the copies of the contract entered into by and between him and the respondent No. 5 and further has not stated the other relevant facts in order to enable this Court to ascertain as to whether and if any to what extent the works contract undertaken by him involves supply of materials so as to bring the same within the purview of "taxable turnover" under the said Act.

    17. By an order dated 9th May, 1989, at the time of admission of the writ application the Division Bench of this Court passed the following interim order : "In the meantime, the respondent may continue with the assessment pursuant to the notice (annexure-4/2), but shall not issue a notice of demand till disposal of the writ application."

    18. Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties could not however inform me as to whether the assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1986-87 and 1987-88 have been concluded, pursuant to the aforementioned notices as contained in annexure-4/2 or not. The assessing authority, therefore, in the event he has not concluded the assessment proceedings, shall while doing so pass orders keeping in view the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court in Builders Association [1989] 73 STC 370 : 1989 BLT 151 and N.M. Goel 1988(38)ELT733(SC) and decision of this Court in Jamshedpur Contractors Association's case [1989] 75 STC 132.

    19. So far as the prayer of the petitioner for quashing the order of penalty as contained in annexure-4 is concerned it appears that the respondent No. 4 did not take into consideration the fact that the respondent No. 6 had already deducted 4 per cent of the amount payable to the petitioner by way of running bills in terms of Section 25A of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, and thus he misdirected himself in law. In view of the large number of writ petitions pending in this Court as also before the Supreme Court of India the law applicable for imposition of tax in the matter of works contract was uncertain.

    20. It is well-known that penalty is not to be imposed only because it is lawful to do so. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. [1972]83ITR26(SC) it was held as follows : "An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out."

    21. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that annexure-4 as also the demand notices issued pursuant thereto and as contained in annexure-4/1 cannot be sustained and the respondent No. 4 should re-examine the matter after giving an opportunity of bearing to the petitioner.

    22. So far as the imposition of penalty for not filing the returns within the prescribed period is concerned, it appears from the order dated 26th December, 1988, passed by the respondent No. 4 as contained in annexure-4/3 to the writ application, the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing by the respondent No. 4 before imposing penalty upon him in terms of Section 16(8) of the said Act and as such no illegality has been committed by him in respect of the said order nor do I find any. Before the respondent No. 4, as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner got an opportunity to explain the reason for non-submission of returns in time, and the respondent No. 4 in his impugned order has assigned cogent reason for not accepting the said explanation and imposing a penalty of Rs. 3,800 upon the petitioner in exercise of his power under Section 16(8) of the said Act. Reference in this connection may be made to Gujarat Travancore Agency v. [1989]177ITR455(SC) .

    23. The petitioner has not made out any case whatsoever for interference with the said order by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

    24. In the result this writ application is allowed to the aforementioned extent and order dated 16th December, 1983, as contained in annexure-4 and the demand notices as contained in annexure-4/l to the writ application are quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

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    Ashok Kumar Ghosh v. Union of India
    (Jul 9, 1989)