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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 83(1) or (2) of the 1951 Act, and its proviso
  • Section 83(1) of the Act, Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the 1951 Act, Section 86 of the 1951 Act
  • the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961
  • Section 81 and Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act
  • Section 83(2) of the Act
  • Section 82 of the RP Act
  • Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 81 of the 1951 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the 1951 Act
  • Section 81 of the RP Act
  • Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
  • Section 83 of the 1951 Act, Order 6 Rule 15 CPC
  • Section 117 of the RP Act
  • Section 86(1) of the Act
  • Section 83 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 83(1) or (2) of the 1951 Act, and its proviso
  • Section 83(1) of the Act, Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the 1951 Act, Section 86 of the 1951 Act
  • the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961
  • Section 81 and Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act
  • Section 83(2) of the Act
  • Section 82 of the RP Act
  • Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 81 of the 1951 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the 1951 Act
  • Section 81 of the RP Act
  • Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
  • Section 83 of the 1951 Act, Order 6 Rule 15 CPC
  • Section 117 of the RP Act
  • Section 86(1) of the Act
  • Section 83 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners have filed Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 14172-73 of 2010 (later tagged with SLPs (C) Nos. 24886-89 of 2010) challenging a judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported at 2010 6 Kant LJ 78. The High Court had held that, because the election petitioner had already filed an affidavit in Form 25 under the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“the 1951 Act”), a separate affidavit under Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) was unnecessary. The returned candidate (now petitioner before the Supreme Court) contends that the absence of an affidavit under Order 6 Rule 15(4) vitiates the election petition and attracts dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court issued the present order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC—by failing to file a separate verification affidavit—renders an election petition liable to dismissal under Section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  2. Whether the decision in P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan (2012 5 SCC 511) correctly states the law in light of earlier and larger-bench precedents such as G. Mallikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa (2001 4 SCC 428) and the Constitution Bench rulings in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar and Subbarao.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Relied heavily on P.A. Mohammed Riyas to contend that an affidavit under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC is mandatory in addition to the Form 25 affidavit; failure to file it should lead to dismissal under Section 86(1).
  • Submitted that the impugned High Court judgment had been cited in P.A. Mohammed Riyas but was not accepted by the Supreme Court in that case.
  • Also cited R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad (2000 1 SCC 481), particularly paragraph 35, in support of the mandatory-affidavit argument.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Contended that P.A. Mohammed Riyas is inconsistent with earlier larger-bench decisions.
  • Pointed out that F.A. Sapa v. Singora (1991 3 SCC 375) was mis-read in P.A. Mohammed Riyas; the earlier case did not hold that non-compliance with Section 83 leads to dismissal under Section 86(1).
  • Relied on the three-Judge Bench ruling in G. Mallikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa (2001 4 SCC 428) for the proposition that defects under Section 83 are curable and do not invite dismissal under Section 86.
  • Submitted that Mallikarjunappa aligns with Constitution Bench judgments in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar and Subbarao v. Election Tribunal, which treat affidavit defects as curable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan (2012 5 SCC 511) Affidavit under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC is mandatory in addition to Form 25; non-compliance attracts Section 86(1). Relied on by petitioner; questioned by respondent; Court noted possible conflict with larger-bench decisions.
R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad (2000 1 SCC 481) Referenced by petitioner (specific proposition not detailed in the order). Cited in support of petitioner’s stance; no further analysis in this order.
F.A. Sapa v. Singora (1991 3 SCC 375) Interpretation of consequences of non-compliance with Section 83. Respondent argued that Riyas mis-read this case; Court noted the dispute.
G. Mallikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa (2001 4 SCC 428) Defects under Section 83 are curable; petition not dismissible under Section 86(1). Relied on by respondent; Court observed that it was not considered in Riyas and warrants review by a larger Bench.
Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore (AIR 1964 SC 1545; 1964 3 SCR 573) Earlier Constitution Bench treating affidavit defects as curable. Cited as consistent with Mallikarjunappa.
Subbarao v. Election Tribunal (AIR 1964 SC 1027; 1964 6 SCR 213) Same constitutional position as above. Referenced to reinforce respondent’s argument on curability.
Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh (2004 11 SCC 196) Noted in Riyas; relates to affidavit requirements. Mentioned as part of background; no fresh application in this order.
K.K. Ramachandran Master v. M.V. Sreyamakumar (2010 7 SCC 428) Considered in Riyas; affidavit compliance. Referenced only contextually.
V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu (2000 2 SCC 294) Referenced in Riyas; specific principle not detailed here. Cited in narrative; no direct application in present order.
M. Kamalam v. Dr V.A. Syed Mohammed (1978 2 SCC 659) Relied upon by returned candidate in Riyas. Listed among cases considered; no independent analysis here.
Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh (1972 1 SCC 214) Linked with consequences of affidavit defects. Mentioned in quotation from Riyas; no additional reasoning.
Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986 Supp SCC 315) Election-petition pleading standards. Referred to in recitation of earlier case law; not analysed separately.
Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez (1969 3 SCC 238) Pleadings and corrupt-practice allegations. Only referenced.
Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (1987 Supp SCC 93) Pleadings relating to corrupt practices. Only referenced.
Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar (2009 9 SCC 310) Pleadings and affidavit requirements. Part of the list of cases noted; no separate application here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that P.A. Mohammed Riyas treats the absence of an affidavit under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC as a defect that effectively invokes Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, whereas the three-Judge Bench in G. Mallikarjunappa expressly held the opposite—that such defects are curable and do not attract Section 86. The order notes that Mallikarjunappa and earlier Constitution Bench rulings (Murarka and Subbarao) were not considered in Riyas. Because of this apparent conflict between co-ordinate and larger-bench authorities, the Court concluded that the legal questions require reconsideration by a Bench of at least three Judges.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: The Special Leave Petitions are to be listed before “a Bench of at least three Hon’ble Judges.” The Registry is directed to place the matters before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate listing, and SLPs (C) Nos. 24886-89 of 2010 are tagged with the present petitions.

Implications: No final pronouncement on the merits has been made. The immediate consequence is that determination of the affidavit-compliance issue is deferred to a larger bench, potentially leading to clarification or overruling of conflicting precedents. Until that occurs, no new binding precedent is set and the parties’ substantive rights remain unresolved.

    G.M Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar .

    Order

    SLPs (C) Nos. 14172-173 of 2010

    1. We have heard Mr V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.

    2. Mr V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, placed heavy reliance upon a judgment of this Court in P.A Mohammed Riyas v. M.K Raghavan (2012) 5 SCC 511 in support of his submission that since the election petitioner, who is the respondent herein, has not filed any affidavit as required under Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) in support of the election petition, the High Court was clearly wrong in taking the view (2010) 6 Kant LJ 78 that such an affidavit was not necessary since the election petitioner has already furnished an affidavit in Form 25 in compliance with proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short “the 1951 Act”). He also relied upon a decision of this Court in R.P Moidutty v. P.T Kunju Mohammad (2000) 1 SCC 481, particularly para 35 thereof.

    3. Mr V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511, as a matter of fact, the impugned judgment (2010) 6 Kant LJ 78 was cited by the appellant therein but this Court did not accept the view taken by the Karnataka High Court.

    4. On the other hand, Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, submitted that the view taken by this Court in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511 was not consistent with the earlier larger Bench decisions of this Court. He submitted that in para 46 of the judgment of this Court in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511 what the Court read in F.A Sapa v. Singora (1991) 3 SCC 375 is not at all stated in that judgment. He would submit that in F.A Sapa (1991) 3 SCC 375 this Court has not held that an election petition filed under the 1951 Act not strictly complying with requirements of Section 83 is not an election petition as contemplated in Section 81 and such election petition would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act.

    5. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent referred to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in G. Mallikarjunappa v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa (2001) 4 SCC 428 in support of the proposition that an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the 1951 Act for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83(1) or (2) of the 1951 Act or of its proviso. Such defect is a curable defect and such defect can be judged at the trial of an election petition but Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case.

    6. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the three-Judge Bench decision in G. Mallikarjunappa (2001) 4 SCC 428 is consistent with the earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore AIR 1964 SC 1545, (1964) 3 SCR 573 and Subbarao v. Election Tribunal AIR 1964 SC 1027, (1964) 6 SCR 213.

    7. P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511 was a case where a preliminary objection was raised by the returned candidate that the election petition was incomplete since no affidavit in Form 25 as required under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 was filed and thus the election petition did not disclose a cause of action and was liable to be dismissed. On the other hand, on behalf of the election petitioner in response to the preliminary objection raised by the returned candidate, it was submitted that the election petition could not be dismissed in limine under Section 86(1) for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83(1). The election petitioner contended that in an election petition based entirely on the allegations of corrupt practices, it was not necessary to file two affidavits—one under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC and another in Form 25. The High Court accepted the preliminary objection of the returned candidate and it was from this order that the matter reached this Court:

    7.1 In paras 6 to 26 of the Report in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511, the submissions made on behalf of the election petitioner have been elaborately noted. The Court also noticed the earlier decisions of this Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar AIR 1964 SC 1545, (1964) 3 SCR 573, F.A Sapa (1991) 3 SCC 375, Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh (2004) 11 SCC 196, K.K Ramachandran Master v. M.V Sreyamakumar (2010) 7 SCC 428 and V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P Thirunavukkarasu (2000) 2 SCC 294, and, as indicated above, the judgment (2010) 6 Kant LJ 78 of the Karnataka High Court which is impugned in the present special leave petitions.

    7.2 In paras 27 to 38, the Court noted the submissions advanced on behalf of the returned candidate and also referred to the judgments of this Court relied upon by the returned candidate particularly, M. Kamalam v. V.A Syed Mohammed (1978) 2 SCC 659; Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh (1972) 1 SCC 214; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315; Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez (1969) 3 SCC 238; Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi 1987 Supp SCC 93 and Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar (2009) 9 SCC 310. The Court also referred to Section 83 of the 1951 Act and Order 6 Rule 15 CPC. Then in paras 45, 46 and 47 of the Report, this Court held as under: (P.A Mohammed Riyas case (2012) 5 SCC 511)

    “45. Of course, it has been submitted and accepted that the defect was curable and such a proposition has been upheld in the various cases cited by Mr Venugopal, beginning with the decision in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar case AIR 1964 SC 1545, (1964) 3 SCR 573 and subsequently followed in F.A Sapa case (1991) 3 SCC 375, Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar case (2004) 11 SCC 196 and K.K Ramachandran Master case (2010) 7 SCC 428, referred to hereinbefore. In this context, we are unable to accept Mr Venugopal's submission that despite the fact that the proviso to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act provides that where corrupt practices are alleged, the election petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that two affidavits would be required, one under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC and the other in Form 25. We are also unable to accept Mr Venugopal's submission that even in a case where the proviso to Section 83(1) was attracted, a single affidavit would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of both the provisions.
    46. Mr Venugopal's submission that, in any event, since the election petition was based entirely on allegations of corrupt practices, filing of two affidavits in respect of the selfsame matter, would render one of them redundant, is also not acceptable. As far as the decision in F.A Sapa case (1991) 3 SCC 375 is concerned, it has been clearly indicated that the petition, which did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 83 of the 1951 Act, could not be said to be an election petition as contemplated in Section 81 and would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951 Act. On the other hand, the failure to comply with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act rendered the election petition ineffective, as was held in Hardwari Lal case (1972) 1 SCC 214 and the various other cases cited by Mr P.P Rao.
    47. In our view, the objections taken by Mr P.P Rao must succeed, since in the absence of proper verification as contemplated in Section 83, it cannot be said that the cause of action was complete. The consequences of Section 86 of the 1951 Act come into play immediately in view of sub-section (1) which relates to trial of election petitions and provides that the High Court shall dismiss the election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the 1951 Act. Although Section 83 has not been mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 86, in the absence of proper verification, it must be held that the provisions of Section 81 had also not been fulfilled and the cause of action for the election petition remained incomplete. The petitioner had the opportunity of curing the defect, but it chose not to do so.”

    7.3 The Court thus concluded in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511 that Section 83 although has not been mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the 1951 Act, in the absence of proper verification, the cause of action for the election petition remains incomplete and it must be held that the provisions of Section 81 has also not been fulfilled.

    7.4 While negating the submission that a defect in the affidavit in an election petition making allegations of corrupt practices renders the election petition incompetent and liable to be dismissed in limine, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in G. Mallikarjunappa (2001) 4 SCC 428 held as under:

    “7. An election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does not comply with either the provisions of ‘Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the RP Act’. The requirement of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt practice is contained in Section 83(1) of the Act. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act, however, does not attract the consequences envisaged by Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the Act, for alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83(1) or (2) of the Act or of its proviso. The defect in the verification and the affidavit is a curable defect. What other consequences, if any, may follow from an allegedly ‘defective’ affidavit, is required to be judged at the trial of an election petition but Section 86(1) of the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case.”

    7.5 In G. Mallikarjunappa (2001) 4 SCC 428, a three-Judge Bench thus has held that an election petition was not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the 1951 Act for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83(1) or (2) of the 1951 Act or of its proviso; the defect in the verification and the affidavit is a curable defect. G. Mallikarjunappa (2001) 4 SCC 428 has not been referred and considered by this Court in P.A Mohammed Riyas (2012) 5 SCC 511.

    8. Having regard to the above, it is appropriate if these special leave petitions are heard by a Bench of at least three Hon'ble Judges. Let the special leave petitions be placed by the Registry before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for listing of the special leave petitions before an appropriate Bench. Ordered accordingly.

    SLPs (C) Nos. 24886-89 of 2010

    9. Tag with Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 14172-73 of 2010.

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    Comments

    G.M Siddeshwar v. Prasanna Kumar .
    (Jul 19, 2012)