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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 116 of the Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 116 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Mangal Chandra Ghosh originally owned the suit property. After his death on 8-1-1967, a partition dated 27-1-1967 allotted a one-third share—comprising 0.02 decimals of land with two shop rooms—to his son Keshab Chandra Ghosh. Mangal’s widow Apabala died on 5-9-1973. On 9-1-1974, Keshab sold this share to the present plaintiffs (appellants).

Before the sale, the respondent-tenant, Baidya Nath Poddar, had been inducted by Mangal and was paying ₹50 monthly rent. After purchasing, the appellants served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 29-3-1974 terminating the tenancy and filed Title Suit No. 225 of 1974 for possession and ₹2,500 arrears.

The respondent contested, relying on a registered Will allegedly executed by Mangal bequeathing the suit property to Apabala and their son Barid Baran Ghosh, who subsequently obtained probate in 1974. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding no landlord-tenant relationship. Successive appeals to the Additional District Judge and the Calcutta High Court were also dismissed, leading to the present civil appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Keshab Chandra Ghosh acquired any valid title to the suit property under the 1967 partition deed in view of Mangal Chandra Ghosh’s prior Will.
  2. Consequently, whether the appellants, as purchasers from Keshab, could prove a superior title entitling them to eject the respondent-tenant.
  3. Whether Section 116 of the Evidence Act estops the tenant from denying the appellants’ title without the appellants first establishing that title.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The purchase in Mangal’s name was benami for the benefit of his three sons; therefore, he had no authority to bequeath the property, and the 1967 partition—joined by Barid Baran—conferred valid title on Keshab.
  • The probate obtained by Barid Baran does not confer title because a Probate Court does not adjudicate title.
  • Under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, a tenant is estopped from disputing the landlord’s title and therefore cannot question Keshab’s or the appellants’ ownership.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The benami plea surfaced only after Mangal’s death; during his lifetime no steps were taken to prove it, indicating the Will’s validity.
  • Because the Will vested title in Barid Baran, Keshab had no transferable interest; hence the appellants obtained no title.
  • Section 116 estoppel is inapplicable because the appellants failed to establish any subsisting title that could be recognised as that of a landlord.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the courts below. It observed that:

  • There was no evidence—either contemporaneous or during Mangal’s lifetime—supporting the allegation that the purchase was benami. Mere participation by Barid Baran in the partition deed did not negate the Will’s efficacy.
  • The foundational requirement for the appellants was to establish that Keshab had a valid, transferable title. Applying the maxim nemo dat qui non habet, a person cannot convey a better title than he possesses; since Keshab had no title, the appellants could derive none.
  • Although a Probate Court does not determine title, the grant of probate to Barid Baran strengthened the inference that the Will was genuine, shifting the burden to the appellants to disprove it—something they “miserably failed” to do.
  • Section 116 Evidence Act estoppel could not be invoked absent proof of the appellants’ ownership; the relationship of landlord and tenant itself was unestablished.

Holding and Implications

The civil appeals are dismissed; the suit stands finally dismissed with no order as to costs.

Direct Effect: The appellants are denied possession and arrears, and the respondent’s occupancy continues. The Court set no new precedent; it reaffirmed established principles on proof of title, benami allegations, and the limits of tenant estoppel.

    Nepal Krishna Roy And Another v. Baidya Nath Poddar .

    Order

    1. Originally, the suit property was owned by one Mangal Chandra Ghosh. His wife is Apabala. They have three sons namely: Keshab Chandra Ghosh, Rajendra Nath Ghosh and Barid Baran Ghosh. Mangal Ghosh died on 8-1-1967. After his death, a partition came to be effected on 27-1-1967. Under that partition, the property forming a part of this civil appeal, namely demarcated 1/3 portion of land comprising .02 decimals pertaining to Khaitan No. 528 Dag Nos. 16 and 5/388 in Mouza Amtola, P.S Bishnupur, District 24-Parganas together with two shop rooms situated therein fell to share of Keshab Chandra Ghosh. Apabala died on 5-9-1973. On 9-1-1974, Keshab Chandra Ghosh sold his one-third share to the plaintiffs (the appellants). The defendant (respondent) Baidya Nath Poddar) was a tenant of the suit premises on a monthly rent of Rs 50 and he was inducted into possession by the father of Keshab Chandra Ghosh. After his purchase, a title suit No. 225 of 1974 came to be filed on the ground that the defendant is a habitual defaulter. Under notice as per Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, on 29-3-1974 plaintiffs determined the tenancy and called upon him to vacate. He did not do so notwithstanding the fact that the notice came to be acknowledged on 30-3-1974. On these averments, a decree for khas possession and for recovery of arrears of Rs 2500 was prayed for.

    2. In the written statement, it was urged that before the death of Mangal Chandra Ghosh, he had executed a registered Will under which he appointed his wife as the sole executrix. It was further provided that in case his wife died before obtaining probate, his son Barid Baran Ghosh would be the next executor. By that Will, the suit property was bequeathed to the said Apabala and his son Barid Baran Ghosh. The said Barid Baran Ghosh after the death of his mother wanted rents to be paid to him and he had obtained letters of probate in Case No. 10 of 1974 in the Court of District Delegate, 24-Parganas. The so-called partition is fictitious, fraudulent and a sham transaction. In view of Will of Mangal Chandra Ghosh, Keshab Chandra Ghosh did not acquire any right. Much less could he convey any title in view of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed.

    3. The learned Munsif held that in view of the Will under the partition, Keshab Chandra Ghosh did not acquire any right. Therefore, the plaintiffs acquired no better title. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.

    4. An appeal was preferred to the learned Additional District Judge, 10th Court, Alipore being Title Appeal No. 834 of 1976 which was dismissed.

    5. The second appeal was preferred to Calcutta High Court which also met with the same fate. Hence, the present civil appeals.

    6. Before us, it is urged that the suit property had come to be purchased benami in the name of Mangal Chandra Ghosh for the benefit of his three sons. Therefore, he had no right to bequeath the property. This is the reason why the property came to be partitioned among the brothers to which Barid Baran Ghosh was also a party. If really the property belonged to Mangal Chandra Ghosh and had been validly bequeathed, he would not have partaken in the partition.

    7. By obtaining probate, Barid Baran Ghosh cannot claim any title. It is well-settled in law that a Probate Court does not adjudicate on the question of title.

    8. It is not open to a tenant to deny the title of landlord. It cannot be urged that Keshab Chandra Ghosh did not acquire valid title; consequently, the plaintiffs also derived no title. Such a contention is not open to him in view of the estoppel contained under Section 116 of the Evidence Act.

    9. Per contra it is submitted, the plea of benami was raised only after the death of Mangal Chandra Ghosh. During his lifetime no steps were taken by the plaintiffs to establish the benami transactions. If really, therefore, Mangal Chandra Ghosh was entitled to bequeath the property in favour of Barid Baran Ghosh, the plaintiffs acquired no title.

    10. No doubt the Probate Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title. But, the plaintiffs will have to establish their title before they can recover possession. That has not been done. In this case, the Principle of Estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act will not apply since the title had not been established.

    11. On a careful consideration of the above arguments, we are of the view that the case of the appellants cannot be accepted. As rightly held by the High Court under the impugned judgment, during the lifetime of Mangal Chandra Ghosh, there was not even a suggestion that the property was purchased benami in his name. By merely joining the partition deed, the title of Mangal Chandra Ghosh is not in any way affected nor does it mean that the Will will be inoperative. First of all the plaintiffs-appellants will have to establish that Keshab Chandra Ghosh acquired valid title. Nemo dat qui non habet (no person can convey a better title other than what he has) is a settled principle of law.

    12. It is true that a court granting probate does not decide questions of title. But unless the plaintiffs have established their title which in this case, they have miserably failed to do, they cannot succeed. Therefore, the suit has been rightly dismissed by the courts below. Accordingly, the civil appeals will stand dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Nepal Krishna Roy And Another v. Baidya Nath Poddar .
    (Feb 17, 1994)