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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the revenue registry of certain lands. Both lower Courts found that the lands belonged to the respondent (the plaintiff), that he was in possession before and at the time of the plaint, and that the sale relied upon by the appellant (the first defendant) was a sham transaction under which no interest passed to the appellant. Those Courts decreed that the respondent's name should be retained in the register.

The appellant (first defendant) contended that the respondent was precluded from asserting title by reason of a prior appellate decision (Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889) arising from earlier litigation in which a creditor of the respondent sued to show the sale was a device to defraud creditors. That earlier litigation produced a decree in favour of the creditor at first instance, but an appeal (No. 105 of 1889) was preferred in which, with the consent of the parties including the respondent, the Appellate Court reversed the decree and upheld the alienation to the present appellant. The appellate judge (Benson, J.) held that the respondent could not impeach that collusive decree and, on that ground alone, would reverse the lower Courts' decrees and dismiss the respondent's suit without costs.

A separate but related judgment addresses the broader legal question whether a plaintiff who executed sham sale-deeds to protect property from creditors can maintain a suit seeking a declaration to prevent alteration of the revenue register. The factual narrative set out in that judgment describes the plaintiff as heavily in debt; the plaintiff executed a sham sale to a second defendant and then another sham sale to the first defendant, while remaining in possession. A creditor obtained a decree at first instance declaring the sale-deeds collusive; on appeal the plaintiff paid a sum to the creditor who consented to a decree admitting the first defendant's title. In 1892 the first defendant sought transfer of the revenue registry to his name, the Collector gave notice that the register would be altered unless the plaintiff established his right by civil suit, and the plaintiff brought the present suit. The lower Courts decreed for the plaintiff; the appeal before the present Court challenges those decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent (plaintiff) is precluded from asserting title to the lands by reason of the prior appellate decision recorded as Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889, which, by consent of parties including the respondent, reversed a decree that had declared the sale fraudulent and upheld the alienation to the present appellant.
  2. Whether a plaintiff who executed collusive or sham sale-deeds to protect property against creditors can maintain a suit founded on the allegation that those deeds were collusive and sham — in other words, whether a person may invoke his own fraudulent act to obtain a declaration to undo that act where the plaintiff remains in possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent is precluded from asserting title to the lands by the decision in Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889 (an appeal on the file of the Cocanada Subordinate Court) which, with the consent of the parties including the respondent, reversed a decree that had declared the sale to be a device to defraud creditors and upheld the alienation to the appellant.
  • Given that the facts supporting this contention are either set out in the plaint or otherwise admitted, the appellant contends that the respondent cannot now impeach that collusive appellate decree.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The respondent asserted ownership of the lands and that he was in possession before and at the time of the plaint.
  • The respondent alleged that the sale-deeds executed in favour of the defendants were collusive and sham, executed without consideration to protect his property against creditors, and therefore sought a declaration that the revenue registry should not be altered in favour of the appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkataramanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17 Authority that a collusive decree, obtained with the consent of the parties, cannot be impeached by the party who participated in it; and identification of an exception allowing a defendant to show mutual turpitude to protect himself where public policy requires it. The Court relied on this case to hold that the respondent could not impeach the appellate decree (Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889) which had been obtained with consent; the case also supplied an articulated exception which the Court discussed and then applied as inapplicable where the parties had colluded to obtain the decree.
Chenuirappa v. Puttappa I.L.R. 11 Bom. 708 Discussed as authoritatively setting out the law that a man cannot set up his own illegal or fraudulent act to avoid his deed; supports a restricted set of exceptions. The judgment cited this Bombay decision as part of the line of authorities establishing the general rule and limiting exceptions; it was used to support the view that the plaintiff could not obtain relief based solely on his own fraud.
Rangammal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378 (and I.L.R. 20 Mad. 323) Authority discussed in respect of the rule barring a party from invoking his own fraud and in support of limiting exceptions. The Court cited this Madras practice as supporting the restricted exceptions to the general rule and as precedent for declining relief to a plaintiff who was the author of the fraudulent transaction and had procured a decree affirming it.
Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendro Nath Bose I.L.R. 23 Cal. 460 Calcutta decision that, with reliance on certain English cases, applied a broader rule permitting some relief in particular circumstances. The judgment noted that the Calcutta Court in this case affirmed a broader approach (the Calcutta rule) and contrasted this with the views of the Bombay and Madras Courts which had dissented from that wider approach.
Kearley v. Thomson L.R. 24 Q.B.D. 742 English authority limiting the application of Taylor v. Bowers and casting doubt on an expansive application of a principle allowing recovery where money/goods were paid/delivered for an illegal purpose. The Court used Kearley to support the restricted approach to allowing relief and to show judicial caution about extending exceptions; Fry, L.J.'s observations were quoted approvingly in support of restraint.
Symes v. Hughes L.R. 9 Eq. 475 Example where a fraudulent transfer was set aside to give effect to a compromise arranged between the transferor and his creditors, with protection of innocent third parties. The Court treated Symes as illustrating an exception where relief may be granted to effect a compromise or to protect third-party interests; it distinguished such cases from one where the plaintiff alone sought relief for his own benefit.
Cecil v. Butcher 2 Jac. & W. 565 Equity will treat a voluntary deed kept by the grantor and never acted upon as imperfect, and will relieve if a grantee surreptitiously obtains possession. Included among limited equitable exceptions where relief might be granted; cited as not generally applicable to the facts of the present suit.
Luckmidas Khimji v. Mulji Canji I.L.R. 5 Bom. 295 Illustration of public policy considerations limiting assistance to a wrong-doer. Referenced in support of the proposition that public policy prevents courts from assisting a plaintiff to recover property or enforce a contract founded on his own illegality.
Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy v. Vulleebhoy Cassumbhoy I.L.R. 6 Bom. 703 Authority that where a decree has been obtained by fraud and collusion of both parties the decree is binding on both and an exception to relief is not available. Relied upon to show that where parties colluded to obtain a decree (which was then acted upon in Court), the party cannot later impeach that decree and seek relief.
Prudham v. Phillips 2 Amb. Rep. 763 Supporting authority cited alongside Ahmedbhoy for the principle that collusive decrees are binding and relief is not available where both parties colluded. Used as part of the body of authorities demonstrating that collusive judgments are binding and cannot be impeached by the colluding parties.
Debia Choivdrain v. Bimola Soonduree Debia 21 W.R. 422 Calcutta High Court decision said to have gone further than English authorities in allowing some relief to parties who had participated in questionable transactions. The Court noted this case as part of the Calcutta line of authority that adopted a broader rule; it was contrasted with the dissenting views of the Bombay and Madras Courts.
Bykwt Nath Sen v. Goboollah Sikdar 24 W.R. 391 Another Calcutta decision cited as part of the broader Calcutta approach. Referenced as an example of Calcutta High Court rulings that the Court of appeal in this opinion considered to have gone too far in enabling a dishonest party to regain position after defrauding creditors.
Bangammal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378 Madras authority dissenting from the broader Calcutta rule and supporting the restricted approach to aiding parties who have engaged in fraud. Relied on by the Court as supporting the restricted exception framework and as a precedent aligning with the Court's conclusion to decline relief to the plaintiff.
Taylor v. Bowers L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 291 English case advanced to the effect that money paid or goods delivered for an illegal purpose may in some circumstances be recoverable before the illegal purpose is carried out; the breadth of this principle was questioned by later authority. Mentioned as an authority relied upon by the Calcutta Court in support of a broader rule; the Court noted that later English authority (Kearley) questioned Taylor v. Bowers and limited its application.
Holman v. Johnson (Cowper, 343) Classic authority on public policy—courts will not aid a plaintiff who seeks relief arising from his own illegal or immoral act. Quoted to underline the public policy basis for denying relief to a plaintiff who is the sole or an equal participant in the fraud.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in two complementary strands set out by different judges but directed to the same result.

  1. Benson, J.'s reasoning (summary):
    • The appellant's contention that the respondent is precluded by a prior appellate decision (Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889) must prevail because the facts necessary to support that contention appear either in the plaint itself or are otherwise admitted.
    • The prior litigation began with a creditor's Original Suit (No. 345 of 1887) to show the sale was a fraudulent device to defeat creditors; a decree was made for the creditor in the first instance.
    • The respondent caused the appellant to appeal that decree (Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889); the Appellate Court, with the consent of the parties including the respondent, reversed the decree and upheld the alienation to the appellant.
    • Because the appellate decree was collusive and obtained with the respondent's consent, the respondent cannot now impeach it (as supported by Venkataramanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17). On that ground Benson, J. would reverse the lower Courts' decrees and dismiss the suit without costs.
  2. Other judge's reasoning (summary):
    • The central legal principle is that a person cannot ask a Court to give effect to a remedy that relies on his own illegal or fraudulent act; this general rule is supported by a line of authorities cited (including Chenuirappa v. Puttappa, Rangammal v. Venkatachari, and others).
    • The Court recognized limited exceptions (derived from English and Indian authorities) where relief may be given despite illegality: for example, to effect a compromise protecting innocent third parties (Symes v. Hughes), where a voluntary deed kept by the grantor is imperfected by lack of delivery (Cecil v. Butcher), or in limited cases to prevent the Court itself from becoming an instrument to aid a defendant's fraud (as noted in Venkataramanna v. Viramma and related authorities).
    • However, these exceptions are narrowly construed. The Court emphasized that where a decree has been obtained by collusion or fraud of both parties, the decree is binding on both and the plaintiff cannot later set it aside (Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy v. Vulleebhoy Cassumbhoy and related cases).
    • Applying these principles to the facts: the plaintiff executed sham sale-deeds and remained in possession; the sham sale was successfully used in earlier litigation to defeat an attaching creditor; the plaintiff later induced the creditor to consent to an appellate decree admitting the title of the first defendant (by payment), and a decree was passed to that effect to which the plaintiff was a party.
    • Because the plaintiff knowingly participated in obtaining a decree affirming the fraudulent sale and thereby benefited from the successful use of the sham deed in Court, public policy precludes the plaintiff from now challenging the deed simply to obtain a declaration for his sole benefit while he remains in possession.
    • The Court also explained that if the defendant sought to oust the plaintiff from possession, the plaintiff might be permitted to plead the true rights (even though this plea involves his own turpitude) to prevent the Court from aiding the defendant's fraudulent claim; but that situation is not present because the plaintiff remains in possession and seeks proactive relief to undo his own acts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decrees of the lower Courts are reversed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. The dismissal is ordered without costs (the Court expressly notes the defendant's fraudulent conduct but nevertheless dismisses the plaintiff's suit without costs).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the revenue registry should not be altered is dismissed; the lower Courts' decrees in favour of the plaintiff are set aside. The appellant's contention that the prior appellate decree (Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889) precludes the respondent from impeaching the sale was accepted by the Court.
  • The Court's reasoning rests on established authorities and a restrictive approach to exceptions: it reinforces the principle that courts will generally not assist a party who seeks relief grounded in his own illegality or fraud, and it emphasises that collusive decrees obtained with the parties' consent are binding on those parties.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was pronounced; the decision applies and synthesizes existing authorities and public policy considerations to the facts of this case.

    Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundru Papayya And Anr.

    1. Both the lower Courts found that the lands (to the registry whereof in the Government Revenue accounts the present litigation relates) belonged to the respondent (plaintiff), that they were in his possession before and at the time of the plaint and that the sale relied upon by the appellant (first defendant) as giving him a title to the property was a mere sham transaction under which no interest passed to him. Upon those findings it was held that the appellant had no right to claim that the registry of the property be transferred to his own name, and a decree was given to the effect that the respondent was entitled to have his name retained in the register as it had stood hitherto.

    2. One of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent was precluded from asserting his title to the land by the decision passed in Appeal Suit No. 105 of 1889 on the file of the Cocanada Subordinate Court. This contention, though advanced for the first time in this Court, must prevail, inasmuch as the facts required to support it are either set out in the plaint itself or are otherwise admitted.

    3. They are as follows: One of the respondent's creditors instituted Original Suit No. 345 Of 1887 for the purpose of establishing that the transaction purporting to be the sale in favour of the present appellant was but a device intended to defraud the creditors, and therefore the lands in question were really the property of the respondent. Both the parties to the present appeal were made defendants to the suit, and a decree was therein given in favour of the creditor. The respondent however caused the present appellant to prefer an appeal against the said decree No. 105 of 1889 already mentioned. The creditor and the present respondent were made respondents to such appeal. The Appellate Court, with the consent of the parties, including the present respon¬dent himself, reversed the decree and upheld the alienation to the present appellant. The collusive decree thus passed cannot be impeached by the respondent Venkatramanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17 On this ground alone and without going into the other points argued I would reverse the decrees of the lower Courts and dismiss the suit, but without costs.

    Benson, J.

    4. The main question in this second appeal is whether the plaintiff can maintain the suit, based as it is on the allegation that certain sale-deeds executed by the plaintiff were collusive and sham documents, executed for the purpose of protecting his property against creditors.

    5. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The plaintiff, being heavily involved in debts, executed, without consideration, a sham sale-deed of certain lands in favour of the second defendant, and afterwards caused the latter to execute another sham sale-deed in favour of the first defendant.

    6. Plaintiff, however, remained in possession of the land.

    7. In Original Suit No. 315 of 1887, a creditor of the plaintiff attached the lands in execution of a decree against the plaintiff. The sham sale-deeds were used as a cloak, and the attachment was successfully resisted. The creditor then sued for a declaration that the sale-deeds were collusive, and got a decree in the first Court. In appeal, however, the plaintiff paid him a certain sum and induced him to consent to a decree admitting the title of the first defendant, and a decree was passed accordingly. In 1892 the first defendant applied to the Collector for transfer of revenue registry of the lands to his (first defendant's) name, and the Collector issued a notice that he would alter the register unless plaintiff established his right by a civil suit. Plaintiff, therefore, brought the present suit for a declaration that the registry of the lands was not to be altered. Both the lower Courts decreed in his favour, and first defendant now appeals against these decrees.

    8. I do not think that the plaintiff's suit is maintainable.

    9. The law on the subject is very fully discussed in the case of Chenuirappa v. Puttappa I.L.R. 11 Bom. 708 in Rangammal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378 in Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendro Nath Bose I.L.R. 23 Cal. 460 and in the recent English case of Kearley v. Thomsom L.R. 24 Q.B.D. 742. The general rule is that a man cannot set up an illegal or fraudulent act of his own in order to avoid his own deed " (May on Fraudulent Conveyances," 432). But some exceptions or quasi exceptions to this rule have been admit ted by the Courts. In Symes v. Hughes L.R. 9 Eq. 475 a fraudulent transfer was set aside in order that effect might be given to a compromise arranged between the transferor and his creditors. Here it will be observed that the Court acted in the interest, and for the protection, of innocent third parties. It may well be doubted whether a decree would have beep given in that suit for the benefit of the transferor alone. So if a voluntary deed has been kept in the hands of the grantor, and has never been acted upon, nor the grantee informed of its existence, a Court of Equity will treat it as an imperfect instrument, and, if the grantee surreptitiously gets possession of it, a Court of Equity will relieve against it Cecil v. Butcher 2 Jac. & W. 565.

    10. A third exception was noticed by PARKER, J., in Venkataramanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17 viz. where a defendant is allowed to show the turpitude of both himself and the plaintiff in order to protect himself against an action by the plaintiff to give effect to a contract or deed entered into for an illegal or immoral purpose. Here an exception is allowed not for the sake of the wrong-doer, but on grounds of public policy, since the Court ought not to assist a plaintiff to recover property or enforce a contract in respect of which he has no true title or right. The rule of public policy cannot be applied without allowing the defendant to benefit by it. But the benefit is allowed him by accident as it were and not in order to secure him any right to which he is entitled [Holman V .Johnson (Cowper, 343)] per Lord MANSFIELD, and Luckmidas Khimji v. Mulji Canji I.L.R. 5 Bom. 295. Even this exception is not allowed, if a decree has been obtained by the fraud and collusion of both the parties. In such a case it is binding on both--Ahmedbhoy Hvbibhoy y. Vulleebhoy Cassumbhoy I.L.R. 6 Bom. 703, Prudham v. Phillips 2 Amb. Rep. 763 Venkataramanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17 and Chenvirappa v. Puttappa I.L.R. 11 Bom. 708.

    11. I think that, broadly speaking, these are the only exceptions which are to be gathered from the English cases, and from the reported cases in this Court and in the Bombay High Court. The Calcutta High Court has gone further Debia Choivdrain v. Bimola Soonduree Debia 21 W.R. 422 .Bykwt Nath Sen v. Goboollah Sikdar 24 W. R:, 391 but the rule there laid down has been expressly dissented from by the Bombay High Court--Chenvirappa v. Puttappa I.L.R. 11 Bom 708 which, as I think, justly remarks: "These decisions go a long way towards enabling a party to a dishonest trick, by which his creditors may have been defrauded, to get himself reinstated when his purpose has been served." They have been dissented from also by this Court Bangammal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378 confirmed in Rangam mal v. Venkatchart I.L.R. 20 Mad. 323. The Calcutta rule has, indeed, notwithstanding these dissents, been affirmed in Sham Lall Mitra v. Amarendro Nath Bose I.L.R. 23 Cal. 460. In doing so the Court relied on the case of Symes v. Hughes L.R. 9 Eq. 475, already cited by me and on the case of Taylor v. Bowers L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 291. In the former case, however, the interests of third parties were involved, and the latter case has been dissented from in Kearley v. Thomson L.R. 24 Q.B.D. 742. FRY L.J., in delivering judgment,, stated: "In that case Taylor v. Bowers L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 291 MELLISH, L.J., in delivering judgment, says at p. 300 ' If money is paid, or goods delivered for an illegal purpose, the person who has so paid the money or delivered the goods may recover them back before the illegal purpose is carried out It is remarkable that this proposition is, as I believe, to be found in no earlier case than Taylor v. Bowers L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 291 which occurred in 1867, and notwithstanding the very high authority of the learned Judge who expressed the law in the terms which I have read, I cannot help saying for myself that I think the extent of the application of that principle, and even the principle itself, may, at some time hereafter, require consideration, if not in this Court, yet in a higher tribunal: and I am glad to find that in expressing that view I have the entire concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice." This passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Bangammal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378. With the exception, then, of the cases to which I have referred and which have been dissented from, I do not think that any authority will be found for holding that a plaintiff can come into Court alleging his own fraud and ask the Court simply and solely for his own benefit to set aside the fraudulent deed or make a declaration to protect him from the threatened consequences for his own act. In such a case the Court may well decline to move and may answer the plaintiff in the words which are often quoted from Story's Equity Jurisprudence Where the party seeking relief is the sole guilty party, or where he has participated equally and deliberately in the fraud, or where the agreement which he seeks to set aside is founded in illegality, immorality or base and unconscionable conduct on his own part; in such cases Courts of Equity will leave him to the consequences of his own iniquity and will decline to assist him to escape from the toils which he has studiously prepared to entangle others" ( Section 268). Especially will this be the case if the purpose of the fraud has been effected by defeat of a third person's rights asserted in Court or effected in any other material way, Ahmedbhoy Hubibhay v. Vulleebhoy Cassurnbhoy I.L.R. 6 Bom. 703 Venketrammanna v. Viramma I.L.R. 10 Mad. 17 Chenvirappa v. Puttappa I.L.R. 11 Bom. 708. Bang animal v. Venkatachari I.L.R. 18 Mad. 378. I think, then, that the plaintiff, apart from his conduct in Original Suit No. 345 of 1887, has no title to come to a Court of Equity and ask for such a declaration as he now seeks. If the defendant were now seeking the assistance of the Court to obtain possession of the land from the plaintiff, it may well be that the Court would allow the plaintiff to plead the true rights of the parties, even though the plea involved a declaration by the plaintiff of his own turpitude. The Court would then allow the plea on grounds of public policy, and in order that it might not itself be made an instrument to aid the defendant in his fraudulent claim to possession contrary to the real agreement with the plaintiff. That, however, is not the case before us. The plaintiff is in possession, and he may be left to rely on it if the defendant seeks to disturb him.

    12. The impropriety of assisting the plaintiff becomes, I think, even more clear, if his conduct in Original Suit No. 845 of 1887 be considered. In that suit the sham sale-deed was successfully used as a cloak to defeat an attaching creditor, and the latter was thus driven to a regular suit. He then succeeded in showing in the Court of First Instance that the sale-deed was a sham, but the present first defendant (then third defendant) in collusion with the plaintiff (then first defendant) appealed against the decree. The appeal was compromised by the present plaintiff paying Rs. 150 to the attaching creditor, and a decree was passed affirming the title of the present first defendant.

    13. Thus the sham sale-deed was successfully used in a Court of Justice for the purpose for which it was concocted, viz., to defeat and delay a creditor and the plaintiff afterwards acknowledged its validity in a Court of Justice and caused a decree to be passed affirming the same (see present plaint), a decree to which both he and the present defendants were parties (Exhibit L.)

    14. I think that, in these circumstances, it would be contrary to public policy, and disastrous to public morality, that the Courts should now allow him to plead his own baseness and should actively assist him to undo his own solemn acts, and this even before his possession of the property is actually attacked by the partner of his crime. I would, therefore, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit, but without costs, in consideration of the defendant's fraudulent conduct.

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    Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundru Papayya And Anr.
    (Apr 7, 1897)