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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
  • SECTION 240 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 223(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Rule 83 of Che Income Tax Act. (17.)
  • u/s 127(1) of the Income Tax Act.
  • Rule 83 of the Income Tax Rule
  • u/s 245 of the Income Tax Act,
  • u/s 127 of the Income Tax Act
  • u/s 148 of the I.T. Act
  • Civil Rule No. 92 (K)/91,
  • Section 181-B
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988
  • SECTION 240 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 223(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Rule 83 of Che Income Tax Act. (17.)
  • u/s 127(1) of the Income Tax Act.
  • Rule 83 of the Income Tax Rule
  • u/s 245 of the Income Tax Act,
  • u/s 127 of the Income Tax Act
  • u/s 148 of the I.T. Act
  • Civil Rule No. 92 (K)/91,
  • Section 181-B
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — V.D. Gyani, C.J. (Writ Appeal from judgment dated 9.5.94)

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ appeal challenges the Single Judge's judgment dated 9.5.94 in Civil Rule No. 92 (K)/91 which had allowed a writ petition filed by the writ petitioner-respondent (a senior Indian Administrative Service officer and erstwhile Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland) and directed the respondent-appellant (Income Tax Officer, Dimapur) to refund Rs. 8,41,142.86 with interest at 18% per annum within one month.

Relevant factual matrix (as stated in the opinion): the petitioner filed income-tax returns with I.T.O., Dimapur from 1970-71 to 1978-79, filed returns at New Delhi while on deputation for 1979-80 to 1983-84, and thereafter returned to filing at Dimapur. The I.T.O., Dimapur proposed transfer of the petitioner's income-tax records to New Delhi (petitioner's permanent place of posting), and issuance of a notice under section 127 of the Income Tax Act was challenged by the petitioner. The record was transferred to New Delhi and assessments were made by the Assistant Commissioner, Investigation Circle, New Delhi.

The writ petitioner challenged assessment orders (including assessments for years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88) and sought multiple reliefs including quashing those assessments, prohibiting recovery, and refund of amounts already recovered (Rs. 8,41,143/- stated in the petition). The Single Judge allowed the petition and ordered the refund. The Income Tax Officer (appellant) appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Single Judge's order directing a refund of Rs. 8,41,142.85 (with interest) was legally sustainable in view of the statutory provisions of Section 240 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (and its proviso), which govern refunds arising from appellate or other orders.
  2. Whether the writ petitioner was entitled to the refund where assessments had been set aside and other proceedings (including potential fresh assessments and outstanding demands) remained in existence.
  3. Whether invoking writ jurisdiction (Article 226) and obtaining relief in a forum where parallel proceedings/appeals were pending constituted an abuse of process or disentitled the petitioner to equitable reliefs (i.e., whether the petitioner came to court with "clean hands").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (respondent to the writ)

  • The transfers of assessment records to New Delhi were in accordance with a memo of the Central Board of Direct Taxes and there was no question of lack of jurisdiction for the New Delhi I.T.O. to assess the petitioner.
  • The petitioner had defaulted in filing returns at New Delhi for certain years, leading to notices under sections 148 and 139(2) of the Income Tax Act; assessments and inquiries (including by CBI and Income Tax Department) revealed undisclosed income and disproportionate assets.
  • The Department relied on provisions (including Section 223(2)) to recover outstanding demands and contended that the properties said to be of petitioner's relatives were in fact held by the petitioner.
  • Counsel argued that, in view of outstanding demands against the petitioner, the Single Judge's refund order was untenable in law; specifically the appellant contended that Section 245 (raised by the appellant at the Single Judge stage) meant the refund ordered was not due.

Respondent's (Writ Petitioner) Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that Section 245 was not argued before the Single Judge and that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had set aside the assessment orders for years 1985-86 and 1987-88 by order dated 26.2.93 (filed as Annexure-I), which supported the claim for refund.
  • The petitioner relied on another Single Judge judgment (Civil Rule No. 7(K)/91 dated 15.7.93) that quashed transfer of jurisdiction from Dimapur to New Delhi, arguing that there was no chance of a fresh assessment being lawfully passed and thus refund was justified.
  • The petitioner also invoked the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, arguing that properties alleged to belong to him could not be treated as his for recovery under section 226(3) or Rule 83 of the Income Tax Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Chittor Electric Supply Corpn., 1995 (2) SCC 430 Interpretation of Section 240 (refund on appeal) and related refund/interest provisions (and the obligation to refund without a claim). The Court noted the holding and observed the impugned judgment was silent on this point; Section 240 was central to the court's assessment that the refund could not legally have been ordered without regard to the proviso.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Vinod Kumar, AIR 1987 SC 1260 Abuse of process where injunctions/orders are obtained in a forum to gain undeserved advantage (parallel proceedings/injunctions in other fora). Used to illustrate that obtaining relief in an inconvenient forum while parallel proceedings exist can amount to an abuse of process; relevant to the court's criticism of parallel proceedings before Kohima and Delhi.
K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand, 1994 (6) SCC 620 Equitable requirement that a writ petitioner must approach the Court with "clean hands" (ethical/equitable constraints on writ relief). Quoted to reinforce the proposition that equitable relief under Article 226 requires clean hands and clean objectives; relevant to the court's assessment of conduct in seeking parallel remedies.
J.H. Patel v. Subhan Khan, 1996 (5) SCC 312 Reiteration that a person who does not approach the Court with clean hands cannot seek equity. Referred to underscore the Court's equitable approach and to support the decision to deny the refund ordered by the Single Judge in light of procedural conduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined its review primarily to the legality of the refund order made by the learned Single Judge, deliberately refraining from re-examining the underlying factual allegations (for example, the benami issue or the merits of undisclosed incomes) so as not to prejudice either party.

The Court began by examining the impugned judgment's structure and holdings: the Single Judge allowed the writ petition and ordered the refund of Rs. 8,41,142.85 with interest at 18% on the basis that allowing adjustment of that sum against present assessments would not be fair and reasonable because assessments for certain periods had been set aside and recovery was held to be bad for those periods.

The Court then turned to the statutory provision central to the appeal — Section 240 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 — which the Court quoted and summarized: Section 240 obliges the Assessing Officer to refund amounts that become due to the assessee as a result of appellate or other proceedings, but the proviso (a) provides that where an assessment is set aside and a fresh assessment is directed, any refund becomes due only on making such fresh assessment.

On a plain reading of Section 240 (and without delving into other factual matters), the Court concluded that no refund could lawfully have been ordered in the circumstances: where assessments have been set aside and directions for fresh assessment exist, the proviso prevents a refund becoming due until fresh assessment is made. The Court emphasized that the impugned judgment did not engage with this statutory constraint and was silent on the authority of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Chittor Electric Supply Corpn. addressing Section 240 and related refund obligations.

The Court also criticized the co-existence of parallel proceedings: the petitioner had pursued both an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) at New Delhi and a writ petition at the Kohima Bench, with interim orders granted in both, and the impugned judgment failed to account for this procedural posture. The Court relied on precedents holding that obtaining injunctive relief or parallel orders in different forums to gain an undeserved advantage can amount to an abuse of process.

The Court invoked equitable principles relevant to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, citing authorities that a writ petitioner seeking equitable relief must come with "clean hands." The Court used these principles to underscore the impropriety of allowing parallel, potentially conflicting proceedings to determine the substantive tax liabilities while simultaneously obtaining a refund order.

Having restricted itself to the statutory question of refund and having found that Section 240 (and relevant precedents) disallowed the refund in the posture presented, the Court refrained from adjudicating the benami/contentious factual issues and proceeded to set aside the Single Judge's order solely on the statutory ground.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment ordering refund was quashed.

Direct consequences for the parties: the Single Judge's order directing refund of Rs. 8,41,142.85 with interest at 18% is set aside; the respondent (writ petitioner) will not receive the refund ordered by the Single Judge pursuant to that judgment. The Court expressly confined its decision to the refund issue under Section 240 and did not adjudicate the underlying factual allegations (such as benami transactions or the correctness of assessments).

Broader implications: the opinion limits itself to statutory interpretation of Section 240 and process-related equitable considerations; it does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond applying existing statutory provisions and cited Supreme Court authorities. No order as to costs was made.

    Income Tax Officer, Dimapur v. S.S.Ahluwalia

    V.D. GYANI, C.J.

    (1.) This Writ Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 9.5.94 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 92 (K)/91, thereby allowing the Writ petition filed by the Writ petitioner-respondent who was at the material time Chief Secretary to the GOvt. of Nagaland, directing the respondent-appellant herein to refund an amount of Rs. 8,41,142.86 Paise with interest at the rate of 18% per annum within one month from the date of receipt of the order Aggrieved by the same the Income Taa Officer, Dimapur has come in appeal.

    (2.) Few basic facts may now be noted The Writ petitioner respondent was a Member of the Indian Administrative Service, Nagaland Cadre, mostly posted in Nagaland except for a short period from July, 1978 to March, 1984 when he was on deputation to the Ministry of Home Affaris, Govt. of India, New Delhi. He retired as Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Nagaland. The petitioner used to submit his Income-Tax Return with the I.T.O., Dimapur right from 1970-71 to 1978-79 but for the period 1979-80 to 1983-84 while he was posted at Delhi he submitted his return to the I.T.O., New Delhi. Again for the subsequent years 1984-85 onwards the Returns were filed with the I.T.O., Dimapur. Till the assessment years 1990-91 when he was informed by the I.T.O. that the Income-Tax record was required to be transferred to New Delhi, his permanent place of posting, the Writ petitioner did raise an objection to the proposed transfer. A notice u/s 127 of the Income Tax Act was issued to the writ petitioner stating, inter alia, that the Returns filed by him were required to be transferred to the Commissioner, Investigation Circle, New Delhi which being the permanent place of appointment of the Writ petitioner, who objected to the same on the ground that the transfer of jurisdiction for the purposes of administrative convenience was wholly unjustified and untenable in law. Overrulling the objection the record was transferred to New Delhi vide order dated 15.3.90 to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Investigation Circle 8(1), New Delhi, who made an assessment u/s 127(1) of the Income Tax Act. It was against this assessment order that the writ petitioner filed a writ petition being Civil Rule No. 7(K)/91 in the Kohima Bench of this Court. By an interim order passed by the Kohima Bench, the assessment for the year 1975-76, 1976-77, 1980-81 were stayed.

    (3.) The Writ petition registered as Civil Rule No. 92(K)/91 was filed by the writ petitioner-respondent challenging the proceeding initiated by the Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Investigation Circle, 8(1) New Delhi and had completed assessment in respect of the assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88. It may be noted that in respect of these assessment years the writ petitioner had filed returns at Dimapur. The Writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), New Delhi against the notice dated 23.3.88 issued by the Assistant Income Tax Commissioner for initiating the assessmant proceedings. The writ petitioner also averned that a notice under Rule 83 of the Income Tax Rule in respect of the alleged arrears outstanding demand amounting to Rs. 1,40,77,276/- in respect of assessment years 1985-86 to 1987-88 was also served upon him, he therefore prayed for stay of recovery proceedings which was rejected. It was his pleaded case that the immovable properties included in the assessment year for the above years 1985-86 to 1987-88 in fact belongs to other relations of the petitioner.

    (4.) The writ petitioner sought the following reliefs :

    "(a) quashing the assessments as framed by Respondent No. 4 for the assessment years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-89; (b) prohibiting the Respondent No. 4 and 5 from taking any action for recovery of any amount relating to the assessment years 1985-86,1986-87 and 1987-88; (c) directing the respondent Nos, 4 and 5 to refund the amount recovered, amounting to Rs. 8,41,143/- and any other amounts recovered thereafter along with interest at the rate of 18% as provided under the Income Tax Act; (d) prohibiting the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 from taking any action of recovery in respect of the alleged outstanding demands against the petitioner for the assessment years 1985-86 to 1987-88 from his relatives and as a whole from the petitioner; (e) directing the Income-Tax authorities to hold the properties standing in the names of relatives of the petitioner was belonging to them, and not to the petitioner; and (f) rental income from properties belonging to the relatives of the petitioners attached under Section 181-B be held as invalid and the attachment orders be quashed"
    .

    (5.) It was the appellant's case that the writ petitioner who had filed his returns for the assessment years 1979-80 to 1983-84 with I.T.O., New Delhi and was assessed accordingly, the writ petitioner himself had submitted the returns and there was no question of jurisdiction of the I.T.O., New Delhi. The old assessment records of the petitioner were required to be transferred to the I.T.O., New Delhi as per order of the Central Board of Direct Taxes contained in Memo No. 739/FN 338/66/86 IT(3) dt. 19.12.86. As for assessment year 1984-85 the petitioner defaulted in filing returns at New Delhi, hence a notice u/s 148 of the I.T. Act was issued requiring him to filing his return for the year 1984-85 and likewise he defaulted in the subsequent years 1985-86 resulting in another notice u/s 139(2) of the Act calling upon the writ petitioner to file its return for the income at New Delhi for the said year. For the year 1984-85 the writ petitioner had filed its returns of his income as noted above and he was assessed summarily but this assessment was without jurisdiction because the I.T.O. at New Delhi was not divested of his jurisdiction and the orders passed by the Officer at Dimapur were non est. It was for this reason that the writ petitioner's case was taken up for special scrutiny and the jurisdiction was transferred by Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, Proceedings for assessment years 1975-76 and 1988-89 were stayed by the High Court. As such, this assessment could not be completed. Similarly the Kohima Bench of this Court by order dated 4.7.91 directed the I.T.O., Dimapur not to transfer the returns for the assessment years 1989-90 onwards to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Investigation Circle, 8(1) New Delhi. The assessmenl proceedings for the year 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1987-88 were completed in March, 1996 which resulted in huge additions to the total income of the writ petitioner for these three years on the basis of enquiries conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Income Tax Department. For these three years, the pecuniary resources of the writ petitioner and the outstanding against the petitioner exceeded Rs. 1,40,00,000/-. The writ petitioner was found in possession of the pecuniary resources and properties wholly disproportionate to his known source of income and had no satisfactory account. The department therefore had to take recourse to Section 223(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to recover the outstanding demands against the petitioner. It was also found that the properties stated to be belonging to the relatives of the writ petitioner were in fact properties held and owned by the writ petitioner himself which he had acquired out of his undisclosed sources of income. The appellant's case before the learned Single Judge was that u/s 245 of the Income Tax Act, the refund, as ordered by the learned Single Judge, was not in fact due.

    (6.) Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner respondent, on the other hand, contended that firstly Section 245 of the Act was not pressed into service before the learned Single Judge and secondly the assessment in respect of the assessment years 1985-86 and 1987-88 passed, were set aside by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) vide order dated 26.2.93, filed as Annexure-I to the counter affidavit filed by the writ petitioner-respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant stated at the Bar that even the subsequent assessment orders passed in respect of the above three assessment years has again been set aside by an order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) some time in the month of March, 1997, the learned counsel was not aware of the exact date.

    (7.) Mr. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that in any view of the matter, in face of the outstanding demands against the writ petitioner-respondent the impugned order of refund as passed by the learned Single Judge is wholly untenable in law.

    (8.) We have gone through the impugned judgment. Going through the same it would be seen that it begins with the relief sought by the writ petitioner-respondent. They are set out in the first paragraph of the impugned judgment, paragraph 2 takes note of the subsequent change. In the circumstances, the order dated 26.2.93 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) rendered as redundant some of the reliefs sought by the writ petitioner. Paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment takes note of the main reliefs sought by the writ petitioner at the time of final hearing which resulted to the refund of Rs. 8,41,143/- with interests @ 18% per annum. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are the rival contentions and submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and paragraph 6 is the finding while paragraph 7 is the operative part of the impugned judgment which are also quoted below for ready reference :

    "6. Upon perusal of the pleadings and upon hearing learned counsel of both sides, I am of the view that to allow adjustment of the sum of Rs. 8,41,142,85 p. recovered from the petitioner against the present assessment will not be fair and reasonable inasmuch as the asessments made for the period in question has already been set aside by the learned Central Incomes Tax Tribunal and consequently the recovery becomes bad for the said period. At the same time assessments are for different periods. Further since the recovery has been held to be bad, it appears to allow this money to be held by the Department will not be in the best interest of justice. 7. In the result, in the light of the facts and circumstances that I have narrated above on the basis of record and submissions made on behalf of the parties, this petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to refund the amount on Rs. 8,41,142.85 p. (Rupees eight lakhs forty one thousand one hundred forty two Paisa eighty five) only with interest at the rate of 18%. This shall be done within one month from the date of receipt of this order."

    (9.) As was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the allegations made against the respondent are disputed, they are not the concluded facts, we are not going by those facts. We have confined ourselves to the statutory requirement of law, as contemplated by Section 240 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, where the refund as ordered by the learned single Judge is sustainable in face of Section 240, which reads as follows :

    "Refund on appeal, etc. - Where, as a result of any order passed in appeal or other proceeding under this Act, refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee, the Assessing Officer shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act, refund the amount to the assessee without his having to make any claim in that behalf : Provided that where, by the order aforesaid, - (a) an assessment is set aside or cancelled and and order of fresh assessment is directed to be made, the refund, if any, shall become due only on the making of such fresh assessment; (b) the assessment is annulled, the refund shall become due only of the amount, if any, of the tax paid in excess of the tax chargeable, on the total income returned by the assessee."

    (10.) On mere reading of this section, without going into any other factual aspects of the case, no refund could have been legally ordered.

    (11.) No doubt, it was strenuously urged and contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that in view of the fact that the Commissioner, CIT (Appeals) had set aside the assessment orders for the years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88, coupled with the fact that the same learned Single Judge in yet another Writ petition being Civil Rule No. 7(k)/91 by his judgment and order dated 15.7.93 (Annexure-2 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent) having quashed the transfer of jurisdiction as regards assessment of writ petitioner's income from Dimapur to New Delhi, there was not the slightest chance or remotest scope for any further or fresh assesment order being passed under the law. He therefore urged that the refund as ordered by the learned Single Judge is wholly justified and does not call for any interference.

    (12.) The Supreme Court in one of its recent judgment as reported in CIT Vs. Chittor Electric Supply Corpn., 1995 (2) SCC 430, dealing with Section 240 of the Act and the proviso to clause (a) has held as follows :

    "Section 240 says that where as a result of any appellate or other order passed under the Act any amount becomes due to the assessee the Assessing Officer shall have to refund it even without the assessee making a claim therefor, Section 244,(1), which carries forward the idea contained in Section 240, says that where a refund is due to the assessee pursuant to an order referred to in Section 240 and the Assessing Officer does not grant the refund within a period of three months from the end of the month in which said order is passed, the Central Government shall pay to the assessee interest on the amount of refund from the date immediately following the expiry of the period of three months till the date on which refund is granted at the prescribed rate."
    It is significant to note that the impugned judgment is silent on this point. Similarly, it may also be noted that the impugned judgment, even while taking note of the subsequent development, set aside the assessment for the years 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 by the CIT (Appeals) vide order dated 26.2.93. There is absolutely no reference to the judgment dated-15.7.93 delivered in Civil Rule No. 7(K)/91, in fact it was the pleaded case of the petitioner that there is much force in the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel for the Department that the writ petitioner was simultaneously pursuing both the remedies, while the appeal was filed before the Commissioner, Income Tax (Appeals) at New Delhi, the writ petition was filed at Kohima. While it is not to suggest any suppression of facts, it was for the Court to see that two parallel proceedings are not allowed to go simultaneously. In the instant case, not only two parallel proceedings were allowed to continue, even interim stay orders were passed.

    (13.) We are not going into the question of jurisdiction for assessment at the moment. Our primary concern is the filing of a writ petition at Kohima Bench by the respondent-writ petitioner, who challenged the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Investigation Circle. The petition could well have been filed at Delhi as well but that was not to be for obvious reasons. The Apex Court in a similar situation where injunctions order were obtained from the Calcutta High Court in respect of goods lying in the godowns at Madras, in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Vinod Kumar, AIR 1987 SC 1260, held it to be an abuse of the process of the Court by gaining an undeserved advantage.

    (14.) The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is essentially an equitable jurisdiction and as has been pointed out by the Apex Court in one of its recent pronouncement in K.R. Srinivas Vs. R.M. Premchand, 1994 (6) SCC 620-

    "A writ petitioner must come not only with clean hands, but must come with a clean heart, clean mind and a clean objective while coming to Court for relief in public interest litigation."

    (15.) In the same vein in J.H. Patel Vs. Subhan Khan, 1996 (5) SCC 312, it has been highlighted that a person who does not approach the Court with clean hand can not seek equity.

    (16.) It was argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent writ petitioner that in view of the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 the writ petitioner-respondent can not be treated as the owner and no recovery of the alleged outstanding demands pertaining to him could be legally made u/s 226(3) or under Rule 83 of Che Income Tax Act.

    (17.) As we have indicated above, we are restricting ourselves to the question of refund as ordered by the learned Single Judge, we deliberately refrain from any further probing of facts as regards 'benami' nature of transactions, lest it prejudices either party.

    (18.) In view of the foregoing discussions, this appeal deserves to be allowed. The impugned judgment in face of statutory provisions of Section 240 of the Income Tax Act cannot be sustained in law, it is liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. Appeal allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Income Tax Officer, Dimapur v. S.S.Ahluwalia
    (Apr 7, 1997)