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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Walsh, A.C.J. and Sulaiman, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns whether a grandmother is entitled to a share in family property on a partition carried out solely between her grandsons. The property originally belonged to one Nainsukh Das. On his death he left a widow, Musammat Gaura (a defendant in the proceedings), and a son, Chunni Lal. Chunni Lal later died leaving a widow, Musammat Har Kuar, and two sons, Kanhaiya Lal and Makhan (Makhan) Lal. The partition in question was between the two grandsons, Kanhaiya Lal and Makhan Lal, and the question was whether Musammat Gaura (the widow of the original owner Nainsukh Das) was entitled to a share of the property.

The trial court and the lower appellate court held that she was entitled to a share under the Mitakshara law. That conclusion was affirmed by a learned Judge of the High Court. The present opinion arises from an appeal against that view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the Mitakshara (and related authorities), a grandmother (the widow of the original owner) is entitled to a share when a partition takes place after the death of the original owner and the partition is effected exclusively between his grandsons.
  2. Whether the provisions/texts of the Mitakshara (especially Section VII, paragraphs 1 and 2) permit or prohibit a grandmother's share in such a post-death partition among grandsons.
  3. Whether, in areas where the Mitakshara is silent or doubtful, other authoritative texts (for example the Viramitrodaya quoting Vyasa, and other commentaries) may be relied upon to determine the grandmother's right.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff (position as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff challenged the interpretation given by the courts below and contended that the logical consequence of the interpretation adopted by the courts below (to give the grandmother a share) would be to hold that the Allahabad Full Bench case had adopted a wrong interpretation; the plaintiff pressed that objection.
  • The learned advocate for the plaintiff contended that the Viramitrodaya had merely quoted the text of Vyasa and had not necessarily approved or adopted it as authoritative on the point of a grandmother's share.

Respondent / Defendants (position as reflected in the opinion)

  • The defendants relied on certain authorities and schools of interpretation (including earlier case law) to contend that the grandmother was not entitled to a share in a partition exclusively between grandsons; specific reliance was placed upon some decisions and on particular readings of Mitakshara texts.
  • Lower courts and a learned Judge of the High Court had concluded that the widow of the original owner (the grandmother) is entitled to a share under Mitakshara; that view was defended in the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree Quoted paraphrase of Mitakshara test that "mother or grandmother is entitled to a share when sons or grandsons divide the family estate between themselves." Court held the point did not arise in that case and the grandmother's entitlement was only conceded for sake of argument; therefore the precedent is not authoritative support for the defendants' contention in this case.
Puddum Mookhee Dossee v. Rayee Monee Dossee Rule laid down that on a partition between sons after the death of the father, the grandmother was not entitled to a share (case under Dayabhaga). Court noted this was a Dayabhaga case with no clear authority cited before the judges; its applicability to present Mitakshara question is limited.
Rayee Monee Dossee v. Puddum Mookhee Dossee Same rule as above (companion/related decision under Dayabhaga). Noted as Dayabhaga authority; not decisive on Mitakshara point before the court.
Sibbosoondry Dabia v. Bussoomutty Dabia Held that a grandmother was entitled to a share (Dayabhaga law; partition not exclusively among grandsons but included the son). Observed as Dayabhaga authority where grandmother's right was recognized; distinguishable facts limit direct application.
Badri Roy v. Bhugwat Narain Dobey Held that a grandmother was entitled to a share (Dayabhaga; partition included the son). Used to show Dayabhaga recognition of grandmother's right; not directly on point for pure-grandson partition under Mitakshara.
Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy Decision that the mother was entitled to a share. Cited as authority limited to mother’s entitlement; not directly addressing grandmother's claim.
Purna Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarojini Debi After review, Henderson, J., concluded grandmother was entitled to a share; the case involved a grandson suing for partition where the plaintiff's father was dead (would have been directly in point under Mitakshaga). Court viewed this as supportive of grandmother's entitlement; noted that though the cited reported case was unclear, the record showed partition akin to sons' partition and the widow of the grandfather was held entitled.
Radha Kishen Man v. Bachhaman Laid down that upon a partition between a father and his sons (i.e., while father is alive) the grandmother (father's mother) does not get a share in the Benares school of Mitakshara. Cited and distinguished: present case is not a partition during the life of the father; therefore the rule is not applicable here.
Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad (Full Bench) Followed Radha Kishen Man on the point that grandmother does not get a share when partition is during the lifetime of the father (Benares school). Referenced and distinguished: the Full Bench concerned partitions during the father's life; present case concerns partition after death of the original owner.
Har Narain v. Bishambhar Nath Decided that a step-mother is entitled to a share just as much as a natural mother. Cited to show that non-biological mothers may be treated as entitled; limited to step-mother context rather than grandmother.
Vithal Ramkrishna v. Prahlad Ramkrishna Held that a step-grandmother was entitled to a share at a partition between her step-grandsons exclusively (case under Mitakshara). Noted that Shah, J., regarded the Mitakshara as silent on grandmother's right and invoked the Mayukha; thus the case is not a clear-cut Mitakshara authority on the point.
Gridhari Lall Roy v. The Bengal Government (Privy Council reference) Remark that Viramitrodaya is a treatise of high authority at Benares and may properly be received to explain doubts left by the Mitakshara, especially for the Benares school. Cited to justify reference to Viramitrodaya (and thereby Vyasa) when Mitakshara is silent or doubtful; supports use of other authoritative texts to supplement Mitakshara.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the matter in a layered analytical way: first by reviewing and distinguishing the existing case law, and then by examining the Mitakshara texts and recognized commentary to determine the proper legal conclusion.

Review of case law: The court noted that authorities are mixed:

  • Some cited cases under Dayabhaga recognize a grandmother's share, but these were often factually distinguishable (e.g., partitions involving a son or being under Dayabhaga law rather than Mitakshara).
  • Certain Mitakshara-era or Benares-school decisions (e.g., those concerned with partitions during the life of the father) were held to be distinguishable because the present case concerns partition after the death of the original owner and after the death of the intermediate son.
  • Some decisions (e.g., Vithal Ramkrishna) are ambiguous because the judges invoked other texts (Mayukha) or considered the Mitakshara silent; thus they are not clear-cut authority.

Textual analysis of Mitakshara: The court examined the structure and relevant sections of the Mitakshara (as a commentary on Yajnavalkya):

  • Section II deals with partitions generally (including partitions during the life of the father); Section V concerns equal rights of father and son in ancestral property; Section VII addresses participation of the mother where distribution occurs after the father's death.
  • Section VII, paragraphs 1 and 2, contain the Yajnavalkya text: "Of heirs dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share" and a provision about the mother taking a share equal to that of a son, provided no separate property given to her.
  • The court interpreted the words "father" and "mother" in these texts broadly: "father" may mean the original owner (here, the grandfather Nainsukh Das), and "mother" may mean the wife of that owner. On this reading, where the partition takes place after the death of the original owner and among his heirs (which may be grandsons), his widow would be entitled to a share.
  • The court noted the drafting: Yajnavalkya's text uses "heirs" rather than "sons" in the quoted passage, which supports a wider application to heirs (including grandsons) dividing after the death of the original owner.

Use of other authoritative texts where Mitakshara is doubtful:

  • The court recognized the established rule that the Mitakshara is paramount in the Provinces but that it is an incomplete commentary and, where it is silent or doubtful, other authoritative texts (e.g., Viramitrodaya, Vyasa as quoted therein, Mayukha) may be resorted to.
  • The Viramitrodaya (a commentary on Mitakshara) quotes Vyasa to the effect that "Grandmothers are also declared to be equal to mothers." The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Viramitrodaya merely quoted Vyasa without approving it; the court considered the Viramitrodaya an acceptable source to supplement the Mitakshara where needed.
  • The Allahabad Full Bench had noted that Vyasa's text appears to refer to partition between sons after the father's death and that grandmothers being 'equal to mothers' would be like mothers entitled to a share; but that Full Bench did not decide the precise question now before the court.

Weight of modern commentators: The court observed that a number of modern commentators and authorities (McNaughten, Shama Charan Sirkar, Mayne, West & Bühler, Ghose) assign or support a grandmother's share under either Mitakshara or Dayabhaga approaches, which lends additional support to allowing the widow of the original owner a share when partition occurs after his death.

Overall application: Taking the textual interpretation (Section VII permitting the "mother" to participate when "heirs" divide after the death of the "father"), the permissibility of resort to other authorities where Mitakshara is doubtful, the Viramitrodaya/Vyasa passage, and the weight of commentators together, the court concluded there is no express prohibition in Section VII against a grandmother taking a share. Therefore the widow of the original owner (Nainsukh Das) is entitled to a share when a partition takes place after his death between his grandsons.

Qualification noted by the court: The court acknowledged that it had to depend on translations and did not have access to the original texts; therefore it could not say the interpretation was necessarily definitive, but it was prepared to hold that nothing in Section VII expressly prohibits the grandmother's share and that supplementary authorities support granting a share.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court affirmed the decisions below and held that the widow of the original owner, Nainsukh Das (the grandmother), is entitled to a share when the partition takes place after his death between his grandsons. The appeal was dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The rulings of the trial court, the lower appellate court, and the learned Judge of this Court in favor of Musammat Gaura (the widow/grandmother) are affirmed; she is entitled to a share in the partition at issue. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion rests on a textual interpretation of Mitakshara Section VII, reliance on the Viramitrodaya's quotation of Vyasa, and supportive commentary from modern authorities. The opinion does not purport beyond its reasoning to announce a new, sweeping rule beyond the facts presented; it affirms the entitlement in the present factual context (a partition after the death of the original owner where the only partitioners are his grandsons). The opinion does not explicitly state that it is creating a new precedent distinct from prior authorities; it primarily affirms the view taken below.

Appeal dismissed.

This summary is based exclusively on the content and language of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been added or inferred.

    Kanhaiya Lal v. Gaura

    Walsh, A.C.J and Sulaiman, J.:— The only question-which arises in this appeal is whether a grandmother gets a share in the family property on a partition between her grandsons only. One Nainsukh Das was the owner of the property in question. On his death he left a widow, Musammat Gaura, defendant, and a son Chunni Lal. Chunni Lal has since died leaving a widow Musammat Har Kuar, and two sons, Kanhaiya Lal and Makhan Lal. The point for consideration is whether in a partition between Kanhaiya Lal and Makhan Lal, Musammat Gaura gets any share in the property which originally belonged to her deceased husband, Nainsukh Das.

    The trial court as well as the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that she was entitled to a share under the Mitakshara law. That view has been affirmed by a learned Judge of this Court, who himself is well acquainted with the provisions of the Hindu law.

    The question raised in this appeal is, however, not a very easy one to decide, and it is, therefore, necessary to consider the authorities in some detail.

    Taking the case law first, it may be stated that the case of Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree is no authority in support of the defendants' contention. The test of the Mitakshara quoted at page 62 by Mitter, J., was paraphrased as meaning: “the mother or grandmother, as the case may be, is entitled to a share when sons or grandsons divide the family estate between themselves.” The point, however, did not at all arise in the case, and it was only conceded for the sake of argument that the grandmother was entitled to a share.

    In the case of Puddum Mookhee Dossee v. Rayee Monee Dossee , and subsequently in the case of Rayee Monee Dossee v. Puddum Mookhee Dossee , the rule was laid down that on a partition between the sons after the death of the father, the grandmother was not entitled to a share. No clear authority had been cited before the learned Judges, and the case also was one under the Dayabhaga law.

    In the case of Sibbosoondry Dabia v. Bussoomutty Dabia , and in the case of Badri Roy v. Bhugwat Narain Dobey , it was held that a grandmother was entitled to a share. But both these cases were under the Dayabhaga law, and were cases of a partition not exclusively amongst grandsons, but one to which the son also was a party.

    In the case of Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy it was merely held that the mother was entitled to a share.

    In the case of Purna Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarojini Debi , Henderson, J., after an exhaustive review of numerous authorities, came to the conclusion that the grandmother was entitled to a share. Referring to the case in 12 W.R, 409, he remarked that as the report of the case was not clear, he sent for the record, and from that it appeared that the partition was apparently a partition between the widows representing their respective husbands, and that it was not a partition among grandsons, but rather in the nature of a partition among sons. The case before Henderson, J., was one in which a grandson was suing for a partition of the property left by his grandfather, the plaintiff's own father being dead. It was held that the widow of the grandfather was entitled to a share. Had not the case been one under the Dayabhaga law, it would have been directly in point.

    On the other hand, in the case of Radha Kishen Man v. Bachhaman , which has been subsequently followed in the Full Bench case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad , it was laid down that upon a partition between a father and his sons—that is, when the father is alive—the grandmother (that is the father's mother) does not get a share in the case of a family governed by the Benares school of the Mitakshara law. It is to be noted that the present case admittedly is not one of a partition during the life-time of the father.

    In the case of Har Narain v. Bishambhar Nath , it was merely decided that a step-mother is entitled to a share just as much as a natural mother.

    In the case of Vithal Ramkrishna v. Prahlad Ramkrishna , which was in fact a case under the Mitakshara law, it was held that a step-grandmother was entitled to a share at a partition between her step-grandsons exclusively, her own husband and her step-son being dead. Though the case was under the Mitakshara law, Shah, J., who delivered the principal judgment in the case, came to the conclusion that the Mitakshara was altogether silent as to the right of the grandmother. In that view he felt justified in invoking the aid of the Mayukha. In consequence of this, it may be said that the case is not a clear authority on the point.

    This being the state of the judicial pronouncement, it is necessary to consider the texts themselves. It is a well settled rule that in these Provinces the Mitakshara by Vijnaneswara is of paramount authority. But the Mitakshara is a mere commentary on the Yajnavalkya, which is by no means an exhaustive work. Vijnaneswara has made his commentary more comprehensive by quoting from the institutes of other Rishis and Smriti writers as well. The Mitakshara being a commentary on an incomplete treatise, is itself on some points not exhaustive. Vijnaneswara has himself pointed out that each of the Smriti writers was authoritative, and that the point not mentioned in one can be supplied from the others. Similarly the Mitakshara is not the only commentary which can be properly received. Where the Mitakshara is silent or is doubtful, other books of authority can legitimately be referred to. As to the Viramitrodaya, their Lordships of the Privy Council, in the case of Gridhari Lall Roy v. The Bengal Government , remarked that it was stated by Mr. Colebrooke and others to be a treatise of high authority at Benares, and was properly receivable as an exposition of what may have been left doubtful by the Mitakshara, and declaratory of the law of the Benares school. But where the Mitakshara lays down a rule clearly, then, even though it contradicts other books of authority, it has to be followed in these Provinces.

    It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether there is anything in the Mitakshara itself bearing on the question before us. The scheme of the first chapter of the Mitakshara is as follows:— Section I deals with certain general notions relating to inheritance, partition and property. Section II deals with partition. Paragraph 1 quotes a text from the Yajnavalkya allowing a father to separate his sons at his pleasure, either the eldest with the best share, or all with equal shares. Paragraphs 5, 4 and 5 refer to the unequal shares. Paragraph 7states that there are four periods of partition, three in the life time of the father, and one after his death. Paragraph 8 quotes a text from the Yajnavalkya: “If he make the allotments equal, his wives, to whom no separate property has been given by the husband or the father-in-law, must be rendered partakers of like portions.” Paragraph 9 refers to the case when the father by his own choice, makes all his sons partakers of equal portions. It is not necessary to refer to the other paragraphs. Section III deals with the case of partition at the fourth period, namely, the partition after the father's decease. A text of the Yajnavalkya is quoted— “Let sons divide equally both the effects and the debts, after their two parents.” In this section it is pointed out that though Manu had authorized an unequal distribution, such an act was abhorred by the world. Section TV deals with effects not liable to partition, with which we are not concerned. Section V deals with the equal rights of father and son in property ancestral. Paragraph 1 begins by saying:— “The distribution of the paternal estate among sons has been shown; the author next propounds a special rule concerning the division of the grandfather's effects by grandsons.” Paragraph 7 expressly states that the text of the Yajnavalkya quoted in section II, paragraph 1, relates, to property acquired by the farther himself.

    It would, therefore, look as if section II was dealing with the partition of the property which belonged to the father himself, and not one which had belonged to the deceased grandfather. Whether the text of the Yajnavalkya quoted in section II, paragraph 8, referred to the self-acquired property of the father only, and not the ancestral property in his hands, is a point on which it is unnecessary in this case to express an opinion. In the Full Bench case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad it was certainly assumed that the text applied to both ancestral and self-acquired properties, and was the only text applicable when the partition was to be effected after the life-time of the father himself.

    Section VI deals with the rights of a posthumous son and of one born after the partition, and with such rights we are not concerned in the present case.

    Section VII, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:—

    Paragraph 1:— “When a distribution is made during the life of the father, participation of his wives, equally with his sons, has been directed. (If he make the allotments equal, his wives must be rendered partakers of like portions). The author now proceeds to declare their equal participation, when the separation takes place after the demise of the father:

    Of heirs dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share”.

    Paragraph 2:— “Of heirs separating after the decease of the father, the mother shall take a share equal to that of a son; provided no separate property had been given to her. But, if any had been received by her, she is entitled to half a share, as will be explained”.

    In our opinion the word “father” used in the Yajnavalkya, as well as in the Mitakshara quoted above, does not only mean the deceased father of the sons who are partitioning the property. It may very well also mean the father who owned the property, and who is now dead. Similarly the word “mother” need not mean only the mother of the sons partitioning the property. (Certainly it does not mean only their natural mother, as the step-mother has been held to be entitled to a share). It may just as well mean the wife of the father who owned the property, and who is now dead. On this interpretation it would follow that if certain property belonged to the deceased owner, then his wife would be entitled to a share when the partition of that property between the heirs takes place after his death. As to who the heirs are, has to be gathered from Section V, under which the sons and grandsons take equal shares in the grandfather's effects.

    In the present case Nainsukh Das was the original owner of the property. Partition has taken place after his death. It so happens that his son Chunni Lal is also dead, but the heirs of Nainsukh Das are his grandsons Kanhaiya Lal and Malthau Lal. In a partition between them, the widow of Nainsukh Das is entitled to a share. Yajnavalkya's text is: “Of heirs dividing after the death of the father, let the mother also take an equal share”. When the original owner was Nainsukh Das and the property has come down from him, there is no reason why he should not be included in the expression “father”, and his wife in the expression “mother”. It is noteworthy that in the text from the Yajnavalkya last quoted, the words are not “of sons dividing after the death of the father”, but the words are “of heirs etc.” According to this interpretation, it would follow that in a case of a partition after the death of the original owner, his widow, if alive, would be entitled to a share. It is contended strongly on behalf of the plaintiff that the logical result of this interpretation would be to hold that the Allahabad Full Bench case proceeded on a wrong interpretation. Our answer to this objection is that in that case a clear distinction was drawn between a partition during the lifetime of the father—which admittedly is not the case here, as both the grandfather and the father are dead—and the case when a partition takes place after the death of the father. The Full Bench thought that the text applicable to the case before them was the text quoted in Chapter 1, Section II, whereas admittedly that text cannot apply to the case before us. Here the case comes under Section VII, and the only point which we have to consider is whether this section disallows a share to a grandmother. We are of opinion that it is possible to interpret Section VII, paragraphs 1 and 2, so as to give the widow of the owner a share when a partition takes place after his death among his grandsons, even though the owner's own son is also dead.

    As we have had no access to the original texts but have had to depend on translations only, it is not possible to say positively that this interpretation is necessarily correct. At the same time we are prepared to hold that there is nothing in Section VII which expressly prohibits the grandmother from getting any share.

    We have already stated that where the Mitakshara is silent, or where its text is doubtful, other books of authority may be properly relied upon. The Viramitrodaya, which is a commentary on the Mitakshara, quotes a text of Vyasa, another Smriti writer, namely “the sonless wives of the father are declared equal partakers. Grandmothers are also declared to be equal to mothers.” Having quoted this text, he proceeds to consider whether step-mothers are entitled to a share, but he does not comment on the right of grandmothers to an equal share with the mothers. It is contended by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that the Viramitrodaya has simply quoted the text of Vyasa, but has not necessarily approved of it. We are unable to accept this contention. Unfortunately the treatise of Vyasa is not available, and only passages from it are to be found quoted in various commentaries. It is, therefore, a matter of some difficulty to interpret the text of Vyasa when isolated from its context. The Allahabad Full Bench, in the case referred to above, when referring to this text of Vyasa, remarked:— “It must be borne in mind that Vyasa evidently refers to the case of a partition between sons after the demise of the father, when the mother of those effecting the partition gets a share, and declares that grandmothers being ‘equal to mothers’ are like the mother entitled to a share”. The learned Judges, however, expressed no definite opinion on the question which has directly arisen in the present case, because that was not before them. We may also remark that the text of Vyasa, has been quoted in the Dayabhaga and the Mayukha, and that under those systems of law a grandmother's right to a share is recognized. Even if, therefore, the Mitakshara is silent or doubtful, it is proper to supplement it by Vyasa's text as quoted in the Viramitrodaya.

    We may also note that amongst modern English commentators, the balance of authority is in favour of giving the grandmother a share. Sir F. McNaughten, in his Considerations on Hindu Law, has stated that after consulting the pandits he assigned her a share, although her great-grandsons may be the partitioners, provided some of her more immediate descendants are parties, or some one more immediate descendant is a party to the partition. Shama Charan Sirkar has also assigned her a share, and Mayne in his Hindu law has followed McNaughten.

    In West and Bühler's Hindu law, 4th edition, page 719, the paternal grandmother and step-grandmother have been given a share.

    Ghose in his Hindu law, part 1, page 298, has allowed a share to the grandmother both under the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga law, and has thought that there was little justification for a divergence of opinion.

    It is unnecessary to quote later text-book writers whose opinions are based on the previous rulings and authorities.

    We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court and the courts below, must be affirmed.

    The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Kanhaiya Lal v. Gaura
    (Jul 28, 1924)