Appeal under the Letters Patent against a decree passed by Mr. Justice Ainslie, affirming that of the Officiating Additional Judge of 24-Pergunnahs, which reversed a decree of the Second Moonsiff of Bussirhaut.
The facts of this case are sufficiently set forth in the above head note, and in the judgments of the High Court. The question in the case was whether a julkur is an easement within the meaning of section 27 of the Limitation Act, Act IX of 1871.
The following judgment was delivered by Ainslie, j.:—
The plaintiff in this suit seeks to recover the rents of a certain julkur from the defendants, who, in answer, allege that the julkur is the property of Government; and, if this is not so, that they have never paid rents to, and do not hold from, the plaintiff. The Judge of the lower Appellate Court has found that with the knowledge, but without the permission, of the plaintiffs the defendants have been fishing in this water for at least eighteen jun adversely to plaintiff, and that the law of limitation bars this suit.
It has been urged in special appeal that the plain tiffs, having enjoyed possession through other tenants, cannot be barred. I think, however, that where property is of such a nature that there may be equal enjoyment thereof by several persons at one and the same time, without necessary interference one with another, it is not necessary for defendants to establish the total exclusion of the plaintiffs in order to succeed on the plea of limitation. If, as in tills case, the defendants can show that, while plaintiff may have been enjoying profits out of this fishery through others, they themselves have, within the knowledge of the plaintiff, been appropriating the entire produce of their own fishing in the same waters without in any way acknowledging plaintiffs' title, they do in effect prove an adverse possession pro tanto. It was, however, further argued that possession for twenty years is necessary to establish a prescription; but, as the law now stands, the case does not fall within the provisions of section 27 of the Limitation Act, and must, therefore, be governed by article 145. The Judge correctly observes that the right claimed is not an easement; and, although in the draft of an amended Law of Limitation recently published,(1) the meaning of the word easement is extended to include such claims; it has as the law now stands a more restricted meaning. As the Judge has found that the enjoyment of the fishery has not been by license or consent of plaintiffs, but, on the contrary, accompanied with a denial by plaintiffs of the defendants' right to fish, and a denial by defendants of plaintiffs' right to interfere with or tax their fishing, and that this state of things has been going on for eighteen years, the suit was rightly dismissed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff appealed under section 15 of the Letters Patent.
Baboo Chunder Madhub Ghose, for Appellants.
The Respondents did not appear.
The judgment of the High Court(2) was delivered by Garth, C.J:—
We have felt some difficulty in coming to a conclnsion upon this case, partly from the peculiar nature of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs, and partly from there being no provision in the Limitation Act of 1871 which applies to, or contemplates, a suit of this nature. The plaintiffs claim to be entitled to an 8-anna share of certain julkur; and they pray for a declaration as against the defendants, that they are entitled to receive rent from them for fishing in their julkur, or that the defendants have no right to fish there without paying them (the plaintiffs) rent; or in other words, that the plaintiffs are entitled to enjoy their julkur rights without the defendants' interference.
The Moonsiff very properly dismissed the first portion of the plaintiffs' claim, upon the ground that the defendants were not, and had never claimed to be, the plaintiffs' tenants; but he decreed their claim in the alternative, declaring in substance that the plaintiffs had a right to the share which they claimed in the julkur, and that the defendants could not fish there without the plaintiffs' permission. He holds that the right of fishing claimed by the defendants in the julkur was at moat an easement; that the defendants, therefore, could not become entitled to it by prescription, till they had enjoyed it as of right for 20 years, (see Limitation Act of 1871, section 27); and that their user and enjoyment of it had not been proved for more than eighteen years. The Additional Judge in appeal reversed this decision of the Moonsiff. He held that neither the right of fishing claimed by the defendants nor the julkur rights claimed by the plaintiffs were “easements.” He apparently considered that the enjoyment of the right of fishing by the defendants was an interference by them with the exclusive right churned by the plaintiffs; and, ultimately, that, as the plaintiffs had not brought their suit to establish such exclusive right within twelve years of the defendants' first interference, their suit was barred by limitation, and ought to be dismissed. The learned Judge of this Court has approved the finding of the lower Court, and substantially upon the same grounds.
It has now been urged before us, on appeal from his decision—first, that the julkur which the plaintiffs claim is not in it ??? immoveable property, or an interest in such property ??? meaning of the Limitation Act; and that, ??? of the second schedule to the Act does not apply; secondly, that a julkur is an easement to which the defendants could only become entitled by a twenty years' user (section 27 of the Limitation Act of 1871); and, thirdly, that the acts of the defendants when fishing in the julkur were only a series of trespasses or infringements of the plaintiffs' right, each of which was a successive cause of suit, and that therefore the plaintiffs are not barred by limitation.
We think, however, that the lower Appellate Courts are right in the view which they have taken. Whatever may be the law under the present Limitation Act, a julkur is clearly not an easement within the meaning of section 27 of the Act of 1871. An easement is defined by Mr. Gale in his Law of Easements (page 5) to be “a privilege without profit,” which the owner of one tenement may enjoy (as a right of way or of light) over the land of another, but “comprising no right to a participation in the profits arising from it.” Now a julkur, on the other hand, is the right to take the profits of a river, lake or other water on a particular estate or tract of country; and, although, (as was decided by Justices Jackson and Mcdonell in the case of Radha Mohun Mundul v. Neel Madhub Mundul, 24 W.R, p. 200) the right to a julkur may not involve any actual property in the soil over which the water flows, it is still, we think, an interest in immoveable property within the meaning of Article 145 of the Limitation Act. We also agree with the lower Appellate Court that the acts of the defendants in taking fish from this julkur for so many years cannot properly be considered as successive acts of trespass. They appear to have been exercised continuously under a claim of right, and in the only way in which that right could be effectually asserted.
Assuming that the plaintiff's possession of the julkur consisted of the perception of the profits derivable from it, the enjoyment by the defendant of a partial perception of those profits for a long course of years must be considered (as Mr. Justice Ainslie describes it) “as a dispossession by the defendants of the plaintiffs' right pro tanto,” during that period. The plaintiffs ought, therefore, to have brought their suit within twelve years from the commencement of such dispossession. The appeal is dismissed without costs, no one appearing for respondents.