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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(q) of the Act
  • the relevant provisions of the Act
  • Section 2(q), Section 4(9) of the Act (read with Schedule I)
  • Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(q) of the Act
  • the relevant provisions of the Act
  • Section 2(q), Section 4(9) of the Act (read with Schedule I)
  • Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Aggarwal each owned a one-half share in Plot Nos. 129, 130 and 131 situated in Gorakhpur. After the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“the Act”) came into force on 21 February 1976 (appointed day: 28 January 1976), the Competent Authority served draft statements on them under Section 8. The appellants and their sons objected, asserting that the lands belonged to their respective Hindu undivided families. The Competent Authority rejected that contention and determined the excess vacant land that had to be surrendered: 4,725.82 sq m by Kamani and 5,095.49 sq m by Aggarwal.

On appeal, the District Judge, Gorakhpur refused leave to adduce additional evidence on the Hindu-undivided-family claim but interpreted Sections 4(9) and 2(q) (read with Schedule I) to allow each appellant an additional retention of 2,000 sq m. Cross-writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court. Relying on State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110, the High Court reinstated the larger surrender areas and dismissed the appellants’ writ petitions.

The Supreme Court granted special leave limited to the question of the permissible 2,000 sq m deduction; leave as to the Hindu-undivided-family issue was expressly refused.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether land already built upon before the appointed day, together with land appurtenant thereto, falls outside the definition of “vacant land” under Section 2(q)(ii) of the Act, thereby entitling each appellant to deduct up to 2,000 sq m from the computation of excess land.
  2. Whether, in light of Meera Gupta v. State of W.B. (1992) 2 SCC 494, the High Court erred in relying on L.J. Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110 to deny the aforesaid deduction.
  3. Whether the matter should be remanded to the Competent Authority for fresh calculations or decided by the Supreme Court on the existing record.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • Contended that Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 governs the present case; under that decision, land built upon prior to the appointed day and its appurtenant land are excluded from “vacant land,” entitling each appellant to a 2,000 sq m deduction.
  • Maintained that the High Court’s reliance on L.J. Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110 was misplaced because that precedent applies only to cases falling under Section 2(q)(i), not Section 2(q)(ii).

Respondent State’s Arguments

  • Did not dispute the applicability of Meera Gupta but urged that the matter be remanded to the Competent Authority to recompute excess land in light of that judgment.
  • Submitted that, although measurements were on record, recalculation by the original authority would be procedurally appropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson, (1983) 4 SCC 110 Interprets “vacant land” under Section 2(q)(i): land where construction is not permissible. Held inapplicable because the present case falls under Section 2(q)(ii); the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s reliance on this precedent.
Meera Gupta (Smt) v. State of W.B., (1992) 2 SCC 494 Land built upon before the appointed day, and land appurtenant thereto, is excluded from “vacant land” under Section 2(q)(ii). Treated as controlling authority; entitled each appellant to deduct up to 2,000 sq m from the calculation of excess land.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court confined its inquiry to whether the appellants could claim a 2,000 sq m deduction under Section 2(q)(ii). It analysed Meera Gupta, which held that sub-clause (ii) excludes pre-existing buildings and their appurtenant land from the “vacant land” computation. The Court observed that L.J. Johnson addressed sub-clause (i), dealing with land on which construction is impermissible, and was therefore distinguishable.

Having accepted that the present facts—land already under construction or built upon before the appointed day—squarely attracted Section 2(q)(ii), the Court concluded that each appellant was entitled to the statutory maximum deduction of 2,000 sq m. The respondent’s request for remand was rejected because all necessary measurements were undisputed and already on record, making a remand unnecessary and inefficient.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s direction requiring Kamani and Aggarwal to surrender 4,725.82 sq m and 5,095.49 sq m respectively. After granting each appellant the 2,000 sq m deduction, it ordered:

  • Kamani must surrender 2,725.82 sq m.
  • Aggarwal must surrender 3,095.49 sq m.

The appeals were allowed; no order as to costs.

Implications: The judgment reinforces the distinction between Section 2(q)(i) and 2(q)(ii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, affirming that land built upon before the appointed day, along with its appurtenant area, is excluded from “vacant land.” Although the ruling adjusts only the excess land to be surrendered by the appellants, it firmly positions Meera Gupta as the governing precedent for similar factual scenarios, thereby guiding future assessments under the Act without creating entirely new legal doctrine.

    Atma Ram Aggarwal And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

    S.P Bharucha, J.— These appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad dated December 10, 1984.

    2. Each of the appellants Hari Ram Kamani and Atma Ram Aggarwal, owned a one-half share in lands bearing Plot Nos. 129, 130 and 131 in Gorakhpur. They were served by the Competent Authority with draft statements under Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called “the Act”) after the same came into effect on February 21, 1976, the “appointed day” therein being January 28, 1976. The appellants and their respective sons filed objections to the draft statements. It was, inter alia, contended that the said lands were held by the appellants as ‘kartas’ of their respective Hindu undivided families. The Competent Authority rejected the contention. He held that the appellant Kamani held a total area of 8302.75 sq. metres; that the area of 3576.93 sq. metres thereout was land under construction and land appurtenant to it and that, therefore, the excess area required to be surrendered was 4725.82 sq. metres. The Competent Authority held that the appellant Aggarwal held a total area of 9969.56 sq. metres; that the area of 4874.07 sq. metres thereout was land under construction and land appurtenant to it and that, therefore, the excess area required to be surrendered was 5095.49 sq. metres.

    3. The appellants and their sons filed appeals before the District Judge, Gorakhpur and applied for leave to rely upon additional evidence in support of their contention that the said lands were owned by the respective Hindu undivided families of which the appellants were ‘kartas’. The applications were rejected. The District Judge, upon the appeals, held that the appellants were entitled to retain an additional area of 2000 sq. metres each upon an interpretation of Section 4(9) and Section 2(q) of the Act (read with Schedule I, Gorakhpur having been placed in Category D therein). The appellants and their sons on the one hand and the State Government on the other filed writ petitions impugning the decision of the District Judge before the High Court. The High Court rejected the contentions as to ownership of the lands by the aforementioned Hindu undivided families and the application to lead additional evidence. It held that the District Judge was in error in reducing the area of the excess land held by the appellants by 2000 sq. metres each and, in so doing, it placed reliance upon this Court's judgment in State of U.P v. L.J Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110. Accordingly, the writ petitions filed by the appellants and their sons were dismissed and those filed by the State Government were allowed.

    4. Special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court was granted save and except in regard to the contention that the lands belonged to the joint families of the appellants. In view of the fact that leave to appeal was so restricted, we have not permitted counsel on behalf of the appellants to raise before us the contention that the lands belonged to the joint families of the appellants.

    5. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the law that was applicable to their case was that laid down by this Court in Meera Gupta (Smt) v. State of W.B (1992) 2 SCC 494. This judgment has analysed the relevant provisions of the Act and has distinguished the judgment in L.J Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110. To understand the distinction, Section 2(q) of the Act which defines ‘vacant land’ must be quoted in so far as it is relevant:

    “2. (q) ‘vacant land’ means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include—

    (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated;

    (ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and

    6. This Court in Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 found that the facts placed Johnson (1983) 4 SCC 110 within sub-clause (i) of Section 2(q) and the law laid down therein was applicable only to matters which fell under that sub-clause. The facts of Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 as also of the case before us, fell within sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(q). It was held in Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 that land built upon prior to the appointed day was outside the purview of ‘vacant land’ within the meaning of the Act and was not to be reckoned in calculating the extent of ‘vacant land’ that was held by its owner. Upon the authority of Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 therefore, we must hold that each of the appellants are entitled to a deduction of the maximum permissible area of 2000 sq. metres in this behalf.

    7. Learned counsel for the respondents did not dispute the applicability of Meera Gupta (1992) 2 SCC 494 but he submitted that the matter should be remanded to the Competent Authority to decide upon the basis thereof what excess lands were held by the appellants. He, however, fairly stated that all the necessary measurements were already upon the record and were not in dispute. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to remand the matter but to give to each of the appellants the benefit of retaining the additional permissible area of 2000 sq. metres.

    8. The judgment and order under appeals is set aside to the extent that it requires the appellants Kamani and Aggarwal to surrender the excess areas of 4725.82 and 5095.49 sq. metres respectively. We find that the appellant Kamani is in possession of an excess area of 2725.82 sq. metres and direct him to surrender the same. We find that the appellant Aggarwal is in possession of an excess area of 3095.49 sq. metres and direct him to surrender the same. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

    9. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Atma Ram Aggarwal And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
    (Nov 3, 1992)