AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 and 1956 Acts, respectively).
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
  • provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,
  • 1954 Act and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
  • SECTION 3 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT 1955
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,
  • Marking) Act, 1937, the Government of India
  • Clause (1) of section 21 of the 1948 Act
  • PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1948
  • section 22(1) of the 1948 Act
  • section 8(5) of the 1956 Act,
  • section 21 of the 1948 Act
  • 1948 Act or the 1956 Act.8.
  • Marking) Act, 1937.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 and 1956 Acts, respectively).
  • PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT 1954
  • provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,
  • 1954 Act and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
  • SECTION 3 ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT 1955
  • Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,
  • Marking) Act, 1937, the Government of India
  • Clause (1) of section 21 of the 1948 Act
  • PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT 1948
  • section 22(1) of the 1948 Act
  • section 8(5) of the 1956 Act,
  • section 21 of the 1948 Act
  • 1948 Act or the 1956 Act.8.
  • Marking) Act, 1937.
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion — Summary (Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The consolidated matters comprise 16 writ petitions by dealers engaged in grinding cotton-seeds and selling cotton-seed oil. They had originally been assessed for sales tax on the premise that they were producing edible oil and, accordingly, charged inter-State sales tax at 1% pursuant to a Punjab notification under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Subsequently, the Regional Authority suo motu reopened assessments under section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and issued separate show-cause notices for different assessment years, alleging that tax should be assessed at 4% and that penalty and interest were leviable.

One petition (C.W.P. No. 6919 of 1987) concerned a partnership firm at Mansa which sold washed cotton-seed oil and was assessed by the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner (order dated 24 November 1986, annexure P4) to an additional tax of Rs. 62,913 and interest of Rs. 42,974. Three revision petitions against that order were dismissed by the Presiding Officer of the Sales Tax Tribunal (order dated 5 August 1987, annexure P5). The petitioner then moved this Court by writ petition. Similar writs challenge the notices in the other matters listed at the start of the opinion.

The motion bench initially issued notices and, after hearing counsel, admitted the writ petitions. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners had an effective alternative remedy under section 22(1) of the 1948 Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the washed cotton-seed oil sold by the petitioners qualifies as "edible oil" for the purpose of sales tax rate classification (i.e., entitlement to 1% inter-State rate versus 4% non-edible rate).
  2. Whether the Commissioner (or Regional Authority) was justified in reopening past assessments suo motu under section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, where prior assessing authorities had accepted the oil as edible and assessed accordingly.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The expression "edible oil" is not defined in the 1948 or 1956 Acts; in absence of such definition, the meaning given in other statutory instruments should be adopted.
  • Relying on the Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977 (as amended by notification dated 13 September 1990), "edible oil" includes oil used directly or after processing for human consumption; the petitioner’s product fell within this definition.
  • The Directorate of Marketing and Inspection / Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) instructions describe "washed edible oil" and specify that cotton-seed oil when neutralised, washed and dried conforms to that description; the petitioner’s product matched that description.
  • Because the oil sold by the petitioner conformed to these definitions and instructions, the respondents' reopening of settled assessments was illegal and arbitrary.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The edibility of cotton-seed oil should be determined with reference to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the standards in Appendix "B" to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; those rules prescribe detailed quality standards for cotton-seed oil (e.g., limits for free fatty acid, saponification value, iodine value, absence of turbidity, etc.).
  • The respondents relied on Indian Standards Institution specifications and on case law (including a Division Bench decision in Kishenlal Oil Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax) which treated edibility as a question of fact and identified rigorous refining processes as relevant to edibility.
  • In written statement: preliminary objection that petitioners had an effective alternative remedy under section 22(1) of the 1948 Act; contention that the case involved no question of law and that findings of fact by tax authorities are not ordinarily interfered with; and assertion that washing with caustic soda does not convert crude oil into edible oil.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1985] 156 ITR 585 (SC); (1985) 4 SCC 590; AIR 1986 SC 484) Cited by petitioner’s counsel as an authority (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). The ruling was cited during submissions, but the court did not adopt any specific principle from it in place of the statutory and administrative definitions it considered more directly applicable.
Satyanarayana v. State of Karnataka ((1986) 2 SCC 512; AIR 1986 SC 1162) Cited by petitioner’s counsel (opinion does not specify the precise point extracted from this decision). The court noted the citation but relied primarily on statutory instruments, government instructions and the facts of the present case rather than drawing a controlling principle from this decision.
Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S.N. Brothers ([1973] 31 STC 302 (SC)) Cited in submissions (opinion does not describe the rule cited). The court recorded that the citation was placed before the Tribunal and the court, but did not rely on it as determinative for its decision in these petitions.
Kishenlal Oil Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1955] 6 STC 650 — Division Bench of the High Court of Hyderabad) Discussed whether cotton-seed oil is edible; held edibility is a question of fact and emphasised a stringent test (refining, removal of pigments such as gossypol) to render cotton-seed oil edible. The court acknowledged Kishenlal's stringent test and chemical laboratory report, but observed the decision dated from 1954. The court contrasted that approach with subsequent administrative instructions (1963 Directorate description and 1990 Notification) that treated washed cotton-seed oil as edible, and thus did not follow the strict standard from Kishenlal for the present factual matrix.
Sales Tax Tribunal — Order in Appeal Nos. 411, 412, 413 of 1985-86 (Order dated 27 January 1987) The Tribunal held that cotton-seed oil was not fit for direct human consumption in those appeals and therefore liable to tax at 4%. The Tribunal's own prior order was noted by the court: it existed and had been relied upon by the revisional authority, but the court ultimately assessed the issue against statutory definitions and administrative instructions and found the tribunal's insistence on a refinery plant to be unwarranted for the petitioner’s washed oil.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded through the following key steps, based solely on the materials and findings recorded in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the factual core: the petitioner sold "washed cotton-seed oil." The assessing authority had previously accepted it as edible and assessed tax at 1% for the relevant years; the revisional and regional authorities later declared it non-edible and reopened assessments suo motu under section 21 of the 1948 Act.
  2. Recognition that neither the 1948 Act nor the 1956 Act defines "edible oil", requiring the court to consider other statutory instruments and administrative definitions cited by the parties.
  3. Consideration of the petitioners' reliance on (a) the amended Control Order under the Essential Commodities Act (1990 Notification) defining "edible oil" to include oil used directly or after processing for human consumption, and (b) the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection/Grading and Marking instructions distinguishing "washed edible oil" and describing its neutralisation, washing and drying.
  4. Consideration of the respondents' reliance on the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (appendix B standards for cotton-seed oil) and the Kishenlal decision which applied a stringent factual test for edibility after refining and bleaching.
  5. Legal distinction drawn by the court: the petitioners were not prosecuted or charged under the 1954 Act or the PFA Rules; neither the petitioner nor the assessing authorities were found to have violated those standards and there was no recorded finding that the oil failed to meet PFA standards. Consequently, the court held that the PFA and its rules could not be invoked to justify reopening the earlier assessment in this case.
  6. Evaluation of historical administrative practice and later declarations: the court observed that as early as 1963 the Directorate had described washed cotton-seed oil as edible, and the Central Government's 1990 Notification explicitly defined edible oil to include oil used after processing. The Indian Standards Institution specification for "washed cotton-seed oil" (neutralised, washed and dried) further supported the view that washed cotton-seed oil can be edible.
  7. Assessment of the revisional exercise under section 21: section 21 permits the Commissioner to call for records to satisfy himself about the legality or propriety of subordinate orders. The court emphasized that the Assessing Authority had taken a bona fide, possible view accepting the oil as edible and had not acted illegally or improperly. Reopening many years later where the original assessment was not shown to be illegal or improper, and where key evidence or material may no longer be available, was held to be unjustified. The court concluded no case for invoking section 21 had been made out in these circumstances.
  8. On the procedural objection of alternative remedy under section 22(1): while respondents argued alternative remedies existed, the court observed that many petitioners had challenged only the notices by approaching the High Court and that in the factual posture of C.W.P. No. 6919, it would have been futile for the petitioners to submit to the departmental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court did not find the alternative remedy objection to be decisive in sustaining the respondents' action.
  9. Conclusion from law and fact: having regard to administrative definitions, ISI specifications, absence of any recorded violation of PFA standards, and the absence of illegality or impropriety in the original assessments, the court found the revisional action and the notices to be unwarranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were allowed. The impugned orders at annexures P4 and P5 in C.W.P. No. 6919 of 1987 and the suo motu notices issued in the other related cases were quashed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The specific assessment orders (annexures P4 and P5) and the reopened assessment notices challenged in these petitions are quashed, leaving the petitioning dealers free from the additional tax, interest and penalties imposed by those orders.
  • Scope of precedent: The court relied on contemporaneous administrative definitions and standards (Directorate instructions, ISI specifications and the 1990 Notification under the Essential Commodities Act) rather than mechanically applying an older, stricter judicial test (Kishenlal). The decision does not purport to create a broad new legal principle beyond the facts: it quashes the revisional action as unjustified on the facts and statutory context presented. The opinion indicates no new precedent of general application was laid down beyond the resolution of the instant matters.

This summary was prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion; no facts, arguments, or legal principles have been added that are not contained in that opinion.

    Milkhi Ram Oil & Dall Mills v. State Of Punjab And Others

    Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.:— The petitioners in these 16 writ petitions are dealing in grinding of cotton-seeds and sale of cotton-seed oil. They were assessed for the payment of sales tax on the hypothesis that they were producing edible oil. These assessments were later on suo motu reopened by the Regional Authority under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. Separate notices were issued in respect of different assessment years. C.W.P Nos. 264, 311—315, 1302, 6919, 1673, 2011, 2084 and 6769 of 1987, 2476,8407, 8408 and 8409 of 1988 are directed against the notices served on the respective petitioners. In C.W.P No. 6919 of 1987, the petitioner appeared before the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner and pursued the remedies under the Act. In this petition, the orders at annexures P4 and P5 passed by the respective authorities have been challenged. It would be trite to notice the facts as stated in C.W.P No. 6919 of 1987.

    2. The petitioner is a partnership firm at Mansa. It is engaged in grinding of cotton-seeds, etc. The cotton-seed oil is sold in the State of Punjab as well as in other States. It is registered as a dealer under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 and 1956 Acts”, respectively). Originally the sales tax was levied on inter-State sales at the rate of 4 per cent. However vide Notification dated January 11, 1979, issued under section 8(5) of the 1956 Act, the Government of Punjab fixed the rate of sales tax at 1 per cent. The petitioner was assessed for the years 1981-82, 1982-83, and 1983-84 and sales tax on inter-State sales was charged at the rate of 1 per cent. Thereafter, the petitioner received notices under section 21 of the 1948 Act calling upon it to show cause as to why tax be not assessed at the rate of 4 per cent. It was also called upon to show cause against the imposition of penalty and interest. The petitioner appeared before the authority, viz., respondent No. 3, who vide orders dated November 24, 1986, a copy of which has been placed on record as annexure P4, created an additional liability of tax for an amount of Rs. 62,913 besides an amount of Rs. 42,974 towards the interest. The petitioner filed three revision petitions before the Presiding Officer of the Sales Tax Tribunal which were dismissed vide orders dated August 5, 1987, a copy of this order is at annexure P5. Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present writ petition.

    3. The motion Bench had initially directed the issue of notice of motion. Subsequently, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition was admitted.

    4. In the written statement besides a preliminary objection that the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy under section 22(1) of the 1948 Act it has been, inter alia, averred that the case does not involve any question of law; and the writ court cannot interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the authorities under the Act it has been averred that the washing of the cotton-seed oil with caustic soda does not convert it into edible oil. Reference to the respective pleadings of the parties shall be made at the appropriate stage.

    5. Arguments were addressed on behalf of the petitioners in these petitions by Messrs J.K Sibal, R.P Sawhney and D.S Brar. Mr. Rajiv Raina, Assistant Advocate-General, argued the matter on behalf of the respondents. A perusal of the order at annexure P4 passed by the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner shows that the following findings have been recorded:

    “(1) The cotton-seed oil as produced by the assessee is not edible because it is produced in crude or raw form without the removal of free fatty acids and impurities. It can become edible only when it is subjected to further refining and purifying processes;

    (2) even, the people, who deal in the trade of cotton-seed oil will never deal in it as edible oil because it is not fit to be taken as food in the form and shape it is produced by the assessee;

    (3) for the lone reason that cotton-seed oil is consumed by many people, it does not become edible unless it is made fit to be taken as food. Even palm-oil which is basically meant for manufacture of soaps is also consumed by a very large number of people for frying fish and pakoras. It is also used by the halwais in the preparation of sweets. Even palm-oil cannot be treated as edible;

    (4) there are casual entries of purchase of caustic soda and sale of ‘gad’. Mere employment of caustic soda does not result in refining and purifying the cotton-seed oil;

    (5) the fact that cotton-seed oil is permitted for use in the manufacture of edible, and vegetable oil products does not prove its worthiness to be declared as edible oil. There is no denying the fact that the Central Government has permitted the use of specified percentage of cotton-seed oil by mixing it with specified percentage of other refined oil for the manufacture of edible oil products;

    (6) the dealer has a plant. In this plant, after crushing cotton-seeds, the crude oil is taken to a vessel. It is heated to a certain degree by passing steam in the pipes fitted in the vessel and the fans fitted therein start thrashing the oil. Caustic soda is poured in the vessel so as to wash the cotton-seed oil. By this process, certain impurities settle down which come out of the vessel as ‘gad’. The remaining oil lying on the surface of the vessel is taken out through pipes to a separate tank. At the most, we can say that the dealer sold washed cottonseed oil;

    (7) the cottonseed oil to assume the character of edible oil has to be refined;

    (8) a minimum refinery unit consisting of the three units, i.e, neutralising section, bleaching section and decolourising section has to be provided, before the oil can be termed as edible oil; and

    (9) the assessee has supplied oil to M/s. D.C.M and General Mills, Delhi and United Vanaspati Works (P) Ltd., Solan. These mills are manufacturing vegetable ghee and the cotton-seed oil purchased from this dealer was further purified, refined and processed before using the same as a constituent of vegetable ghee.”

    6. These findings were challenged through the three revision petitions filed by the petitioner. The Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has observed as under:

    “8. Shri Goyal further argued that in common parlance, cotton-seed oil is taken as edible oil and shown in the newspapers as such. In support of this he attached some newspaper cuttings, particularly, from the Tribune of May 6, 1987, where while quoting price of edible oils, cotton-seed oil (mill delivery) was also mentioned. The point at issue is, whether the washed cotton-seed oil, sold by the applicant-dealer in the particular years, is edible; and if so, what evidence is available in its support. The Assessing Authority, vide its orders of October 19, 1984, July 5, 1985 and October 18, 1985, accepted it as edible and charged the tax at the rate of one per cent. The orders of the Assessing Authority are very sketchy and do not refer to any material on the basis of which he accepted this oil as edible. Later, the revisional authority, vide his orders of November 24, 1986, declared the oil sold by the applicant-dealer as non-edible. These orders are detailed one and discuss all the points raised by Shri Goyal today in his oral arguments. These orders do discuss the point of common parlance, nomenclature, consumability and edibility, purchase of caustic soda for refining and cleaning of the oil and the machinery with the applicant-dealer for refining process so as to make this oil edible. As regards these orders, argument of Shri Goyal is that these were passed ex parte and full opportunity was not made available to the applicant-dealer. However, even in arguments today, no new point has been brought excepting an extract from the instructions of the Government of India in Schedule 12 regarding agmark grade designation and the definitions of quality for the cotton-seed oil. In support of his arguments, Shri Goyal cited rulings reported in [1985] 156 ITR 585 (SC); (1985) 4 SCC 590 : AIR 1986 SC 484 (Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), (1986) 2 SCC 512 : AIR 1986 SC 1162 (Satyanarayana v. State of Karnataka) and [1973] 31 STC 302 (SC) (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S.N Brothers).

    9. Shri Brar representing the State brought to my notice that the question of cotton-seed oil being edible or not, was discussed quite succinctly in Appeal No. 65 of 1985-86 decided by this Tribunal where various provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, were also discussed. This Tribunal, vide order of January 27, 1987, in Appeal Nos. 411,412 and 413 of 1985-86 held that the cotton-seed oil was not fit for direct human consumption and hence was liable to be taxed at the rate of four per cent.

    10. In view of these facts and after giving careful consideration to the arguments of Shri Goyal, as well as rulings; cited by him and taking into account my order of January 27, 1987, I see no reason to upset the orders of the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner dated November 24, 1986, and hence I dismiss these revision applications.”

    7. The admitted position, therefore, is that the petitioner sold washed cotton-seed oil. Was this edible oil? This expression is not defined under the 1948 Act or the 1956 Act.

    8. Mr. Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that in the absence of a definition in the Act, the meaning given to the expression under various other statutory provisions should be adopted. He has referred to the provisions of the Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. By a Notification of September 13, 1990, the Control Order was amended and edible oil was defined as under:

    “2(g) ‘edible oil’ means oil used, directly or after processing, for human consumption and includes hydrogenated vegetable oil.”

    9. He also referred to the instructions issued by the Government of India under the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act, 1937. In these instructions of the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, edible oil has been described as “refined edible oil” and “washed edible oil”. Under the heading of washed edible oil, the following description has been given:

    “Cotton-seed oil shall be the oil obtained from the seed of plant cotton (gossypium Sp.) only. It shall be clear and free from admixture with any other oil or substance and from suspended matter or sediment. The oil shall be neutralised with alkali, washed and dried.”

    10. A copy of these instructions has been appended as annexure P9 with C.W.P No. 264 of 1987. Relying on the above description of edible oil, the learned counsel has contended that the oil sold by the petitioner conformed to the above specifications. According to the learned counsel, it was oil, used after processing for human consumption and thus met with the requirements of the Control Order referred to above. He further submits that even under the provisions of the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act, 1937, the Government of India had accepted two forms of cotton-seed oil, viz., the refined and the washed. Both these forms had been accepted to be “edible”. The product sold by the petitioner conformed to the description of washed edible oil. In this view of the matter, the action of the respondents in reopening the settled assessments was wholly illegal and arbitrary.

    11. Mr. Raina, on the other hand, has contended that the edibility of the product has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1954 Act”). He referred to standards of quality as specified in appendix “B” to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, wherein the following entry appears:

    “A. 17.02—Cotton seed oil (Binole ka tel) means the oil extracted from clean, sound and decorticated cotton-seeds (genus gossypium), refined and dehydrated. It shall be clear, free from rancidity suspended or other foreign matter, separated water, added colouring or flavouring substances, or mineral oil.

    It shall conform to the following standards:

    (a) Butyro-refractometer reading at 40° C 55.6 to 60.2 (b) Saponification value 190 to 198 (c) Iodine value 98 to 112 (d) Unsaponifiable matter Not more than 1.5% (e) Free fatty acid as oleic acid Not more than 1.0%

    (f) There shall be no turbidity after keeping the filtered sample at 30°C for 24 hours.”

    12. He has also relied upon the standard prescribed by the Indian Standards Institution at annexure R2. He also relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Hyderabad in Kishenlal Oil Mills v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1955] 6 STC 650, wherein the following observations appear:

    “The second point, viz., whether cotton-seed oil is edible, is a question of fact. We have gone through the report of the Chemical Laboratories and find that at some stage or other if the cotton-seeds are subjected to a highly specialised process, it might be possible to extract oil which is edible. The National Chemical Laboratories have in their report stated as under:

    ‘Cotton-seed oil when pressed from cotton-seeds is dark and unappetising. On refining with alkali, bleaching with bleaching earths generally followed by deodorisation, colouring matters are removed and a light coloured oil is obtained. Most of this colour is due to a pigment called gossypol; on alkali treatment, the pigment is carried away leaving a light coloured oil.

    Refined cotton-seed oil, provided it is of the quality usually expected of an ordinary refined vegetable oil like groundnut, sesame, till, etc., is completely harmless and edible. This has been proved in the laboratory by test on rats; while especially in America, where the major oil is refined cotton-seed oil, it has been eaten without ill-effects for over 30 years. It is also being consumed after refining in various parts of India. It can be used as food material as such or after hydrogenation: to vanaspati.

    Refined cotton-seed oil of good quality is hence an edible oil just like any other edible vegetable oil.’

    The report taken as a whole would show that cotton-seed oil at any rate for the present has not become edible in the hands of the dealer.”

    13. It is no doubt true that their Lordships in the above-noted case, have adopted a fairly stringent test for determining the edibility of the cottonseed oil. It is also correct that under the 1954 Act, certain standards, which the cotton-seed oil has to meet, have been prescribed. However, the fact remains that the petitioner is not facing a case for violation of the 1954 Act and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. It is nobody's case that the oil sold by the petitioner did not conform to these standards. In fact, even the authorities under the Act have not recorded any such finding. In such a situation, I am of the view that the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannot be invoked. As far the test laid down by the Division Bench in Kishenlal Oil Mills' case, [1955] 6 STC 650 (Hyd.), it must be remembered that the decision was rendered in the year 1954. Thereafter, as far back as the year 1963, the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection! had itself described washed cotton-seed oil as edible. Further, as recently as September, 1990, the Central Government has defined “edible oil” to mean any oil used for human consumption after processing. The oil produced by the petitioner conformed to these standards. It was processed. It is admittedly used for human consumption. There is nothing to show that it did not conform to the instructions issued by the Government in the year 1963 (vide annexure P9 in C.W.P No. 264 of 1987).

    14. In fact, a perusal of the impugned order would show that respondent No. 3 has found as a fact that cotton-seed oil is consumed by many people like the palm-oil and that the petitioner “sold washed cotton-seed oil”. Even the Presiding Officer of the Sales Tax Tribunal has found that the petitioner had sold washed cotton-seed oil. Even the specification issued by the Indian Standards Institution, inter alia, provides as under:

    “2.12 Washed cotton-seed oil—cotton-seed oil obtained by the process of expression which has been neutralised with alkali and subsequently washed and dried.”

    15. In this view of the matter, the conclusion of the authorities that the cotton-seed oil has to be subjected to a further process of refining by installing a plant for that purpose consisting of neutralising, bleaching and decolouring sections is wholly unwarranted. No such requirement has been laid down as a condition precedent. The insistence on the existence of a refining plant is, therefore, wholly unwarranted.

    16. There is another aspect of the matter. Clause (1) of section 21 of the 1948 Act provides as under:

    “The Commissioner may of his own motion call for the record of any proceedings which are pending before, or have been disposed of by any authority subordinate of him, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order made therein and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit.”

    17. The authority can call for record of any proceedings which are pending or have been disposed of for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the “legality or propriety” of such proceedings or order made therein. In the present case, the Assessing Authority had upheld the claim of the petitioner. It had levied sales tax on the basis that the petitioner had sold edible oil. In this process, the authority had not violated any provision of law. The conclusion was not an impossible one. The authority had taken a positive view. In such a situation, no occasion for invoking the provisions of section 21 and issue of suo motu notices had been made out. In this context it is noteworthy that the petitioner had not concealed or withheld any information. If on the basis of the evidence available with, the Assessing Authority it had accepted the claim of the petitioner, it could not be said to have acted illegally or improperly. I am, therefore, of the opinion that no case for invoking the provisions of section 21 had been made out. Let it not be forgotten that the assessment orders had been passed many years prior to matter being reopened. It is not unlikely that the petitioner would have lost a fair amount of relevant evidence. Evidently even the material sold will not be traceable. In such a situation, it would be unfair to the petitioner to reopen the matter especially when no apparent illegality or impropriety has been shown to exist in the orders of assessment. Mr. Raina also contended that the petitioners had effective alternative remedy under the Act. The writ petitions have been filed by most of the petitioners against the notices only. It is no doubt correct that most of the petitioners had approached this Court against the notices. However, the view of the authorities is apparent from the orders produced by the petitioner in C.W.P No. 6919 of 1987. In that view of the matter, no useful purpose would have been served by their submitting to the jurisdiction of the departmental authorities. As such, the objections raised on behalf of the respondents cannot be sustained. In view of the above conclusion, I have not considered it necessary to go into the various other submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the limitation, etc.

    18. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders at annexures P4 and P5 in C.W.P No. 6919 of 1987 and the notices in the other cases are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

    19. Writ petitions allowed.

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    Milkhi Ram Oil & Dall Mills v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Jul 18, 1991)