Straight, J.:— In the suit to which this appeal relates there were two plaintiffs, the appellants before us, Musammat Hashmat Begam and Mussammat Ishrat Begam. The defendants to that suit, who are respondents before us, were Mazhar Husain, the brother of the plaintiffs, Husaini Begam, wife of Mazhar Husain, Musammat Khudayat-ul-Kubra, the sister of the plaintiffs, and Musammat Wajid-un-nissa, the second wife of Kamar-ud-din, the deceased father of the plaintiffs and defendants (1) and (3). It may be convenient also to state here that Kamar-ud-din, the father of the plaintiffs and defendants (1) and (3) and the husband of defendant No. (4), had a brother of the name of Zam-ul-Abid; and that his first wife was one Musammat Sakina Bibi, who predeceased him. The property, which is the subject of the present suit is of two kinds: first, the interest which the plaintiffs claim as the daughters of Musammat Sakina Bibi in their deceased mother's estate; and secondly, their shares in the estate left by their deceased father, Kamar-ud-din, who died upon the 25th May, 1874. The case for the plaintiffs in regard to these two properties was that as to each of them they were severally entitled to six sihams; that their sister, defendant Khudayat-ul-Kubra, was also entitled to six sihams; and that the principal defendant, Mazhar Husain, their brother, was entitled to the residue of 12 sihams out of the 30 sihams into which the properties were divisible. Such were the claims in respect of which the plaintiffs brought their present suit, and the grounds upon which they based their cause of action for coming into Court was, that by reason of certain alienations of the property of their deceased father and mother made by their brother Mazhar Husain in favour of his wife, the second defendant and daughter [345] of their father's brother, Jamal-ud-din, they had been prejudice in their rights by inheritance. In regard to that portion of the property which belonged to the estate of their mother Sakina Bibi, they no doubt said in their plaint, as part of their statement of the facts, that her death took place upon the 2nd February, 1873. The nature of their claim being that which I have indicated, it was met by a long statement of defence filed by the defendant Mazhar Husain, the real answering defendant which, when we come to analyze it, sets up three main contentions:— First, that Musammat Sakina Bibi did not die on the 2nd February, 1873 but on the 22nd January, 1873, and, therefore, that the suit, quoad that portion of the property claimed is, as to both the plaintiffs, barred by limitation; secondly, that if it is not barred, then that, quoad the claims of the plaintiffs to the property both of Musammat Sakina Bibi and of Kamar-ud-din, there has been upon their parts a relinquishment of their rights of inheritance; and, lastly, it is urged that, even assuming the rights of the plaintiffs have not been relinquished, they are hound to repay to the defendant, before they can succeed in this suit, their shares of certain debts of their deceased father Kamar-ud-din, which have been satisfied by the defendant.
As to the first of these matters, an issue was framed and tried by the learned Judge below, namely, whether Musammat Sakina Bibi died upon the 2nd February, 1873, as alleged by the plaintiffs, or on the 22nd January, 1873, as alleged by the defendant. Upon this point the Subordinate Judge found against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendant, and his finding was that the death of Musammat Sakina Bibi took place upon the 22nd January, 1873. The learned Subordinate Judge acting upon that finding has, so I understand him, held that art. 141 of the Limitation Law is applicable to the suit, and that it, having been instituted upon the 29th day of January, 1885, is beyond time, such date being more than twelve years from the date of the death of Musammat Sakina.
As to the first point impeaching this finding of fact, I listened to Mr. Conlan's argument with very great attention, and gave full weight to his criticisms of the witnesses for the defendants, and of the views expressed by the Subordinate Judge as to the value to be attached to the testimony on the one side and the other. Having fully considered all that evidence [346] as it bears upon this point, I think it enough to say, without travelling through it in detail, that I am of opinion the Subordinate Judge was right in coining to the conclusion he did, and that the weight of evidence does appear to me to be in favour of the allegations made on the part of the defendants, that the 22nd January, 1873 was the date of the decease of Sakina Bibi.
Then arises the question whether art. 141 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Upon consideration, I am inclined to think that it is not. I have come to the conclusion, though not without doubt, that the suit therein provided for is one by a Hindu or Muhammadan who, prior to the date of the death of the female, occupied the position of a remainder man, or reversioner, or of; a devisee, by devise, after the death of the female, instituting a suit on the basis of such title as remainder-man, reversioner, or devisee, and that it does not apply to the case of an heir-at-law suing for the possession of immoveable property in that character. I say I have come to this conclusion not without doubt; but it seems to me that when there is doubt upon a question of limitation, and another article can be found which reasonably applies to the suit, it is fight to adopt it. From the assertion of the defendant himself in the 9th paragraph of his statement of defence, and from the circumstances disclosed, I think that the property left by Sakina Bibi and Kamar-ud-din may be regarded as joint family property of the kind mentioned in art. 127 of the Limitation Act. If this be so, then it is clear that knowledge of their exclusion from their, shares therein was not acquired by the plaintiffs till a date which would bring the suit well within the period provided by that article. But if this article be not applicable, the plaintiffs can fall back upon the limitation of art. 144, and as no adverse possession has been pleaded or shown—indeed, the inference from the relation between them and the defendant rather pointing to a contrary inference—the suit under that article would also be within time. In this view the matter stands thus, that the plaintiffs are persons who, as the daughters of Sakina Bibi and Kamar-ud-din, are entitled to a share in the inheritance of the estates left by those two persons, and it rests with the defendant Mazhar Husain to show either that, by relinquishment formally made and clearly and satisfactorily established, they have abandoned their interests in both properties, [347] or that by his adverse possession for a period of more than twelve years prior to the date of suit, he has obtained a proprietary title to their shares.
[As to this latter point I have looked very carefully through the statement of defence, and I find no paragraph therein which I can construe as setting up a plea of adverse possession. Mr. Ross has said that, because the plaint was framed in a particular way, and suggested the date of the death of Sakina Bibi as the time when their cause of action arose in respect of her estate, the defendant was misled thereby, and did not raise the plea of adverse possession. I do not think that we ought at this stage of litigation to listen to such a contention. Taking the statement contained in the plaint as a whole, if the defendant Mazhar Husain had a defence upon the ground of adverse possession, he ought, in my opinion, to have raised it. But he did not, and not having done so, I do not think that we should entertain that question now or afford him further opportunity for producing evidence in regard to it. Then comes the point of whether the defendant has shown that the plaintiffs' relinquished their rights of inheritance in the estate of their father and mother in favour of the defendant (or any other person). I do not propose upon the present occasion to repeat the remarks that I have in cases of this description frequently had to make before with regard to the obligation that rests upon our Courts of scrutinizing these matters in which pardahnashin ladies are involved, with an extremely careful and jealous eye. Here I may remark that the learned Sub-Judge seems to have been a good deal influenced in dealing with the present case by certain circumstances present to his mind with regard to the character and conduct of Riazuddin, the husband of the plaintiff Hashmat Begam, and he seems to have lost sight of the fact that her rights in the property of her deceased father and mother were wholly independent of, and apart from, her husband; and that she was entitled to, entirely independent; control of that property according to Muhammadan Law. Therefore, whatever his misconduct, or however fraudulent or dishonest her husband was. He could in no way prejudice or damage her interest or right, or by any, act of his, preclude her from obtaining a determination of the question whether she is not entitled to the rights which she claims. Mr. Ross has admitted, with the candour which always marks his conduct of his cases, that with regard to the plaintiff Ishrat Begam there is no evidence from which it would be proper to infer that she has relinquished her share, so that as regards her it must be taken as conceded, and I think rightly, that the defendant's plea upon that score entirely failed. Generally, as regards her case and that of her sister Hashmat Begam, the other plaintiff, I can only repeat what I have so often remarked before, that, considering the peculiar conditions of the lives of these pardah ladies, and remembering that in 999 cases out of 1,000 their business matters and interests connected with their own property are left in the hands of, and managed by, their male relatives, too much importance is not to be attached to their silence about or failure to assert their legal rights. Indeed, ordinarily speaking, I doubt if any adverse inference should be drawn from that circumstance. It is unfortunate that we have not before us the evidence of either of the plaintiffs, as, for some reason unknown to us, no commission was issued to take their deposition. But applying the common knowledge open to us of the position which the females in Muhammadan families occupy in regard to the male members, we are disposed to accept the explanation offered us for the plaintiffs, that while they were willing for a time at any rate to allow their brother, the defendant Mazhar Husain, to remain in possession of their interest, he having to wind up the father's affairs and pay any debts that he had owing out of the profits generally derivable from the joint properly, they never contemplated nor intended to surrender or abandon their rights in the corpus of the estates left by their father and mother. With regard to the plaintiff Hashmat Begam, I have only a word or two to say about the evidence of relinquishment set up by the defendants to defeat her. This rests upon that extraordinary transaction, for I can call it no other, which is alleged by the defendant to have taken place on the 17th March, 1874. First of all it is to be observed with regard to it that the mortgage, which is said to be evidence that she relinquished her inheritance in the estate of her father, was executed before her father's death, a portion of the consideration money being in fact found by the father himself. Further, upon looking into the document and the evidence with regard to it, it is difficult to understand why the plaintiff Hashmat Begam should accept the position of a mortgagee of her father-in-law for Rs. 7,000 as an equivalent for the interest she had already acquired in her mother's estate, and was in future to acquire in her father's estate. It looks very much as if the real state of things was that Kamaruddin, who then was a Munsif within the jurisdiction of this Court, was in conjunction with his son lending Rs. 7,000 to his brother Zain-ul-abdin, and for the purpose of avoiding the appearance of his name in the transaction as mortgagee, he simply used the name of his daughter, a course of proceeding by no means uncommon in this country. As I said, Kamaruddin did not die until the 23rd May, 1874, and, so far as I can ascertain, it was not until this suit was instituted that it was ever suggested that this extraordinary mortgage transaction represented the consideration for the relinquishment by the plaintiff Hashmat Begam of her interests in the several estates of her father and mother. But, as I have before observed, we must not lose sight of the fact that this is a case in which we are dealing with a pardahnashin lady, and it behoves us not to hold her bound by any transaction, unless we are clearly satisfied that she was, with the knowledge of its nature, a conscious and consenting party thereto. Now it is clear, upon the face of the mortgage itself, that it was not executed by the lady, her name nowhere appears upon it, and even the name of her husband, who is said to have been mixed up in the transaction, is not subscribed by himself but by Zain-ul-abdin, his father-in-law, as his attorney. As far as the document itself is concerned, I find nothing to bind the plaintiff, Hashmat Begam, and for that purpose it seems to me to be practically worthless. In this connection, I need only refer to, without speaking at length, what I have more than once laid down from this Bench as to the objection that rests upon a party to a suit seeking to bind a pardahnashin lady to give clear and satisfactory proof that she had opportunities of obtaining independent advice before entering into the transaction with which she is sought to be fixed, and that she did enter into it with full knowledge of its nature and legal effect. I think also that, as regards Hashmat Begam, the evidence of any relinquishment of her rights by her entirely fails. Then the single question remains, has the defendant under the eighteenth plea, which was raised in his statement of defence, established any thing on the nature of an equitable set-off that would entitle him to require the plaintiffs to repay to him any sums of money paid by him in respect of the debts of the father or mother? He has, in my opinion, proved no such case. Even if he has paid any debts, which as far as I can see were by no means considerable, he has now been in possession and enjoyment of the proofs derivable, in respect of the rights of the two plaintiffs, since 1873 and 1874. No claim is made by them for profits received by him antecedent to the date of the institution of this suit and therefore I think we may well say here that we are not called upon to hold that he is entitled to receive any thing from the plaintiffs before they can receive their shares. I am of opinion that this appeal succeeds, that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in the view he took, and, reversing his decree, the claim of the plaintiffs will stand decreed with costs in both Courts.]
Tyrrell, J.:— I entirely concur.
Appeal decreed.