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Case Summary: Turner Broadcasting Systems Asia Pacific Inc. v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (High Court of Delhi)

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated judgment disposes of two writ petitions filed by Turner Broadcasting Systems Asia Pacific Inc. (formerly Turner Entertainment Networking Asia Inc.), a company incorporated in Georgia, U.S.A., which is a U.S. tax resident. The two petitions are:

  • WP(C) No. 1874/2013 — Assessment Year 2007-08;
  • WP(C) No. 1984/2014 — Assessment Year 2008-09.

The petitioner derived income from rights granted to Turner International India Private Limited to sell advertising and distribute various television, interactive and mobile entertainment services in India. For AY 2007-08 the petitioner filed a return on 27.03.2009 declaring income of Rs. 12,40,99,555/-. For AY 2008-09 the petitioner filed a return on 05.03.2010 declaring income of Rs. 11,17,78,295/-.

In AY 2007-08: On 11.08.2009 the revenue issued a 38-question questionnaire; the petitioner responded and supplied documents (including a distribution and advertising sales agreement dated 1 April 2006, computation of income, Form 3CEB, tax residency certificate and an order under s.195(2)). Assessment under section 143(3) was concluded on 24.12.2009, holding that 10% of total advertisement and distribution revenue was taxable in India, with specific reference to prior MAP (Mutual Agreement Procedure) resolutions and earlier assessment practice.

Thereafter, on 27.03.2012 (served 30.03.2012) a notice under sections 147/148 was issued proposing reassessment. The reasons recorded stated that the MAP resolution applied only to earlier assessment years (2001-02 to 2004-05), and that the current receipts in the year under consideration should have been taxed under section 115A and that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. The petitioner filed objections on 14.05.2012 which were disposed of by order dated 22.02.2013; the petitioner challenged the reopening notice and order in WP(C) 1874/2013.

In AY 2008-09: The Assessing Officer issued notice under section 143(2) on 25.08.2010; the petitioner furnished computations, notes and the distribution and advertising agreement. Assessment under section 143(3) was framed on 20.12.2010 concluding that 10% of advertisement and distribution revenue was taxable, referring to earlier MAP resolution and earlier assessments treated on the same basis. A notice under sections 147/148 to reopen the assessment was issued on 28.03.2013. The reasons recorded for reopening echoed that the MAP resolution was applicable only to specific earlier years and asserted that the income should have been taxed at 10% on a gross basis under section 115A, concluding there was reason to believe income had escaped assessment. The petitioner filed objections on 30.01.2014 which were disposed of on 20.02.2014; the petitioner challenged the reopening notice and the disposal order in WP(C) 1984/2014.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notices issued under sections 147/148 to reopen assessments for AY 2007-08 and AY 2008-09 were valid where the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer was already available and considered at the time of the original assessments under section 143(3).
  2. Whether the reassessment notices constituted an impermissible "change of opinion" by the Assessing Officer, in the absence of any fresh information or material that was not before the Assessing Officer at the time of the original assessments.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner had responded to a detailed questionnaire (38 queries) and furnished all relevant documents, including the Distribution and Advertising Sales Agreement (dated 1 April 2006), computation of income, Form 3CEB, tax residency certificate and prior assessment orders; the material on which reassessment is sought was already before the Assessing Officer during the original assessments.
  • Because the Assessing Officer had the relevant material and had recorded consideration of it in the assessment orders (and taxed the revenue at 10% following the MAP resolution and prior practice), reopening the assessment was effectively a re-appreciation of the same material and therefore constituted an impermissible "change of opinion".

Respondent's (Revenue's) Position / Reasons Recorded

  • In the reasons recorded for reopening, the Assessing Officer stated that the MAP resolution cited by the petitioner applied only to earlier assessment years (2001-02 to 2004-05). The Assessing Officer took the view that for the years under consideration the income should have been offered to tax at 10% under section 115A on a gross basis (as per the Assessing Officer's reading) and therefore concluded there was reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.
  • The reasons recorded explicitly state that "from the perusal of assessment records ... it is observed that" and then set out the view that the MAP resolution did not apply to the years under reassessment, leading to the belief that income had escaped assessment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Usha International Ltd., 348 ITR 485 (Del.) (Full Bench) The expression "change of opinion" requires that an opinion was earlier formed and is later altered; reassessment is invalid where the issue was raised and decided in favour of the assessee in original proceedings or where the assessee answered a query which was thereafter not added to in assessment — such reassessment is hit by "change of opinion". The court relied on these propositions to characterize the present reopening as a prohibited change of opinion: the Assessing Officer had considered the material earlier and yet sought to re-open on the basis of the same material.
Jindal Photo Films Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, (1999) 234 ITR 170 (Del.) Reiterates Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. as leading authority; assessee must disclose primary facts, AO draws inferences; reopening is permissible only when fresh or previously undisclosed facts come to light — not merely to correct an earlier opinion. Used to support the proposition that where primary facts were disclosed and were before the AO, the AO cannot later reopen assessment merely because he forms a different view.
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC) Leading authority that distinguishes between disclosure of primary facts (which the assessee must make) and inference/conclusions (which the AO draws); AO cannot later reopen merely to take a different inference from the same facts. Cited as foundational authority for the principle that reassessment must be based on fresh information and not on a mere change in the AO's opinion from the same facts.
Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO, [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC) Reopening under section 147 is justified only if specific, reliable and relevant information comes to the AO subsequently, or if information is obtained that exposes untruthfulness of previously disclosed facts; not for mere change of opinion. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to examine whether any fresh information existed; it concluded there was none and therefore reopening was impermissible.
A.L.A. Firm v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, [1991] 189 ITR 285 (SC) Supports the principle that reassessment cannot be used to revisit a concluded decision merely because the AO thinks the earlier view was incorrect. Referred to as part of the jurisprudence preventing reopening where the AO simply re-evaluates earlier considered material.
Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT, [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) Authority for the limitation on reopening assessments where the AO attempts to revisit questions decided earlier against revenue. Used to reaffirm that the power to reopen was not intended to permit the AO to revisit concluded matters on a change of opinion.
ITO v. Lakshmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC) Part of line of cases limiting the scope for reopening assessments when earlier inferences have been drawn and no fresh material exists. Cited to show settled law that reassessment cannot be used to correct what the AO perceives as earlier errors of judgment based on the same facts.
CIT v. Bhanji Lavji, [1971] 79 ITR 582 (SC) Supports the legal position regarding reopening and the limits on change of opinion. Relied upon as part of the controlling authorities indicating reassessment is not permissible when it is effectively a review of earlier conclusions.
Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. CIT, West Bengal-II, [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC) Earlier decision that where omission is due to oversight or mistake by the ITO, reopening may be permitted; but subsequent three-judge benches clarified limits — it cannot be used to revisit deliberate conclusions. Cited in the context of distinguishing legitimate reopenings for oversight from impermissible reopenings that amount to change of opinion; the court noted the constrained application of Kalyanji Mavji's principle.
CIT v. Rao Thakur Narayan Singh, [1965] 56 ITR 234 (SC) Legislative conferment of power to reopen was not intended to enable unlimited review by ITOs depending on changing moods. Used to support the view that the power to reopen has limits and cannot be exercised merely to revisit final decisions.
Siesta Steel Construction (P.) Ltd. v. K.K. Shikare, [1985] 154 ITR 547 (Bom.) High Court decision recognising that erroneously allowed deductions cannot be taxed by reopening absent fresh information. Referred to as part of the consistent line of High Court authorities that reject reopening where the AO merely changes opinion regarding previously allowed deductions or expenditures.
Satpal Automobile Company v. Income-Tax Officer, Circle-II(5), Kanpur, [1983] 141 ITR 450 (All.) High Court authority on limits to reopening where the same material was before the AO originally. Invoked to show consistency of High Court rulings that reopening cannot be used to alter earlier conclusions drawn from the same material.
Gopal Films v. Income-Tax Officer, Assessment-5 (Addl.) Circle-I, [1983] 139 ITR 566 (Kar.) Another High Court authority applying the principle limiting reopening to cases of fresh material or information. Used as corroborative authority that the department cannot reopen merely because it later forms a different view on the same facts.
CWT v. Manilal C. Desai, [1973] 91 ITR 135 (MP) High Court authority referenced to support the trend that reassessment should not be used to revisit allowances/deductions which were earlier admitted. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential support for the proposition that reassessment cannot be invoked to correct perceived earlier errors absent new information.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by comparing the material available to the Assessing Officer at the time of the original assessments with the reasons recorded for reopening under sections 147/148. The court noted:

  1. The Assessing Officer, in framing the original assessments (for both years), treated 10% of advertisement and distribution revenue as taxable in India, referencing prior MAP resolutions and earlier assessment practice. The court observed that an opinion had been formed by the Assessing Officer in the original assessments to treat the revenue in that manner.
  2. The petitioner had been issued a detailed questionnaire (38 queries) and had furnished a comprehensive reply with annexures and supporting documents, including the Distribution and Advertising Sales Agreement, the tax residency certificate, Form 3CEB and the computation/notes to computation. The court emphasized that the material on which reassessment was sought was before the Assessing Officer at the time of the original assessments and had been referred to in the assessment orders themselves.
  3. The reasons recorded for reopening (quoted in the notices) did not rely on any new material or fresh information; rather, they expressly stated that the conclusion was arrived at "from the perusal of assessment records". The reasons thus indicated that the Assessing Officer was re-appreciating material already on record.
  4. The court then considered binding and persuasive authorities (including the Full Bench decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Usha International Ltd. and Supreme Court authorities such as Phool Chand Bajrang Lal) which establish that reopening under section 147 is permissible only when new and relevant information comes to the officer's possession or when previously disclosed facts are shown to be untrue — not when the officer merely forms a different opinion on the same material.
  5. Applying these principles, the court concluded that the Assessing Officer's action amounted to an impermissible "change of opinion" because there was no fresh information or material identified in the reasons recorded that would justify reopening. The court found that the Assessing Officer merely intended to re-visit concluded assessments and re-appreciate the same material already considered.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the writ petitions and set aside the impugned notices and orders. Specifically, the impugned order dated 22.02.2013 and notice dated 27.03.2012 in WP(C) 1874/2013 and the impugned order dated 20.02.2014 and notice dated 28.03.2013 in WP(C) 1984/2014 were set aside and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The reassessment proceedings that had been initiated in reliance on the impugned notices and the orders disposing of objections have been quashed. The writ petitions were allowed and the parties were left to bear their own costs.
  • Broader precedent: The court applied established authority on the principle that reopening under section 147/148 is impermissible where it merely represents a change of opinion based on material that was already before the Assessing Officer. The opinion does not assert that it creates a new legal principle; it applies settled authorities to the facts of these petitions.

Judgment delivered on: 08 October 2015. Coram: Hon'ble Mr Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed and Hon'ble Mr Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva. Authoring judge: Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.

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    Turner Broadcasting Systems Asia Pacific Inc. Petitioner v. Deputy Director Of Income Tax

    WP(C) 1874/2013 & WP(C)1984/2014 Page 1 of 17

    * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

    % Judgment reserved on: 07th May, 2015 Judgment delivered on: 08thOctober, 2015 + WP(C) No. 1874/2013

    TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEMS ASIA PACIFIC INC. ..... Petitioner versus

    DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX ..... Respondent

    Advocates who appeared in this case:

    For the Petitioner : Mr M.S. Syali, Sr Advocate with Mr Mayank Nagi, Ms Husnal Syali and Mr Harkunal Singh

    For the Respondent: Mr Rohit Madan, Mr Ruchir Bhatia, Mr Akash Vajpai and Mr Alay Kshatriya

    AND

    + WP(C) No. 1984/2014

    TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEMS ASIA PACIFIC INC. ..... Petitioner versus

    DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX ..... Respondent

    Advocates who appeared in this case:

    For the Petitioner : Mr M.S. Syali, Sr Advocate with Mr Mayank Nagi, Ms Husnal Syali and Mr Harkunal Singh

    For the Respondent: Mr Rohit Madan, Mr Ruchir Bhatia, Mr Akash Vajpai and Mr Alay Kshatriya

    1

    CORAM:-

    HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

    JUDGEMENT

    SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J

    1. Since both the petitions involve common questions and pertain to the same petitioner, the same are being disposed of by a common judgment. WP(C) 1874/2013 pertains to assessment year 2007-08 and WP(C) 1984/2014 pertains to assessment year 2008-09.

    2. The petitioner, Turner Broadcasting Systems Asia Pacific Inc., formerly known as Turner Entertainment Networking Asia Inc. (hereinafter referred to as „TENA") is a company incorporated in the state of Georgia, U.S.A. and is a tax resident of the U.S.A. During the relevant financial years, TENA derived income from the grant of exclusive rights to Turner International India Private Limited (TIIPL) in India to sell advertising on the products and to distribute the products, namely, (a) Satellite Delivered Televisions Services called Cartoon Networks, TCM Turner, TCM Turner Classic Movies, POGO and Boomerang ; (b) from Interactive Entertainment Services known as cartoonnetworkindia.com and POGO.T.V.; and (c) from Entertainment Mobile Telecommunication Services "Cartoon Network Mobile and Boomerang Mobile.

    2

    WP(C) No. 1874/2013 (Assessment year 2007-2008)

    3. The petitioner filed its return of income on 27.03.2009 declaring an income of Rs. 12,40,99,555/-.

    4. On 11.08.2009, a questionnaire was issued by the respondent/revenue seeking details/evidence/explanations on various aspects pertaining to taxability of the petitioner. In total 38 queries were raised. For the present context, the following queries may be noticed:-

    (i) Give detailed note regarding the nature of business activities performed by the Petitioner. Furnish details regarding the projects executed in India during the year;

    (ii) File copy of return of Income for AY 2007-08 with Balance-sheet, Profit and Loss account and Notes on accounts.

    (iii) Furnish Statement/ Computation of Income with supporting/ evidence in support of the return of income.

    (iv) Furnish report in Form 3CEB under Section 92E read with Rule 10E.

    (v) Copy of agreement / contract with Indian customer or any other party in India from whom payment is received during the year.

    3

    (vi) Copy of all orders under Section 195(2), which Assessee might have received from payers relevant to the AY in question.

    (vii) Explain in detail whether you have Permanent Establishment in India.

    (viii) Give the list of AE's in India, if any, and also give details of transactions entered with them.

    (ix) Copy of Tax Residency Certificate.

    (x) Copy of last Assessment Order."

    5. On 5.10.2009, the petitioner filed a detailed reply to the questionnaire and reply given to the above referred queries was as under:-

    (i) In reply to query no. 1, it was submitted that Petitioner was company incorporated under the laws of state of Georgia. During the AY in question, the Petitioner derived the largest portion of its Indian income from the grant of exclusive rights to Turner International India Private Ltd. (`TIIPL') in India to sell advertising on the products and to distribute the products.

    (ii) In reply to query no 2, a print of Corporate Tax Return e-filed for AY 2007-08 was submitted.

    (iii) In reply to query no. 3, a copy of computation of income along with Notes to computation was filed.

    4

    (iv) In reply to query no. 5, a copy of report in Form 3CEB was filed.

    (v) In reply to query no. 12, copy of Order under Section 195(2) of the Act, determining the withholding tax rate for making remittance to the Petitioner was filed.

    (vi) In reply to query no. 14, a detailed explanation was given showing how the Petitioner did not have any PE in India.

    (vii) In reply to query no. 19, list of AE's of the Petitioner in India was provided to the Respondent.

    (viii) In reply to query no. 25, a copy of Tax Residency Certificate was filed.

    (ix) In reply to query no. 37, copy of last Assessment Order for AY 2006-07 was furnished.

    (x) Further, in response to query no. 10, inter alia, the Distribution and Advertising Sales Agreement, dated as of April 1, 2006 was filed before the Respondent vide letter dated 14.12.2009.

    6. On 24.12.2009, the proceedings u/s 143 (3) of the Income Tax Act were concluded and the assessment was framed. The Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that only 10% of the total advertisement and distribution revenue earned in India was taxable in India. In the detailed assessment order, specific reference is made to the notes to computation of

    5

    income tax filed during the course of assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer in the assessment order has referred to the mutual agreement to avoid double taxation under Article 27 of India/USA DTAA for the assessment years 2001-2002 to 2004-2005 and the fact that subsequently for the assessment year 2005-06, assessment was concluded following the MAP resolution. The Assessing Officer in the assessment order has specifically recorded that since the facts of the year under consideration remain the same, therefore, following the agreement reached by the respective competent authorities in the earlier years, the tax was computed at 10% as per the MAP resolutions.

    7. On 27.03.2012 notice under Section 147/148 was issued, within the period of four years and the said notice was served on 30.03.2012. The reasons recorded for re-opening of assessment were as under:-

    "The assessment in this case of M/s Turner Entertainment network Asia Inc., a foreign company for the assessment year 2007-08 was completed u/s 143(3) in December, 2009 determining the income of Rs. 12,40,99,555/-. Form the perusal of Assessment records it is observed that the income of the assessee from advertisement and distribution revenue was taxed by taking only 10% of the revenue as the net profit chargeable to tax in India as per the MAP resolution for the A.Y. 2001-02 and A.Y. 2004-05. Even the ITO-TDS u/s 195 of the I.T.Act has held that there receipts are taxable as royalty and also as per article 12(3) of the

    6

    DTAA with USA, tax is deductible at 10%. As the MAP Resolution was only for A.Y. 2001-02 to 2004-05 and the revenue was accruing the assessee in A.Y. 2007-08 in pursuance of the agreement, which is effective from 01.04.2006, it should have been offered and taxed at 10% as per section 115A of the I. T. Act, 1961. Thus, the assessee has chargeable income, in excess of 1 lakh rupees, which has escaped assessment.

    In view of the above, I have reasons to believe that the income chargeable to tax the escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147/148.

    (Mazhar Akram)

    Deputy Director of Income Tax Cir-

    2(2) Intl. Taxation New Delhi"

    8. On 14.05.2012, the petitioner filed objections to the reasons. By order dated 22.02.2013, the objections have been disposed of. The petitioner has thus impugned the notice under Section 148 as well as the order disposing of the objections in this petition.

    WP(C) 1984/2014 (Assessment Year 2008-09)

    9. On 05.03.2010, the petitioner filed its return of income declaring an income of Rs. 11,17,78,295/-.

    10. On 25.08.2010, notice under Section 143 (2) of the Act was issued by the respondent asking the petitioner to produce documents, accounts and any

    7

    other evidence on which the petitioner relied in support of the return of income.

    11. On 22.10.2010, the petitioner filed the computation of income alongwith notes to computation disclosing the income from advertisements and distribution alongwith its tax treatment both in the notes as well as in the computation. The petitioner by letter dated 3.12.2010 furnished the India Specific Revenue Statement and by letter dated 15.12.2010 submitted a copy of the distribution and advertisement sales agreement effective April 01, 2006 with the department.

    12. On consideration of the material filed during the assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer framed the assessment on 20.12.2010 concluding and holding that 10% of the total advertisement and distribution revenue received from India was taxable in India. The Assessing Officer in the Assessment Order has specifically noted that in case for Assessment Years 2001-02 to 2004-05, the respective competent authorities of India and USA have reached a mutual agreement to avoid double taxation under Article 27 of India/USA DTAA. As per the terms of the mutual agreement, 10% of the advertisement revenues received from Indian Sources during the relevant previous years by the appellant is deemed to net profit chargeable to tax in India.

    8

    13. Subsequently for assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08 (WP(C) 1784/2013), assessments were concluded following the afore- mentioned MAP resolution. Further, the Assessing Officer has noted that since the facts of the year under consideration remain the same as for assessment year 2007-08, therefore, following the agreement reached by the respective competent authorities in the earlier years, the returned income was being assessed. The advertisement revenues received were assessed at 10%.

    14. On 28.03.2013, notice was issued by the respondents under Section 147/148 seeking to reopen assessment concluded under Section 143 (3). The reasons recorded for reopening as supplied to the petitioner are as under:-

    "The assessment of M/s Turner Entertainment Network Asia Inc. for the assessment year 2008-09 was completed under section 143 (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In December 2010, determining the income at Rs. 11,17,78,295/- The income of the assessee from the advertisement & distribution revenue was taxed by taking only 10% of the revenue as the net profit chargeable to tax in India as per the MAP resolution for the assessment years 2001-02 and 2004-05. During the course of perusal of records, it is revealed that the MAP resolution was application only for assessment years 2001-02 & 2004- 05, and the current revenue was accruing to the assessee in assessment year 2008-09 (FY 2007-08) in pursuance of the agreement, which is effective from 01.04.2006. Hence, it would have been taxed at the rate of 10% on gross basis as per the provisions of section 115A of the Income Tax Act, 1961,

    9

    In view of the above, I have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped has assessment within the meanings of section 147/148 of the Act, 1961. (Mazhar Akram)

    Deputy Director of Income Tax

    Circ 2(2) Intl. Taxation, New Delhi"

    15. On 30.1.2014, the petitioner filed its objections against the notice seeking to reopen the assessment. By the order dated 20.02.2014, the objections have been disposed of. The petitioner in the present petition has impugned the notice under Section 147/148 seeking to re-open the assessment and the order dated 20.02.2014 disposing of the objections filed by the petitioner.

    Discussion

    16. Perusal of the assessment orders in both the petitions clearly show that an opinion was formed by the Assessing Officer that taxation of advertisement and distribution revenue was to be governed by MAP resolution and the competent authorities of USA and India had agreed to an attribution of 10% of the total revenue generated from the said distribution and advertisement sales agreement. The same was agreed to be treated as business income.

    10

    17. A detailed questionnaire had been issued to the petitioner, which was duly replied to. As many as 38 queries had been raised and a detailed reply alongwith all annexures and supporting documents were furnished by the petitioner in response to the queries raised. The copies of the relevant agreements, the generation of income and the tax treatment given by the petitioner to the said income was duly disclosed to the assessing officer. The material based on which the reopening has been sought to be done by the department was available before the assessing officer at the time of the framing of the assessment under Section 143. Not only was the same before the Assessing Officer, the Assessing Officer has referred to the same in the Assessment Year and taken note of the same.

    18. In Commissioner of Income Tax Versus Usha International Ltd.

    348 ITR 485 (Del.) (FB), Full Bench of Court laid down the following propositions of law:

    (i) The expression 'change of opinion' postulates formation of opinion and then a change thereof. In the context of section 147, it implies that the Assessing Officer should have formed an opinion at the first instance, i.e., in the proceedings under section 143(3) and now by initiation of the reassessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer proposes or wants to take a different view.

    (ii) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case the assessment order itself records that the issue

    11

    was raised and is decided in favour of the assessee. Reassessment proceedings in the said cases will be hit by principle of 'change of opinion'.

    (iii) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case an issue or query is raised and answered by the assessee in original assessment proceedings but thereafter the Assessing Officer does not make any addition in the assessment order. In such situations, it should be accepted that the issue was examined but the Assessing Officer did not find any ground or reason to make addition or reject the stand of the assessee. He forms an opinion. The reassessment will be invalid because the Assessing Officer, had formed an opinion in the original assessment, whether or not he had recorded his reasons in the assessment order."

    19. In Jindal Photo Films Ltd. Versus Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (1999) 234 ITR 170 (Del) a division bench of this court held as under:

    14. Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Ito [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC) is the leading authority which still holds the field. It is well-settled that while submitting to the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer, it is the duty of the assessee to disclose all the primary facts (in contradistinction with inferential facts) which have a bearing on the liability of the income earned by the assessee being subjected to tax. It is for the Assessing Officer to draw inferences from the facts and apply the law determining the liability of the assessee. The law

    12

    does not require the assessee to state the conclusions that can reasonably be drawn from the primary facts. Once that is done and assessment order framed, the Assessing Officer cannot at a later point of time merely on forming an opinion, by giving a second thought to the primary facts disclosed by the assessee, arrive at a finding that he had committed an error in computing the taxable income of the assessee and reopen the assessment by resort to section 147. Discovery of new and important matters or knowledge of fresh facts which were not present at the time of original assessment Would constitute a „reason to believe the income has escaped assessment" within the meaning of section 147. Here also such facts which could have been discovered by the assessing authority but were not so discovered at the time of original assessment may not constitute a new information. - Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO [1993] 203 ITR 456, 477 (SC), A.L.A Firm v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras . [1991] 189 ITR 285, 298/ 55 Taxman 497 (SC), Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996, 1004 (SC), ITO v. Lakshmani Mewal Das [1976] 103 ITR 437, 445 (SC), CIT V. Bhanji Lavji

    [1971] 79 ITR 582, 588 (SC).

    15. In Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. Cit, West Bengal-Ii . II [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC), one of the points decided was that where in the original assessment, the income liable to tax had escaped assessment due to oversight, inadvertence or a mistake committed by the ITO, the assessment can be reopened. It was a decision by a Bench of two Honourable Judges. At least on two occasions, Benches of three Honourable Judges have clarified that Kalyanji Mavji & Co."s case (supra) cannot be taken to have overridden the consistently laid down law. Where

    13

    the ITO (very often successor officer) attempts to reopen the assessment because the opinion formed earlier by himself (or more often, by a predecessor ITO), was in his opinion incorrect, judicial decisions have consistently held that this could not be done. - Indian Eastern Newspaper Society"s case (supra) and A.L.A. firm"s case (supra).

    16. The power to reopen an assessment was conferred by the Legislature but not with the intention to enable the ITO to reopen the final decision made against the revenue in respect of questions that directly arose for decision in earlier proceedings. If that were not the legal position, it would result in placing an unrestricted power of review in the hands of the assessing authorities depending on their changing moods - CIT v. Rao Thakur Narayan Singh [1965] 56 ITR 234 , 239(SC).

    17. In Phool Chand Bajrang Lal. v. ITO [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC), their Lordships have held while interpreting section 147 as it stood in the assessment year 1963-64:-

    ". . . An Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under section 147(a) read with section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, only if on the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information coming to his possession

    subsequently, he has reasons, which he must record, to believe that, by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a true and full disclosure of all material facts necessary for his assessment during the concluded assessment proceedings, any part of his income,

    14

    profits or gains chargeable to income-tax has escaped assessment. He may start reassessment proceedings either because some fresh facts had come to light which were not previously disclosed or some information with regard to the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts as were earlier available but acting on fresh information. Since the belief is that of the Income-tax Officer, the sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief is not for the Court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the Court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income- tax Officer and examine whether there was any material available on the record from which the requisite belief could be formed by the Income-tax Officer and further whether that material had any rational connection or a live link for the formation of the requisite belief. . . ." (p. 477)

    18. Following the settled trend of judicial opinion and the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court time and again, different High Courts of the country have taken the view that if an expenditure or a deduction was wrongly allowed while computing the taxable income of the assessee, the same could not be brought to tax by reopening the assessment merely on

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    account of subsequently the assessing officer forming an opinion that earlier he had erred in allowing the expenditure or the deduction - Siesta Steel Construction (P.) Ltd. v. K.K. Shikare [1985] 154 ITR 547 (Bom.), Satpal Automobile Company v. Income-Tax Officer, Circle-Ii(5), Kanpur. [1983] 141 ITR 450 (All.), Gopal Films v. Income-Tax Officer, Assessment-5, (Addl.) Circle-I. [1983] 139 ITR 566 (Kar.), CWT v. Manilal C. Desai [1973] 91 ITR 135 (MP). (underlining supplied)

    20. On applying, the above principles to the facts of the present case and on perusal of the reasons we find that no fresh information or material has been referred to in the reasons recorded for seeking to reopen the assessment. The material that is referred to is the very same material that was already before the Assessing Officer at the time of framing of the assessment under Section 143 (3) of the Act and even the reasons record that „from the perusal of the assessment record, it is observed that". This clearly shows that the assessing officer has sought to re-appreciate the material that was already there at the time when the assessment was framed under Section 143 (3). Thus, as seen from above, it is clearly a case of change of opinion, which is clearly not permissible.

    21. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the assessing officer has merely intended to revisit the concluded assessments and it is a clear case of change of opinion, which is not permissible in law. The impugned order dated 22.02.2013 and notice dated 27.03.2012 in

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    WP(C) 1874/2013 and the impugned order dated 20.02.2014 and the notice dated 28.03.2013 in WP(C) 1984/2014 are set aside and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto to are hereby quashed.

    22. In view of the above, the writ petitions are allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

    SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J

    BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

    October 08 , 2015 sk

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