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Case Number

C.R.P 91 of 1965

Advocates

For the Appellant: V. Bhaskaran Nambiar C. R. Natarajan M. K. Ananthakrishnan

Judges

S. Velu Pillai
T.S Krishnamoorthy Iyer, JJ.

Acts

provision in Section 142. Even the rule of liberal construction of Section 78B
Sections 141 and 142 of the Indian Railways Act.
Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898).S. 142.
section 78B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890
SECTION 9 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
POST OFFICE ACT 1898
Section 140(c), the effect of Section 142
Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act
SECTION 27 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
SECTION 10 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
clause (c) of Section 140 and S. 141,
Sections 140 to 142. Section 69(2)

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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Velu Pillai, J. (Revision: Interpretation of Section 78B read with Sections 140–142, Indian Railways Act, 1890)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent consigned goods for carriage by railway from Cannanore railway station to be delivered to himself at Bilimora railway station (consignment dated 15 March 1962). The goods were not taken delivery at Bilimora and, at the respondent's request, the goods were re-booked at Bilimora on 25 June 1962 for carriage to and delivery at Cannanore; the consignment never reached Cannanore. The respondent forwarded a claim under Section 78B by registered post on 26 December 1962. When the claim was not met, the respondent sued the Union of India (the revision petitioner, represented by the General Managers of the concerned railways) for compensation for non-delivery of goods. The Munsiff overruled the petitioner's contention that no claim was preferred within the period prescribed by Section 78B and gave judgment for the respondent. The revision petition challenges that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the claim preferrred by the respondent complied with the time limit set out in Section 78B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (i.e., whether it was preferred within six months from the date of delivery for carriage).
Whether a claim forwarded by post under clause (c) of Section 140 attracts the deeming provision in Section 142 (i.e., whether service by post is to be "deemed" at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post).
How the period of "six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway" in Section 78B is to be computed — specifically, whether the period runs from the date goods were delivered for carriage at the station of consignment (Bilimora) or from the date when they were to be delivered at the destination (Cannanore).
Whether rules in the General Clauses Act (notably Sections 9, 10 and 27) affect computation of the period and the meaning of terms like "serve" and "give" in the context of Section 78B and Sections 140–142.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Union of India) — Primary Contentions

The claim was not preferred within six months as required by Section 78B. Using Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the day of delivery (25 June 1962) is excluded in computation and six months therefore expired on 25 December 1962.
Even assuming 25 December 1962 (Christmas Day) was a post office holiday and Section 10 of the General Clauses Act allowed the claim to be made on the next day (26 December 1962), the claim still fails because Section 78B must be read with Sections 140 and 142. Under Section 142 a claim sent by post is deemed to have been served when it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; a claim posted on the last day could not be deemed served on that same day in the ordinary course of post.
Therefore, a claim posted on the last permissible day, but which could not in the ordinary course have been delivered on that same day, cannot be treated as preferred within the statutory six-month period.

Respondent — Primary Contentions

The respondent relied on having forwarded the claim by registered post in accordance with clause (c) of Section 140; posting within the prescribed period is sufficient to "prefer" a claim under Section 78B.
The respondent argued that Section 78B uses the term "preferred" while Sections 140–142 use the term "served", and that this distinction should be maintained so that forwarding by post within the period satisfies Section 78B even if actual or constructive delivery would fall after the period.
Alternatively, the respondent contended that the phrase "within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway" should be read so that the six-month period runs from the date when the goods were to be delivered at the destination (Cannanore) rather than from the date the goods were delivered for carriage at Bilimora.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Secretary Of State…Applicant; v. Firm Imperial Metal Works…Opposite Party, AIR 1926 All 214	Interpretation of the predecessor provision (Section 77) read with Sections 141 and 142: a notice sent by post suffices if, in the ordinary course of post, it should have been delivered within the statutory period.	The Court cited this decision as supporting the view that the deeming rule in Section 142 controls when a posted notice/claim is to be treated as served, and thus that posting is not automatically sufficient if delivery in ordinary course would occur later than the statutory cutoff.
Ram Gopal Marwari v. Bengal and North-Western Railway Co., AIR 1927 Pat 241	Held that posting within the prescribed period in accordance with Section 140(c) was sufficient.	The Court noted this decision but observed that Section 142 was not adverted to in that case; it was not followed by the Court for the present matter because it did not consider the effect of Section 142.
Union of India v. Asharfi Devi, AIR 1957 Madh. Pra 114	Followed the approach that posting within the prescribed period (Section 140(c)) was sufficient.	The Court observed this decision but pointed out that Section 142 was not applied in that case; it therefore did not displace the present Court's reading that Section 142 governs deemed service by post.
Amarchand Pannalal v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Assam 221	Interpreted the period for Section 78B in a manner supportive of the respondent's alternative contention regarding the date from which the six months should run.	The Court acknowledged that this decision supported the respondent's argument about the starting point for the six-month period, but ultimately did not adopt that view and instead held that the six months run from the date of delivery for carriage at the station of consignment.
Union of India, New Delhi v. Haji Jiwakhan, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 374	Expressed a view contrary to the Assam decision on the point of computation of the six-month period.	The Court referred to this decision as part of appellate authority that aligned with the view adopted in the present opinion (i.e., computing the period from delivery for carriage at the consignment station).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the sole question as whether the claim was in compliance with Section 78B. Key statutory provisions considered were Section 78B itself and Sections 140–142 of the Indian Railways Act (which deal with modes of service and a presumption as to time of service by post), read together with principles from the General Clauses Act (Sections 9, 10 and 27).

The Court performed the following analytical steps:

Computation under General Clauses Act: The petitioner pointed to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act to exclude the day of delivery (25 June 1962) from computation, producing a six-month expiry on 25 December 1962. The Court accepted the computation for the purpose of argument and also accepted, without deciding, that Section 10 could move the effective last day to 26 December 1962 if 25 December were a post office holiday.
Interaction of Sections 78B with 140–142: The Court then held that Section 78B must be read with Sections 140 and 142. Section 140(c) prescribes forwarding by post as a permitted mode of service on a railway administration. Section 142 contains a deeming provision: where a notice is served by post, it is deemed served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post (and proof that the letter was properly addressed and registered is sufficient).
Effect of Section 142 on timeliness: Because the claim had been posted on what the parties treated as the last permissible day (26 December under the assumed holiday extension), the Court reasoned that the claim "could not have reached the addressee in the ordinary course of post on the same day." Under Section 142, therefore, service is not to be taken as occurring on the posting date but on the date when delivery would have occurred in the ordinary course — which was necessarily later. This meant the claim was not "preferred" within the statutory six-month period.
Rejection of objections to this construction: The Court rejected the submission that applying Section 142 would undermine the definiteness of the six-month period by making it depend on postal transmission times. The Court held that the explicit wording of Section 142 must prevail and that even the rule of liberal construction of Section 78B would not permit circumventing Section 142.
Precedent and consistency: The Court relied on the All-India decision (Secretary of State… v. Imperial Metal Works, AIR 1926 All 214) adopting the same view when an analogous statutory provision was considered. The Court also discussed other decisions (Ram Gopal Marwari and Union of India v. Asharfi Devi) that reached a contrary result but noted that those cases did not consider Section 142's effect.
Meaning of terminology: The respondent's argument that "preferred" (in Section 78B) differs from "served" (in Sections 140–142) was addressed. The Court relied on Section 27 of the General Clauses Act (that terms like "serve" have the same meaning as "give" or "send") and held that there was no meaningful distinction that would exclude Section 142 from applying to claims under Section 78B. Thus forwarding under Section 140(c) falls within the ambit of service by post under Section 142.
Interpretation of "date of the delivery": The Court rejected the respondent's grammatical argument that the six-month period should start from the date when the goods were to be delivered at the destination (Cannanore). The Court read the phrase in its plain grammatical meaning and concluded that the six months runs from the date of delivery for carriage at the station where the goods were delivered for carriage (here, Bilimora — 25 June 1962).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

REVISION ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED

Implications and direct consequences:

The Court held that the respondent's claim was not preferred within the six-month period prescribed by Section 78B because service by post is governed by Section 142 and the claim, though posted on the last day, could not be treated as served within the period under the deeming rule.
The Court further held that the six-month period in Section 78B is to be computed from the date of delivery of the goods for carriage at the station of consignment (here, 25 June 1962 at Bilimora).
The revision petition succeeds on this technical point and the suit for compensation is dismissed. The Court directed the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
This decision resolves the case at hand by applying Sections 140–142 (and relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act) to claims under Section 78B; the opinion does not state that it is laying down a broader new principle beyond this interpretation, and its effect as stated is the direct dismissal of the respondent's suit for being time-barred.

Revision allowed.

Reference: Opinion delivered by Velu Pillai, J., concerning interplay of Section 78B with Sections 140–142 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, and relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act as recited in the provided text.

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Union Of India (Owning The Western Railway, Central Railway And Southern Railway), v. M/S. Lakshmi Textiles, By Managing Partner, M.P Chathu, .

Velu Pillai, J.:— This civil revision petition has been referred to a bench for decision as it raises a question of importance under section 78B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 On the 15th March 1962, the respondent consigned goods for carriage by railway from Cannanore railway station for delivery to self at Bilimora railway station. They were not taken delivery of at the destination, and were, at the request of the respondent, re-booked at Bilimora on the 25th June, 1962, for carriage by railway and delivery at Can-nanore. The consignment never reached Cannanore The respondent preferred a claim under Section 78B by forwarding it by registered post on the 26th December, 1962. The claim not being met, the respondent sued the revision petitioner, the Union of India, represented by the General Managers of the concerned railways, for compensation for non delivery of goods. The petitioner contended, that no claim was preferred within the period prescribed by Section 78B. The Munsiff overruled the contention and gave judgment to the respondent which is now sought to be revised.

2. The only question is whether the claim preferred was in compliance with Section 78B. The relevant part of that Section is as follows.

“A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf—

(a) to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by railway, or

(b) to the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred, within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway:

3. According to the revision petitioner, the claim had not been preferred within six months from the 25th June, 1962, the date on which the goods were delivered at Bilimora railway station for carriage by railway to Cannanore. Applying Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the period of “six months from the date of delivery” has to be reckoned, excluding the 25th June, 1962; so excluding, the period of six months expired on the 25th December 1962 it may be assumed that the 25th December being Christmas day, was a holiday for the post-office and it may further be assumed without deciding, that by virtue of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, the claim may be made on the next day, the 26th. That was the date on which the claim was forwarded by registered post. It is not necessary to pronounce on these points, for even so, we are of the view that the respondent has to fail. To appreciate the contention of the revision petitioner. Section 78B has to be read with Sections 140 and 142 of the Act. Section 141 though not applicable, has a bearing on the discussion. S. 140 provides for three modes of service of a notice or other document required to be served on a railway administration, Section 141 provides for such service on any person by a railway administration and Section 142 raises a presumption as to the point of time when such notice or document shall be deemed to have been served by post. These three Sections may be quoted:—

S. 140. “Any notice or other document required or authorised by this Act to be served on a railway administration may be served, in the case of a railway administered by the Government on the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent, and in the case of a railway administered by a railway company, on the Agent in India of the railway company—

(a) by delivering the notice or other document to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent; or

(b) by leaving it at his office: or

(c) by forwarding it by post in a prepaid letter addressed to the Manager or the Chief Commercial Superintendent or Agent at his office and registered under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898)”

S. 141. “Any notice or other document required or authorised by this Act to be served on any person by a railway administration may be served—

(a) by delivering it to the person, or

(b) by leaving it at the usual or last known place of abode of the person; or

(c) by forwarding it by post in a prepaid letter addressed to the person at his usual or last known place of abode and registered under the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898).”

S. 142. “Where a notice or other document is served by post, it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, and in proving such services it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter containing the notice or other document was properly addressed and registered”

4. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, a claim under Section 78B when forwarded by post, has to be in accordance with clause (c) of Section 140 and when so forwarded, the presumption under Section 142 is attracted. Ostensibly, the claim was forwarded by post by the respondent in compliance with clause (c) of Section 140 This is neither more nor less than service by post within the meaning of Section 142. According to this section, when the claim is served by post, it shall be deemed to have been served at the time when it would be delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course of post in the case of service by post under clause (c) of Section 140, three dates may be considered, (1) the date of posting of the notice or other document, (2) the date of actual delivery of it to the addressee and (3) the date when it would be delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course of post, whether it was actually delivered or not, or if delivered whatever be the date of delivery, the loss of such letter or other document, or incidental delay in the transmission thereof to the addressee, being of no consequence. Section 142 ordains, that the last of such dates shall be taken as the date of service, provided however that the letter containing the notice or document was properly addressed or registered. There is no dispute here that the letter containing the claim was properly addressed and registered. The claim having been posted on the last day of the period of six months, could not have reached the addressee in the ordinary course of post on the same day. According to Section 142, it could be deemed to have been served only after an interval. This is sufficient for holding that the claim was not preferred or served within the prescribed period. The argument that the above construction would virtually reduce the period of six months prescribed by the Section, or would destroy the definiteness of the period by making it dependent upon the ordinary course of post which may vary between different places, cannot prevail over the express provision in Section 142. Even the rule of liberal construction of Section 78B would not permit of Section 142 being overlooked or by-passed.

5. In Secretary Of State…Applicant; v. Firm Imperial Metal Works…Opposite Party., AIR 1926 All 214, a similar view was taken of Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act before amendment which corresponded to Section 78B. read with Section 142. It was observed:

“The law requires that the notice should not merely be preferred, but preferred to the railway administration within six months. What this means in the case of a notice sent by post is made clear by Sections 141 and 142 of the Indian Railways Act. If the notice was so posted that in the ordinary course of post it should have been delivered to the Railway Company within six months, this would have been a sufficient compliance with the law”

6. This decision was not followed in two cases. Ram Gopal Marwari v. Bengal and North-Western Railway Co., AIR 1927 Pat 241 and Union of India v. Asharfi Devi, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 114. In the former it was held to be sufficient, if the claim was preferred in accordance with Section 140 clause (c) by posting it within the prescribed period. This decision was followed in the latter. Though in both of them it was noted, that the claim was preferred according to Section 140(c), the effect of Section 142 was not considered. In the former that Section was not adverted to and in the latter it was not applied

7. but learned counsel for the respondent argued, that whereas Section 78B uses the term “preferred”. Sections 140 to 142 use the term “served” Such a distinction was not maintained in any of the cases relied on by him, not even in the two cases just cited even the term “served” according to clause (c) of Section 140 and S. 141, contemplates no more than forwarding by post and not actual or constructive delivery by post. According to the dictionary too, the distinction does not seem tenable. It is useful to note, that there is no provision in the Act which expressly and in terms uses the term “serve” or “service by post” on or by the railway admlnis-i tration except Sections 140 to 142. Section 69(2) speaks of “giving” notice to a railway servant, and Section 78B appears to be the only provision in the Act for a notice of claim being given to the railway administration. Similarly Section 56(1) appears to be the only provision in the Act for a notice being served by the railway administration upon any person. It seems to follow, that Sections 140 and 141 were intended to govern the manner of service of claims or notices under Section 78B and Section 56(1) respectively; to hold otherwise would be to render both Sections 140 and 141 otiose. According to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, the term ‘serve’ has the same meaning as the terms “give”, “send” etc. If so, the term prefer” cannot mean anything different. Apparently, the respondent himself adopted the mode prescribed by Section 140(c) for preferring the claim under Section 78 B. On these considerations, it is not possible to hold that Section 142 has no application to a claim under Section 78B.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent advanced a third argument, based on the interpretation of the words “the date of the delivery”, occurring in the clause “within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway” in Section 78B According to him, the words “for carriage by railway” qualify the word “goods” and not the date of delivery of the goods,” and therefore the period of six months should be counted from the date the goods were to be delivered at Cannanore and not from the date on which the goods were consigned at Bilimora. The interpretation is opposed to the plain grammatical meaning of the clause. Section 78B uses the words “delivery for carriage” in more than one place and have to be read and understood consistently and not differently if so, the interpretation of the clause suggested is impossible or far-fetched. The decision of the Assam High Court in Amarchand Pannalal v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Assam 221, does support the respondent. It was dissented from in AIR 1957 Madh. Pra 114 by a Division Bench and later in Union of India, New Delhi v. Haji Jiwakhan, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 374 by a single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. There are decided cases of other High Courts also, taking a similar view as the Madhya Pradesh High Court. We are accordingly of the opinion that the period of six months under Section 78B has to be computed in the present case from the date of delivery of the goods at Bilimora for carriage to Cannanore that is from the 25th June 1962. It follows, that the claim preferred was out of time and was not valid. The Revision Petition has to be allowed and the suit has to be dismissed, we do so but as the revision petitioner succeeds on a technical point, we direct the parties to bear their costs throughout.

FK/JHS/D.V.C

9. Revision allowed.

Union Of India (Owni... v. M/S. Lakshmi Textile...