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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Petitioner :- Shri Kulwinder Singh
  • Advocate.
Judges
  • M.M Kumar, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, the Act)
  • Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act,
  • VII rule 11 of the Code
  • section 7(iv)(c).6.
  • section 7(iv)(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Petitioner :- Shri Kulwinder Singh
  • Advocate.
Judges
  • M.M Kumar, J.
Acts
  • provisions of section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, the Act)
  • Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act,
  • VII rule 11 of the Code
  • section 7(iv)(c).6.
  • section 7(iv)(c)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M.M. Kumar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges the order dated 24.11.2001 of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa, which allowed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and directed the plaintiff-petitioner to pay ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of two sale deeds (No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 and No. 395 dated 27.4.2000).

The plaintiff had instituted Civil Suit No. 530-C of 2000 seeking declarations that both sale deeds executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondents No. 2 and No. 3 were liable to be set aside on grounds of misrepresentation, concealment and fraud. The plaint also sought consequential reliefs including permanent injunctions restraining further alienation, mutation, or creation of encumbrances in respect of the suit land.

The plaintiff valued the suit at Rs. 200 and affixed court fee of Rs. 25. The defendant-respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of inadequate court fee, contending that Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 required payment of ad valorem court fee based on the sale consideration. The Civil Judge accepted that application and directed payment of ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds. The plaintiff filed the present revision petition against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 applies so as to require payment of ad valorem court fee based on the sale consideration where a suit seeks a declaratory decree to set aside sale deeds and prays consequential relief (including injunction) arising from that declaration.
  2. Whether the plaint should be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for having affixed an inadequate court fee (plaintiff having valued the suit at Rs. 200 and paid Rs. 25) when the relief sought challenges sale deeds with substantial sale considerations.
  3. How the court is to determine the substance of the relief (declaratory vs. substantive/independent relief) for the purpose of assessing the proper court fee under Section 7(iv)(c).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Petitioner (Revisionist)

  • Contended that the Full Bench decision in Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, 1981 P.L.J. 423 (Full Bench) supports the view that the order of the Civil Judge is not sustainable.
  • Argued that the consequential relief claimed is ancillary to the challenge of the sale deeds and therefore the suit should be treated as primarily a suit for declaration (with ancillary relief), not one requiring ad valorem fee on the sale consideration.
  • Maintained that it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff is seeking a substantive relief of declaration that would attract ad valorem fee calculated on the sale consideration.

Defendant-Respondents

  • Filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of inadequate court fee.
  • Asserted that Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act applies and that the plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the sale deeds (i.e., on the sale consideration), not the nominal amount assessed by the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurjeewan Singh (referred) Holds that where a plaintiff (member of joint family) sues for declaration that alienations were without legal necessity and without consideration, the suit is for declaration and question of paying ad valorem on sale price may not arise. The Civil Judge placed reliance on this authority in support of the plaintiff's plea, but the learned revisional Judge noted other High Court views to the contrary and did not allow Gurjeewan Singh to decide the matter conclusively in favour of the plaintiff.
Bagrawat (referred) Expresses the view that a challenge to the validity of a sale deed as void for want of legal necessity and consideration requires payment of ad valorem court fee as per the sale consideration. The Civil Judge relied on this recent High Court view to require ad valorem court fee; the revisional court treated this view as relevant and applicable on the facts of the present case.
Ranjit Singh (referred) Stated the same view as Bagrawat — that a challenge to a sale deed void for lack of legal necessity/consideration attracts ad valorem fee based on the sale price. The Civil Judge noted this authority as supporting the requirement to pay ad valorem fee on the sale consideration in cases like the present one.
Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, 1981 P.L.J. 423 (Full Bench) Full Bench consideration of Section 7(iv)(c) and related principles on when ad valorem fee is required for suits seeking declaratory decrees with consequential reliefs (as described in the opinion). The plaintiff relied on this Full Bench decision. The revisional court extensively discussed the Full Bench's approach but concluded that, applied to the facts here, the Full Bench's principles supported finding the suit to be for a declaratory decree with consequential relief and thus ad valorem fee was required; reliance by the plaintiff did not advance his case.
Shamsher Singh (Supreme Court) (referred) Explains that in certain suits for declaration the effective relief sought may be to set aside a decree or to obtain consequential injunctions; the nature of the relief determines whether ad valorem fee is required. The revisional court quoted this authority and observed the facts of Shamsher Singh to be distinguishable from the present case; it used the principle to analyse whether the present plaintiff's suit was substantially declaratory or was seeking substantial relief requiring ad valorem fee.
Vinayakrao v. Mankunwaribai, AIR 1943 Nagpur 70 Holds that in a suit by a son for declaration that a decree against his father does not affect his interest, consequential relief was involved and ad valorem court fee was necessary. Quoted by the revisional court to show examples where a declaratory suit with consequential relief required ad valorem fee; used to illustrate when Section 7(iv)(c) applies.
Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa (referred) Explains that 'consequential relief' in Section 7(iv)(c) cannot mean a substantive relief whose valuation is otherwise provided; if the relief is substantive, it cannot be converted into a mere consequential relief by adding a declaration. The revisional court relied on this principle to emphasise that courts must look at the substance of the relief, not mere form, when deciding the appropriate court-fee regime under Section 7(iv)(c).
Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, 54 All. 812 (Allahabad Full Bench) Defines 'consequential relief' as relief that follows directly from a declaration, whose valuation is not capable of definite ascertainment, is not provided for elsewhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently as a substantial relief. The revisional court cited this authority (as an accepted exposition of 'consequential relief') to support the proposition that where relief is truly consequential the valuation may be left to the plaintiff; but if the relief is really substantive, ad valorem fee must be paid on the substantive relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the statutory text of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act and the established authorities interpreting the clause. The court emphasized that the inquiry is into the substance of the relief claimed in the plaint rather than the form in which it is cast. The key analytical steps were:

  1. Reference to Section 7(iv)(c) itself: the court cited the provision and its application to "declaratory decree and consequential relief" to frame the statutory test.
  2. Reliance on precedent: the court reviewed the Full Bench decision in Niranjan Kaur (and the Supreme Court and High Court authorities discussed therein) which instruct that where a suit is truly for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, ad valorem court fee as per Section 7(iv)(c) may be appropriate, but if the relief claimed is in reality a substantive relief then the plaintiff cannot evade payment of appropriate fee by prefacing it with a declaration.
  3. Emphasis on substance over form: the court reiterated the settled principle that a court must look to what the plaint actually seeks — the substantive relief — and not permit drafting artifice to alter the applicable court-fee consequences.
  4. Application to the facts: the court examined the prayers in the plaint — namely, that the two sale deeds be set aside for fraud, misrepresentation and collusion, and that consequential reliefs such as permanent injunctions be granted restraining further alienation or mutation. The court concluded that the suit seeks declaration and consequential reliefs which fall within the ambit of Section 7(iv)(c) as interpreted by the Full Bench and related authorities.
  5. Conclusion on adequacy of court fee: applying those principles, the court found that the plaintiff's assessment (Rs. 200 with Rs. 25 fee) was inadequate in view of the reliefs claimed and that the Civil Judge's direction to pay ad valorem court fee on the sale considerations was justified.

The court therefore held that the revision petition lacked merit and that the Civil Judge's order should be upheld. The court also noted that it would not make any order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is DISMISSED. (The opinion records at the end: "Revision dismissed.")

Implications

  • Direct effect: The Civil Judge's order dated 24.11.2001 directing the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds is upheld by this revisional court decision.
  • No further relief on costs: The court made no other order as to costs.
  • On precedent and legal principle: The decision applies established principles — particularly that under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act the court must ascertain the substantive nature of relief claimed and, where a declaratory decree with consequential relief is genuinely sought, ad valorem fee may be required; conversely, a substantive relief cannot be recast as merely consequential by crafty pleading to avoid proper court-fee liability. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying existing authorities.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what is expressly contained therein.

Show full summary ...

    Om Parkash v. Indrawati

    M.M Kumar, J.:— This is a revision petition directed against the order dated 24.11.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirsa allowing the application of the defendant-respondents filed under Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) wherein a direction has been issued to the plaintiff-petitioner to pay the ad valorem court fee on the sale consideration of the two sale deeds namely No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 and sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000 Aggrieved by the order dated 24.11.2001, the plaintiff-petitioner has filed present revision petition.

    2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the issues raised in this revision petition are that a civil suit No. 530-C of 2000 was filed by the plaintiff-petitioner challenging the sale deeds on various grounds. A declaration was sought to the effect that the sale deed No. 420 dated 28.4.2000 made by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 2 regarding the part of the suit land is liable to be set aside as the same is result of mis-representation and concealment of facts. It was also prayed that the other sale deed No. 395 dated 27.4.2000 executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 3 in respect of other part of the suit landis also liable to be set aside as the same is the result of fraud, mis-representation and concealment of facts. Therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. The consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from further alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any part thereof to anyone on the basis of the aforesaid sale deeds and from creating any type of bar, encumbrance or charge etc. in respect of the above said suit land in any manner or also restraining them from getting the mutation entered or sanctioned in their favour has also been sought. However, the plaintiff-petitioner has assessed the value of the suit at Rs. 200/- and affixed the court fee of Rs. 25/- An application under order VII rule 11 of the Code was filed by the defendant-respondents seeking rejection of the plaint for affixing inadequate court fee and it was claimed that the provisions of section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) would be attracted and the plaintiff-petitioner is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the sale deed. The Civil Judge accepting the application directed that the plaintiff-petitioner to pay court fee ad valorem on the sale consideration of the sale deeds. The order passed by the Civil Judge reads as under:

    “After hearing the rival contention of the both the Ld. counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it has been observed that in the present case plaintiff has challenged two sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2060 as both the sale deeds were executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of the defendants No. 2 & 3. The plea of the plaintiff is that defendant No. 1 had executed the above said sale deeds in favour of the defendants No. 1 & 3 because there was no legal necessity to alienate the suit property. In support of his arguments he has placed reliance on Gurjeewan Singh's case (supra). It was a case where suit was filed by son for declaration challenging alienations made by the father on the ground of being without legal necessity and without consideration. The plaintiff being the member of the joint Hindu Family has a right to have transactions declared null and void, if they are not justified. It was, therefore, held that being so question of paying ad-valorem court fee on the sale price did not arise. For all intents and purposes the suit is for declaration and possession by way of consequential relief.

    But the recent view of our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court is that challenge to validity of sale deed which is null and void being without legal necessity and consideration required to pay ad valorem court fee as per sale deed consideration in sale deed in Bagrawat's case (supra). In this case Hon'ble High Court has also discussed Gurjeewan Singh's case. The same view has been taken by our Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ranjit Singh case (supra). The above said authorities are squarely applicable on the facts of the present case.”

    3. I have heard Shri Kulwinder Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner, who has argued that in view of the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Niranjan Kaur v. Nirbigan Kaur, 1981 P.L.J 423, the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) is not sustainable. He has also argued that the consequential relief claimed by the plaintiff-petitioner is ancillary relief of challenging the sale deed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff-petitioner is seeking substantive relief of declaration.

    4. I have thoughtfully considered submissions of the learned counsel and perused the record with his assistance. I am of the considered opinion that this revision petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. The provisions of section 7(iv)(c) of the Act may be referred in order to ascertain the statutory intention in cases where a declaration for setting aside the sale deed has been sought. section 7(iv)(c) of the Act reads as under:

    “for declaratory decree and consequential relief. - to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed.”

    5. A perusal of clause (c) makes it obvious that whenever a suit has been filed for grant of declaratory decree or order wherein consequential relief is prayed then the Court fee ad valorem is required to be paid. This provision has been subject matter of the decision of the Full Bench in Niranjan Kaur's case (supra). The view taken by the Full Bench is based on various judgments of the Supreme Court and other High Courts which reads as under:

    “Thus, what the Supreme Court has held in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) is that in the suit by the plaintiffs for the declaration that the decree obtained by the mortgagee against their father was not binding on them, they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to do. This case is hardly helpful to the case of the plaintiff-petitioner as it is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case for the simple reason that herein the plaintiff-petitioner is a party to the document, which she is required to get cancelled because of the alleged fraud etc. A suit for declaration by a son or a member of a coparcenary under the Hindu Law will thus be on a different footing. In such a suit, the main relief will be that of a declaration and the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree against the sons etc. will be just ancillary. This is further clear when reference has been made in Shamsher Singh's case (supra) to Vinayakrao v. Mankunwaribai, AIR 1943 Nagpur 70, wherein it was held that in a suit by the son for a declaration that the decree against his father does not affect his interest in the family property, consequential relief was involved and ad valorem Court-fee was necessary. On the other hand, there may be cases, where the declaration asked for is merely a suplusage and the so-called consequential relief is in reality an independent substantial relief. For instance, if a person sues for a declaration that the defendant is liable to pay him money due on a certain bond and also asks for recovery of the amount, or asks for a declaration that he is the owner of the certain property and entitled to its possession and asks for possession of the property, the reliefs for the recovery of the amount or for possession cannot properly be treated as consequential reliefs, which can be valued arbitrarily by the plaintiff under section 7(iv)(c).

    6. It is well-settled that the Court in deciding the question of Court-fee should took into the allegations made in the plaint to find out what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court, looking at the substance of the relief asked for. Thus, in each case, the Court has to find out the real relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Where the main relief is that of the cancellation of the deed, and the declaration if any, is only a surplusage, the case would not be covered under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act, because in a suit under that clause, the main relief is that of a declaration and the consequential relief is just ancillary. In this respect, reference may again be made to Mt. Zeb-ul-Nisa's case (supra), wherein it has been observed as follows:—

    “It seems obvious that the consequential relief referred to in section 7(iv)(c) could not mean a substantive relief, the valuation of which is separately provided for in the Court-fee Act. If it were so held, a plaintiff could easily evade payment of the necessary Court-fee on the substantive relief by prefacing it with a declaration as to his rights. Every suit involves the establishment of certain rights of the plaintiff as a necessary preliminary to the grant of the relief claimed by him. But the addition of a prayer for a declaration as to such rights cannot convert a suit for a substantive relief into one for a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed for within the meaning of section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act. It is significant that the valuation of the relief in cases falling within the scope of section 7(iv)(c) is left to the plaintiff. This is presumably because the ‘consequential relief’ contemplated by the section is some ancillary relief to which the plaintiff becomes entitled as a necessary result of the declaration, but for which no separate provision is made in the Act. The essence of the relief in such cases lies in the declaratory part and the consequential relief being merely an auxiliary equitable relief, its valuation seems to have been left to the plaintiff. The meaning of the expression ‘consequential relief’ as used in section 7(iv)(c), Court-fee Act, was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (consisting of five Judges) in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, 54 Allahabad 812, and it was held that the expression ‘consequential relief’ means some relief, which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for any where in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a ‘substantial relief’. If follows, therefore, that if the relief claimed in any case is found in reality to be tantamount to a substantial relief and not a mere ‘consequential relief’ in the above sense, the plaintiff must pay Court-fee on the substantial relief.”

    7. If the principles laid down by the Full Bench are applied to the facts of the case in hand, no doubt is left that the suit is not only for declaration but also for consequential relief. The prayer made in the suit is that the sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 may be set aside as the same have been the result of fraud, misrepresentation and collusion. The consequential relief of permanent injunction has also been prayed restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any part thereof to anyone on the basis of the aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deeds and many other consequential reliefs. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the Full Bench does not in any manner advance his case. On the contrary, the Full Bench laid down the principle that the Court should find out the substantive relief claimed without going into the form. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

    8. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. However, I do not make any other as to costs.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Om Parkash v. Indrawati
    (Apr 4, 2002)