AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2, Sub-section (2) of the Act
  • Section 11(4) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 2 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2, Sub-section (2) of the Act
  • Section 11(4) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
  • Section 2 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an Indian company headquartered in Delhi, ordered facial tissue paper from the respondent, a company incorporated in New York. The respondent’s pro-forma invoice dated 22-6-2001 contained the clause, “Any disputes or claims will be submitted to arbitration in New York,” which the petitioner treated as the parties’ arbitration agreement.

The petitioner opened a letter of credit, and the goods were shipped to Nhava Sheva Port, Mumbai. Alleging that the goods were non-conforming, the petitioner sought damages, refund of the letter of credit amount, and interest. By notice dated 22-11-2001, it appointed its own arbitrator (Mr. Vikas Jain, Chartered Accountant, New Jersey) and asked the respondent to name its arbitrator within 30 days. Receiving no response, the petitioner filed the present application on 12-1-2002 under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Chief Justice of India (CJI) or his designate to secure the appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the respondent.

The respondent, though served, remained absent. The matter therefore proceeded ex parte, with Senior Advocate Shri V.A. Mohta assisting the Court as amicus curiae.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Chief Justice of India (or his designate) has jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to appoint an arbitrator when the parties have contractually selected New York as the place (seat) of arbitration.
  2. Whether Part I of the 1996 Act applies to arbitrations seated outside India in view of Section 2(2) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 2(2) states positively that Part I applies where the place of arbitration is in India but does not expressly exclude its application where the seat is abroad; hence Section 11 jurisdiction should still be available.
  • The underlying contract was to be performed in India, and the alleged breach occurred in India, providing a sufficient nexus for Indian courts to intervene.

Respondent's Position

The respondent did not appear and offered no submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Thermal Power Corpn. v. Singer Co., (1992) 3 SCC 551; AIR 1991 SC 998 Absent an express choice of governing law, there is a rebuttable presumption that the law of the seat of arbitration is the proper law of the arbitration agreement. The Court applied this presumption to hold that, because New York was chosen as the seat and no contrary intention appeared, New York law governs the arbitration, supporting the conclusion that Indian courts lack Section 11 jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is situated in Part I, and Section 2(2) clearly states, “This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.” The Court held that the affirmative wording necessarily implies the converse: Part I does not apply where the arbitration is not seated in India.

The petitioner’s argument that the contract was performed and breached in India was rejected in light of established conflict-of-laws principles reaffirmed in National Thermal Power Corpn. v. Singer Co. The parties’ explicit choice of New York as the seat of arbitration triggers the presumption that New York law governs the arbitral procedure. No evidence rebutting that presumption existed.

Because appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(4) is available only when Part I applies, the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

Holding and Implications

PETITION DISMISSED.

The Court ruled that Section 11 jurisdiction is confined to arbitrations seated in India. The petitioner must therefore pursue arbitration in New York as contractually stipulated. The decision reiterates the territorial scope of Part I of the 1996 Act and does not create any new precedent beyond affirming the statute’s plain meaning.

    Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Paperline International Inc. .

    Order

    1. This is a petition under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, the Act for short) seeking appointment of an arbitrator for and on behalf of the respondent herein, in the backdrop of the events briefly stated hereinafter.

    2. The petitioner, a company duly incorporated in India and having its principal office at Delhi placed an order for the supply of facial tissue paper to the respondent, a company incorporated in New York and having its seat thereat. The respondent issued pro forma invoice dated 22-6-2001 wherein one of the clauses provides as under:

    “Any disputes or claims will be submitted to arbitration in New York.”

    3. The abovesaid clause is treated by the petitioner as arbitration contract between the parties.

    4. The petitioner opened an L/C as demanded by the respondent and agreed to by the petitioner. The shipment of the goods arrived at Nhava Sheva Port at Mumbai. The goods on inspection were found to be not conforming to the sample of goods. The petitioner held the respondent guilty of breach of contract and demanded damages and compensation along with refund of the amount of L/C with interest. Vide legal notice dated 22-11-2001 the petitioner called upon the respondent to join in constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal. The petitioner nominated one Shri Vikas Jain, Chartered Accountant, New Jersey, USA as his arbitrator and requested the respondent to nominate its arbitrator within 30 days of the date of receipt of the notice and thereafter both the nominated arbitrators proceeding to appoint a presiding arbitrator. The respondent neither appointed an arbitrator nor responded to the petitioner's notice. On 12-1-2002 the present petition has been filed.

    5. The respondent though noticed has chosen to remain absent. These proceedings have, therefore, proceeded ex parte against the respondent. In view of the place of arbitration being New York, as agreed upon between the parties, a doubt arose whether the Chief Justice of India or his designate within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act would be competent to appoint an arbitrator. Shri V.A Mohta, Senior Advocate was requested to render his assistance as amicus curiae. Shri V.A Mohta has appeared and pointed out various relevant legal provisions. Shri Rajesh Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also been heard.

    6. Section 11 is placed in Part I of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 provides: “This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.” On a plain reading of this provision it is clear that Parliament intended the provisions of Part I to be applicable when the place of arbitration is in India. Shri Rajesh Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provision is not couched in a negative form i.e it does not exclude the applicability of Part I if the place of arbitration is not in India. He submitted that the contract was to be performed in India; it is here that the breach of contract has taken place. Therefore, a petition under Section 11 of the Act is maintainable before the Chief Justice of India or his designate.

    7. In National Thermal Power Corpn. v. Singer Co. (1992) 3 SCC 551, AIR 1991 SC 998 a question arose as to the applicability of Indian law when one of the contracting parties was a foreigner. Though the case is pre-1996, certain observations made therein are apposite. In case of conflict of laws, the Supreme Court of India has opined that for arbitration, the selection of the place of arbitration may have little significance where it is chosen, as is often the case, without regard to any relevant or significant link with the place. This is particularly true when the place of arbitration is not chosen by the parties themselves, but by the arbitrators or by the outside body, and that too for reasons unconnected with the contract. It would be different if choice of place for submission for the arbitration is supported by the rest of the contract and surrounding circumstances which may be treated as stronger indication in regard to the intention of the parties. Dicey & Morris on The Conflict of Laws (11th Edn., Vol. II) was cited with approval wherein the learned authors state inter alia that the law governing arbitration proceedings is the law chosen by the parties, or, in the absence of agreement, the law of the country in which the arbitration is held. In the absence of express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole or the arbitration agreement as such having been exercised by the parties, a presumption may arise that the law of the country where the arbitration is agreed to be held is the proper law of the arbitration agreement. The presumption is rebuttable. The parties have the freedom to choose the law governing an international commercial arbitration agreement. Where there is no express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole, or the arbitration agreement in particular, there is, in the absence of any contrary indication, a presumption that the parties have intended that the proper law of the contract as well as the law governing the arbitration agreement are the same as law of the country in which the arbitration is agreed to be held. There is nothing in the contract or correspondence between the parties to rebut the ordinary presumption and spell out an intention of the parties that they intended proper law of India to govern arbitration in spite of the place of arbitration having been agreed to be at New York.

    8. So far as the language employed by Parliament in drafting sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the language is clear and unambiguous. Saying that this Part would apply where the place of arbitration is in India tantamounts to saying that it will not apply where the place of arbitration is not in India.

    9. For the foregoing reasons it is held that the petition under Section 11(4) of the Act is not maintainable before the Chief Justice of India or his designate.

    10. The petition is dismissed.

    11. The appreciation of valuable assistance rendered by Shri V.A Mohta, the learned Senior Advocate is placed on record.

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    Comments

    Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Paperline International Inc. .
    (Dec 17, 2002)