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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Manisana, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Bacha Bora, filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of habeas corpus and compensation, complaining of the alleged illegal arrest and detention of his two sons: Rituraj Barua (aged 19) and Padmaraj Barua (aged 21).

The record as set out in the opinion indicates that:

  • Rituraj Barua was arrested by army personnel on 1.12.90 from his house at Tingrai within Digboi Police Station, Tinsukia district.
  • Padmaraj Barua was stated in one part of the record to have been arrested on 7.12.90 from Margherita in Tinsukia district (paragraph 1).
  • At another point in the judgment the court records that, "admittedly", the two were arrested on 1.12.90 and 2.12.90 respectively (paragraph 12). The opinion contains both formulations and does not resolve this discrepancy.
  • Army authority made over the two to Tinsukia Police Station on 16.12.90 and a criminal case (Tinsukia PS Case No. 389 of 1990) was registered on 16.12.90 under sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), alleging accomplice involvement in ULFA activities.
  • After formal arrest by civil police, the two were produced before the Additional District Magistrate on the same day for remand. The Additional District Magistrate transferred/renumbered the matter to Digboi Police Station as Case No. 200 of 1990. The two were produced before this Court on 21.12.90.

There are allegations that the army personnel assaulted and tortured the two after arrest; the army authority denied those allegations.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the initial arrest and detention by army personnel was illegal for failure to inform the arrested persons of the grounds of arrest, as required by clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether detention by the army personnel for a period of 15–16 days (as alleged) violated section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (referred to in the opinion as the Act) and thereby violated Article 21 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the detention by the civil police and the remand order were unlawful because the remand was made without production of the accused before the Magistrate (alleged violation of Article 21).
  4. Whether the two arrested persons are entitled to compensation for alleged assault and wrongful detention by the army personnel.
  5. At what point in time the legality of detention must be judged in habeas corpus proceedings (date of application, time of return, or date of hearing) and the consequences of that timing for the present petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri A.C. Borbora)

  • The initial arrest and detention by army authority was illegal because the arrested persons were not informed of the grounds of their arrest in breach of clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution.
  • The detention by army personnel for about 15–16 days contravened section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (the requirement to make over arrested persons to the nearest police station with the least possible delay), and thereby violated Article 21.
  • The remand order passed by the Magistrate and the subsequent detention by the civil police violated Article 21 because the remand order was made without production of the accused before the Magistrate.
  • The petitioners sought habeas corpus relief and monetary compensation for alleged assaults and wrongful detention by the army personnel.

Respondents' Position (State / Army / Union)

  • The army authority denied the allegations that the two were assaulted and tortured.
  • The Union's affidavit stated that the two were made over to the civil police on 16.12.90, about 6.25 p.m.; the affidavit and the State's records asserted that the two were produced before the Magistrate (supporting the validity of the remand).
  • The court noted that the affidavit of the Union was "modelled in such a casual manner" and that the records produced by the State show production before the Magistrate; the court also stated it would presume regularity of judicial and official acts in the absence of contrary proof.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 Held that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court should have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of institution of the proceedings. Used to support the proposition that legality at the time of return (or disposal) is a relevant point for habeas corpus consideration.
Ram Narayan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 Similar principle as Naranjan Singh: focus on legality at time of return rather than date of filing. Referred to as part of the line of authority establishing the "time of return" approach.
A.K. Gopalan v. Government of India, AIR 1986 SC 816 Held that in dealing with a petition for habeas corpus the Court has to see whether the detention on the date on which the application is made is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of application and the date of hearing. Referred to as articulating the "date of application" view among the tripartite approaches on timing.
Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1971) 3 SCC 118 : AIR 1971 SC 62 Held that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of hearing. Identified as supporting the "date of hearing" view on when legality must be assessed.
B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa, (1972) 3 SCC 256 : AIR 1971 SC 2197 Held that the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings (following Naranjan and Ram Narayan). Reinforces the "time of return" approach; cited in the discussion of the three views.
Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, (1974) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1974 SC 510 After reviewing earlier decisions, observed that the "time of return" approach appears in consonance with law and practice and has received the largest measure of approval in India, though the "date of hearing" view cannot be discarded as incorrect. Applied to explain the court's acceptance that the "time of return" view is the most persuasive among competing authorities.
Saptawna v. State of Assam, (1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813 Held that where initial arrest/detention by army was illegal but became lawful when the accused was subsequently arrested by civil police and produced before the Magistrate as an undertrial, the Court cannot order release by habeas corpus. Relied upon to justify that a subsequent lawful custody by civil police and production before Magistrate renders habeas corpus relief unavailable even if initial army arrest was illegal.
Civil Rule (HC) 3 of 1991 — Smti. Purnima Barua v. Union of India & Ors. Interpretation of the statutory phrase "least possible delay" in section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act: no fixed arbitrary time; assessment depends on circumstances and whether act was done within the shortest possible time given the facts. Quoted and reiterated by the court to frame its assessment of whether the making-over of arrested persons to police complied with "least possible delay".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several distinct steps, grounded in the cited authorities and the facts on record:

  1. The court identified three competing judicial approaches (from Supreme Court decisions) as to when the legality of detention should be assessed in habeas corpus proceedings:
    • on the date of application;
    • at the time of return (the time of the return to the writ); and
    • on the date of the hearing.
    The court observed that the "time of return" approach has received the largest measure of approval, although the "date of hearing" approach is also relevant in some circumstances (drawing on Kanu Sanyal and earlier cases).
  2. Applying those principles to the present facts, the court noted the procedural timeline: the application was filed on 17.12.90, and the army had made over the two arrested persons to the civil police on 16.12.90. The civil police then registered the FIR and formally arrested/produced the accused before the Magistrate for remand.
  3. Because the two were in civil custody and were produced before the Magistrate as undertrial prisoners, the court reasoned that the crucial inquiry for habeas corpus was whether the remand order itself was illegal. The petitioner contended the remand was ordered without production; the Union's affidavit suggested the making-over occurred after court hours (about 6.25 p.m.), which could support the contention.
  4. The court examined the State's records, which showed production before the Magistrate, and stated a presumption that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. On that basis the court rejected the petitioner's contention that production had not occurred and concluded that the detention had become lawful upon arrest/production by civil police. Consequently, the remedy of habeas corpus was rendered infructuous in relation to release.
  5. Separately, the court turned to the claim for wrongful detention and physical assault. It applied the statutory requirement in section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act that a person arrested by army authority be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station "with least possible delay." The court reiterated its prior interpretation of "least possible delay" (from Civil Rule (HC) 3 of 1991) that no arbitrary temporal limit can be fixed and the question must be decided by reference to the circumstances of each case.
  6. Factual findings relevant to that analysis included: (a) the two were arrested by army authority on early December dates but were not made over to the civil police at Tinsukia until 16.12.90; (b) the nearest police station was Digboi, yet they were made over to Tinsukia; and (c) there was no satisfactory explanation in the Union's affidavit for the more-than-two-week interval between arrest and making-over. The court therefore concluded that the making-over did not occur with "least possible delay" and that the detention in army custody therefore violated section 5 of the Act and the constitutional rights of the arrested persons.
  7. Regarding the allegation of assault, the court ordered medical examinations. The medical reports (made on 21.12.90) documented simple injuries consistent with blunt force (haematoma, tenderness, scars) and noted some referrals for further specialist examination; the age of the injuries was not specified. The court observed there was a definite assertion of assault and that the Union's affidavit was casual, but the medical reports did not specify timing of injuries.
  8. Exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, the court considered whether compensation was appropriate and concluded that a compensatory award in the nature of a palliative was warranted on the facts and circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The petition is partly allowed.

Specific orders and immediate consequences:

  • The court held that the prayer for habeas corpus was infructuous with respect to releasing the detained persons because, on the court's view of the record, the detention had become lawful when the civil police arrested and produced the two before the Magistrate (thus habeas corpus relief for release was not granted).
  • The court found a violation of section 5 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in respect of the period the accused remained in army custody without being made over "with least possible delay" and held that such violation also amounted to a breach of constitutional and legal rights.
  • The court awarded monetary compensation to the two arrested persons, directing respondents to pay Rituraj Barua and Padmaraj Barua Rs. 5,000 each as a palliative measure.
  • The court made clear that this award does not preclude the aggrieved parties from pursuing a separate action to recover appropriate damages from the respondents or erring officials in accordance with law.
  • The respondents were directed to ensure that in future such violations of constitutional and/or legal rights by army personnel are not permitted.
  • No costs were awarded.

Broader implications: The opinion reaffirms the settled principle (as applied by the court) that where detention is lawful at the time of disposal (or upon production and lawful custody by civil police), habeas corpus relief for release may not be available, but separate relief (including compensation) may still be appropriate where statutory or constitutional safeguards (such as section 5 of AFSPA and Article 21) have been violated. The court exercised Article 226 powers to award a modest compensatory payment as a palliative and to leave open the civil remedy for full damages.

    Bacha Bora v. State Of Assam & Ors. .

    Manisana, J.:— In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Bacha Bora complained against the arrest and detention of his sons Rituraj Barua aged 19 and Padmaraj Barua aged 21 as illegal and wrongful and prays for a writ of habeas corpus and compensation.

    2. It appears from the records that on 1.12.90 the army personnel arrested Rituraj Barua from his house at Tingrai within Digboi Police Station of the district of Tinsukia and on 7.12.90 Padmaraj Barua from Margherita within Tinsukia District. Army authority made over them to Tinsukia Police Station on 16.12.90 Thereafter, a case was registered on 16.12.90 being Tinsukia Police Station Case No. 389 of 1990 under sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 on the accusations that the two are accomplice in the ULFA activities. After the formal arrest of the two by the civil police, they were produced before the Additional District Magistrate on the very same day for remand order. The Additional District Magistrate transferred the case to Digboi Police Station renumbered the case as its police station Case No. 200 of 1990. As ordered by this Court the two arrested persons were produced on 21.12.90 before this Court. There are allegations that after the arrest the two were assaulted and tortured by the army personnel. The army authority denies the allegations.

    3. The Central Government declared the whole of the State of Assam as a disturbed area under section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1952, for short, ‘the Act’. The Act authorises the army authority to arrest, or to search and arrest, of arrestable person as provided under section 4 of the Act. Under section 5 of the Act, any person arrested and taken into custody under the Act shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with least possible delay with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest.

    4. Sri A.C Borbora, learned counsel for the petitioner put forward the following grounds for challenging the legality of the arrest and detention of Rituraj Barua and Padmraj Barua by the army authority. First, the initial arrest and detention of the two by the army authority was illegal because they were arrested and detained without being informed of the grounds of their arrest as required by clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution. Secondly, the detention by the army personnel for 15 or 16 days was illegal as it was in violation of section 5 of the Act and consequently violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thirdly, the detention by the civil police was also in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution for the remand order was made without production of the two arrested persons.

    5. In two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 and Ram Narayan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277, it has been held that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceedings. In A.K Gopalan v. Government of India, AIR 1986 SC 816, the Supreme Court has held that in dealing with a petition for heabas corpus the Court has to see whether the detention on the date on which the application is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of application and the date of hearing. In Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu Kashmir, (1971) 3 SCC 118 : AIR 1971 SC 62, it has been held that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of hearing. In B.R Rao v. State of Orissa, (1972) 3 SCC 256 : AIR 1971 SC 2197, the Supreme Court has held that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard the legality and otherwise of the detention at the time of return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings following the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, namely Naranjan's case and Ram Narayan's case (supra.)

    6. There are three views of the Supreme Court with regard to the point in time for consideration of the legality or otherwise of the detention, that is to say-(1) on the date of application, (2) at the time of return and not on the date of filing of petition, and (3) on the date of hearing.

    7. In Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, (1974) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1974 SC 510, after discussing the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, the Supreme Court observed that of the three views taken by the Supreme Court at different times, the second view (at the time of return) appears to be in consonance with the law and practice in England and may be taken as having received the largest measure of approval in India, though third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an enquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.

    8. In Saptawna v. State of Assam, (1972) 4 SCC (N) 45 : AIR 1971 SC 813, the Supreme Court has held that, where intial arrest and detention of the accused by the army authority is illegal and the detention becomes lawful when subsequently he was arrested by civil police and produced before the Magistrate as undertrial prisoner, the Court cannot order release by issuing writ of habeas corpus.

    9. It is clear from the above decisions of the Supreme Court that in habeas corpus proceedings if the detention is legal at the time of the disposal of the petition the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the legality or otherwise of the detention shall also be considered ??? the date of final disposal of the petition.

    10. In the present case the application was filed on 17.12.90 Army authority made over the two arrested persons to the civil police on 16.12.90 The civil police arrested them under FIR case referred to above. If the two are in the custody of the armed forces a question may arise as to whether the two would be entitled to be released or they would be made over to the civil police. But the question does not arise because the two are under-trial prisoners. The only question which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether the remand order was illegal. The submission of Mr. Borbora, as already stated, is that at the time of passing remand order the two were not produced before the Magistrate. Mr. Borbora has submitted that in the affidavit of the State, it is stated that the two were made over to civil police on 16.12.90 at about 6.25 pm. This statement suggests that the remand order was made after the Court hours and therefore, it supports his contention that the two were not produced when the remand order was made. We are not expressing any opinion about the effect of the remand order, if made, without production of accused before the Magistrate, as the records produced by the State show that the two arrested persons were produced before the Magistrate. We presume that the judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. In that view of that matter, we are unable to accept the contention of Shri Borbora Therefore, the detention became lawful when the two were arrested and produced by the civil police before the Magistrate for remand order as under trial prisoners. In that view of the matter the prayer for writ of habeas corpus has become infrucfuous.

    11. The next contention of Mr. Borbora is that the detention of Rituraj and Padmaraj by the army authority was wrongful and army personnel also assaulted them and, therefore, they are entitled to compensation.

    12. Under section 5 of the Act, the person arrested by the army authority shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with least possible delay. We reiterate what we have held in Civil Rule (HC) 3 of 1991 between Smti. Purnima Barua… v. Union Of India & Ors.… as regards the span of time, which is designated by the words “least possible delay”. The word “least possible delay” may be said to do a thing within the shortest possible time. But no arbitrary time limit can be set down as it may not be possible in many cases to affirmatively say or precisely quantify the period of time by reference to hours, dates or months. However, it will be possible having regard to the circumstances of the case, to say whether thing was done or was not done with “least possible delay”. Therefore, whenever the question of “least possible delay” arises for decision in computing the period of time the Court has to have regard to the particular circumstances of the case, for example, physical impossibility or otherwise to make over the arrested person to the nearest police station, and how, where and in what circumstances the arrest was effected. Therefore, when an act is done after an interval of time and there is no explanation forthcoming for delay, it cannot be said to have been done with least possible delay.

    13. Admittedly, Rituraj Barua and Padmaraj Barua were arrested by the army authority on 1.12.90 and 2.12.90 respectively and both of them were made over to the civil police station at Tinsukia on 16.12.90 whereas the nearest police station was Digboi Police Station. There is no explanation forthcoming as to why the to were detained for more than two weeks. The affidavit of the Union has been modelled in such a casual manner that it would be difficult to rely on it. In the absence of any explanation, it cannot be said that Rituraj and Padmaraj were made over to civil police with least possible delay. Therefore, the detention was in violation of section 5 of the Act. The violation of section 5 of the Act will not only amount to wrongful detention but also violation of constitutional and legal rights.

    14. As regards the assault on Rituraj and Padmaraj, they were medically examined on 21.12.90 as directed by this Court. The medical reports indicate that the doctor found the following injuries-Haematome over right side chest, tenderness over the upper abdomen, tenderness over the right flank, and scars (old) over the knees and dorsum of left wrist on the body of Padmaraj and soft tissue hae-matoma over the right side chest, tenderness over the coccyx region and scar marks on the knees (old and healed) and left elbow on the body of Rituraj. The medical reports further indicate that Padmaraj was sent to Urology unit and Rituraj was sent to cardio thoracic and orthopaedic units for further examination. The medical reports furthermore indicate that the wounds are simple in nature caused by blunt weapon. However, age of the injuries has not been given. There is definite assertion that the army personnel assaulted the two. It has already been held that affidavit of the Union has been modelled in a casual manner.

    15. This Court in a series of cases has held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can award compensation in appropriate cases. On the facts and in circumstances of the case, we are of the view that if we award Rituraj Barua and Padmaraj Barua Rs. 5000/- each as monetary compensation in the nature of a palliative, it would meet the ends of justice.

    16. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered and directed that the respondents shall pay Rituraj Barua and Padmaraj Barua Rs. 5000/- each as monetary compensation in the nature of a palliative. It is made clear that the order of monetary compensation will not preclude the aggrieved party from bringing an action to recover appropriate damages from the respondents or their erring officials in accordance with law. It is further ordered and directed that the respondents shall see that in future not such violation of constitutional and/or legal rights of the citizens are permitted to be committed by the army personnel.

    17. In the result, the petition is partly allowed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Bacha Bora v. State Of Assam & Ors. .
    (Mar 20, 1991)