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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (respondent) filed a suit for injunction (both mandatory and prohibitory) seeking, inter alia, a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to vacate a building comprised in the suit property. The plaintiff's case was that she obtained the suit property pursuant to Ext.A2 (a partition deed) and that the defendants were in permissive occupation of the building and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.

The first defendant is the wife of the brother of the plaintiff; defendants 2 and 3 are the children of the first defendant (the third defendant being a minor represented by her mother). The defendants contended that a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid to the plaintiff's father at the time of the marriage of the first defendant with the brother of the plaintiff on the understanding that a property would be given as the share of the husband of the first defendant. They asserted that the father purchased a property in Mumbai using that money but did not give the suit property to the husband's share, and that they therefore have a charge over the suit property.

At trial, the trial court rejected the defendants' contentions and decreed the suit. The defendants appealed; the appellate court confirmed the trial court's decision. The defendants then filed this regular second appeal (RSA No.110 of 2014). The appeal was finally heard on 06-01-2016 and the court delivered judgment on the same day.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or whether the matter fell within the jurisdiction of a Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act because the suit was said to arise "in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship".
  2. Whether the first defendant has a charge over the suit property under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act by reason of the alleged payment of Rs.4,00,000/- to the plaintiff's father at the time of marriage, and if so, whether that affects the plaintiff's right to the relief sought (mandatory possession).
  3. Whether the defendants should be granted time to surrender vacant possession of the building in the suit property and on what conditions.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Plaintiff's Case

  • The plaintiff obtained the suit property by Ext.A2 (partition deed) and is entitled to possession.
  • The defendants are in permissive occupation of the building in the suit property and have refused to vacate despite repeated demands.
  • The relief sought included a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to vacate the building in the suit property, together with ancillary reliefs.

Appellants / Defendants' Arguments

  • The suit falls within the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act and therefore the civil court lacks jurisdiction; reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Vasumathi v. Valsa (2011(3) KLT 638).
  • A sum of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid to the plaintiff's father at the time of the marriage of the first defendant with the plaintiff's brother on the understanding that the plaint schedule property would be given as the husband's share; consequently, the first defendant has a charge over the suit property under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Alternatively, the defendants sought time to surrender vacant possession of the building in the suit property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vasumathi v. Valsa, 2011(3) KLT 638 Relied upon by appellants to support the contention that the suit falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court (i.e., that the suit is within the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act). The court noted the appellants' reliance on this decision but, after analysis of Section 7 and related authorities, rejected the contention that the present suit fell within the Family Court's jurisdiction.
Leby Issac v. Leela M. Nainan, 2005(3) KLT 665 Interpretation of clause (d) of Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act — specifically the meaning and scope of the phrase "in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship". The court relied on paragraphs 12–14 of this decision to explain that "circumstances" include occurrences surrounding, preceding, accompanying or closely following a marital relationship, but concluded that the present suit did not fall within those parameters and therefore was not within Section 7(1)(d).
Salter v. State, 163 Ga. 80, 135 S.E. 408 Quoted in Leby Issac for definition/explanation of the word "circumstances" (as part of the authorities used to interpret clause (d) of Section 7(1)). The court reproduced the reasoning from Leby Issac (which cites Salter) to underline the meaning of "circumstances" and used that explanatory material in concluding that the present suit does not arise out of circumstances connected to the marital relationship of the first defendant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the jurisdictional contention under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. It quoted Section 7(1) (including the Explanation and clauses (a)–(g)) and identified that the appellants relied particularly on clause (d) (suits or proceedings for an order or injunction "in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship").

The court considered this clause in light of its earlier decision in Leby Issac v. Leela M. Nainan (paras 12–14), which interprets "circumstances" to mean the surroundings or particulars that accompany an act and, in the marital context, those particulars which closely precede, surround, accompany or follow the marriage and have a direct bearing on it. The court explained that clause (d) contemplates only those injunctions that are in relation to such circumstances surrounding or connected with the marital relationship.

Applying that interpretation to the facts, the court observed that clause (c) (suits with respect to property of the parties to a marriage) applies only where the dispute is between the parties to the marriage. The present dispute was not between parties to a marriage: the plaintiff was not a party to the marriage in question such that the dispute could be characterized as between spouses. Further, the court concluded it could not be said that the present suit was for an order or injunction in relation to occurrences that attend upon, surround, precede or follow the marriage of the first defendant or that it otherwise arose out of such marital circumstances. On that basis the court rejected the appellants' contention that the civil court lacked jurisdiction in favor of the Family Court.

On the second contention (reliance on Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act), the court found no substance in that argument because the suit before it was not a suit for the realization of money. The court also observed that even if it were assumed that a charge in favor of the first defendant existed, such a charge would not affect the plaintiff's right to claim the relief sought in the suit (possession). Thus the Section 39 contention did not defeat the plaintiff's claim for possession.

Finally, exercising its discretion in the circumstances of the family relationship between the parties, the court disposed of the appeal by dismissing it but granted the defendants a limited, conditional period to vacate the building: the defendants were given time until 30.6.2016 to vacate the plaint schedule building provided they file an affidavit within six weeks unconditionally undertaking to surrender vacant possession on or before 30.6.2016. All interlocutory applications in the appeal were closed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is dismissed.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The plaintiff's decree for possession (as previously granted by the trial court and affirmed on first appeal) stands.
  • The defendants are granted time until 30.6.2016 to vacate the building in the suit property on the specific condition that they file an affidavit within six weeks from the judgment date unconditionally undertaking to surrender vacant possession on or before 30.6.2016. All interlocutory applications are closed.

Implications: The court's decision resolves the parties' dispute by affirming the lower courts' decree in favour of the plaintiff and by imposing a conditional timeline for compliance by the defendants. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle or wider precedent beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and prior authority to the facts of this case.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Valsala v. Geetha Rajmohan

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

    PRESENT:

    THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR

    WEDNESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY 2016/16TH POUSHA, 1937 RSA.No. 110 of 2014 ()

    -----------------------

    (AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN AS.NO. 61/2008 OF ADDL.DISTRICT COURT-1, MAVELIKKARA DATED 31-10-2013)

    (AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OS.NO. 240/2005 OF MUNSIFF COURT, MAVELIKKARA DATED 10-01-2008)

    -----------

    APPELLANT(S)/APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS:

    -----------------------------------------------------------------

    1. VALSALA, AGED 44 YEARS,

    SREYAS, KANDIYOOR MURI, MAVELIKKARA VILLAGE.

    2. AKHILA KRISHNAKUMAR, AGED 19 YEARS,

    SREYAS, KANDIYOOR MURI, MAVELIKKARA VILLAGE.

    3. NEELIMA KRISHNAKUMAR, AGED 15 YEARS,

    SREYAS, KANDIYOOR MURI, MAVELIKKARA VILLAGE,

    REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER THE 1ST APPELLANT HEREIN.

    BY ADV. SRI.B.MOHANLAL

    RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:

    ------------------------------------------------------------

    GEETHA RAJMOHAN, AGED 48 YEARS,

    FLAT NO. 513, ABDUL AZIZ AL MASJID BUILDING,

    PORT SAEED, DUBAI, U.A.E.

    FROM SREYAS, KANDIYOOR MURI,

    MAVELIKKARA VILLAGE, REPRESENTED BY POWER OF

    ATTORNEY HOLDER REGHUNATHA PILLAI,

    SREYAS, KANDIYOOR MURI,

    MAVELIKKARA VILLAGE. PIN-690 101.

    BY ADVS. SRI.P.B.KRISHNAN

    SRI.SABU GEORGE

    SRI.P.B.SUBRAMANYAN

    SRI.P.M.NEELAKANDAN

    THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD

    ON 06-01-2016, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE

    FOLLOWING:

    sts

    1

    P.B.SURESH KUMAR, J.

    = = = = = = = = = = = = R.S.A.No.110 of 2014. = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 6th day of January, 2016.

    J U D G M E N T

    Defendants in a suit for injunction, both mandatory and prohibitory, are the appellants in this second appeal.

    2. The first defendant is the wife of the brother of the plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3 are the children of the first defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that she has obtained the suit property as per Ext.A2 partition deed and that the defendants who are in permissive occupation of the building in the suit property are not vacating the building despite repeated demands. The relief sought in the suit was a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to vacate the building in the suit property. Other ancillary reliefs were also sought by the plaintiff. The defendants resisted the suit

    2

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    2

    contending inter alia that a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid to the father of the plaintiff at the time of the marriage of the first defendant with the brother of the plaintiff on an understanding that the plaint schedule property will be given towards the share of the husband of the first defendant. According to the defendants, though a property was purchased making use of the said amount of Rs.4,00,000/- by the father of the plaintiff at Mumbai, the suit property was not given to the share of the husband of the first defendant as undertook by the father of the plaintiff. It was also contended by them that in the circumstances they have a charge over the suit property.

    3. The trial court rejected the contentions raised by the defendants and decreed the suit. Though an appeal was preferred by the defendants challenging the decision of the trial court, the appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this second appeal by the defeated defendants.

    3

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    3

    4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants as also the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellants raised two contentions. The first contention was that the suit is one which would fall within the scope of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act and therefore, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of this Court in

    Vasumathi v. Valsa (2011(3) KLT 638) in support of the said contention. The second contention raised by the learned counsel was that in so far as a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid at the time of the marriage of the first defendant to the father of her husband who held the suit property at the relevant time, the first defendant has a charge over the same under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. Alternatively, the learned counsel for the appellants pleaded for time to surrender vacant possession of the building in the suit property.

    4

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    4

    6. There is no substance in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act reads thus:

    "Jurisdiction - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall.--

    (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and

    (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.

    Explanation:- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:--

    (a) suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;

    (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;

    (c) a suit of proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;

    (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;

    (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;

    5

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    5

    (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;

    (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.

    (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise: -

    (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and

    (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment".

    The learned counsel for the appellants relies on clause (d) of Section 7(1) of the Act to contend that the present suit would come within the scope of Section 7. The scope of clause (d) of Section 7(1) of the Act was considered by this Court in Leby Issac v. Leela M.Nainan (2005(3) KLT

    665). Paragraphs 12 to 14 of the said judgment read thus:

    "12. The expression, "circumstances" means 'the surroundings of an act', as per Law lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, reprint edition, 1992. It also means 'the particulars which accompany an act', The word "circumstances" is explained in Salter v. State, 163 Ga. 80, 135 S.E.408, 409 also as,

    "related or accessory facts, occurrences or things which stand around, or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify a principal fact or event. (vide Black's Law Dictionary Fourth edition).

    13. So, 'circumstances' in relation to a marital relationship will be

    6

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    6

    those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage. The main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship'. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship.

    14. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship ie., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same."

    It is thus evident that clause (d) of Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act contemplates only suits or proceedings for an order or injunction in relation to occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany,

    7

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    7

    which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event of a marriage or marital relationship. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' would also include circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place between marital life, which resulted in breaking down of the marriage and also which closely followed as a consequence of all these. Among the categories of suits and proceedings referred to in Section 7(1), clause (c) of Section 7(1) alone deals with suits or proceedings with respect to property. To attract clause (c) of Section7(1) of the Act, the dispute must be between the parties to the marriage. The present suit is one for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to vacate the suit property alleging that the defendants are in permissive occupation of the building in the suit property. The dispute is not between parties to a marriage. Further, it cannot be said that the present suit is a suit in relation to any occurrence or thing which stand around or about, which

    8

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    8

    attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the marriage of the first defendant. Likewise, it cannot also be said that the present suit is one arising out of circumstances which led to the marriage of the first defendant, which developed thereafter, which took place between marital life, which resulted in breaking down of the marriage and also which closely followed as a consequence of all these. In the said circumstances, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the suit was not maintainable before the civil court cannot be accepted.

    7. There is no substance in the contention raised relying on Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act as the suit in the instant case is not one for realization of money. Even assuming that the first defendant has a charge over the suit property, the same does not affect the right of the plaintiff to claim the relief sought in the suit.

    9

    RSA.No.110/2014.

    9

    In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. However, having regard to the relationship between the parties, I deem it appropriate to grant to the defendants time till 30.6.2016 to vacate the building in the suit property on condition that the defendants shall file an affidavit before the trial court/execution court, within six weeks from today, unconditionally undertaking to surrender vacant possession of the plaint schedule building, on or before 30.6.2016. All the interlocutory applications in the appeal are closed.

    Sd/- P.B.SURESH KUMAR,

    JUDGE.

    Kvs

    // true copy //

    PA TO JUDGE.

    10

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    Valsala v. Geetha Rajmohan
    (Jan 6, 2016)