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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 215 and 216 of Act VIII of 1859. Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859, the first Limitation Act
  • provisions of Article 180 of the 2nd schedule of the Limitation Act. Section 230
  • provisions of Act VIII of 1859. The provisions of Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859
  • provisions of Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Article 169 of the Limitation Act of 1871,
  • Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Article 180 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 216 of Act VIII of 1859.
  • Section 21 of Act VI of 1874
  • Article 180 by Section 230,
  • Act IX of 1871, Article 169,
  • Act VI of 1854, Section 31,
  • Act X of 1877. Article 180
  • Article 169 of Act IX
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 215 and 216 of Act VIII of 1859. Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859, the first Limitation Act
  • provisions of Article 180 of the 2nd schedule of the Limitation Act. Section 230
  • provisions of Act VIII of 1859. The provisions of Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859
  • provisions of Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Article 169 of the Limitation Act of 1871,
  • Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Article 180 of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 216 of Act VIII of 1859.
  • Section 21 of Act VI of 1874
  • Article 180 by Section 230,
  • Act IX of 1871, Article 169,
  • Act VI of 1854, Section 31,
  • Act X of 1877. Article 180
  • Article 169 of Act IX
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The court began by noting a prior misimpression that various applications made between 10 February 1883 and September 1888 related to a decree of the High Court dated 28 March 1882, an impression arising from an ambiguous translation of a decree-holder's application dated 19 November 1890. A careful perusal of the petition established that all the applications were in respect of the execution of a Privy Council decree (an Order in Council). The judgment-debtors challenged execution on limitation and related grounds. Earlier, on 20 December 1887 the Subordinate Judge had overruled similar contentions and ordered execution of the decree; no appeal was preferred against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree sought to be executed is an "Order of Her Majesty in Council" within the meaning of Article 180 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code limits or applies to the provisions of Article 180 (i.e., whether Section 230 bars execution as urged by the judgment-debtors).
  3. Whether there has been a "revivor" of the decree within the meaning of Article 180 (and the meaning of the word "revivor").
  4. Whether the decree is barred by limitation for want of any revivor or other act within twelve years prior to the present application.
  5. Whether the matter is res judicata in light of the Subordinate Judge's order dated 20 December 1887.

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-debtors' Arguments

  • The decree of which execution is sought is not an Order of Her Majesty in Council within the meaning of Article 180 of the Limitation Act.
  • The decree is barred by Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • There was no revivor at any time within twelve years before the date of the present application, as required by Article 180, and therefore the decree is barred.

Mr. Advocate-General's / Appellants' Arguments

  • It was urged that the "orders" mentioned in Article 180 refer to orders made in suits going to the Privy Council from the High Court in the exercise of its Original Civil jurisdiction (i.e., an argument about the scope of Article 180).
  • The Advocate-General also relied on Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, suggesting it rendered the decree barred.
  • With respect to the meaning of "revivor," the learned Advocate-General contended that the word meant a revival of the suit or decree against the representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Luchmun Persad Singh v. Kishun Persad Singh, I.L.R. 8 Cal. 218 : 10 C.L.R. 425 Determines that once an order is made in Council it becomes the paramount decision in the suit (i.e., an Order in Council is the final decision in the suit). The court relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the decree sought to be enforced in the present case is an Order in Council.
Pitts v. La Fontaine, L.R. 6 App. Ca. 482 Expresses the view that when a decision of the Judicial Committee is reported to Her Majesty and embodied in an Order in Council it becomes the decree or order of the final Court of appeal. The court cited this passage (quoted in the opinion) and used it, as followed by Luchmun Persad Singh, to support that Orders in Council are final and thus fall within Article 180.
Mayabhai Prembhai v. Tribhuvandas Jagjivandas, I.L.R. 6 Bom. 258 Held that Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to decrees made by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction. The court noted this view (along with the Madras decision) to support its conclusion that Section 230 does not cut down the effect of Article 180 and thus is inapplicable to Orders in Council.
Ganpathi v. Balsundara, I.L.R. 7 Mad. 540 Similar holding to the Bombay case: Section 230 does not apply to decrees of the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction. The court cited this decision to reinforce the position that Section 230 is not applicable to Orders in Council and does not limit Article 180.
Ashootosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee, I.L.R. 6 Cal. 504 : S.C. L.R. 23 White, J. held that an order for execution of a decree made after notice to show cause has the effect of reviving it within the meaning of Article 180. The court adopted this judicial interpretation to conclude that an order for execution (made after notice as in the present case) operates as a revivor of the decree for the purposes of Article 180.
Wise v. Jugobandhoo Baboo, 4 W.R. Mis. 10 Referenced for the historical point that, prior to legislative change, there was no period of limitation prescribed for execution of decrees of the Privy Council. Used in historical discussion to explain the legislative amendments (Section 21 of Act VI of 1874) which extended the limitation provisions to include Orders in Council.
Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri, I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51 Authority for the proposition that an unappealed order of a subordinate court becomes conclusive (res judicata) as to questions decided by it. The court relied on this case to treat the Subordinate Judge's order of 20 December 1887 (which overruled the same contentions and ordered execution) as conclusive and to treat the present objection as res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a series of analytical steps, applying legal principles and precedent strictly as contained in the opinion:

  1. Clarification of the subject-matter: The court corrected its initial impression and, on careful reading of the petition, concluded that all applications related to execution of a Privy Council decree (an Order in Council).
  2. Characterisation under Article 180: The court rejected the contention that the decree was not an Order in Council within Article 180. It relied on a Full Bench decision (Luchmun Persad Singh) which, following Pitts v. La Fontaine, held that an Order in Council becomes the decree of the final Court of appeal. No distinction was drawn between Orders in Council arising from appeals from the High Court's Original or Appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the decree in question was held to be an Order in Council and therefore within Article 180.
  3. Interaction between Section 230 CPC and Article 180: The court analysed Section 230 (quoted in full in the opinion) and Article 180 (also quoted). It observed that Section 230 was introduced in Act X of 1877 and that Article 180 is a reproduction of Article 169 of the Limitation Act of 1871. The court noted decisions from the Bombay and Madras High Courts holding Section 230 inapplicable to High Court decrees in Original Civil jurisdiction and applied those reasons to Orders in Council. The court further reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to limit Article 180 by Section 230 it would likely have signalled that intention within the Article itself (as in Article 179). On this basis the court overruled the objection founded on Section 230.
  4. Meaning of "revivor" and its application: The Advocate-General contended that "revivor" meant revival only against representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor. The court reviewed prior judicial interpretation, in particular Ashootosh Dutt, where White, J. held that an order for execution made after notice to show cause operates as a revivor under Article 180. The court traced the historical and statutory context (Act VIII of 1859, Act XIV of 1859, Act IX of 1871, and the 1874 amendment adding "order of Her Majesty in Council" to the Article) and concluded that "revived" must be read consistently for High Court decrees and Orders in Council. Given that an order for execution had been made after notice (analogous to procedure under the older Acts and the present code's Section 248 analogous to Section 216 of Act VIII of 1859), the court found that revivor had occurred and therefore the present application was not barred by Article 180.
  5. Res judicata: The court observed that the very same contentions were raised before the Subordinate Judge on 20 December 1887 and were overruled with an order that the decree be executed. No appeal was taken from that order. The court treated that decision as conclusive and therefore the present objection was res judicata, citing Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri.
  6. Conclusion: On the whole, applying the foregoing reasoning and precedents, the court concluded that the objections raised by the judgment-debtors must be overruled.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Holding (core ruling): The appeal is dismissed and the decree-holder's application for execution is sustained. The court held specifically that (a) the decree sought to be enforced is an Order in Council within Article 180 of the Limitation Act; (b) Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code does not limit or cut down the effect of Article 180 in the manner contended; (c) there has been a revivor of the decree (an order for execution after notice operates as a revivor under Article 180); and (d) the objections raised are res judicata in view of the Subordinate Judge's order of 20 December 1887.

Immediate consequences for the parties: the appeal is dismissed and the order for execution stands; costs are awarded against the appellants. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge dated 20 December 1887 is treated as conclusive on the same contentions because no appeal was preferred against it.

Broader implications: The court applied existing Full Bench and High Court authorities to confirm that Orders in Council are to be treated as final decrees within Article 180 and that execution-orders made after notice can amount to a revivor for limitation purposes. The opinion does not expressly state that it is intended to create a new precedent beyond the application of and reliance upon the cited authorities.


Judges: Tottenham, J. delivered the opinion. A concurring note was added by another judge who fully concurred but observed he would dismiss the appeal principally on the ground of res judicata arising from the Subordinate Judge's order dated 20 December 1887.

    Futteh Narain Chowdhry v. Chundrabati Chowdhrain And Anr.

    1. We were at first under the impression that the various applications from the 10th February 1883 to September 1888 were in respect of the decree which was made in the High Court on the 28th March 1882, and this impression arose from the translation of the decree-holders' application of the 19th November 1890, which in some places is no doubt ambiguous; but upon a careful perusal of the petition itself it is clear that all the applications were in respect of the execution of the Privy Council decree.

    2. The judgment-debtors contend, in the first place, that the decree of which execution is sought is not an Order of Her Majesty in Council within the meaning of Article 180 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Advocate-General, who appeared for the appellants, urged that the orders mentioned in Article 180 refer to orders made in suits going up to the Privy Council on appeal from the High Court in the exercise of its Original Civil jurisdiction. He also urged that the decree was barred under the provisions of Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code. And he further contended that, even if the decree of which execution is sought could be regarded as an Order of Her Majesty in Council, there was no revivor at anytime within 12 years before the date of the present application, as required by Article 180, and that consequently the decree was barred.

    3. It appears to us that the first contention is untenable. Whatever may have been the view previously entertained regarding cases going to the Privy Council from the High Court in the exercise of its Appellate jurisdiction, it is now finally settled by a Full Bench in the case of Luchmun Persad Singh v. Kishun Persad Singh I.L.R. 8 Cal. 218 : 10 C.L.R. 425 that when once an order is made in Council it becomes the paramount decision in the suit. The Full Bench followed the view expressed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Pitts v. La Fontaine L.R. 6 App. Ca. 482, where they said that

    "when a decision of this Board has been reported to Her Majesty, and has been sanctioned and embodied in an Order in Council, it becomes the decree or order of the final Court of appeal."
    No distinction was made between cases going up to the Privy Council from the High Court in the exercise of its Original Civil jurisdiction and those from its Appellate jurisdiction. We must therefore hold that the decree which is sought to be enforced is the Order in Council.

    4. The next question which arises is whether Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code limits in any way the provisions of Article 180 of the 2nd schedule of the Limitation Act. Section 230 runs thus:

    When the holder of a decree desires to enforce it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree, or to the officer, if any, appointed in this behalf or if the decree has been sent under the provisions hereinbefore contained to another Court, then to such Court, or to the proper officer thereof. The Court may in its discretion refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment-debtor.

    Where an application to execute a decree for the payment of money, or delivery of other property, has been made under this section, and granted, no subsequent application to execute the same decree shall be granted after the expiration of twelve years from any of the following dates (namely), (a) the date of the decree sought to be enforced or of the decree (if any) on appeal affirming the same, or (6) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money, or the delivery of any property, to be made at a certain date, the date of the default in making the payment or delivering the property in respect of which the applicant seeks to enforce the decree.

    Nothing in this section shall prevent the Court from granting an application for execution of a decree after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within twelve years immediately before the date of the application.

    5. Article 180 is as follows:

    When a present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of realising the right, provided that when the judgment, decree or order has been revived, or some part of the principal money secured thereby, or some interest on such money has been paid or some acknowledgment of the right thereto has been given in writing, signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, the twelve years shall be computed from the date of such revivor, payment or acknowledgment or the latest of such revivors, payments or acknowledgments, as the case may be.

    6. Section 230 was introduced for the first time in Act X of 1877. Article 180 is a reproduction of Article 169 of the Limitation Act of 1871, and seems to us to be independent of Section 230. The Bombay and Madras High Courts have, in the cases of Mayabhai Prembhai. v. Tribhuvandas Jagjivandas I.L.R. 6 Bom. 258, and Ganpathi v. Balsundara I.L.R. 7 Mad. 540, expressed the same views, and held that the section in question has no application to decrees made by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction. In Article 180, Orders in Council stand in the same category as decrees of Courts established by Royal Charter in the exercise of such jurisdiction. The reasons upon which the Bombay and Madras High Courts have held Section 230 not to be applicable to decrees of the High Courts, and with which we have no reason to differ, apply mutatis mutandis to the Orders of Her Majesty in Council. Had the Legislature intended to cut down the effect of Article 180 by Section 230, we would have expected some reference to that section in the article itself, as we find in Article 179, or some other indication of such intention. We think that the objection of the judgment-debtors under Section 230 must also be overruled.

    7. The only other question which requires consideration is, whether there has been such a revivor of the decree in this case as is required by Article 180. The learned Advocate General contended that the word "revivor" means a revival of the suit or decree against the representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor.

    8. The word has received, however, a judicial interpretation in respect of decrees of the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction. In the case of Ashootosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee I.L.R. 6 Cal. 504 : S.C. L.R. 23, White, J., held that an order for execution of a decree made after notice to show cause, has the effect of reviving it within the meaning of Article 180. As pointed out in that case, before Act VIII of 1859 was made applicable to the Chartered Courts, judgment would not issue upon a decree more than a year old without suing out a writ of scire facias against the defendant. The rule as to writs of scire facias was applicable to common law judgments. An equity suit was revived by a bill of revivor. Act VI of 1854, Section 31, introduced a simpler method of reviving a suit on the Equity side of the Court; on the Plea side the practice remained unchanged until the application of Act VIII of 1859 to the Chartered Courts. The provisions of this Act did away with the more cumbrous procedure of former times and introduced a simpler method of reviving a decree or suit on the Original Side of the Court. That method was by proceedings under Sections 215 and 216 of Act VIII of 1859. Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859, the first Limitation Act passed by the Indian Legislature of general application, provides as follows:

    No proceeding shall be taken to enforce any judgment, decree, or order of any Court established by Royal Charter, but within twelve years next after a present right to enforce the same shall have accrued to some persons capable of releasing the same, unless in the meantime such judgment, decree, or order shall have been duly revived or some part of the principal money secured by such judgment, decree, or order, or some interest thereon shall have been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto shall have been given in writing signed by the person by whom the same shall be payable or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, and in any such case no proceeding shall be brought to enforce the said judgment, decree, or order, but within twelve years after such revivor, payment, or acknowledgment or the latest of such revivors, payments, or acknowledgments as the case may be; provided that for three years next after the passing of this Act, every judgment, decree, and order which may be in force at the date of the passing of this Act shall be governed by the law now in force, anything therein contained notwithstanding.

    9. There is no definition of the word "revived" anywhere, but, as indicated by White, J. it has to be read in connection with the provisions of Act VIII of 1859. The provisions of Section 19 of Act XIV of 1859 were continued in Act IX of 1871, Article 169, which ran thus:

    When a present right to enforce the judgment, decree, or order accrued to some person capable of releasing the right, provided that when the judgment, decree, or order has been revived, or some part of the principal money secured thereby, or some interest on such money has been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto has been given in writing, signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, the twelve years shall be computed from the date of such revivor, payment, or acknowledgment, or the latest of such revivors, payments, or acknowledgments, as the case may be.

    10. Until 1874 these provisions were confined to decrees of the Chartered High Courts, in the exercise of their Ordinary Civil jurisdiction. There was no period of limitation prescribed for execution of decrees of the Privy Council [see Wise v. Jugobandhoo Baboo 4 W.R. Mis. 10]. By Section 21 of Act VI of 1874 the following words were added to Article 169 of Act IX of 1871: "or any order of Her Majesty in Council." The same words appear in Article 180, only instead of "any order" it is "an order." It is clear to us that the term "revived" must be read in one and the same sense in connection with High Court decrees and Orders in Council, and not distributively as Mr. Woodroffe contends. If we were to confine WHITE, J's., interpretation to Orders in Council made in suits going up to the Judicial Committee from the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction, this incongruous result would follow, that whereas such decrees would be subject to twelve years' limitation, there would be no limitation in cases going up from the Appellate Side. Now section 248 of the present code is analogous to Section 216 of Act VIII of 1859. And in the present case an order was made, after notice as provided for in that section, for the execution of the decree. We think, therefore, that the present application is not barred under Article 180. Further, it seems to us that the question now raised is res judicata. The vary same contentions were raised on the 20th of December 1887 before the Subordinate Judge which were overruled, and the order was that the decree be executed. As there was no appeal preferred against that order it became conclusive [Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51].

    11. On the whole, we are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.

    Tottenham, J.

    12. I desire to add that, while fully concurring in the opinion expressed in the judgment just delivered, I would dismiss this appeal only for the reason that the objection of the judgment-debtor is res judicata by the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, dated the 20th December 1887.

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    Futteh Narain Chowdhry v. Chundrabati Chowdhrain And Anr.
    (Dec 12, 1892)