Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gauhati High Court)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Smti Purnima Barua, filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of Habeas Corpus and compensation, complaining that the arrest and detention of her son, Dipanka Barua, were unlawful.

Relevant factual matrix as presented in the opinion:

  • On receipt of information that Dipanka was an ULFA activist, army personnel visited the petitioner's house in Jorhat and enquired about him. The petitioner stated Dipanka was in Guwahati in connection with his sister's marriage.
  • Army authorities searched Swapnalee's house at Ulubari in Guwahati and arrested Dipanka there on 31.12.1990, at about 2:00 pm, in the presence of an Executive Magistrate.
  • After the arrest, the army authority handed Dipanka over to the civil police at Jorhat. There was a factual dispute about the date of handing over: the army's affidavit asserted 2.1.91, while the State of Assam's affidavit stated 4.1.91.
  • Dipanka was produced before the Magistrate at Jorhat as directed by the Court, and was produced on 7.1.91 for that purpose.
  • The petitioner’s counsel did not press for habeas corpus relief because Dipanka had been arrested by the civil police in a regular case and was then an under-trial prisoner; instead, monetary compensation was sought on the ground of wrongful detention by the army authority.
  • The Central Government had declared the whole of Assam a “disturbed area” under section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1952 by notification dated 27.11.90, following which the armed forces were used in aid of civil power.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the army's arrest and subsequent detention of Dipanka complied with the requirement of section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1952 that an arrested person be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station "with the least possible delay".
  2. What is the meaning and temporal scope of the phrase "least possible delay" in section 5 of the Act, and whether the facts of this case satisfy that requirement.
  3. Whether the petitioner (through Dipanka) is entitled to monetary compensation for wrongful detention resulting from non-compliance with section 5 of the Act and invasion of Constitutional and legal rights, and if so, what amount is appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. H. Roy)

  • The petitioner did not seek a writ of habeas corpus because Dipanka was in the custody of the civil police in connection with a regular police case and was an under-trial prisoner; reliance was placed on Saptawana v. State of Assam.
  • The petitioner sought monetary compensation on the ground that the army authority had detained Dipanka wrongfully by not complying with the statutory requirement to hand him over with the least possible delay.

State / Respondent's Arguments (Mr. M. A. Laskar, Additional Advocate General)

  • If monetary compensation were awarded at this stage it would be premature and could prejudice or affect the ongoing investigation or trial.
  • The precedents relied upon by the petitioner (e.g., Rudul Sah; Bhim Singh) would not apply because there was no allegation that Dipanka's detention was with mischievous or malicious intent; therefore, compensation under those authorities should not be awarded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Saptawana v. State of Assam ((1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813) Authority for not seeking habeas corpus where the arrested person is in custody of civil police in connection with a regular police case (practical approach). The Court agreed with the petitioner's counsel's decision not to press for habeas corpus because Dipanka had been taken into civil police custody and was an under-trial prisoner.
Savitramma v. Civil Naronha (1988 Supp SCC 655 : AIR 1988 SC 1987) Explains the purpose of verification of affidavits (Rule 27): to enable the court to decide whether it is safe to act on affidavit evidence and to distinguish what is based on personal knowledge versus information and belief. The Court relied on Savitramma to stress that Rule 27 must be complied with and to reject slipshod verification in the army authority's affidavit where statements rested on documents but were not properly verified.
State of Bombay v. Purushottam (AIR 1952 SC 317) Warns that slipshod verification of affidavits may lead to their rejection. The Court invoked this authority to support the proposition that imprecise verification may render affidavit statements unreliable and, in this case, justified rejecting the army's asserted handing-over date claimed to be based on records.
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar ((1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086) Confirms that the Supreme Court can award monetary compensation for deprivation of fundamental rights, and sets an example of compensation awarded for prolonged wrongful incarceration. The Court cited Rudul Sah as authority that compensation can be awarded by superior courts for deprivation of fundamental rights and used it to support granting monetary relief here as a palliative.
Bhim Singh v. State of J&K ((1985) 4 SCC 677 : AIR 1986 SC 494) Holds that detention without magistrate order and violation of Articles 21 and 22(2) can constitute a gross violation of constitutional rights and that courts may award compensation in appropriate cases. Relied upon to reinforce that compensation is an available remedy where constitutional and legal rights (Articles 21 and 22(2)) are infringed by unlawful detention.
Khatri v. State of Bihar ((1981) 1 SCC 627 : AIR 1981 SC 928) Highlights irregularities in producing accused before a Magistrate and detaining persons without remand orders; urges strict compliance with constitutional safeguards. Referred to as part of the jurisprudence showing courts' concern about procedural safeguards and the State's duty to prevent illegal detention; used to underline that violations attract judicial scrutiny.
Civil Liberties v. P.L. Kukrety ((1988) 2 GLR 137 (DB)) Local precedent where this Court awarded compensation for detention in violation of section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The Court cited this local decision as a similar instance where compensation was awarded for breach of section 5, supporting the present award.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, applying statutory text, evidentiary rules, and precedent:

  1. Statutory framework and initial legal question:

    Section 4 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act authorises arrest in a "disturbed area"; section 5 mandates that any person arrested under the Act "shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay" along with a report of the circumstances.

    The critical legal issue was the meaning and temporal scope of "least possible delay" and whether the army's conduct met that statutory standard.

  2. Interpretation of "least possible delay":

    The Court held that "least possible delay" means doing the act within the shortest possible time compatible with circumstances; no rigid temporal limit can be universally prescribed. The appropriate standard is factual and depends on the circumstances (e.g., how and where the arrest was effected, physical impossibilities, distance to nearest police station).

  3. Assessment of facts and distances:

    Dipanka was arrested on 31.12.90 at Ulubari, Guwahati. There are police stations within about 10 km of Ulubari (nearest at Paltanbazar). Instead of handing him to a nearby police station, the army took Dipanka to Jorhat (about 300 km away), stating he was required for Jorhat cases. Whether that transfer and delay were consistent with "least possible delay" became the factual focal point.

  4. Evaluation of evidentiary material and verification requirement:

    The army authority's affidavit asserted handing over on 2.1.91, while the State's affidavit said 4.1.91. The army deponent's affidavit contained statements (paras 7 and 8) said to be "matters of records," but the affidavit's verification language did not conform to Rule 27 of the Gauhati High Court Rules because the deponent failed to state his information or belief as to the truth of facts disclosed in documents said to underlie those statements.

    The Court relied on Savitramma and State of Bombay v. Purushottam to stress the importance of proper verification and warned that slipshod verification may lead to rejection of those parts of an affidavit. No supporting document was produced for the army's asserted 2.1.91 handing-over date; accordingly, the Court rejected the army's 2.1.91 claim as unreliable.

  5. Factual conclusion on the handing-over date and delay:

    Given the defective verification and lack of documentary proof, the Court concluded that Dipanka was in fact handed over to the civil police at Jorhat on 4.1.91. The Court found a delay of at least two days between arrest (31.12.90) and handing over (4.1.91), which constituted non-compliance with section 5 of the Act under the circumstances of the case.

  6. Legal consequences of non-compliance:

    The Court concluded that violation of section 5 not only amounted to wrongful detention but also amounted to infringement of constitutional and legal rights. The Court invoked authorities (Rudul Sah, Bhim Singh, Khatri) to show that superior courts can award monetary compensation as a remedy for deprivation of fundamental rights and procedural violations, and that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant such relief in appropriate cases.

  7. Response to State's objections and determination on compensation:

    The Court addressed the State's contention that awarding compensation at this stage would prejudice investigation/trial, finding that compensation as a palliative for the initial arrest/detention by the army would not cause prejudice. The Court also accepted that there was no allegation of malicious intent but reasoned that judicial review permits relief for illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety; here, procedural non-compliance and invasion of rights justified a palliative monetary award.

  8. Quantum of compensation:

    Taking into account counsel's submissions and the facts, the Court considered a nominal amount sufficient to meet the ends of justice and awarded Rs. 200 to Dipanka as monetary compensation in the nature of a palliative.

  9. Directions:

    The Court directed respondents to ensure that in future no such violations of constitutional or legal rights are committed by army personnel.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is partly allowed and disposed of. The Court concluded that there was non-compliance with section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act because Dipanka was handed over to the civil police on 4.1.91 (not 2.1.91 as claimed), amounting to at least a two-day delay from his arrest on 31.12.90. As a consequence of that wrongful detention and the infringement of constitutional and legal rights, the respondents were directed to pay Rs. 200 to Dipanka as compensation.

Other immediate orders and practical consequences:

  • The respondents are to pay a sum of Rs. 200 to Dipanka as a palliative monetary compensation.
  • The Court directed the authorities to ensure that in future no violations of constitutional or legal rights by army personnel occur.
  • No costs were awarded.

Broader legal implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court reaffirmed that violation of section 5 of the Act can amount to wrongful detention and infringement of constitutional rights and that High Courts, in suitable cases, have jurisdiction under Article 226 to award monetary compensation as consequential relief for deprivation of fundamental rights (as illustrated by the cited precedents).
  • The decision applies existing precedent and principles (Rudul Sah, Bhim Singh, Khatri, and local authority Civil Liberties v. P.L. Kukrety) rather than purporting to lay down a new legal doctrine. The award in this case is modest and characterized by the Court as a palliative for procedural breach rather than a comprehensive damages determination.

This summary strictly reflects the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences that are not present in the original text.

    Smti. Purnima Barua v. Union Of India & Ors.

    Manisana, J.:— In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Smti Purnima Barua complains that the arrest and detention of her son Dipanka Barua are unlawful and prays for a writ of Habeas Corpus and compensation.

    2. Facts.—On receipt of reliable information that Dipanka is an ULFA activist, the army authority went to the house of the petitioner Purnima at Jorhat and enquired about her son Dipanka. The petitioner informed the army authority that her son Dipanka had gone to Guwahati in connection with marriage of his elder sister Swapnalee. The army authority searched the house of Swapnalee at Ulubari in Guwahati on 31.12.90 at about 2.00 pm accompanied by an Executive Magistrate and the army authority arrested Dipanka therefrom. After arrest of Dipanka on 31.12.90, the army authority made over Dipanka to the police station at Jorhat. The Jorhat police produced Dipanka before the Magistrate at Jorhat for remand order. As directed by this Court in this application Dipanka was produced on 7.1.91 It may be noted here that the date of handing over Dipanka to Jorhat police is in dispute. We shall deal with it later in this judgment.

    3. Mr. H. Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the course of the argument, has not sought the writ of habeas corpus as Dipanka has been arrested by the civil police in connection with regular police case and he is now under trial prisoner. We are of the view that the learned counsel has rightly done so in view of the decision in Saptawana v. State of Assam, (1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813. However, the learned counsel has prayed for monetary compensation stating that the army authority detained Dipanka wrongfully.

    4. The Central Government was of the opinion that the whole of the State of Assam was in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of civil power was necessary and, therefore, the Central Government in the exercise of power conferred upon it by section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1952 (For short ‘the Act’) declared the whole of the State of Assam a disturbed area by issuing a notification dated 27.11.90 in the official gazette. After the declaration, the armed forces have been used or deployed in aid of civil power.

    5. In a disturbed area, section 4 of the Act authorises army authority to arrest, or to search and arrest, arrestable persons. Section 5 of the Act provides;

    “Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest.”

    (emphasis added)

    The power of the army authority given by section 4 of the Act to arrest person implies the authority to detain, but the army authority shall make over the arrested person to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with least possible delay, as provided under section 5.

    6. The question then is.—What is the span of time, which is designated by the words “least possible delay”? We are of the view that the words “least possible delay” may be said to do the thing within the shortest possible time. But no arbitrary time limit can be set down as it may not be possible in many cases to affirmatively say or quantify the period of time by reference to hours, dates or months. However, it will be possible having regard to the circumstances of the case, to say whether thing was done or was not done with “least possible delay”. Therefore, whenever the question of “least possible delay” arises for decision in computing the period of time the Court has to have regard to the particular circumstances of the case—Physical impossibility or otherwise to make over the arrested person to the nearest police station, and how, where and in what circumstances the arrest was effected, for example.

    7. Coming to the present case, admittedly Shri Dipanka Barua was arrested from Ulubari of Guwahati city on 31.12.90 There are police stations within 10 km from Ulubari in Guwahati. Although the nearest police station is at Paltanbazar, the army authority had taken Dipanka to Jorhat, which is about 300 km away from the place of arrest (Ulubari), on the ground that he was required in connection with Jorhat police station cases and he was to be treated to have been arrested in connection with the pending cases against him. Even if the explanation given by the army authority with respect to the handing over of Dipanka to Jorhat police station is accepted, a question arises whether it was within the meaning of “least possible delay”. In paras 7 and 8 of the affidavit of the army authority, it is stated that Dipanka was handed over to the officer in charge Jorhat police station on 2.1.91 whereas in the affidavit of the State of Assam, it is stated that the army authority handed over Dipanka on 4.1.91 to the civil police and police arrested him in connection with Jorhat PS case No. 815 of 1990 under sections 3 and 4 of TADA(P) Act and on the same day he was forwarded to the Magistrate for remand order.

    8. The question is whether Dipanka was made over on 2.1.91 or 4.1.91 to the civil police at Jorhat. The affidavit of the army authority is verified thus—

    “10. That the statements made in this affidavit and in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 9 are true to my knowledge, those made in paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 being matters of records of the case are true to my information derived there from which I believe to be true and the rests are my humble submissions before this Hon'ble Court.”.

    (emphasis added)

    The above verification indicates that the statement made in paras 7 and 8 is matter of records. Rule 27 of the Gauhati High Court Rules provides that when the statement rests on the facts disclosed in the documents, the deponent shall state, inter alia, his information or belief as to truth of the facts disclosed in such documents. But the deponent has not stated about his information or belief of the truth of the facts disclosed in the document. In this Court evidence in support of the statements contained in the writ petition and other miscellaneous matters, is accepted in the form of affidavit filed by the parties concerned. It is therefore necessary that the rule 27 of the High Court Rules should be complied with. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Savitramma v. Civil Naronha, 1988 Supp SCC 655 : AIR 1988 SC 1987, we are of the view that the purpose underlying rule 27 is to enable the Court to find out as to whether it would be safe to act on such evidence and to enable the Court to know as to what facts are based in the affidavit on the basis of personal knowledge, information and belief as this is relevant for the purpose of appreciating the evidence placed before the Court, in the form of affidavit. The importance of verification has to be judged by the purpose for which it is required it is oily on the basis of verification, it is possible to decide the genuineness and authenticity of the allegations and the deponent can be held responsible for the allegations made in the affidavit. In State of Bombay v. Purushottam, AIR 1952 SC 317, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has held that slipshod verification of affidavits may lead to their rejection.

    9. The affidavit of the army authority discloses that the deponent was not the person who handed over Dipanka to the civil police at Jorhat, and that he had no personal knowledge of making over Dipanka to civil police, and as such, his statement rests on document. No document has been produced to support his statements made in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the affidavit. As already stated, the deponent has not stated in the statements made in paragraphs 7 and 8 about his information or belief as to the truth of the facts disclosed in the document on which his statement rests. Therefore, the verification of the affidavit in so far as it relates to handing over Dipankd to the civil police on 2.1.91 is slipshod verification. That apart, the basic document on which statement rests has not been produced. In such a situation, the statement in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the affidavit relating to handing over of the accused to the police on 2.1.91 is to be rejected, and we conclude that Dipanka was handed over on 4.1.91 to the civil police at Jorhat. The affidavit of the army authority implies that if the accused was banded over on 2.1.91 it will be within the meaning of “least possible delay” and that if Dipanka was banded over on 4.1.91 it would not be within the meaning of “least possible delay”. That is why it is stated in the affidavit that Dipanka was made over to the civil police on 2.1.91 The army authority has not given any other explanation other than that stated above. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that there was a delay of at least 2 (two) days. In that view of the matter, there was non-compliance with provisions of section; 5 of the Act, and as a result of it, the Constitutional and legal rights of Dipanka had been infringed.

    10. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086, the petitioner was in jail for more than 14 years after he was acquitted by the Court of Session Majjafarpur. The Supreme Court, after Holding that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction winder Article 32 can pass an order for payment of money in the nature of compensation consequential upon deprivation of fundamental right, awarded a sum of Rs. 30,000/- in addition to the sum of Rs. 5000/- already paid by the Government as an interim measure in the nature of a palliative with an observation that the order will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a suit to recover appropriate damages from the State and its erring officials.

    11. In Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, (1985) 4 SCC 677 : AIR 1986 SC 494, the petitioner Bhim Singh was detained in police lock-up for 4 days without order of a Magistrate. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that it was a gross violation of Bhim Singh's constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) and that when a person comes with a complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases, the Court has the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation. In that case a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded.

    12. In Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627 : AIR 1981 SC 928 there was two irregularities. First, in a few cases the accused persons were not produced before the Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of their arrest as required by Article 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not wish to express any definite opinion in regard to those irregularity but the Supreme Court strongly urged upon the State and its police authorities to see that the constitutional and legal requirement to produce an arrested person before a Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest must be scrupulously observed. Secondly, some of the prisoners were detained in jail without any remand orders being passed by a Judicial Magistrate. The Supreme Court observed that it was plainly contrary to law and it was difficult to understand how the State continued to detain those accused persons in jail without any remand order. In that case, the Supreme Court directed the State Government to enquire as to how the irregularity was allowed to be perpetrated and would see to it that in future no such violation of law are permitted to be committed by the administrators of law.

    13. In view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is concluded that violation of section 5 of the Act will not only amount to wrongful detention but also violation of Constitutional and legal rights. Compensation can be awarded by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in appropriate cases, or, where detention is with mischievous and malicious intent. The High Court can also direct the authorities concerned to see that in future no constitutional and/or legal rights of the citizens be infringed.

    14. Mr. M.A Laskar, the learned Additional Advocate General Assam has contended that, if monetary compensation is awarded, it will be premature and it will affect the investigation or trial. We are concerned with initial arrest and detention of Dipanka by the army authority before he was handed over to the civil police. In that view of the matter, no prejudice shall cause, if any monetary compensation in the nature of palliative is awarded, to the investigation or trial.

    15. Mr. Laskar has further contended that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rudul Sah, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 and Bhim Singh, (1985) 4 SCC 677 : AIR 1986 SC 494 would not be applicable to the present case as the detention was not with mischievous and or malicious intent. There is no allegation that Dipanka was detained with mischievous or malicious intent. In the absence of it, we shall presume that the detention was not with mischievous and malicious intent. But the judicial review has developed to a stage today. There are many heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. Some of them are ‘illegality,’ ‘irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’. We have already concluded that the detention of Dipanka by the army authority was wrongful at least for two days and Dipanka's fundamental and legal rights have been invaded. On the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the present is an appropriate case where monetary compensation in the nature of a palliative should be awarded. In a similar case where detention was in violation of section 5 of the Act, this Court also awarded compensation (see the Civil Liberties v. P.L Kukrety, (1988) 2 GLR 137 (DB)).

    16. The question which arises for consideration is what would be the amount of compensation to be awarded. Mr. Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that if compensation is to be awarded he will have no grievance as to the amount of compensation. Considering the submission of Mr. Roy and the facts and circumstances of the case, if we award a nominal amount of Rs. 200/- it would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, it is ordered and directed that the respondents shall pay a sum of Rs. 200/- to Dipanka. It is further ordered and directed that the respondents shall see that in future no such violation of Constitutional or legal rights of citizens are permitted to be committed by the army personnel.

    17. With the aforesaid observations and direction the petition is partly allowed and disposed. No costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Smti. Purnima Barua v. Union Of India & Ors.
    (Mar 14, 1991)