Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 278-281 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 281 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 278-281 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 281 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment concerns execution proceedings arising from a bond dated 2 January 1875 in which Kalian Singh hypothecated his zamindari rights in mauza Deva Kanohan in favour of Gauri Sahai. At the time of the bond Kalian Singh was recorded as proprietor of a 5 biswas share; Musammat Bhagirathi and Musammat Bijai Kuar were recorded as owners of one 5 biswas share each. On 28 September 1883 Gauri Sahai obtained a decree enforcing a lien against the entire zamindari rights of Kalian Singh in mauza Deva but his claim against the person of the obligor was dismissed.

A compromise between Kalian Singh, Musammat Janki and Bijai Kuar resulted in Janki's name being removed and Bijai Kuar being entered as owner of two 5 biswas shares (so that Bijai Kuar stood recorded in respect of two shares). On 14 April 1884 Gauri Sahai applied for execution by attachment and sale describing the hypothecated rights as 15 biswas in mauza Deva. The Court issued an attachment against the whole 15 biswas and the shares were attached on 11 May 1884. Kalian Singh died on 8 June 1884 and Janki (his widow) and Bahori Lal (his son) were substituted as his representatives.

The execution was transferred to the Collector who sold only the 5 biswas share that had stood recorded in the name of the deceased judgment-debtor and which was in the possession of Janki and Bahori Lal as his representatives. Gauri Sahai later applied for sale of the remaining 10 biswas (the shares described as in the name of Janki and Bijai Kuar). Bijai Kuar filed objections claiming she was the owner and that Janki had no interest; Bijai Kuar died before the scheduled hearing. Bahori Lal, under the guardianship of his mother, had his name substituted as representative of Bijai Kuar in order to support her objections. Bahori Lal then filed objections contesting Bijai Kuar's title and asserting hypothecation under the 1875 bond.

The Subordinate Judge heard the objections and on 7 December 1885 held that a charge had been created on the whole right and interest in mauza Deva Kanchan and that the share of Kalian Singh standing in the name of Bijai Kuar should be considered hypothecated. The Subordinate Judge disallowed the objections of the representative (Bahori Lal) on the ground that Bijai Kuar's interest was merely a life interest and died with her.

Bahori Lal appealed to the Judge (a higher court), contending among other pleas that as the representative of Kalian Singh the objections should have been settled under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Judge raised a preliminary point of jurisdiction, returning the memorandum of appeal to the present court (All. H.C.) for presentation. A preliminary objection was taken by the respondent's counsel that the Subordinate Judge's order was under Section 281 of the Code and therefore conclusive, barring an appeal to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Subordinate Judge of 7 December 1885 disposing of objections filed (originally by Bijai Kuar and pressed by Bahori Lal as her representative) was an order passed under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code or under Section 281 of the Code.
  2. Whether, if the Subordinate Judge's order was passed under Section 281, the appellate tribunal (this Court) has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against that order.
  3. Whether the representative of a deceased judgment-debtor (brought into execution-proceedings after decree) is required to have his title (including rights claimed through a third person) determined by the summary procedure of execution under Section 244, or whether such claims fall for determination under the procedures of Sections 278–281 (and, if unsuccessful, by a regular suit under Section 283).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (for Gauri Sahai)

  • The proceedings before the Subordinate Judge were proceedings in respect of objections filed by Bijai Kuar under the execution provisions, and therefore the Subordinate Judge's order was passed under Section 281 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Because the order was passed under Section 281 it is conclusive (subject to the remedy of a separate suit) and no appeal lay to this Court against that order.

Appellant's Arguments (for Bahori Lal)

  • The proceeding before the Subordinate Judge should be regarded as held under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code because Bahori Lal was the representative of the judgment-debtor, Kalian Singh, and therefore the objections raised by him should have been set at rest under Section 244 and not required to be pursued by a separate suit.
  • In support of the contention that a representative brought in after decree must have his title determined in execution-proceedings, authorities were cited including Wahed Ali v. Jumaee (Privy Council) and Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar (this Court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wahed Ali v. Jumaee, 11 B.L.R. 149 (Privy Council) The Lords of the Privy Council held that a party sued in a representative character is a party to the suit for purposes of execution of a decree. The Court (chief justice and Mahmood, J.) considered the Privy Council ruling important but held the present case distinguishable from Wahed Ali because here the objections were those of a third party (Bijai Kuar) whose representative was substituted; the Privy Council ruling did not directly govern this factual situation.
Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar, I.L.R. 7 All. 547 (All. H.C.) Applied the principle that the representative of a judgment-debtor who objects that attached property was acquired by himself (not inherited from the judgment-debtor) must be treated as a party for purposes of Section 244 and the objection dealt with in execution. The appellant relied on this authority. The Court noted the case but held the present case distinguishable because the objections here originated with a third party (Bijai Kuar) and were governed by Sections 278–281, not Section 244.
Oseem-un-nissa Khatoon v. Ameer-un-nissa Khatoon, 20 W.R. 162 Supports the effect that a party sued in representative character may be regarded as a party for execution purposes. Referenced by Mahmood, J. as part of authorities supporting the position in Wahed Ali; not applied directly because of factual distinctions in the present case.
Ameer-un-nissa Khatoon v. Meer Mozuffer Hossein Chowdhry, 12 B.L.R. 65 (Calcutta High Court) Extended the rule to a person brought upon the record as representative in execution-proceedings (post-decree) being treated as a party for Section 244 purposes. Mentioned by Mahmood, J. as part of the line of cases that broaden the principle; the Court nevertheless found the current facts distinguishable and declined to treat the order as falling under Section 244.
Buddu Ramaiya v. C. Venkaiya, 3 Mad. H.C. Rep. 263 (Madras) Held that questions for execution are not limited to those between parties at the date of decree; representatives may be parties for execution purposes. Cited by Mahmood, J. as part of authorities supporting the broader rule; the Court did not apply it to change the result because the present objections were under Sections 278–281 raised by a third person.
Ruriyali v. Mayan, I.L.R. 7 Mad. 255 (Madras) Followed the principle that representatives may be parties for execution purposes. Referenced by Mahmood, J. as consistent with the view that representatives can be parties; ultimately distinguished on the facts of the current case.
Abdul Rahman v. Muhammad Yar, I.L.R. 4 All. 190 (All. H.C.) Contains a ruling that appears inconsistent with the broader line of authorities treating representatives as parties for execution purposes. Mentioned by Mahmood, J. as part of conflicting authorities; the Court noted the conflict in case law but did not rely on this case to decide the present matter.
Awadh Kuan v. Raktu Tiwari, I.L.R. 6 All. 109 (All. H.C.) Another ruling seen as inconsistent with the broader line of authorities. Not applied; referenced as part of the complex and conflicting jurisprudence discussed by Mahmood, J.
Nimba Harishet v. Sita Ram Paraji, I.L.R. 9 Bom. 458 Discusses inconsistency among decisions and reference to other cases; Sargent, C.J. declined to follow one inconsistent earlier ruling. Referenced in discussion of conflicting authorities; not applied to change the Court's conclusion about the Section under which the Subordinate Judge acted.
Arundadhi Ammyar v. Natesha Ayyar, I.L.R. 5 Mad. 391 Cited as supporting a view adopted by the Bombay Chief Justice in related cases. Referenced by Mahmood, J. when reviewing conflicting precedents; not applied to alter the decision that the order was under Section 281.
Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar, I.L.R. 2 All. 752 Referred to regarding the proper scope of Section 244 and related reasoning adopted by members of this Court. Mentioned by Mahmood, J. as part of the reasoning he had previously followed; used in the analysis but did not lead to a different outcome in the present case.
Nath Mal Das v. Tajammul Husain, I.L.R. 7 All. 36 Referred to in the context of interpretation of Section 244 and related issues about rights claimed by representatives. Cited by Mahmood, J. in support of a view previously taken; did not change the conclusion that the Subordinate Judge's order fell under Section 281 in this instance.
Kanai Lall Khan v. Sashi Bhuson Biswas, I.L.R. 6 Gal. 777 (Calcutta) Held that a person impleaded as reversionary heir and decreed against may in a subsequent suit claim the decree covered only a life-interest (a broader approach inconsistent, according to Mahmood, with Privy Council rulings). Mentioned by Mahmood, J. as a ruling he could not reconcile with the Privy Council's view; not followed as determinative of the present facts.
Sita Ram v. Bhagwan Das, I.L.R. 7 All. 733 (All. H.C.) Affirmed the rule that a representative who objects that attached property was acquired by himself (and not inherited) should be treated as a party for Section 244 purposes. Mentioned by Mahmood, J. as a case he had concurred with in the past; notwithstanding prior concurrence, he agreed the present case was distinguishable and that Section 281 applied here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along two tracks, reflected in the opinions of the presiding chief justice and of Mahmood, J., who concurred.

  1. Characterization of the proceedings and the nature of the objections:

    The Court examined the record and determined that the objections which the Subordinate Judge considered were originally filed by Musammat Bijai Kuar on 19 September 1885 under the execution provisions ( Sections 278–281 of the Civil Procedure Code ). These objections challenged the attachment on the basis that she was the owner of the shares and that Janki had no interest.

  2. Distinction between capacities claimed by Bahori Lal:

    Bahori Lal had two differing relationships in the proceedings: (a) as the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor Kalian Singh, and (b) as the substituted representative of the objector Bijai Kuar (a third party) for the limited purpose of supporting her objections. The Court emphasized that the latter capacity was "wholly distinct and apart" from his capacity as Kalian Singh's representative for execution of the decree.

  3. Applicability of Section 244 versus Sections 278–281:

    The chief justice reasoned that because the objections before the Subordinate Judge were those of a third party (Bijai Kuar) filed under the execution provisions, they had to be considered and disposed of under Sections 280 and 281. If the decision was adverse to such an objector, the remedy was a regular suit as contemplated by Section 283. The Subordinate Judge's order disallowed the objections on the ground that Bijai Kuar's interest was only a life-interest and died with her; this treatment corresponded with Section 281 procedure.

  4. Precedent and conflict of authorities:

    Mahmood, J. reviewed a substantial and conflicting body of case-law about how far representatives can be treated as parties for execution purposes under Section 244. He acknowledged Privy Council authority and several High Court decisions that favor treating representatives as parties for execution. He also acknowledged inconsistent decisions of this Court. After canvassing the authorities, Mahmood, J. concluded that the present case was distinguishable from the Privy Council and other rulings because the objections were those of a third party whose representative (the appellant) had been substituted; therefore the order came within Sections 278–281 and not Section 244.

  5. Jurisdictional and remedial consequence:

    Because the Subordinate Judge's order was properly regarded as an order under Section 281, the Court held that the order was conclusive in the sense that an appeal to this Court was not the proper remedy; instead the unsuccessful objector's representative (or successor) should pursue the remedy by instituting a suit as provided by Section 283.

  6. Final disposition of the preliminary objection:

    The chief justice allowed the respondent's preliminary objection that the Subordinate Judge's order was not passed under Section 244 and dismissed the appeal with costs. Mahmood, J. concurred, stating that under the circumstances the proper remedy was a suit contemplated by Section 283.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court held that the Subordinate Judge's order of 7 December 1885 was an order passed under Section 281 of the Civil Procedure Code and not under Section 244; accordingly the appeal to this Court was not maintainable and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Subordinate Judge's decision disallowing the objections of the substituted representative (Bahori Lal) stands.
  • The Court indicated that the proper remedy for the appellant, if he wished to contest the matter further, is to institute a separate suit of the kind contemplated by Section 283 of the Civil Procedure Code rather than pursuing an appeal under Section 244.
  • The opinion distinguishes the present facts from authorities holding that representatives must in all circumstances have titles determined in execution-proceedings; the Court therefore did not treat this decision as extending or overturning the broader lines of authority. No sweeping new precedent beyond the factual holding was proclaimed.

This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

    Bahori Lal () v. Gauri Sahai ().

    1. In order to make the questions that have been raised in this appeal intelligible, it is necessary to state the following facts, and the accompanying table may facilitate the doing so:

    2. On the 2nd January 1875, Kalian Singh executed a bond in favour of Gauri Sahai, respondent, hypothecating his zamindari rights and interests in mauza Deva Kanohan. He was at that time recorded in the kheuiat as proprietor of a 5 biswas share in that mauza, and Musammats Bhagirathi and Bijai Kuar, the widows of his deceased uncle, Kashi Ram, were respectively described therein as owners each of a 5 biswas share. On the 28th September 1883, Gauri Sahai obtained a decree for enforcement of lien against the entire zamindari rights of Kalian Singh in mauza Deva, hypothecated in the bond of the 2nd January. 1875, but his claim against the person and other property of the obligor was dismissed. Owing to some antecedent litigation that had taken place between Bijai Kuar on the one side, and Kalian Singh and Musammat Janki on the other, in reference to the 5 biswas share recorded in Janki's name, a compromise was arrived at between them, by which it was agreed " that mutation of names in respect of the property in dispute should be effected in favour of Musammat Bijai Kuar, and that she should remain as heretofore in possession of the said property and other properties situate in mauza Deva and mauza Ghasita, and that the said property shall be responsible for any debts due from us Kalian Singh and Musammat Janki." On her side Bijai Kuar said: "I shall have no right to transfer any property, nor shall the said property be liable for any debt due from me. I shall have a life-interest in all the estate left, by my deceased husband. "This arrangement was given effect to by the removal of Janki's name from the khewat as to the 5 biswas share, and the substitution of Bijai Kuar's, who thus stood entered in respect of two shares of 5 biswas each.

    4. On the 14th April 1884, Gauri Sahai made his first application for execution by attachment and sale of the hypothecated rights and interests of his obligor, which he described as

    "5 biswas entered in the name of Kalian Singh, judgment-debtor, and 5 biswas in the name of Janki and 5 biswas in that of Bijai Kuar, in mauza Deva, of which Kalian Singh is the owner."
    As I have already stated, Janki's name had been expunged and no share 'stood in her name at all. On the 23rd April 1884, the Court Issued an attachment against the whole 15 biswas, and on the 11th of May following they were attached. On the 8th June 1884, Kalian Singh, the judgment-debtor, died, and Janki, his widow, and Bahori Lal, his son, were substituted as his representatives on the 18th of the same month.

    8. On the 29th of November 1884, the Subordinate Judge transferred the execution-proceedings to the Collector of the district, and on the 20th June 1885, the Collector put up and sold only the 5 biswas share which had stood recorded in the name of the deceased judgment-debtor, and which was in the possession of Janki and Bahori Lal as his representatives. Subsequently, Gauri Sahai applied for sale of the 5 biswas which he described as entered in the name of Janki and the 5 biswas in the name of Bijai Kuar. On the 19th September 1885, Bijai Kuar filed objections, stating that Janki had no interest in the property, that she (Bijai Kuar) was the owner, and that any interests derived by Janki from her deceased husband had already been sold by the decree-holder. The 14th November 1885, was fixed for the hearing of these Objections, but before that date Bijai Kuar died, and on the 11th November Bahori Lai, under the guardianship of his mother, applied to have his name brought on the record in her place with the object of supporting her objections. This was done subject to anything that might hereafter be urged by the decree-holder. On the 5th December 1885, he in his turn put in objections to the effect that any interest Bijai Kuar might have had in the property died with her, and that she left no rights that could pass to Bahori Lal as her heir; on the contrary, that anything she had was in reality the property of Kalian Singh, that it was hypothecated in the bond of the 2nd January 1875, and that by the terms of the compromise between Bijai Kuar and Kalian Singh and Janki, the first-named had agreed that the property should be liable for the debts of Kalian Singh. These objections were heard and disposed of by the Subordinate Judge on the 7th December 1885; and he held that

    "no specified share of Kalian Singh has been charged under the decree sought to be executed and under the bond dated the 2nd January 1875, the basis of the decree; on the contrary, a charge was created on the whole right and interest in mauza Deva Kanchan; therefore the share of Kalian Singh in the property, standing in the name of Bijai Kuar, should also be considered hypothecated. The objection that the property of Bijai Kuar had been exempted should not have been allowed. She might have perhaps continued m possession during her life, but she died while the suit was pending. The son of Kalian Singh, the heir of the judgment-debtor, wishes to become the representative of Bijai Kuar, but the Court thinks none can become her representative, her interest having been merely life interest ordered that the claim be disallowed with costs."

    9. It is obvious therefore, from the terms of the order of the Subordinate Judge, that the proceeding before him had reference to the objections which had been filed by Bijai Kuar, and supported by Bahori Lal, through his guardian, pursuant to the order granted on the application of the 11th November 1885. The decision of the Subordinate Judge was appealed from by Bahori Lal to the Judge, and among the pleas was the fourth to the following effect: "As applicant is the representative of Kalian Singh, judgment-debtor, and the execution is taken out against him, all the objections raised by him should have been set at rest under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and he should not be made to prefer a claim." The Judge disposed of the case upon a preliminary point of jurisdiction, holding that as "the decree, in the execution of which the objection is taken, is over Rs. 5,000 in amount," this Court, and not his Court, was the proper appellate tribunal. He accordingly returned the memorandum of appeal for presentation here, and this is the mode in which the matter comes before us. When the case came on for hearing, Pandit Bishambar Nath, for the respondent, took a preliminary objection to the effect that the proceeding Before the Subordinate Judge having taken place in reference to the claim of Bahori Lal, as the heir of Bijai Kuar, to have the 10 biswas share released from attachment, his order must be regarded as passed under Section 281 of the Civil Procedure Code, and such being the case, and it toeing conclusive, subject to Bahori Lal's bringing a suit to establish his Tight, no appeal lay to this Court. In reply for the appellant, it was urged that the proceeding before the Subordinate Judge must be regarded as held under Section 244, Bahori Lal being the representative of Kalian Singh, and in support of this contention a ruling of the Privy Council--Wahed Ali v. Jumaee 11 B.L.R. 149 and one of this Court--Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar I.L.R. 7 All. 547 were referred to.

    10. I think that the preliminary objection urged for the respondent is a valid one and must prevail. It is clear that the objections filed by Bijai Kuar on the 19th September 1885, were put in under section 278 of the code, and that, whether rightly or wrongly, she claimed to be entitled to the two shares of 5 biswas each, and on that ground to have the decree-holder's attachment released. Had she survived, those objections would have had to be considered and disposed of in the manner provided in Sections 280 and 281, and had the decision been adverse to her, her remedy, and her only remedy, would have been a suit, of the kind mentioned in Section 283. All that Bahori Lal sought to be allowed to do was to come in as the representative of Bijai Kuar for the purpose of supporting those objections, and it was his claim to do this that was rejected by the Subordinate Judge, and nothing more. It was in right of a third person, whose interest he asserted to have passed to him, that he prayed admission to "the proceedings, and this character was wholly distinct and apart from that he filled as the legal representative of his deceased father, in which capacity he had been cited after the passing of Gauri Sahai's decree. No application had been put in by the decree-holder, which would have made the second paragraph of Section 234 applicable, and in my opinion it is impossible to hold that the question decided by the Subordinate Judge, which is sought to be impeached on appeal here, was one that fell within the purview of Clause (c), Section 244; on the contrary, if any section covers the Subordinate Judge's order, it must be Section 281. I do not think that because Bahori Lal happens, for the purpose of the execution-proceedings under Gauri Sahai's decree, to be the legal representative of his father Kalian Singh, and to be liable to satisfy it to the extent of any assets which may have come to his hands, that any rights claimed by him through a third person must be dealt with, and can only be dealt with, between him and the decree-holder in the execution-proceedings, in which, be it observed, only for the property of the deceased which has come to his hands, and has not been duly disposed of, can any personal responsibility attach to him. I do not understand the Privy Council ruling, or the judgment of this Court referred to by the appellant's learned pleader, to lay down the proposition that the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, brought in after decree, is constrained to have his title, possibly to a large property, determined by the summary method adopted in execution-proceedings, and that because he is another man's legal representative, he is placed in a worse position than other people, and has no remedy by suit. Both the cases had reference to persons who had been cited in the suit as representatives of a deceased person before decree, and so far as the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council was concerned, its direct object was to determine that such persons were parties to the suit for the purpose of Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, and their remarks referred to by my brother Oldfield in Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar I.L.R. 7 All. 547 are directed to that point and that point only. I allowed the preliminary objection, that the order here was not passedjuoder section 244 of the code, and dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Mahmood, J.

    11. I confess that I have had considerable doubts upon the question of law raised in this case, and the difficulty is considerably enhanced by the fact that there exists a long conflict of decisions in the published reports as-to how far the representative of a judgment-debtor can be dealt with as a party to the suit for purposes of execution-proceedings relating to the questions under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. The most important case upon the subject is Waked Ali v. Jumaee 11 B.L.R. 149 where the Lords of the Privy Council held that a party sued in a representative character, against whom a decree is obtained, is a party to the suit for purposes of execution of such decree. The same is the effect of Oseem-un-nissa Khatoon v. Ameer-un-nissa Khatoon 20 W.R. 162. The rule appears to have been carried further by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ameer-un-nissa Khatoon v. Meer Mozuffer Hossein Chowdhry 12 B.L.R. 65 where the same rule was applied to the case of a person who was not a party to the decree, but had been brought upon the record as representative of the deceased judgment-debtor in the execution-proceedings. The view is in accord with a much older ruling of the Madras High. Court in Buddu Ramaiya v. C. Venkaiya 3 Mad. H.C. Rep. 263 where it was held that questions arising between the parties to the suit cannot be limited to questions arising between those who were parties to the suit at the date of the decree; but after decree the representative of a decree-holder, or the representative of a defendant against whom an execution is sought, become parties to the suit for the purposes of execution. The same is the effect of a later ruling of the same Court in Ruriyali v. Mayan I.L.R. 7 Mad. 255. On the other hand, the rulings of this Court in two cases--Abdul Rahman v. Muhammad Yar I.L.R. 4 All. 190 and Awadh Kuan v. Raktu Tiwari I.L.R. 6 All. 109 seem to proceed upon a ratio decidendi which appears to be inconsistent with the rulings above referred to. Indeed, in Nimba Harishet v. Sita Ram Paraji I.L.R. 9 Bom. 458 Sargent, C.J., referring to the former of these cases, declined to follow it, regarding it to be inconsistent with the Privy Council ruling, and he adopted the ruling of the Madras Court in Arundadhi Ammyar v. Natesha Ayyar I.L.R. 5 Mad. 391. Again, the rulings of this Court in Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar I.L.R. 7 All. 547 and Sita Ram v. Bhagwan Das I.L.R. 7 All. 733 in both of which I concurred with my brother Oldfield, laid down the rule that the representative of the judgment-debtor who had objected that the property attached had been acquired by himself, and not inherited from the judgment-debtor, and was therefore not liable in execution must be treated as a party to the suit within the meaning of Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the objection must be dealt with in execution of the decree. I must also here point out that whilst in the latter of these cases the representative of the judgment-debtor was brought upon the record in the execution-proceedings, subsequent to the decree, in the former case the representatives were themselves, impleaded in the original suit in that capacity, and the decree had been obtained against them. In delivering my judgment in the case, whilst concurring with my brother Oldfield, I expressed the view that the turning point upon which the application of the rule contained in Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, barring adjudication in a regular suit, depends, is, whether the judgment-debtor, in raising objections to execution of decree against any property, pleads, what may analogically be called a jus tertii, or a right which, although he represents it, belongs to a title totally separate from that which he personally holds in such property. And I also held that this view was consistent with the ratio decidendi which had been adopted by my brother Oldfield in Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar I.L.R. 2 All. 752 and which I followed in Nath Mal Das v. Tajammul Husain I.L.R. 7 All. 36 and at the same time I expressed my dissent from the ruling of a Division Bench of the Calcutta Court in Kanai Lall Khan v. Sashi Bhuson Biswas I.L.R. 6 Gal. 777 which goes the length of holding that even where a person, upon the death of a Hindu widow, is made? a party to the suit as reversionary heir to the estate, and a decree is passed against him, he may in a subsequent suit claim to establish that the decree covered only the life-interest of the widow. The ratio decidendi adopted in the ruling seems to be that, although the plaintiff was impleaded in the decree as the representative of the widow, the nature of his claim was such as to exclude it from the operation of Section 244 of the Code--a view which I could not reconoile with the ruling of the Lords of the Privy Council in Wahed Ali v. Jumaee 11 B.L.R. 149. These are not the only reported cases which complicate the question; and in this state of the case-law, I felt inclined to ask the learned Chief Justice to refer this case to the Full Bench. But I am not prepared to dissent from him in the distinction which be has drawn between this case and the rulings Co which I have referred. The present appellant was no party to the original decree of the 28th September 1883, and he was impleaded in execution-proceedings as the representative of the original judgment-debtor, Kalian Singh, and in that capacity he might, according to the rulings to which I have already referred, be treated as a party to the suit for purpose of Section 244 of the Code. But the case, as it has come before us, does not, as the learned Chief Justice has shown, relate to such capacity. In the execution-proceedings a third party, Musammat Bijai Kuar, who could under no conditions be regarded as the representative of the judgment-debtor, Kalian Singh, raised objections on the 19th September 1885, to the attachment of the property, and her objections were undoubtedly such as are contemplated by Sections 278-281 of the Civil Procedure Code. The 14th November 1885, was fixed for the hearing of the objections; but the objector died in the meantime, and the present appellant had his name substituted as the representative of the objector, and the objections were disposed of on the 7th December 1885, and this is the order from which this appeal has been preferred.

    12. Upon this state of things, I am not prepared to dissent from the learned Chief Justice in the view that the case is not on all fours with the Privy Council ruling in Wahed Ali's cane 11 B.L.R. 149, and that it is distinguishable from the other rulings to which reference has been made. Nor am I prepared to dissent from him in the view that the mere circumstance of the representative of a deceased judgment-debtor becoming the representative also of a deceased third party, was objector in the execution-proceedings, will not preclude him from prosecuting those objections, and that the adjudication upon such objections falls beyond the scope of Section 244 of the Code. Indeed, as the learned Chief Justice has pointed out, the matter was dealt with in the Court below as objections by a third party, and there can belittle doubt that the order of the 7th December 1885 now under appeal, was passed under section 281 of the code, as it disallowed the objections upon the ground that the appellant had inherited nothing from the original objector, Musammat Bijai Kuar. And this being so, I am not willing to disagree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for the appellant would be a suit such as is contemplated by section 283 of the code.

    16. For these reasons I concur in the order which the learned Chief Justice has made.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bahori Lal () v. Gauri Sahai ().
    (Aug 2, 1886)