1. It is first urged on appellant's behalf that the suit is barred by limitation. We agree with the judge that the document sued upon is a promissory note as defined in Section 3 of the Act of Limitations, and that the contention that Article 73 is applicable cannot be supported. Exh. A provides for repayment in these terms, namely "I shall pay you whenever you may demand after you attain the age of majority." These words clearly indicate an intention to postpone the right to sue, and the case therefore does not fall under the ordinary rule that no demand is necessary as in the case of a note payable on demand. The intention to postpone the right of suit being clear, the question to what date the right has been postponed must be decided with reference to the language of the instrument. Upon the true construction of document A we are satisfied that the parties intended that there should be a demand after the creditor attained his majority. In Norton, v. Ellam, 2 M & W, 461, Baron Parke observes that the creditor is under no obligation in law to make a demand, and if he desires to create such obligation he may make it part of his contract. The decision of the judge that Article 80 is applicable is, in our opinion, correct.
2. It is next contended that there was no demand made prior to the suit and that the suit could not therefore be maintained. There is a distinct allegation in the plaint of a demand "having been made within three years before suit and it is not traversed in the written statement; nor is the objection taken in the memoranda of appeals either in the Lower Appellate Court or in this Court. On the true construction of document A we consider that the suit is governed by the principle laid down in Sanjivi v. Errapa, I. L. R, 6 M, 290 and Hanmantram Sadhuram Pity v. Arthur Bowles, I. L. R, 8 B, 561.
3. This second appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs.