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Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation concerns an account claimed by the plaintiff against Baboo Kali Pershad (and, after his death, against the defendants). The Collector, on behalf of the defendants, pleaded a denial of an alleged statement of account dated 13th Bhadro 1282 (30 August 1875); that plea was embodied as the third issue by the Subordinate Judge, who decided that issue in favour of the defence and against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, attacking that finding among other grounds. The appellate court first examined the evidence on that point and affirmed the judgment of the lower court on the denial issue.

A central procedural and substantive consequence arose from questions of limitation: the lower court held that so much of the plaintiff's claim as became due more than three years before suit was barred by limitation. The appellate court examined whether acknowledgments made by Kali Pershad in his lifetime, and by the defendants after his death, were sufficient to take the claim out of the Limitation Act. The suit was brought in September 1877, such that the Limitation Act applicable at the time of suit was Act IX of 1871 (the Act of 1877 came into force on 1 October 1877 and so did not govern this suit). The appellate court concluded that certain written acknowledgments (letters) constituted sufficient acknowledgments under Section 20 of the Act of 1871, that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation, and remanded the matter to the lower court to investigate and report the amount found to be due upon the accounts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged statement of account (the 1875 account) was proved.
  2. Assuming the 1875 account is not proved, whether so much of the plaintiff's claim as became due more than three years before suit is barred by limitation.
  3. Whether acknowledgments or promises made while the account was running (by Kali Pershad in his lifetime and by defendants after his death) are sufficient to prevent the claim being barred by the Limitation Act.
  4. Whether the Limitation Act of 1859 operated to extinguish the debt itself (not merely bar the remedy), and the consequences of the repeal by the Limitation Act of 1871.
  5. Whether acknowledgments given before the Act of 1871 (but which would suffice under that Act) have retrospective effect under Section 20 of the Act of 1871.
  6. Whether the letters relied upon were (a) written by Kali Pershad or by an agent authorised to bind him, (b) signed in the sense required by Section 20, and (c) whether they contained a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt within Section 20.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that, while the account was running, Kali Pershad in his lifetime, and the defendants after his death, made acknowledgments from time to time of the existence of the debt, which would take the case out of the operation of the Limitation Act.
  • The appellant relied upon three letters (and other subsequent letters) written in Kali Pershad's name within three years of the date the account was said to have been signed, asserting that these were sufficient written acknowledgments under the Limitation Act of 1871.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent argued that the letters were not proved to have been written either by Kali Pershad himself or by an agent generally or specially authorised on his behalf.
  • The respondent contended that the letters were not signed by Kali Pershad or by any authorised agent in the manner required by the Limitation Act.
  • The respondent also argued that the letters did not contain a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act of 1871.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishna Mohun Bose v. Okhilmoni Dossee, I.L.R. 3 Cal. 333 Held (by a Division Bench) that under the Limitation Act of 1859 the debt as well as the remedy was extinguished after the statutory period. The Court reviewed this decision, noted it was a Division Bench decision, and treated it as one of the authorities whose correctness was later doubted; it considered the reasoning but ultimately declined to follow the extinguishment view.
Bam Chunder Ghosaul v. Jugyulmonmohiney Dabec, I.L.R. 4 Cal. 283 Considered the same question (extinguishment vs. merely barring remedy) with reference to a mortgage debt; earlier decision was followed by operation of precedent though with expressed doubts. The court acknowledged that in that case a similar point had been decided by a Division Bench and that the Chief Justice had expressed doubts; in the present opinion those doubts weighed in favour of departing from the extinguishment view.
Valia Tamburati v. Vira Rayan, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 228 Madras High Court authority taking the contrary view: that the Limitation Act does not extinguish the debt, but bars the remedy. The court accepted the Madras view as correct, relied on it in concluding that the debt was not extinguished by the Act of 1859, and used it to justify applying the Act of 1871's provisions.
Madhavan v. Achuda, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 301 Another Madras decision supporting the view that limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt. The court cited this authority alongside Valia Tamburati to support its conclusion that the Madras Court's contrary view was right.
Teagaraya Mudali v. Mariappa Pillai, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 264 Held that provisions of the Limitation Act of 1871 regarding payments of interest (and thus treatment of acts which keep remedy alive) were retrospective; payments before the Act could keep remedy alive under the 1871 Act. The court applied the same principle to acknowledgments under Section 20: if an acknowledgment fulfils Section 20, it prevents the debt from being barred whether given before or after the 1871 Act.
Gunga Gobind Mundul (11 Moore's I.A., 345) Privy Council observations previously thought to support extinguishment view; court noted these observations were intended to apply to suits for immovable property. The court concluded that earlier misunderstanding of these observations had contributed to the erroneous extinguishment view and limited their proper application to immoveable-property suits.
Tanner v. Smart (6 B. & C., 603); Quincey v. Sharpe (L.R. 1 Exch. D., 72); Sheet v. Lindsay (L.R., 2 Exch. D., 314) English authorities holding that an acknowledgment need not specify the amount of the debt; amount can be proved by parol evidence if the acknowledgment admits a debt is due. The court relied on these cases to hold that the letter need not state the amount and that the letter of 25th Assin 1278 was a sufficient acknowledgment of a debt though it did not specify an amount.
Knight v. Crockford; Lobb v. Stanley; Johnson v. Dodgson; Darrell v. Evans; Bird v. Boulter; Durrell v. Evans English authorities on what constitutes a sufficient signature under the Statute of Frauds (and by analogy Section 20): a party's name or words acknowledging contracting may suffice; an agent may sign the principal's name and bind him. The court adopted these authorities to conclude that a formal signature at the foot is not necessary; if an authorised agent writes or signs the principal's name in a manner indicating authorship, that suffices for Section 20 purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded stepwise, applying facts to legal principles as follows:

  1. Identification and dating of the foundational document: the court started with an account adjusted and signed by Kali Pershad showing a balance due at the close of the Mahajani year 1274 (Rs. 13,611-2-6). It analyzed the distinction between the Mahajani and Fusli years (dates of Assin) to establish that the account could not have been signed until at least a few days after the 24th of Assin 1275 Fusli (concluding for present purposes that the account was signed on or after the 26th of Assin 1275 Fusli).
  2. Identification of the written acknowledgments: three letters (marked T10, T11, T12) were shown to have been written in Kali Pershad's name within three years from the date on or after which the account was signed. The court then asked whether these letters (and subsequent ones) constituted sufficient written acknowledgments under the Limitation Act of 1871 (Section 20) to restart the limitation period.
  3. Determination of applicable Limitation Act and effect of repeal: because the suit was brought in September 1877, Act IX of 1871 governed. The court confronted a preliminary difficulty: whether the earlier Limitation Act of 1859 had merely barred the remedy or extinguished the debt, and whether acknowledgments made before the 1871 Act could revive a right under the later Act even if insufficient under the 1859 Act. It concluded that this question turned on whether the 1859 Act extinguished the debt; after reviewing authorities, the court accepted the Madras High Court view (and other subsequent judicial views) that the 1859 Act did not extinguish the debt but only barred the remedy.
  4. Retrospectivity of Section 20: the court treated Teagaraya Mudali (Madras) as correctly establishing that provisions like Section 20 (and payments of interest) are retrospective—i.e., an acknowledgment that satisfies Section 20 prevents the debt from being barred whether it was made before or after the Act of 1871. The court concluded that, given the repealing clause in the Act of 1871, if the acknowledgments were not available under the 1871 Act they would not be available at all.
  5. Construction of Section 20's requirements: the court stated the statutory requirement that any promise or acknowledgment must be "contained in some writing signed before the expiration of the prescribed period by the party to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf," and that such writing restarts the limitation period for a fresh period computed from the time of signing.
  6. Proof of authorship and agency: the court examined testimony of the defendants' dewan, Shital Lal, who explained the regular practice of correspondence and identified who actually wrote the letters (Bharosi Lal the mohurir for T10 and T11; Shital Lal's father the dewan for T12; Shital Lal himself later for other letters). The court held that the letter T12, written by the dewan, was written by an agent generally authorised to correspond and therefore was a writing signed by an authorised agent for purposes of Section 20. Although there was some doubt about the mohurir's authority for T10 and T11, the court deemphasised the need to rely on them because T12 and subsequent letters written by the dewan were sufficient.
  7. Interpretation of "signed": the court rejected the Subordinate Judge's view that a formal signature at the end of the letter was necessary. Drawing on English Statute of Frauds authorities, the court held that if an authorised agent signs the name of the principal in such a way as to show the principal is the author (for example, customary forms of correspondence used in the country), that suffices. The court gave examples (short forms of letters and agent entries) and relied on authorities holding that a party's name in any part of the instrument may suffice as a signature.
  8. Sufficiency of content of acknowledgment: the court applied explanation 1 of Section 20 and English authorities to hold that an acknowledgment need not state the amount; an admission that a debt is due suffices, with the amount provable by parol evidence. The court examined the text of the letter dated 25th Assin 1278 (T12) and found it to contain a clear acknowledgment of debt and a promise to send a mohurir to adjust the account—thus satisfying Section 20 and restarting a fresh three-year limitation period from that date.
  9. Effect of subsequent letters and defendants' post-death acknowledgment: the court found subsequent letters (T13, T14, T15) written by the dewan contained further admissions and gave further three-year periods as applicable. After Kali Pershad's death, defendants' letter G17 dated 18th Aughran 1282 (11 December 1874) was held to be a direct acknowledgment by the defendants, giving the plaintiff another three-year period; the present suit was brought within that period.
  10. Conclusion on limitation and procedural disposition: on this analysis, the court held the plea of limitation did not bar the plaintiff's suit. Because the lower court had not fully investigated the amount due upon the entire account (except for the three years immediately preceding the suit), the appellate court remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge for investigation of the accounts and directed that the lower court report the amount found due; the appellate court would then finally dispose of the case.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court held that, so far as the plea of limitation is concerned, the plaintiff's suit is not barred. Certain written communications (notably the letter of 25th Assin 1278 and subsequent letters written by the dewan and a letter by the defendants after Kali Pershad's death) constituted sufficient acknowledgments under Section 20 of the Limitation Act of 1871 and thereby gave fresh periods of limitation; the suit was brought within one such revived period.

Implications:

  • The court determined that the Limitation Act of 1859 should not be read as extinguishing the debt itself (a view it reached adopting the contrary Madras authorities), and that the Limitation Act of 1871's provisions as to acknowledgments (Section 20) apply retrospectively to acknowledgments given before the Act, so long as they meet the statutory requirements.
  • On the facts before it, the court found that at least one written acknowledgment (T12) had been made by an agent generally authorised (the dewan), and that form and substance of the letters satisfied Section 20's writing and signature requirements; hence those acknowledgments restarted the limitation period.
  • The immediate practical effect: the case was remanded to the lower court to investigate and report the precise amount found due on the accounts (the appellate court did not finally adjudicate the quantum, only the legal question on limitation and the need for further accounting).
  • The court recorded its reconsideration of earlier Division Bench authority which had held the debt extinguished by limitation, expressing its preference for the view that limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt; it explained why it did not refer the point to a Full Bench, noting the concurrence of other judges and supporting Madras authorities.

    Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree

    1. (after shortly stating the nature of the suit and defence, continued):--The first point in the defence filed by the Collector on behalf of the defendants is a denial of the alleged statement of account by the defendant on the 13th Bhadro 1282 (30th August 1875), and the Subordinate Judge embodied this plea in the third issue, and decided against the plaintiff, in favor of the defence. The first nine paragraphs of the petition of appeal attack this finding. We propose to dispose of this part of the case before entering upon a consideration of the intricate questions raised in the other grounds of appeal and in the able arguments which have been addressed to us. [His Lordship then went into the evidence on this portion of the case, and as to that affirmed the judgment of the Court below.]

    2. But then comes the question (assuming this account of 1875 not to be proved), whether so much of the plaintiff's claim as became due more than three years before suit, is barred by limitation ? The lower Court has held that it is so barred. But it has been contended here, on behalf of the appellant, that, whilst the account was running, Baboo Kali Pershad, in his life-time, and the defendants since his death, have made such acknowledgments, from time to time of the existence of the debt, as will take the case out of the operation of the Limitation Act. This question does not appear to have been adequately brought to the notice of the Court below; and as it is one of some nicety, it is necessary to go carefully into the facts as well as the law for the purpose of deciding it.

    3. We start then with an account, which was admittedly adjusted and signed by Kali Pershad himself, showing a balance due from him to the plaintiff's firm, at the close of the Mahajani year 1274, of Rs. 13, 611-2-6. It is obvious that the account must have been adjusted up to the end of the Mahajani, and not the Fusli year 1274, because the Fusli year begins on the 1st of Assin, whilst the Mahajani year begins 24 days later,--viz., on the 25th of Assin; and this account, which purports to be for the three years, 1272, 1273, and 1274, runs from the 25th of Assin to the 24th of the following Assin in each year, and brings the account down to the close of the year 1274, so that the 24th of Assin, which is the last day of the Mahajani year 1274, must needs be the 24th of Assin 1275 of the Fulsi year; and as the account would hardly have been prepared until after the close of the year, and could not have been brought to the notice of Kali Pershad until after it had been completed, it follows that Kali Pershad could not have signed and settled it until at least two or three days after the 24th of Assin 1275 Fusli.

    4. Assuming then that the account was signed on or after the 26th of Assin 1275 Fusli, we have in evidence three letters, which purport to have been written by Kali Pershad to the plaintiff's firm within three years after that date, which are said to be sufficient acknowledgments of the debt to prevent its being barred by limitation.

    5. As the suit was brought in September 1877, the Limitation Act by which it is governed is act ix of 1871, the act of 1877 not having come into force till the first of October in that year. But here the question arises whether, although the Limitation Act which was in force at the time when the suit was brought is the one to which were must look in order to ascertain the proper period of limitation, still if, under the former Act of 1859, the right to bring this suit was barred, that right can be revived by any promise or acknowledgment made before the Act passed, which would be sufficient to keep alive the debt under the Act of 1871, but insufficient under the Act of 1859. This point, no doubt, presents some difficulty; but we think its solution must depend upon, whether, in the case of a debt, the Act of 1859 merely barred the remedy or extinguished the obligation. Assuming the debt in this instance to have originated with the statement of account in 1867, which gave rise to a new and substantive cause of action, if the remedy was barred at the end of three years from that time, then the debt itself was in force at the time of the passing of the Act of 1871, and that Act repealed entirely the Act of 1859, making new provisions both with regard to limitation and also as to the means by which limitation might be prevented.

    6. The first apparent difficulty which has presented itself upon this point is, that, in two cases it has been held by Division Benches of this Court, that, under the Limitation Act of 1859, it is not only the remedy that is barred after the expiration of the statutory period, but the debt. The first of these cases is Krishna Mohun Bose v. Okhilmoni Dossee I. L. R., 3 Cal., 333, decided by Markby and Prinsep, JJ. That was a suit for arrears of maintenance, and it was held, partly upon the authority of a case decided by Mr. Justice Pontifex, Nohoor Ckunder Bose v. Kally Coomar Ghose I. L. R., 1 Gal., 328, and partly upon the doctrine supposed to have been Lald clown by the Privy Council in Gunga Gobind Mundul's case (11 Moore's I. A., 345), that the suit having been barred under the Act of 1859, the debt as well as the remedy was extinguished.

    7. The other case was Bam Chunder Ghosaul v. Jugyulmonmohiney Dabec I. L. R., 4 Cal. 283. In that case the same question came before the present Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Markbyf, with regard to a mortgage-debt; and although the Chief Justice expressed great doubt as to the propriety of the judgment in the case of Krishna Mohun Bose I, L. R., 3 Cal., 333, still, as that case had been decided by a Division Bench of two Judges, of whom Mr. Justice Mabkby was one, and as that learned Judge adhered to his opinion, the Chief Justice considered himself bound to follow their judgment.

    8. In this case we have again considered the question very carefully, and our attention has been directed to two cases decided by the High Court of Madras, in which a contrary view has been taken: Valia Tamburati v. Vira Rayan I. L. R., 1 Mad., 228 and Madhavan v. Achuda I. L. R., 1 Mad. 301. The result is, that we are satisfied that the Madras Court is right. We have had some doubt whether we ought not to refer the point to a Full Bench; but as, upon consulting Mr. Justice Prinsep, we find that he agreed with Mr. Justice Markby in the above case with some hesitation, and that he is now of opinion that the debt is not extinguished by limitation, and as we find that, in a late case, Mr. Justice Pontifex has expressed a similar opinion, we consider that we are justified in deciding the point at once.

    9. But then a further question has suggested itself under Section 20a of the Act of 1871--viz., whether the provisions of that Section as regards acknowledgments were retrospective; or, in other words, whether an acknowledgment given before the Act of 1871, which would be sufficient under that Act, but insufficient under the Act of 1859, would prevent a debt from being barred by the Act of 1871. This question appears to us to be answered, and correctly answered, by the Madras case of Teagaraya Mudali v. Mariappa PilLal I. L. R., 1 Mad. 264. The question there arose whether payments of interest made before the Act of 1871 prevented the debt from being barred; under the Act of 1859 such payments would have been of no avail; under the Act of 1871 they would keep the remedy upon the debt alive; and it was held, that this provision as to payments of interest was retrospective. We think that the same principle applies to acknowledgment under Section 20. If the acknowledgment fulfils the terms of that Section, it would prevent the debt from being barred, whether it was given before or after the passing of the Act of 1871; and it must be borne in mind that, having regard to the repealing Clause in the Act of 1871, if the acknowledgments which have been made in this case, would not be available under the Act of 1871, it would seem that they would not be available at all.

    10. It, therefore, remains to be seen, whether the acknowledgments given in this case are sufficient under the Act of 1871.

    11. By Section 20a of the Act of 1871 any promise or acknowledgment to take the case out of the operation of the Statute must be "contained in some writing signed before the expiration of the prescribed period by the party to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that, behalf." And when such writing exists, then a "new period of limitation according to the nature of the original liability is to be computed from the time when the promise or acknowledgments were signed."

    11. The time prescribed in this case is three years, and the three letters written in Kali Pershad's name to the plaintiff's firm within three years from the 26th of Assin of 1275 Fusli, are as follows:--1st, the letter marked T 10, dated the 6th of Pous 1276; 2ndly, that marked T 11, dated the 15th of Assar 1276; and 3rdly, that marked T 12, dated the 25th of Assin 1278. These letters are all addressed to the plaintiff, and are written in the same form, commencing, compliments of "Baboo Kali Pershad Singh." They appear to be answers to applications by the plaintiff's firm for the settlement of the account or for the payment of money in part liquidation of it; and they certainly do appear to admit a debt due to the plaintiff, although no mention is made of the amount of it.

    12. But it is argued by the respondent, 1st, that these letters are not proved to have been written either by Kali Pershad himself, or by his agent generally or specially authorized on that behalf; 2ndly, that they are not signed by Kali Pershad or his authorized agent; and 3rdly, that they do not contain a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act.

    13. Now, as to the first of these points, the defendants' dewan, Shital Lal, is called as a witness by the plaintiff. He and his father before him have been the dewans of Kali Pershad for many years, and since Kali Pershad's death he has been the dewan of the defendants, and he is in their service now; so that we may presume that his evidence would rather be in favour of the defendants than otherwise. He says that, after the account up to the end of the year 1274 had been signed by Kali Pershad, the business went on in the same way as before; and that the letters which Kali Pershad during his life, and the defendants after his death, used to write to the plaintiff upon the subject of the account matters, were either written by himself as dewan when he happened to be present, or, in his absence, by some one else. He says further, that the letters T 10 and T 11 were written by Bharosi Lal, the mohurir of Kali Pershad, and that the letter T12 was written by his (Shital Lal's) father, who was at that time the dewan of Kali Pershad; and he also says, that the form in which these letters were written, was the same as was always adopted in the correspondence between Kali Pershad and the plaintiff.

    14. Upon this evidence it seems to us that, as Kali Pershad never wrote letters to the plaintiff himself, but authorized them to be written by his dewan, whose ordinary duty it would be to carry on a correspondence of that kind, we are bound to hold that, at any rate, the letter No. 12 which was written by Shital Lal's father, as the dewan of Kali Pershad, was written by him as his t agent generally authorized for that purpose.

    15. We have more doubt with regard to the authority of the mohurir, Bharosi Lal, to sign the letters T 10 and T 11; but as in the absence of the dewan the mohurir would be the proper person to write such letters, we should have been disposed to hold, if it were necessary, that, even as regards these letters, the mohurir had authority to write them. As, however, we think we must assume that the letter No. T 12 was written within three years from the time when Kali Pershad signed the account for Es. 13, 611-2-6 at the end of 1274, and as the letters T 12, T 13, and T 15, which follow, all admit more or less clearly the existence of debt, and are all written by Shital Lal as the dewan of the family; it is not necessary for our present purpose to resort to the letters T 10 and T 11, which were written by the mohurir, provided that, in other respects, the letters written by the dewan are sufficient to satisfy the provisions of section 20.

    16. The next point is, whether the letter was sufficiently signed by Kali Pershad.

    17. The Subordinate Judge seems to think that a formal signature at the end of the letter is necessary for this purpose; but here we think he is in error. As long as the document is signed with Kali Pershad's name by his duly authorized agent in such a way as to make it appear that the letter is his, and that he is the real author of it, we do not think it matters what the form of the instrument is, or in what part of it the signature occurs.

    18. It seems to us that the acknowledgment is quite as effectually signed whether it runs thus.

    Dear Sir

    19. I beg to acknowledge the correctness of your account.

    20. A.B. presents his compliments to C. D., and begs to acknowledge the correctness of his account.

    21. By the 17th Section of the English Statute of Frauds, the note or memorandum of the bargain which is necessary in the case of a sale of goods must be signed (in a similar way to an acknowledgment under the Indian Limitation Act) by the party to be charged therewith or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized; and it has been held, under that Section, that where a party to a contract signs his name in any part of it in such a way as to acknowledge that he is the party contracting, that is a sufficient signature within the Statute, as for instance, the words "I, James Crockford, agree," "Mr. Stanley agrees," "Sold to John Dodgson," have been held to be sufficient signature by those parties; see Knight v. Crockford 1 Esp., 190 Lobb v. Stanley 5 Q. B., 574, Johnson v. Dodgson 2 M. & W., 653; and see also Darrell v. Evans 1 H. & C., 174. Indeed, if this were not so, having regard to the peculiar form of letter usually adopted in this country, few acknowledgments of debts, however complete they might be, would be binding under Section 20, if it were necessary that they should be signed at the foot like an English letter.

    22. And as to the name of the principal being written by the agent, it seems clear, that if the agent is authorized to write the letter, it matters not whether he signs the name of the principal or his own name. Thus, under the 17th Section of the Statute of Frauds, it has been held that where goods were sold at auction, and the purchaser authorized the auctioneer's clerk to put down his name as having purchased certain lots, and the clerk accordingly did so, the entry of the purchaser's name so made by the clerk was a sufficient signature under the Statute to bind the purchasers: see Bird v. Boulter (4 B., and Ad., 443). This case has been since always considered and acted upon in England as good law--Durrell v. Evans (1 H. & C, 174).

    23. The only remaining question is, whether the letter of the 25th Assin 1278 (Ex. T 12) amounts to a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to take the case out of the Statute.

    24. Now it is not necessary, according to the provisions of explanation 1 of Section 20 of the Limitation Act, that the acknowledgment should specify the amount of the debt; and according to the authority of many English cases, it is sufficient that the acknowledgment should contain an admission that the debt is due, the amount in such case being proved by parol evidence: see Tanner v. Smart (6 B. and C., 603), Quincey v. Sharpe (L. R., I Exch. D., 72), Sheet v. Lindsay (L. R., 2 Exch. D., 314). The letter of 25th Assin 1278 was evidently written in answer to a demand made by the plaintiff, for payment of money in part liquidation at least of a debt due to the plaintiff's firm. It states:

    "Next year I will pay all your money out of the collections which will be made according to the jammabandi, because I cannot be free from your debt; when you are master of the raj how can I be free from your debt; but according to your account it may be liquidated from this year to the next year. Now I have got all the mouzas in direct possession, and I have increased the jammabandi; now it will not be much difficult to liquidate it. You have written for adjustment of account; I too am willing to it. In the course of a month or two everything will be settled in the villages, and then I will positively send the mohurir to you for adjustment of account."
    The letter surely contains a clear acknowledgment of a debt being due by Kali Pershad to the plaintiff, and a promise that, in the course of a month or two, the writer will send a mohurir to adjust the account.

    25. We consider, therefore, that this letter was a sufficient acknowledgment within Section 20 of the Act of 1871, and that it gave to the plaintiff a fresh period of limitation of three years from the time when it was written.

    26. Then follow three other letters, one T 13, dated 22nd Kartick 1279; T 14, dated 18th Bhadro 1280; and T 15, dated 7th Pous 1281. The letters T 13 and T 15, Shital Lal says, were written by himself as the dewan, and by the authority of Kali Pershad; and we think that they (especially that of the 7th Pous 1281) contain direct admissions of a debt being due from Kali Pershad. In the last letter it is said:

    "all the debts of other persons have been paid off through your kindness; now I am only anxious for your money, of which also, through your kindness, I will pay this year as much as I can, and then make settlement."

    27. These letters would also give the plaintiff a further period of three years from the time when they were written.

    28. Kali Pershad died in June 1874 (Assar 1281); and we have then a letter, G 17, dated the 18th of Aughran 1282 (11th of December 1874), from the defendants to the plaintiff, written, as Shital Lal says by the direct authority of the defendants. The defendants say in that letter,

    "you have written that you will now take steps to recover your money, so that we will not blame you afterwards. We do not disagree with you. As you have always been kind to the Baboo, you should now be more kind to us; therefore, we give you this trouble, that as you have waited so long, you will be pleased to wait for a short time more, then we will settle your account."

    29. That again is a direct acknowledgment of the plaintiff's debt, which gave him another three years to sue for it; and this suit is brought within that period.

    30. We are of opinion, therefore, that so far as the plea of limitation is concerned, the plaintiff's suit is not barred; and that it is only a question of evidence what amount is now due upon the account. As that question has not been considered by the Court below, except as regards the accounts for the three years next preceding this suit, and as the defendants' counsel informs us that, in the interest of his clients, he desires that those accounts should be investigated, it is necessary that we should remand the case to the Court below for that purpose. That Court will report to us what amount is found to be due upon the investigation, and we will then dispose finally of the case.

    Richard Garth, C.J.

    31. I only desire to add that, as regards myself, I have felt some difficulty, in consequence of the decision, to which I was a party with Mr. Justice Markby, in the case of Bam Chunder Ghosaul v. Juggutmon-mohiney Dabee I. L. R., 4 Cal., 283, where we held that the Limitation Act in this country extinguished the debt as well as barred the remedy.

    32. I was by no means satisfied, as I stated at the time, of the correctness of that decision; but as the point had been directly decided by a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Mr. Justice Markby and Mr. Justice Prinsep, in the case of Krishna Mohun Bose v. Okhilmoni Dossee I. L. R., 3 Cal., 333, and as my brother Markby did not see the propriety of referring the question to a Full Bench, I felt bound, according to our usual practice in this Court, to follow the previous decision.

    33. I confess, that it has been a great satisfaction to me to find that, since that judgment was delivered, not only Mr. Justice Prinsep, but several other Judges of this Court, have arrived at the conclusion that our decision was wrong.

    34. The High Court of Madras has also, in several cases, expressed a similar view; and as this appears, so far as I am aware, to be the general opinion of the Court as at present constituted, we have considered that it is not necessary to submit the question now to a Full Bench.

    35. I believe that the erroneous view which prevailed here for a time was due mainly to a misunderstanding of the observations of the Privy Council in the case of Gunga Gobind Mundul (11 Moore's I. A., 345). It seems clear that those observations were only intended to apply to suits for the recovery of immoveable property.

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    Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kumaree
    (Jun 15, 1880)