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  • provisions of sub-section (2):
  • Sections 27(1)(a)/ 27(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 ('Act').
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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Micromax Informatics Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Delhi High Court) — Order dated 26.02.2016

Factual and Procedural Background

These three writ petitions by Micromax Informatics Limited ("MIL") challenge three orders dated 21 December 2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund), Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Export, Refund Section, New Delhi. The impugned orders rejected refund claims filed by the Petitioner in respect of bills of entry filed for August 2014, September 2014 and October 2014. MIL had imported mobile phones and paid customs duty and additional customs duty (countervailing duty, "CVD"). MIL asserted it was liable to pay only 1% CVD but had paid 6% and filed refund claims in Form 102 under Sections 27(1)(a)/27(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, relying on Notification No. 12/2012 - CE (Serial No. 263A) as amended and on a Supreme Court decision (Srf Limited).

Along with the refund applications, MIL submitted bills of entry, challans of payment, certificates and affidavits. MIL's counsel clarified that although the refund claims stated the CVD had been paid "under protest," there was no endorsement on the challans; therefore the court treated the claims as having been made for alleged excess payment without protest.

The Assistant Commissioner (Refund) heard the Petitioner and received written submissions but rejected the claims on grounds of maintainability, observing that the refunds related to B/Es that were "already assessed" and relying on Supreme Court authorities to hold that refunds contrary to an assessment order are not maintainable unless the assessment order is reviewed or modified on appeal. MIL thereafter challenged the rejection before the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether refund claims under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 are maintainable where duty has been paid pursuant to bills of entry/clearance (including self-assessment) and no appeal has been filed against any assessment order.
  2. How the amendment to Section 27 effective from 8 April 2011 affects the authority's obligation to entertain refund claims and whether an assessment order (or appeal against it) is a prerequisite to consider a refund application.
  3. Whether the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) was correct in rejecting the Petitioner’s refund claims as not maintainable on the ground that the relevant bills of entry were already assessed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Micromax Informatics Limited)

  • The Petitioner paid a higher rate of CVD (6%) but was entitled to 1% under the applicable notification (Serial No. 263A of Notification No. 12/2012 - CE as amended); therefore it filed refund claims under Section 27.
  • The Petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in Srf Limited for the method of quantifying CVD (presuming domestic manufacture to determine excise duty) to support its entitlement.
  • The Petitioner relied on this Court's decision in Aman Medical Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Delhi (2010) to contend that in cases of self-assessment, a refund application could be maintained under Section 27 (as it stood prior to 8 April 2011) without having to file an appeal, because there was no adversarial assessment order.
  • The Petitioner filed the requisite documents and sought a decision on the merits of its refund applications; it also clarified the absence of an endorsement of payment "under protest" on the challans.

Respondents' / Customs' Arguments

  • The Assistant Commissioner (Refund) treated the B/Es as "already assessed" and held that once an assessment order is passed, duty is payable in terms of that order and a refund claim contrary to such assessment is not maintainable unless the assessment order is reviewed under Section 28 or modified in appeal.
  • To support that position, the Assistant Commissioner relied on Supreme Court decisions in Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) and Collector of Central Excise v. Flock (India) (P.) Ltd., which, as applied by the Assistant Commissioner, stand for the proposition that refunds contrary to an assessment order are not maintainable unless the assessment order is reviewed or modified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srf Limited v. Commissioner Of Customs, Chennai, 2015 (318) ELT 607 (SC) Principle for quantification of CVD: presume that the imported article has been manufactured in India and ascertain the excise duty leviable thereon to determine exemption/extent of CVD. The Petitioner relied on this decision to support its method of calculating the CVD entitlement. The Court records that the Petitioner drew attention to this decision; the Court does not further apply or reject the principle but records its use in the petitioner's submissions.
Aman Medical Products Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Customs, Delhi, 2010 (250) ELT 30 (Del) Held that in cases of self-assessment where duty is paid without an adversarial assessment order, a refund application could be maintained under Section 27 (as it stood prior to 8 April 2011) without filing an appeal. The Court relied on and followed this decision as correctly stating that where there was no assessment order (no lis/adversarial assessment), the petitioner could maintain a refund claim. The Court held the Assistant Commissioner failed to notice this decision and that it supported entertaining the refund claims.
Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), 2004 (172) ELT 145 (SC) Authority for the principle that a refund claim contrary to an assessment order is not maintainable unless the assessment order is reviewed or modified on appeal (as applied in that case where an assessment order had been passed). The Assistant Commissioner relied on this decision to reject the refund claims. The Court distinguished it on facts: the authority noted that Priya Blue involved an actual assessment order and therefore is not applicable to cases where there is no assessment order (as in the present case).
Collector of Central Excise v. Flock (India) (P.) Ltd., 2000 (120) ELT 285 (SC) Support for the proposition that refunds contrary to an assessment order are not maintainable unless reviewed or modified in appeal (in circumstances where an assessment order exists). The Assistant Commissioner cited this authority. The Court observed that Flock, too, involved an assessment order and therefore its principle does not apply where there is no such assessment order; the Court relied on this distinction in reversing the Assistant Commissioner's maintainability finding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining (a) the factual matrix of the petitioner's filings and the basis of the Assistant Commissioner's rejection, (b) the statutory text of Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 and its amendment effective 8 April 2011, and (c) the precedents relied on by the parties.

Key steps in the Court's analysis (as stated in the opinion):

  1. The Court noted the factual position that MIL imported mobile phones, paid customs and CVD (6%), filed refund claims under Section 27 asserting entitlement to 1% CVD, and submitted supporting documents. The refunds were treated as claims made without payment under protest because the challans had no protest endorsement.
  2. The Assistant Commissioner's raison d'être for rejection was that the refund related to B/Es that were "already assessed" and therefore, per his understanding of Supreme Court authorities (Priya Blue and Flock), a refund contrary to an assessment order is not maintainable unless the assessment order is reviewed or appealed.
  3. The Court examined Priya Blue and Flock and found that both decisions dealt with cases in which an assessment order had in fact been passed; thus the factual foundation for those authorities was different from the present case where there was no such assessment order in the adversarial sense. The Court therefore distinguished those authorities on the factual basis that they applied to cases with an assessment order.
  4. The Court considered the decision in Aman Medical Products Ltd. (a Division Bench of this Court) which held that when duty is paid in self-assessment without there being a lis or adversarial assessment order, a refund claim under Section 27 (as it then stood) could be maintained without filing an appeal. The Court treated that decision as directly relevant to self-assessment situations.
  5. The Court then analysed the amendment to Section 27 effective 8 April 2011. The amended text allows "any person claiming refund of any duty or interest" which was (i) "paid by him" or (ii) "borne by him" to make an application for refund before the expiry of one year (subject to provisos). The amendment (and accompanying subsections) places a duty on the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner to consider such applications and determine if refund is payable under Section 27(2).
  6. The Court concluded from the amended Section 27 that: (a) the conditionality that payment be pursuant to an assessment order no longer exists; (b) once an application is made under Section 27(1), the authority must make an order under Section 27(2) determining whether a refund (in whole or part) is payable; and (c) the lack of an appeal against an assessment order is not a ground to refuse consideration of the refund application where an application under Section 27 has been validly made.
  7. Applying the legal framework to the facts, the Court found that there was no adversarial assessment order in the present case (clearance upon filing of the B/E and payment of duty did not amount to an "assessment order" in the pre-amendment sense). The Assistant Commissioner failed to appreciate (i) the Aman decision and (ii) the statutory change effected by the 8 April 2011 amendment to Section 27. For these reasons the Assistant Commissioner's maintainability conclusion was "plainly erroneous."

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the three impugned orders dated 21 December 2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) rejecting the Petitioner's refund claims and restored the refund applications to the file of the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) to be dealt with on merits in accordance with law.

Specific directions and immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The Petitioner, through its authorised representative, was directed to appear before the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) on 14 March 2016.
  • The Assistant Commissioner (Refund) was directed to pass a fresh order on the three refund applications after hearing the Petitioner, within a period of two months from the date of the order (i.e., within two months from 26 February 2016).
  • The writ petitions were disposed of in those terms.

Implications of the decision (as explained in the opinion):

  • The Court clarified that, following the amendment to Section 27 effective 8 April 2011, a person who has paid or borne duty or interest may make a refund application and the relevant authority is obliged to consider and determine the refund application under Section 27(2). The existence of an assessment order and the fact that no appeal has been filed against it cannot, by themselves, justify refusing to consider a Section 27 refund application.
  • In the factual context of this case, because no adversarial assessment order existed, the Assistant Commissioner's reliance on authorities decided in the context of assessment orders (Priya Blue and Flock) was misplaced; Aman Medical Products Ltd. was the more relevant precedent for cases of self-assessment, and the amended Section 27 makes the entitlement to have refund applications considered even clearer.

Date of Order: 26 February 2016. Coram: Justice S. Muralidhar and Justice Vibhu Bakhru.

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    Micromax Informatics Limited Petitioner v. Union Of India & Ors. S

    $~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

    8.

    + W.P.(C) 523/2016

    MICROMAX INFORMATICS LIMITED ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Tarun Gulati with Mr. Shashi Mathews, Mr. Sparsh Bhargava, Mr. Ankit Sachdeva, Ms. Rachna Yadav, Mr. Neil Hildreth, Advocates.

    versus

    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents

    Through: Mr. Kirtiman Singh, CGSC for UOI with Mr. Srikant Misra, Mr. Waize Ali Noor and Mr. Gyanesh Bhardwaj, Advocates.

    Mr. Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for Customs.

    WITH

    9.

    + W.P.(C) 524/2016

    MICROMAX INFORMATICS LIMITED ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Tarun Gulati with Mr. Shashi Mathews, Mr. Sparsh Bhargava, Mr. Ankit Sachdeva, Ms. Rachna Yadav, Mr. Neil Hildreth, Advocates.

    versus

    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents

    Through: Mr. Kirtiman Singh, CGSC for UOI with Mr. Srikant Misra, Mr. Waize Ali Noor and Mr. Gyanesh Bhardwaj, Advocates.

    Mr. Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for Customs.

    AND

    1

    10.

    + W.P.(C) 529/2016

    MICROMAX INFORMATICS LIMITED ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Tarun Gulati with Mr. Shashi Mathews, Mr. Sparash Bhargava, Mr. Ankit Sachdeva, Ms. Rachna Yadav, Mr. Neil Hildreth, Advocates.

    versus

    UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents

    Through: Mr. Kirtiman Singh, CGSC for UOI with Mr. Srikant Misra, Mr. Waize Ali Noor and Mr. Gyanesh Bhardwaj, Advocates.

    Mr. Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for Customs.

    CORAM:

    JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR

    JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

    O R D E R

    % 26.02.2016 Dr. S. Muralidhar, J:

    1. These three writ petitions by Micromax Informatics Limited ('MIL') challenge three orders dated 21stDecember 2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) in the office of the Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Export, Refund Section, New Delhi rejecting the refund claims filed by the Petitioner in respect of the bills of entry (B/Es) filed by it for the months of August 2014, September 2014 and October 2014 respectively.

    2. The facts in brief are that the Petitioner imported mobile phones on which it paid both customs duty as well as additional customs duty (commonly

    2

    known as countervailing duty - CVD). The Petitioner lodged a refund claim in Form 102 under Sections 27(1)(a)/ 27(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 ('Act'). The reason given by the Petitioner for making the claim was that it was liable to pay only 1% CVD whereas it had paid 6% CVD. A reference was made to Serial No. 263A of Notification No. 12/2012 - CE dated 17th March 2012, as amended by Notification No. 4/2014 and further amended by Notification No. 12/2015-CE dated 1stMarch 2015, applicable to mobile phones which provided for an effective rate of duty of 1% CVD for mobile phones provided that no Central Value Added Tax ('CENVAT') credit on input or capital goods have been availed. A reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Srf Limited v. Commissioner Of Customs, Chennai . 2015 (318) ELT 607 (SC) where the Supreme Court had held that for quantification of CVD in case of an article that has been imported it has to be presumed that the said imported article has been manufactured in India and then the amount of excise duty leviable thereon has to be ascertained for determining the extent of exemption from payment of CVD to which the importer would be entitled.

    3. Along with the refund application, the Petitioner enclosed the details of the B/Es, the challans of payment of customs duty, the requisite certificate and affidavits of declarations etc. It is clarified by Mr. Tarun Gulati, learned counsel for the Petitioner, that although the refund claim states that the CVD had been paid under protest, there was no endorsement to that effect on the challans. Accordingly, the aforementioned refund claims should be considered to have been made on the basis that the CVD was paid in excess by the Petitioner without protest.

    3

    4. A hearing was afforded to the Petitioner by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) and written submissions were also filed by it. According to the Petitioner, it drew the attention of the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) to the decision of this Court in Aman Medical Products Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Customs, Delhi 2010 (250) ELT 30 (Del) in which it was held that in the case of a self-assessment, a refund application could be maintained under Section 27 of the Act, as it stood prior to 8thApril 2011, without having to file an appeal since there was in fact no assessment order in the first place.

    5. In the impugned order while rejecting the refund claim, the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) observed that the "claimant has filed the refund of duty on the bills of entry, which are already assessed". According to the Assistant Commissioner, once the assessment order was passed, duty was payable in terms thereof and unless such assessment order was reviewed under Section 28 of the Act or modified in an appeal. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) 2004 (172) ELT 145 (SC) and

    Collector of Central Excise v. Flock (India) (P.) Ltd. 2000 (120) ELT 285 (SC) it was held that a refund claim contrary to the assessment order was not maintainable unless the assessment order was reviewed or modified in appeal.

    6. This Court has heard the submissions of Mr. Tarun Gulati, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Satish Kumar, learned counsel for the Customs.

    4

    7. It requires to be noticed that the decision in Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Prevention) (supra) was rendered by the Supreme Court in respect of Section 27 of the Act as it stood prior to 8th April 2011. Factually the said decision does not apply to the facts of the present case since the said decision notes at the outset that "the Petitioners have imported a ship for breaking purposes. They filed a Bill of Entry. The amount of duty payable was assessed." It is clear, therefore, in the facts of that case that there was an assessment order passed on the B/Es filed by the importer. In Collector of Central Excise v. Flock (India) (P.) Ltd. (supra) again an assessment order had been passed.

    8. In Aman Medical Products Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, Delhi (supra), a Division Bench of this Court was considering an instance of an importer having filed B/Es, paid customs duty and thereafter claimed refund under Section 27 of the Act. The question of law framed by the Court in the appeal filed by the Assessee against an order of refusal of refund read as under:

    "Whether non-filing of appeal against the assessed Bill of Entry in which there was no lis between the importer and the Revenue at the time of payment of duty will deprive the importer of his right to file refund claim under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962?"

    9. The above question was answered in the negative. Analysing Section 27 of the Act, as it then stood, the Court noticed that it was always not necessary to have an order of assessment for a person to claim refund of duty. The initial payment of duty in terms of Section 27(1)(i) of the Act

    5

    could be pursuant to "an order of assessment" or in terms of Section 27(1)(ii) of the Act could be "borne by him." The Court explained:

    "The object of Section 27(i)(ii) is to cover those classes of case where the duty is paid by a person without an order of assessment, i.e. in a case like the present where the assessee pays the duty in ignorance of a notification which allows him payment of concessional rate of duty merely after filing a Bill of Entry. In fact, such a case is the present case in which there is no assessment order for being challenged in the appeal which is passed under Section 27(1)(i) of the Act because there is no contest or lis and hence no adversarial assessment order."

    10. The Court in Aman Medical Products Limited (supra) also took note of and held that the decisions in Collector of Central Excise v. Flock (India) (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Prevention) (supra) would not apply since those were cases where "there is no assessment order on dispute/contest, like as is in the present case." It was held in Aman Medical Products Limited (supra) that the Assessee in was entitled to maintain the refund claim notwithstanding that there was no appeal filed against the assessed B/Es.

    11. It is significant that with effect from 8thApril 2011, the structure of Section 27 of the Act has undergone a change. The relevant portions of Section 27, as amended with effect from that date, read as under:

    27. Claim for refund of duty.— (1) Any person claiming refund of any duty or interest,—

    (i) paid by him; or

    (ii) borne by him,

    6

    may make an application in such form and manner as may be prescribed for such refund of to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs, before the expiry of one year, from the date of payment of such duty or interest:

    Provided that where an application for refund has been made before the date on which the Finance Bill, 2011 receives the assent of the President, such application shall be deemed to have been made under sub-section (1), as it stood before the date on which the Finance Bill, 2011 receives the assent of the President and the same shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of sub-section

    (2):

    Provided further that the limitation of one year shall not apply where any duty or interest has been paid under protest:

    [Provided also that where the amount of refund claimed is less than rupees one hundred, the same shall not be refunded.]

    Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, "the date of payment of duty or interest" in relation to a person, other than the importer, shall be construed as "the date of purchase of goods" by such person.

    (1A) ....

    (1B)....

    (2) If, on receipt of any such application, the [Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs] is satisfied that the whole or any part of the [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Fund:

    7

    Provided that the amount of [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] as determined by the [Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs] under the foregoing provisions of this sub-section shall, instead of being credited to the Fund, be paid to the applicant, if such amount is relatable to-

    (a) the [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty], paid by the importer [or the exporter, as the case may be], if he had not passed on the incidence of such [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] to any other person;

    (b) the [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty], on imports made by an individual for his personal use;

    (c) the [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] borne by the buyer, if he had not passed on the incidence of such [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty], to any other person;

    (d) the export duty as specified in section 26;

    (e) drawback of duty payable under sections 74 and 75;

    (f) the [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] borne by any other such class of applicants as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify:

    Provided further that no notification under clause (f) of the first proviso shall be issued unless in the opinion of the Central Government the incidence of [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] has not been passed on by the persons concerned to any other person."

    12. An important change that has been made is that a person can now claim

    8

    refund of any duty or interest as long as such duty or interest was paid or borne by such person. The conditionality of such payment having been made pursuant to an order of assessment does not exist. Secondly, once an application is made under Section 27(1) of the Act, it is incumbent on the authority concerned to make an order under Section 27 (2) determining if any duty or interest as claimed is refundable to the applicant. The proviso to Section 27(2) of the Act sets out the instances where refund should be paid to the claimant instead of being credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund. The only relevance as far as payment of duty under protest is concerned is indicated in the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act which states that the limitation of one year shall not apply in such event. In other words, whether or not the duty is paid under protest once an application for refund is made in the requisite manner and form as prescribed, it is incumbent on the authority to deal with such an application. Where there is an assessment order, the authority will take it into account in deciding the application for refund. If such assessment order has been reviewed or modified in appeal such further order will obviously be taken into account. In other words, under Section 27 of the Act, as it now stands, it is not open to an authority to refuse to consider the application for refund only because no appeal has been filed against the assessment order, if there is one.

    13. As far as the present case is concerned, there was indeed no assessment order as such passed by the customs authorities. Although under Section 2

    (ii) of the Act, the word 'assessment' includes a self-assessment, the clearance of the goods upon filing of the B/E and payment of duty is not per

    9

    se an 'assessment order' in the context of Section 27 (1) (i) as it stood prior to 8th April 2011, particularly if such duty has not been paid under protest. In any event, after 8th April 2011, as noticed hereinbefore, as long as customs duty or interest has been paid or borne by a person, a claim for refund made by such person under Section 27 (1) of the Act as it now stands, will have to be entertained and an order passed thereon by the authority concerned even where an order of assessment may not have reviewed or modified in appeal.

    14. The Assistant Commissioner (Refund), in the present case, appears to have not noticed the decision of this Court in Aman Medical Products Limited (supra) which was rendered in the context of Section 27 of the Act as it stood prior to 8thApril 2011. Further he failed to notice that the said provision has undergone a significant change with effect from 8thApril 2011. The impugned order of the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) rejecting the refund claim of the Petitioner on the ground of maintainability was, for the aforementioned reasons, plainly erroneous.

    15. Consequently, the Court sets aside the three impugned orders dated 21st December 2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) in respect of the refund claims of the Petitioner for the months of August, September and October 2014 and restores the said applications to the file of the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) for being dealt with on merits in accordance with law.

    16. The Petitioner, through its authorised representative, will appear before

    10

    the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) on 14thMarch 2016. A fresh order shall be passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Refund) on the said three refund applications, after hearing the Petitioner, within a period of two months from today.

    17. The petitions are disposed of in the above terms.

    S. MURALIDHAR, J

    VIBHU BAKHRU, J

    FEBRUARY 26, 2016

    dn

    11

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    Micromax Informatics Limited Petitioner v. Union Of India & Ors. S
    (Feb 26, 2016)